Archive for July, 2008

Pakistan’s Political Crisis & State of Emergency

Overview

 

On November 3, 2007, Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf issued a Proclamation of Emergency suspending the country’s Constitution.[1] The proclamation justified the suspension as necessary due to the country’s rapidly deteriorating security circumstances (“an unprecedented level of violent intensity posing a grave threat to the life and property of the citizens of Pakistan”) and to the allegedly negative role being played by the country’s judiciary, which was claimed to be “working at cross purposes with the executive and legislature in the fight against terrorism and extremism thereby weakening the Government and the nation’s resolve and diluting the efficacy of its actions to control this menace.” According to the proclamation, the situation required “emergent and extraordinary measures.” 

A Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) was issued by Musharraf (in his role as army chief) on the same day pursuant to the emergency proclamation. The PCO requires, inter alia, that the country’s judiciary take a new oath of office, and it bars the judiciary from making any orders against the PCO or from taking any action against the President, the Prime Minister, or anyone acting under their authority. It also suspends a number of “Fundamental Rights” listed in Chapter One of the Pakistani Constitution. These include freedom from unlawful arrest and detention, and freedoms of movement, assembly, association, and speech.[2] Seven Supreme Court justices, including the Chief Justice, and scores of High Court judges refused to take a new oath of office under the PCO and were summarily dismissed.

The imposition of an emergency comes after months of political instability and worsening Islamist-related violence in Pakistan in 2007. Top U.S. officials repeatedly have urged President Musharraf to make more energetic efforts to restore civilian government and rule of law in Islamabad by respecting the independence of the country’s judiciary, resigning his position as army chief, and holding free and fair parliamentary elections as scheduled in January 2008. Despite seemingly undemocratic developments in Islamabad, the United States has since 2001 provided billions of dollars in foreign assistance to Pakistan. Musharraf’s most recent measures elicited immediate criticism from Washington: the State Department expressed being “deeply disturbed” by Musharraf s extra-constitutional action, calling it a “sharp setback for Pakistani democracy.” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called the move a “highly regrettable” step backward and said she had “communicated very clearly to the Pakistanis that the holding of free and fair elections is an absolute necessity.” She later said U.S. aid to Pakistan would come under review. The Pentagon subsequently announced a postponement of upcoming high-level bilateral defense consultations. In his first public comments on the issue, President George W. Bush on November 5 said the United States expects elections in Pakistan as soon as possible and that Musharraf should resign his military post.[3]

Musharraf s “second coup” appears to many observers to be a desperate power grab by a badly discredited military ruler. A former Bush Administration envoy to Pakistan said, “Musharraf has committed the political equivalent of a suicide bombing. He blasted his political credibility and legacy and in the process killed the transition to civilian democracy. It is a tragedy.”[4] There arc fears that the move could further destabilize Pakistan and embolden Islamist militants, while further alienating Pakistani civil society. It may also bring a surge in unwanted attention to the Pakistani military’s failure to defeat the country’s militant extremist elements, as well as to its major and hugely profitable role in the country’s economy. Moreover, Pakistan’s Western allies find themselves in the awkward position of supporting an increasingly unpopular Musharraf who has now twice used force to obtain or maintain power.[5] One senior Washington-based Pakistan watcher called Musharraf’s move a more or less direct result of three key developments: a “catastrophic course” taken by the Bush Administration when it began pressuring him to hold free and fair elections; Supreme Court challenges to the military’s preeminence; and a dramatic increase in militant attacks against the army itself. This analyst sees the best-case scenario – “carefully controlled elections” followed by a successful Musharraf­Bhutto accommodation – as coming under specific threat from both the forceful resistance of militants and the political resistance of Musharraf’s civilian allies in the ruling Pakistan Muslim League faction (PML-Q). There is also the risk that Pakistan’s multi-ethnic army could lose its coherence and/or the country itself could fracture along ethnic lines.[6]

Political Crisis in 2007

Pakistan suffers from considerable political uncertainty as the tenuous governance structure put in place by President Musharraf has come under strain. Moreover, among ordinary Pakistanis, criticism of the army – typically among the most respected institutions in the country – and its role in governance has become much more common.

Judicial Crisis

A judicial crisis began with President Musharraf’s summary March 2007 dismissal of the country’s Chief Justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry, on charges of nepotism and misconduct. Analysts widely believe the action was an attempt by Musharraf to remove a potential impediment to his continued roles as president and army chief, given Chaudhry’s rulings that exhibited independence and went contrary to government expectations. The move triggered immediate outrage among Pakistani lawyers; ensuing street protests by opposition activists grew in scale. In July, in what was widely seen as a major political defeat for Musharraf, the Supreme Court unanimously cleared Chaudhry of any wrongdoing and reinstated him to office. By providing a platform upon which anti-Musharraf sentiments could coalesce, the imbroglio morphed into a full-fledged political crisis. In August, President Musharraf reportedly came close to declaring a state of emergency. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice telephoned Musharraf, by some accounts in a successful effort to dissuade him.

August brought further indications that the Supreme Court would not be subservient to military rule and could derail President Musharraf’s political plans. Most significantly, the court ruled that former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif could return to Pakistan after seven years in exile. When Sharif attempted to return on September 10, the government immediately arrested him on corruption charges and deported him. On October 24, Pakistan’s Chief Justice stated that Sharif still has an “inalienable right” to return to Pakistan, and he accused current Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz of violating a Supreme Court order by arranging for Sharif’s most recent deportation. In September, the Islamabad government arrested hundreds of opposition political leaders and activists, many of them deputies of Nawaz Sharif, including some sitting members of Parliament. A statement from the U.S. Embassy called the development “extremely disturbing and confusing,” and Secretary Rice called the arrests “troubling.”[7]

President Musharraf’s Reelection

Musharraf won provisional reelection on October 6, 2007, capturing 98% of the votes cast by Pakistan’s 1,170-member Electoral College. About 57% of the total possible vote from the membership of all national and provincial legislatures went to Musharraf; two-fifths of the body had either resigned in protest (mostly members of the Islamist party coalition) or abstained (members of the Bhutto-led Pakistan People’s Party). Musharraf vowed to resign his military commission following reelection, but he would become even more politically vulnerable as a civilian president. Controversy had arisen over Musharraf s intention to seek reelection by the current assemblies, as well as his candidacy while still serving as army chief (2002 and 2005 Supreme Court rulings allowed for his dual-role until November 15). Opposition parties called such moves unconstitutional and petitioned the Supreme Court to block this course. On October 5, the court ruled the election could take place as scheduled but that official results would be withheld until after the court rules on such legal challenges. While few observers predicted the court would void the result, Musharraf was to some degree left in political limbo – he is not expected to doff his army uniform until his reelection is confirmed. Some analysts feared that a state of emergency would be declared were the court to rule against Musharraf. U.S. and other Western officials, including Secretary Rice, urged Musharraf to refrain from any such move.

 Musharraf-Bhutto Engagement

President Musharraf and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto have in 2007 been negotiating a power-sharing arrangement that could facilitate Musharrafs continued national political role while also allowing Bhutto to return to Pakistan from self-imposed exile, potentially to serve as prime minister for a third time. The Bush Administration reportedly has encouraged such an arrangement as the best means of both sustaining Musharrafs role and of strengthening moderate political forces in Islamabad. Pakistan’s deputy information minister recently claimed that the United States essentially forced a reluctant Islamabad to allow Bhutto’s return from exile.[8] Some analysts take a cynical view of Bhutto’s motives in the negotiations, believing her central goal is removal of standing corruption cases against her. Bhutto insists that she has engaged Musharraf so as to facilitate “an effective and peaceful transition to democracy.”

On October 4, President Musharraf and Bhutto agreed to an accord that could pave the way for a power-sharing deal. The National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) provides amnesty for all politicians who served in Pakistan between 1988 and 1999, thus essentially clearing Bhutto of pending and potential corruption charges. Officials said the amnesty would not apply to former Prime Minister Sharif. In return, Bhutto reportedly agreed (tacitly) to accept Musharraf s reelection plans. The Supreme Court subsequently put a spanner in Bhutto’s plans by ruling on October 12 that it would hear challenges to the NRO, thus threatening a Musharraf-Bhutto deal by potentially reinstating corruption charges against the former prime minister. Following the imposition of emergency, Bhutto stated that she will not meet or negotiate with Musharraf, further diminishing prospects for a deal.

 

Many Pakistanis were unhappy with news of the potential deal, viewing it as a politically unprincipled arrangement between two opportunistic figures. The public also appears increasingly put off by a seemingly arbitrary electoral process that preserves the power of a corrupt elite perceived as being unconcerned with the problems of ordinary citizens. Moreover, there has been considerable dismay among Pakistanis at the appearance of unabashed U.S. interference in their political system.

Benazir Bhutto’s Return

 

On October 18, Benazir Bhutto made good on her promise to return to Pakistan after more than eight years of self-imposed exile and was welcomed in Karachi by hundreds of thousands of supporters. She has since vigorously re-entered Pakistan’s political stage with a major and polarizing effect; even segments of her own powerful Sindh-based clan are bitterly opposed to her reentry. While Bhutto continues to enjoy significant public support in the country, especially in rural Sindh, there are signs that many PPP members are ambivalent about her return and worry that her credibility as an opponent of military rule has been damaged through deal-making with Musharraf. Pakistani government officials have warned that Bhutto could be subject to arrest if the Supreme Court upholds legal challenges to the NRO. Only hours after Bhutto’s arrival in Karachi, two blasts near her motorcade – likely perpetrated by at least one suicide attacker – left some 140 people dead, but Bhutto was unharmed. To date, police have made no breakthroughs in the case, but there are signs (along with widely-held suspicions) that the perpetrators are linked to Al Qaeda and other Islamist extremists in Pakistan. 

National Election Schedule and Credibility Concerns 

Pakistan’s next parliamentary and provincial elections must take place by January 15, 2008, or within 60 days of the November 15, 2007, end of the current bodies’ terms. Even before the emergency proclamation, some observers saw signs that the government did not intend to conduct credible elections; most prominently controversy surrounding the possible disenfranchisement of scores of millions of Pakistanis from voter rolls. The U.S. government has provided millions of dollars in democracy-related aid funds to Pakistan, much of these going toward an effort to computerize the country’s voter rolls. Washington also plans to sponsor election observation programs in support of the parliamentary elections. U.S. officials have repeatedly emphasized that the United States is neutral with regard to the outcome of Pakistan’s national elections.

State of Emergency Imposed 

As Islamist-related militancy surged and political uncertainty continued unabated in Pakistan in October 2007, observers grew increasingly concerned that President Musharraf would impose martial law through an emergency proclamation. When asked about the possibility on November 1, Secretary Rice said it was “quite obvious that the United States would not be supportive of extra-constitutional means,” and she reiterated Washington’s view that Pakistan “needs to prepare for and hold free and fair elections” as planned.[9]

President Musharraf announced his decision to declare a state of emergency in a late-night televised address to the Pakistani people on November 3. In that speech, Musharraf argued that the country was under existential threat from terrorism and extremism, and that his government and its law enforcement agencies were stricken by paralysis due especially to Supreme Court interference. He also held certain elements in the Pakistani media responsible for deteriorating conditions. Calling his emergency proclamation necessary in the interests of the state, he compared his actions to those of Abraham Lincoln’s “sweeping violations of constitutional limits” as an effort to preserve the union, and he pleaded with Pakistan’s “friends in the United States” to give the country more time to establish democratic rule.[10]

The emergency declaration led to an immediate and harsh crackdown on Pakistan’s independent media outlets. Numerous private television and radio stations were blacked out in the wake of Musharraf s announcement and a new government order banned any media reports that “defame or bring ridicule” to the government or military. Violations of the order can bring a one-year prison sentence or a five million rupee ($82,000) fine. As of November 6, independent domestic news stations, as well as international outlets such as the BBC and CNN, remained off the air in Pakistan. Moreover, about 2,000 opposition figures, human rights activists, and lawyers were rounded up and detained in the two days following the emergency proclamation. On the Monday following Musharrafs weekend move, thousands of lawyers protested in several Pakistani cities and were met with police beatings and mass arrests. Chief Justice Chaudhry, who was among seven Supreme Court judges dismissed by the Musharraf government, publicly urged the country’s lawyers to continue their protests. The U.S. government has expressed “grave concern” about the crackdown, calling such “extreme and unreasonable measures” contradictory to the goal of a fully democratic Pakistan.[11]

As noted above, the United States called the emergency declaration a serious setback to Pakistan’s democratization process. Other world governments, including that of key Pakistani benefactor Britain, echoed U.S. criticisms. Pakistani neighbor and rival India issued a notably restrained expression of “regret” for “the difficult times that Pakistan is passing through.” The Dutch government announced a cutoff of aid to Islamabad and several other countries are reviewing their own assistance programs. Former Prime Minister Bhutto expressed “bitter disappointment” with Musharraf s move and vowed that her party would protest against the “mini-martial law.” The Pakistani public appeared overwhelmingly opposed to Musharraf s move, but street protests have thus far been modest in scale. The Pakistani media were adamant in their criticism of what was widely seen to be a bald-faced attempt by Musharraf to maintain his own power in the face of increasing pressures. [12]

Implications for Pakistani Democratization 

Islamabad has sought to assure foreign governments that the emergency is a temporary measure and will soon be lifted. Prime Minister Aziz at first suggested that national elections could be delayed for up to one year, then later said the polls would be held “according to schedule.” However, many observers predict that elections are likely to be postponed until Musharraf has consolidated his grip on power and sufficiently hamstrung the opposition.[13] Some analysts also expect that Musharraf will now further delay his planned retirement from the army, even if the new Supreme Court validates his October 6 reelection as president. Islamabad may be measuring the Pakistani public’s reaction to the new situation before it announces decisions on this and issues related to the country’s political calendar.[14] 

Former Prime Minister Bhutto’s stance in coming days could have major impact on the course of events: she was the only major opposition figure spared from jail in Musharraf’s crackdown and she could greatly bolster her influence by taking her party faithful to the streets in protest against military rule. She has plans to lead a party rally in Rawalpindi and has threatened to lead a mass protest march to the capital unless Musharraf quits as army chief, holds elections, and restores the constitution. She has given Musharraf until November 9 to comply. Until she issued that threat, she was seen to be hedging her bets by refraining from taking too hard a line against Musharraf’s actions.[15] 

Implications for Pakistani Security and Stability

The imposition of a state of emergency is likely to further inflame anti­Musharraf sentiment among the Pakistani public and aggravate already considerable civil-military tensions. By redirecting resources toward subduing Pakistani civil society, the move could even hinder the military’s ability to combat religious extremists, who many argue are strengthened by authoritarian rule that weakens the country’s moderate political forces.[16] The developments also may harm what has been a generally strong Pakistani economy. Pakistan’s main stock market in Karachi lost nearly 5% of its value when trading reopened on November 5 – the market’s worst-ever one-day loss – and the country’s attractiveness for foreign investors may wane considerably upon further instability. Many Western diplomats, including those from the United States, have reportedly been dismayed by President Musharraf s fixation on the Pakistani judiciary and on his arrest of civil society elements considered unthreatening to state security. Indeed, Musharraf has to many appeared more interested in battling his domestic political adversaries than in taking on the country’s religious militants. When asked about this apparent contradiction, the White House spokeswoman said, “We do not believe that any extra-constitutional means were necessary in order to help prevent terrorism in the region.[17]

In the days after the emergency proclamation, rumors abounded in Pakistan that President Musharraf had himself been placed under house arrest. However, the only figures who could potentially unseat Musharraf – intelligence chiefs and corps commanders – all were handpicked by Musharraf on the assumption that they would remain loyal to him. The probability of Musharraf being removed from office by force is therefore considered to be quite low. Should a major outpouring of public protest occur, however, it is possible that Musharraf s powerful military subordinates could seek his resignation in the national interest.[18]

Implications for Pakistan-U.S. Relations

Policy Discussion

The ability of the United States to effectively exert diplomatic pressure on Pakistan is demonstrably low at present. In reaction to the November 2007 emergency proclamation in Islamabad, Bush Administration officials said they would review relevant U.S. law on aid to Pakistan. However, Pakistan has been under democracy-related U.S. aid sanctions for more than eight years. Musharraf’s extra­constitutional 1999 seizure of power triggered automatic penalties under Section 508 of the annual foreign assistance appropriations act, which bans non-humanitarian U.S. assistance “to any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.” Assistance may be resumed to such government if the President determines and certifies to Congress that subsequent to the termination of assistance a democratically elected government has taken office. Post-September 2001 circumstances saw Congress take action on such restrictions. P.L. 107-57 (October 2001) waived coup-related sanctions on Pakistan through FY2002 and granted presidential authority to waive them through FY2003. Subsequent Congresses provided further annual waiver authority. In issuing the waiver, the President must determine and certify for Congress that it “would facilitate the transition to democratic rule in Pakistan” and “is important to United States efforts to respond to, deter, or prevent acts of international terrorism.” President Bush has exercised this waiver authority five times, most recently in July 2007.[19]

A State Department spokesman said it is important that the emergency decree be rescinded and that constitutional order be restored. Along with an expectation that President Musharraf honor his commitment to resign from the army, the U.S. government wants free, fair, and transparent national elections to be held on schedule. Necessary conditions for this would include “an end to the crackdown on independent media and on the political opposition…..[20] An unnamed senior Bush Administration official explained that, following the emergency proclamation, Islamabad has given mixed signals about future electoral and governance plans. As of November 5, this official was still looking for a “clarification of intentions” from Pakistan, but did note that positive indications on poll dates and restoration of constitutional order were beginning to be seen.[21]

In discussing the potential implications of new developments in Pakistan, Administration officials have emphasized the importance of not allowing Islamabad’s continuing cooperation in anti-terrorism efforts to be undermined. Thus, the Administration likely will continue to see the demands of what it terms the “War on Terror” as trumping concerns about Pakistan’s system of governance, as it has appeared to do since 2001. Many observers viewed President Bush’s response to the emergency proclamation and ensuing crackdown as somewhat subdued. Some see developments in Pakistan and the Administration’s fairly tepid response as evidence that President Bush’s so-called Freedom Agenda is applied selectively and without principle.[22]

While the President has the authority to immediately halt all or some U.S. assistance to Pakistan, there arc no signs that he intends to do so. In “reviewing” U.S. aid programs, Administration officials could place holds on certain items, such as F-16 combat aircraft being purchased by Pakistan as a Foreign Military Sale. Acute and historic Pakistani sensitivities to such U.S. policy choices – combined with repeatedly voiced concerns that Pakistan’s full cooperation in counterterrorism efforts continue – have most analysts doubting that the United States would halt delivery of defense supplies to Pakistan. Congress already has legislated conditions on U.S. aid to Pakistan and pending legislation would provide for further conditionality.[23] However, many analysts, including those making policy for the Bush Administration, assert that conditioning U.S. aid to Pakistan has a past record of failure and likely would be counterproductive by reinforcing Pakistani perceptions of the United States as a fickle and unreliable partner.

Numerous commentators on U.S. assistance programs for Pakistan have recommended making adjustments to the proportion of funds devoted to military versus economic aid and/or to the objectives of such programs. For most of the post­2001 period, funds have been split roughly evenly between economic and security­ related aid programs, with the great bulk of the former going to a general economic (budget) support fund and most of the latter financing “big ticket” defense articles such as airborne early warning aircraft, and anti-ship and anti-armor missiles. Only about 10% of the more than $10 billion provided to Pakistan since 2001 (including coalition support) has been specifically devoted to development and humanitarian programs. The Bush Administration and/or Congress may find it useful to better target U.S. assistance programs in such a way that they more effectively benefit the country’s citizens. Some analysts call for improving America’s image in Pakistan by making U.S. aid more visible to ordinary Pakistanis.



[1] Sources for this document beyond those cited include U.S. and Pakistani government agencies, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, U.S. and regional press reports, and major wire services. See also CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-US. Relations.

[2] Proclamation text at [http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press Releases/2007/Nov/emergency.htm]; PCO text at [http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press Releases/2007/Nov/order.htm]; Pakistani Constitution at [http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/].

[4] Wendy Chamberlain, “Pakistan’s Crisis: US Reaction?” (speech transcript), November 6, 2007.

[5] “‘A Desperate Power Grab in Pakistan” (editorial), Financial Times (London), November 4,2007; “Emergency Could Backfire on Musharraf,” Associated Press, November 4,2007; Peter Wonacott, “Emergency Rule in Pakistan Puts Military Under the Gun,” Wall Street Journal, November 5, 2007; Shahan Mufti and Mark Sappenfield, “Emergency Rule in Pakistan: Musharraf’s Last Grab for Power?,” Christian Science Monitor, November 5, 2007.

[6] Stephen Cohen, “Catastrophe or a Last Chance in Pakistan?,” November 5, 2007, at [http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/1105 Pakistan cohen.aspx].

[7] ‘See [http:/iusembassy.state. gov/pakistan/h07092402.html]; “Rice Says Arrests of Pakistani Opposition Troubling,” Reuters, September 24, 2007.

[8] Paul Wiseman, “Official: U.S. Forced Pakistan to Allow Bhutto Back,” USA Today, October 29, 2007.

[9] Griff Witte and Imtiaz Ali, “U.S. Warns Musharraf Not to Use Martial Law,” Washington Post, November 2, 2007.

[10] Unofficial speech transcript at [http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2007/11/05 18458318.php].

[11] Gretchen Peters, “Pakistan Stifles Media, Cuts Phone Lines,” ABC News (online), November 4, 2007; Jane Perlez and David Rohde, “Pakistan Attempts to Crush Protests by Lawyers,” New York Times, November 6, 2007; U.S. Embassy statement at [http://usembassy.state.gov/pakistan/h07110401.html].

[12] Sam Dolnick, “World Leaders Condemn State of Emergency in Pakistan,” Associated Press, November 3, 2007; Indian External Affairs Ministry Press Release, November 3, 2007; “World Reconsiders Pakistan Aid,” CNN.com, November 5, 2007; Zarar Khan, “Public Angry as Pakistani Leader Declares State of Emergency,” Associated Press, November 3, 2007; “Simon Gardner, “Pakistan’s Media Slams Musharraf’s `Second Coup,”‘ Reuters, November 4, 2007.

[13] Emergency Short-Term, Envoys Told,” Daih’ Times (Lahore), November 5, 2007; “Pakistan PM Says Election Will Be Held on Schedule,” Reuters, November 5, 2007; “Elections Appear Far Off in Pakistan: Analysts,” Agence France Presse, November 5, 2007.

[14] President’s Game Plan Will Change Drastically,” News (Karachi), November 5, 2007.

[15] Zeeshan haider, “Bhutto Threatens Musharraf With “Long March,”‘ Reuters, November 7, 2007; Shahan Mufti and Mark Sappenfield, “Key Leaders Stay Silent in Pakistan,” Christian Science Monitor, November 6, 2007.

[16] Lisa Curtis, “Musharrafs Emergency Rule Will Only Fuel Pakistan Crisis,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 1691, November 5, 2007. See also Ahmed Rashid, “A Second Coup in Pakistan,” Washington Post, November 5, 2007; “The Pakistan Mess” (editorial), New York Times, November 6, 2007.

[17] David Rohde, “A Detour From a Battle Against Terror,” Washington Post, November 6, 2007; White House statement at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/11/ 20071105-2.html].

[18] M. Ilyas Khan, “Does Musharraf Face Risk of a Coup’?,” BBC Nevi-s, November 5, 2007.

[22] Howard LaFranchi, “Why U.S. Sticks By Musharraf,” Christian Science Monitor, November 6, 2007; Mark Mazzetti, “Bush Urges Musharraf to Reverse Course But Signals No Penalty If He Doesn’t,” New York Times, November 6,2007; “Working With a Dictator” (editorial), Washington Post, November 6, 2007; Brian Bennett, “Can the US Pressure Musharraf?,” Time (online), November 5, 2007; Dana Milbank, “Hitting the Mute Button on the Freedom Agenda,” Washington Post, November 6, 2007.

The Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53) would end U.S. military assistance and arms sales licensing to Pakistan in FY2008 unless the President reports to Congress a determination that Islamabad is undertaking a comprehensive campaign to “eliminate from Pakistani territory any organization such as the Taliban, al Qaeda, or any successor, engaged in military, insurgent, or terrorist activities in Afghanistan,” and “is currently making demonstrated, significant, and sustained progress toward eliminating support or safe haven for terrorists.” The Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008 (H.R. 1585) would withhold FY2008 and FY2009 coalition support reimbursements to Pakistan unless the President certifies to Congress that Pakistan is “making substantial and sustained efforts to eliminate safe havens for the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other violent extremists in areas under its sovereign control ….”

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Pak Law Minister Flip Flops Again

Government is demanding the loyalty of deposed judges prior to reinstating them

The Federal Law minister, Farooq H. Naek, while talking to the media said that, “The previously dismissed judges were welcome to resume their responsibilities. They only had to take a fresh oath under the Third Schedule of the Constitution to resume their responsibilities.”  He added that the seniority of such judges would not be affected.

The government has taken this new approach after it failed to quiet the lawyer’s movement advocating the restoration of the sacked judges. In its strategy, The government also failed to get approval for their proposed ‘constitutional package’ from different political parties, including its own coalition partners, for the reinstatement of deposed judiciary who were removed from their positions after the imposition of the state of emergency on November 3, 2007.

On the issue of restoration of sacked judiciary, the government of PM Gillani, previously emphasized that judges could only be restored through a constitutional package and that it is not possible to restore them through a resolution in the national assembly as this would be unconstitutional. The law minister himself stated that to do away with an unconstitutional action by unconstitutional methods could not be done.

However, in the latest development, the law minister has stated he is ready to reinstate any deposed judge (without any constitutional amendment) provided that judges take a fresh oath. He also offered a further incentive to deposed judges that if they take fresh oaths their seniority would be restored. The question of constitutionality appears to no longer be a question before the government in order to restore the deposed judiciary. This would appear to indicate that the government wants the loyalty of the judges so that the judiciary does not overplay its constitutional responsibilities.

This government’s flip-flopping on the issue of restitution of judiciary is even worse than that of the previous government of President Musharraf at the very least made it clear that he would never tolerate an independent judiciary under the leadership of (deposed) CJ  Iftekhar Choudhry. It was however a major campaign promise of the newly elected coalition government to restore the judiciary within 30 days of its formation through a resolution in the national assembly. They then stated that the deposed judiciary would be restored through a constitutional package. Now, the government has come out with a back door approach, promising that everything will return to normality, but only if and when the deposed judges demonstrate their loyalty.
 
The government’s new policy for the restoration of deposed judiciary is nothing less than that of the colonial rulers and dictatorships before them, where loyalty was the prime concern, not a constitutional basis to the rule of law. The government has been working since its first day on the ‘minus one’ formulation, that is to have deposed judiciary returned without CJ Iftekhar Choudhry and anyone else who might want an independent judiciary. A way of divide and rule is being applied by the government, which was elected by masses on its promise to restore the deposed judges and do away all the amendments made to the constitution during the state of emergency imposed by the chief of army staff on November 2007.

The government should know that this policy can not solve the constitutional, legal and judicial issues at stake. A great understanding of the rule of law, independent judiciary and governance through constitutionalism is required by the newly elected members other wise it would be difficult for the government to run the day to day issues of the country with credibility. There is also a need to understand the strength and viability of the lawyer’s movement, which highlights the strong desire for democracy and rule of law in the country. If the government tries to thwart the struggle the lawyer’s movement by forcing its prejudices then it will find it difficult to survive against the powerful establishment of Pakistan, which always prefers the rule of an autocratic government.  


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BJP Led by Advani Launches Movement Against Congress – SP Corruption

By L.K. ADVANI
BJP and Opposition Leader, Lok Sabha, India.

July 23, 2008  – Slightly over two decades ago, a stinking corruption scandal at the highest level of the Government, first unearthed by the foreign media and subsequently investigated by several courageous journalists in the Indian media, changed the political landscape in the country. Such was the public outrage created by the revelations of huge kickbacks in the purchase of Bofors guns from Sweden that the late Rajiv Gandhi, who had won a four-fifth majority for the Congress party in the Lok Sabha in 1984, was swept out of power in the parliamentary elections in 1989.

The country witnessed an even more shocking bribery scandal on July 22,  2008 when the Congress-led UPA Government secured a completely illegitimate victory in the trust vote by manufacturing a slender majority in the House. Votes: 275-256 (10 abstentions) out of total 543 current members of the Lok Sabha.
Three BJP MPs – Ashok Argal and Faggan Singh Kulaste from Madhya
Pradesh and Mahavir Baghora from Rajasthan – exposed, with tell-tale
evidence, of how top leaders of the Congress and Samajwadi Party conspired together to secure cross-voting and abstention of non-UPA MPs by paying them crores of rupees.

A close look at the final tally in the House shows that the Manmohan
Government would have certainly lost the confidence motion in
the absence of cross-voting and abstentions by MPs belonging to
several non-UPA parties.

So shameless were activities and public pronouncements of the top
functionaries of the two parties in the run-up to the trust vote that the entire country started suspecting that the Singh Government was up to some mischief. Indeed, in my speech in Parliament on July 21, I had specifically referred to the corrupt means being employed by a Singh Government which, in the name of promising nuclear power, was resorting to “horse power” to save itself.

Honourable Members from several other opposition parties also accused
the Government of indulging in the worst kind of horse-trading to convert its minority into majority.

The Prime Minister had asked in a tone of injured innocence: “Where is the proof?” After the incontrovertible proof that our three BJP MPs produced in front of the Speaker Somnath Chatterjee, the Prime Minister has no moral right to continue in office. His is a tainted victory. After having devalued
the office of the Prime Minister by allowing the misuse of several democratic institutions for highly questionable ends – which includes
misuse of the CBI and the Law Ministry in the Bofors case – Dr Manmohan Singh now stands exposed as one who blessed the desecration of the Temple of Democracy.

I am deeply saddened by the fact that several [eight] of our own [BJP]
MPs became a party to the murder of democracy. The BJP has decided to
expel them with immediate effect.

The BJP profusely congratulates our brave three MPs who not only
resisted the temptation of crores of rupees offered by the Congress-SP
combine to abstain from the vote, but chose to expose this scandal in
an effective manner.

I would also like to congratulate several other MPs, belonging to both
the BJP and other political parties, for defying the threats,
blackmailing tactics and allurements coming from persons in very high
quarters in the [Singh] Government and the Congress-SP combine. They
have stood by the high standards of parliamentary behavior expected
from every political party.

The cash-for-votes scandal has raised serious questions about the
journalistic ethic followed by the TV news channel which recorded it. The right thing for the channel to have done is to show it and let the people draw their own conclusion. Indeed, at the meeting party leaders at the Speaker’s Chamber yesterday, several opposition leaders, including Vijay Kumar Malhotra of the BJP, had demanded that the video tape be shown to all MPs before the trust vote was taken.

After listening to the account given by our three MPs, the BJP is left with no doubt that, had the channel broadcast the tape, the Government would have been in the dock before the trust vote was taken.

Soon after our three [BJP] MPs exposed the scandal inside the House, the TV channel had announced, at around 4:30 p.m. yesterday, that it had handed over the [video] tape to the Speaker. We have now come to know that the tape had not been delivered to the Speaker’s office till 1pm today. This raises great apprehensions in everyone’s mind about the possibility of doctoring of the tape.

The BJP demands that the Speaker immediately convene a meeting of the
leaders of all parties, show the tape to them, and institute a time-
bound inquiry. The outcome of this inquiry must be made known before
Parliament convenes for the Monsoon Session in August 2008.

The BJP has decided to launch a nationwide campaign to make the people
aware of the illegitimacy of the UPA Government and its unsuitability
to continue in office after exposure of the cash-for-votes scandal.
The campaign, which will begin from July 27, will also highlight the UPA Government’s saga of failures and betrayals – above all, its failure to control skyrocketing prices of essential commodities, to ameliorate the plight of farmers, and to effectively fight the menace of terrorism.

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Indian Communists Flex Their Muscle

The Manmohan Singh Government has won the vote of confidence in the
Lok Sabha but the entire country has witnessed how parliamentary
democracy has been subverted. [Votes: 275-256 (10 abstentions) out of
total 543 current members of the Indian Parliament's House of the
People]. Reports of bribery, intimidation and horse-trading have been
proved true by the cross-voting and abstentions engineered by the
Congress and the Samajwadi Party. It is by such means that they got a majority. In this connection, the video tape submitted by a television channel about a bribery for-vote or money-for-abstention] episode [3 BJP MPs reportedly bribed by the INC and the SP officials] should be made public.

The Congress leadership is mistaken if it considers this vote as one
that has provided legitimacy to the [Singh] Government. The moral
authority of the government has been compromised. The debate in the
Lok Sabha has shown up the sharp division on the nuclear deal. This is no mandate for going ahead with the deal.

The Left parties will continue the struggle against the Indo-US nuclear deal. They will step up their opposition to the anti-people policies of the Congress-led Government and strive to build the widest movement against the failure of the government to tackle price rise, the problems of the farmers and the rural poor due to the agrarian crisis. The Left parties will join hands with other like-minded parties to take up these issues.

The Left parties decided to extend their full support to the call of the central trade unions for a general strike on August 20, 2008. They appealed to all sections of the working people to participate and join the strike.

Signed,

Prakash Karat
General Secretary, CPI(M)
http://www.cpim.org

A.B. Bardhan
General Secretary, CPI
http://www.cpindia.org

Debabrata Biswas
General Secretary, AIFB
http://www.forwardbloc.org

T.J. Chandrachoodan
General Secretary, RSP
http://rsp.org.in
Traitor Chatterjee Kicked Out of the CPIM
The Polit Bureau of the Communist Party of India (CPI-Marxist) has unanimously decided to expel Somnath Chatterjee, CPIM Speaker of Indian Parliament’s House of the People from Bolpur, West Bengal from the membership of the Party with immediate effect. This action has been taken under Article XIX, Clause 13 of the Party Constitution for seriously compromising the position of the Party.
Advani Demands Probe into Alleged Bribery to BJP MPs

July 22/ 2008 (PTI) – Senior BJP leader L.K. Advani today demanded a detailed investigation by the Lok Sabha Speaker into allegations that three of his MPs were offered Rs. nine crore by Samajwadi Party for abstaining during the trust vote. “On the basis of whatever happened (on the floor of the House), we can demand from the Speaker, that as the issue is so serious, that a detailed investigation should be done,” Advani told reporters here.

Advani’s demand came shortly after unprecedented scenes were witnessed
in the Lok Sabha when a BJP MP waved in the well of the House wads of
currency notes offered as a bribe.

He claimed that the three BJP MPs – Ashok Argal, Faggan Singh Kulaste
and Mahavir Bagora – were offered Rs. three crore each and were handed
over Rs. one crore each in advance. Terming the incident as a breach
of privilege, the Leader of Opposition said the MPs were given the
money for abstaining from the voting during the trust vote.

“In my own whole life I have not come across such a sad event. We had
received information yesterday and today. This is shameful,” he said.

Advani noted that he had hinted about horse-trading in his speech
yesterday while some Left members openely spoke about such things in
the House.

He said three BJP MPs came to him yesterday saying that they were
offered Rs. three crore each for “only abstaining” during the voting.
“Rs. one crore was given in advance and the rest was to be given
later,” he claimed.

“They asked me whether they can produce the money in House. I said it
is normally not allowed. But the kind of scandal it is I thought the
House will at least be adjourned,” he said.
How the Money Changed Hands!
July 22, 2008  – The three BJP MPs who suprised everybody by tabling Rs. one crore in the Lok Sabha today named SP MP Reoti Raman Singh and SP General Secretary Amar Singh for striking a deal with them and giving them the cash.

“We were contacted on Monday and told the deal would be struck in Le
Meridian hotel here but that could not take place. Later, SP MP Reoti
Raman Singh came to meet us at 12:30 a.m. at 4, Ferozshah Road and
said please come with me to Amar Singh’s house where the deal would be
finalised,” Fagan Singh Kulaste told reporters.

Kulaste, along with Mahavir Bhagore and Ashok Argal, emptied a bag
with Rs. one crore in cash in the Lok Sabha today and claimed this
money was given as advance to them to abstain from voting. The house
on Ferozshah Road is occupied by Argal.

“In the morning today, Ahmed Patel (INC) discussed the deal with us.
Thereafter, we went with Reoti Raman Singh to Amar Singh’s house where
he offered us Rs. three crore – Rs. one crore each as advance – there
and then. But, we refused to take the money and said it should be
delivered at 4, Ferozshah Road,” Kulaste said.

“About twenty minutes later a man came to the residence with two bags
full of cash and put it on the table. I asked him to open the bags to
show whether the cash was real or fake. Then he took out Rs. one crore
in cash,” said Mahavir Bhagora, another BJP MP who had displayed the
wads in the House.

“A man telephoned Amar Singh who told me this money is an advance for
the deal,” Argal said.

Eight Traitorous BJP MPs Kicked Out of the BJP
List of BJP members of the Lok Sabha who are being expelled from the Party for violating the Party whip on the trust vote July 22, 2008 held in the House of the People of India’s Parliament:

Members who did cross voting:

1. Brij Bhushan Sharan Singh – Uttar Pradesh
2. Soma Bhai Patel – Gujarat
3. Manjunath Kunnur – Karnataka
4. H.T. Sanglania – Karnataka
5. Manorama Madhavraj – Karnataka
6. Chander Bhan Singh – Madhya Pradesh
7. Haribhai Rathore – Maharashtra
8. Babubhai Katara – Gujarat

Shyam Jaju
[BJP] Headquarter Incharge
New Delhi, India

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Ivy Leagues ve Forgotten That They Exist to Make Minds, Not Careers

The Disadvantages of
an Elite Education

By William Deresiewicz

It didn’t dawn on me that there might be a few holes in my education until I was about 35. I’d just bought a house, the pipes needed fixing, and the plumber was standing in my kitchen. There he was, a short, beefy guy with a goatee and a Red Sox cap and a thick Boston accent, and I suddenly learned that I didn’t have the slightest idea what to say to someone like him. So alien was his experience to me, so unguessable his values, so mysterious his very language, that I couldn’t succeed in engaging him in a few minutes of small talk before he got down to work. Fourteen years of higher education and a handful of Ivy League dees, and there I was, stiff and stupid, struck dumb by my own dumbness. “Ivy retardation,” a friend of mine calls this. I could carry on conversations with people from other countries, in other languages, but I couldn’t talk to the man who was standing in my own house.

It’s not surprising that it took me so long to discover the extent of my miseducation, because the last thing an elite education will teach you is its own inadequacy. As two dozen years at Yale and Columbia have shown me, elite colleges relentlessly encourage their students to flatter themselves for being there, and for what being there can do for them. The advantages of an elite education are indeed undeniable. You learn to think, at least in certain ways, and you make the contacts needed to launch yourself into a life rich in all of society’s most cherished rewards. To consider that while some opportunities are being created, others are being cancelled and that while some abilities are being developed, others are being crippled is, within this context, not only outrageous, but inconceivable.

I’m not talking about curricula or the culture wars, the closing or opening of the American mind, political correctness, canon formation, or what have you. I’m talking about the whole system in which these skirmishes play out. Not just the Ivy League and its peer institutions, but also the mechanisms that get you there in the first place: the private and affluent public “feeder” schools, the ever-growing parastructure of tutors and test-prep courses and enrichment programs, the whole admissions frenzy and everything that leads up to and away from it. The message, as always, is the medium. Before, after, and around the elite college classroom, a constellation of values is ceaselessly inculcated. As globalization sharpens economic insecurity, we are increasingly committing ourselves—as students, as parents, as a society—to a vast apparatus of educational advantage. With so many resources devoted to the business of elite academics and so many people scrambling for the limited space at the top of the ladder, it is worth asking what exactly it is you get in the end—what it is we all get, because the elite students of today, as their institutions never tire of reminding them, are the leaders of tomorrow.

The first disadvantage of an elite education, as I learned in my kitchen that day, is that it makes you incapable of talking to people who aren’t like you. Elite schools pride themselves on their diversity, but that diversity is almost entirely a matter of ethnicity and race. With respect to class, these schools are largely—indeed increasingly—homogeneous. Visit any elite campus in our great nation and you can thrill to the heartwarming spectacle of the children of white businesspeople and professionals studying and playing alongside the children of black, Asian, and Latino businesspeople and professionals. At the same time, because these schools tend to cultivate liberal attitudes, they leave their students in the paradoxical position of wanting to advocate on behalf of the working class while being unable to hold a simple conversation with anyone in it. Witness the last two Democratic presidential nominees, Al Gore and John Kerry: one each from Harvard and Yale, both earnest, decent, intelligent men, both utterly incapable of communicating with the larger electorate.

But it isn’t just a matter of class. My education taught me to believe that people who didn’t go to an Ivy League or equivalent school weren’t worth talking to, regardless of their class. I was given the unmistakable message that such people were beneath me. We were “the best and the brightest,” as these places love to say, and everyone else was, well, something else: less good, less bright. I learned to give that little nod of understanding, that slightly sympathetic “Oh,” when people told me they went to a less prestigious college. (If I’d gone to Harvard, I would have learned to say “in Boston” when I was asked where I went to school—the Cambridge version of noblesse oblige.) I never learned that there are smart people who don’t go to elite colleges, often precisely for reasons of class. I never learned that there are smart people who don’t go to college at all.

I also never learned that there are smart people who aren’t “smart.” The existence of multiple forms of intelligence has become a commonplace, but however much elite universities like to sprinkle their incoming classes with a few actors or violinists, they select for and develop one form of intelligence: the analytic. While this is broadly true of all universities, elite schools, precisely because their students (and faculty, and administrators) possess this one form of intelligence to such a high degree, are more apt to ignore the value of others. One naturally prizes what one most possesses and what most makes for one’s advantages. But social intelligence and emotional intelligence and creative ability, to name just three other forms, are not distributed preferentially among the educational elite. The “best” are the brightest only in one narrow sense. One needs to wander away from the educational elite to begin to discover this.

What about people who aren’t bright in any sense? I have a friend who went to an Ivy League college after graduating from a typically mediocre public high school. One of the values of going to such a school, she once said, is that it teaches you to relate to stupid people. Some people are smart in the elite-college way, some are smart in other ways, and some aren’t smart at all. It should be embarrassing not to know how to talk to any of them, if only because talking to people is the only real way of knowing them. Elite institutions are supposed to provide a humanistic education, but the first principle of humanism is Terence’s: “nothing human is alien to me.” The first disadvantage of an elite education is how very much of the human it alienates you from.

The second disadvantage, implicit in what I’ve been saying, is that an elite education inculcates a false sense of self-worth. Getting to an elite college, being at an elite college, and going on from an elite college—all involve numerical rankings: SAT, GPA, GRE. You learn to think of yourself in terms of those numbers. They come to signify not only your fate, but your identity; not only your identity, but your value. It’s been said that what those tests really measure is your ability to take tests, but even if they measure something real, it is only a small slice of the real. The problem begins when students are encouraged to forget this truth, when academic excellence becomes excellence in some absolute sense, when “better at X” becomes simply “better.”

There is nothing wrong with taking pride in one’s intellect or knowledge. There is something wrong with the smugness and self-congratulation that elite schools connive at from the moment the fat envelopes come in the mail. From orientation to graduation, the message is implicit in every tone of voice and tilt of the head, every old-school tradition, every article in the student paper, every speech from the dean. The message is: You have arrived. Welcome to the club. And the corollary is equally clear: You deserve everything your presence here is going to enable you to get. When people say that students at elite schools have a strong sense of entitlement, they mean that those students think they deserve more than other people because their sat scores are higher.

At Yale, and no doubt at other places, the message is reinforced in embarrassingly literal terms. The physical form of the university—its quads and residential colleges, with their Gothic stone façades and wrought-iron portals—is constituted by the locked gate set into the encircling wall. Everyone carries around an ID card that determines which gates they can enter. The gate, in other words, is a kind of governing metaphor—because the social form of the university, as is true of every elite school, is constituted the same way. Elite colleges are walled domains guarded by locked gates, with admission granted only to the elect. The aptitude with which students absorb this lesson is demonstrated by the avidity with which they erect still more gates within those gates, special realms of ever-greater exclusivity—at Yale, the famous secret societies, or as they should probably be called, the open-secret societies, since true secrecy would defeat their purpose. There’s no point in excluding people unless they know they’ve been excluded.

One of the great errors of an elite education, then, is that it teaches you to think that measures of intelligence and academic achievement are measures of value in some moral or metaphysical sense. But they’re not. Graduates of elite schools are not more valuable than stupid people, or talentless people, or even lazy people. Their pain does not hurt more. Their souls do not weigh more. If I were religious, I would say, God does not love them more. The political implications should be clear. As John Ruskin told an older elite, grabbing what you can get isn’t any less wicked when you grab it with the power of your brains than with the power of your fists. “Work must always be,” Ruskin says, “and captains of work must always be….[But] there is a wide difference between being captains…of work, and taking the profits of it.”

The political implications don’t stop there. An elite education not only ushers you into the upper classes; it trains you for the life you will lead once you get there. I didn’t understand this until I began comparing my experience, and even more, my students’ experience, with the experience of a friend of mine who went to Cleveland State. There are due dates and attendance requirements at places like Yale, but no one takes them very seriously. Extensions are available for the asking; threats to deduct credit for missed classes are rarely, if ever, carried out. In other words, students at places like Yale get an endless string of second chances. Not so at places like Cleveland State. My friend once got a D in a class in which she’d been running an A because she was coming off a waitressing shift and had to hand in her term paper an hour late.

That may be an extreme example, but it is unthinkable at an elite school. Just as unthinkably, she had no one to appeal to. Students at places like Cleveland State, unlike those at places like Yale, don’t have a platoon of advisers and tutors and deans to write out excuses for late work, give them extra help when they need it, pick them up when they fall down. They get their education wholesale, from an indifferent bureaucracy; it’s not handed to them in individually wrapped packages by smiling clerks. There are few, if any, opportunities for the kind of contacts I saw my students get routinely—classes with visiting power brokers, dinners with foreign dignitaries. There are also few, if any, of the kind of special funds that, at places like Yale, are available in profusion: travel stipends, research fellowships, performance grants. Each year, my department at Yale awards dozens of cash prizes for everything from freshman essays to senior projects. This year, those awards came to more than $90,000—in just one department.

Students at places like Cleveland State also don’t get A-’s just for doing the work. There’s been a lot of handwringing lately over grade inflation, and it is a scandal, but the most scandalous thing about it is how uneven it’s been. Forty years ago, the average GPA at both public and private universities was about 2.6, still close to the traditional B-/C+ curve. Since then, it’s gone up everywhere, but not by anything like the same amount. The average gpa at public universities is now about 3.0, a B; at private universities it’s about 3.3, just short of a B+. And at most Ivy League schools, it’s closer to 3.4. But there are always students who don’t do the work, or who are taking a class far outside their field (for fun or to fulfill a requirement), or who aren’t up to standard to begin with (athletes, legacies). At a school like Yale, students who come to class and work hard expect nothing less than an A-. And most of the time, they get it.

In short, the way students are treated in college trains them for the social position they will occupy once they get out. At schools like Cleveland State, they’re being trained for positions somewhere in the middle of the class system, in the depths of one bureaucracy or another. They’re being conditioned for lives with few second chances, no extensions, little support, narrow opportunity—lives of subordination, supervision, and control, lives of deadlines, not guidelines. At places like Yale, of course, it’s the reverse. The elite like to think of themselves as belonging to a meritocracy, but that’s true only up to a point. Getting through the gate is very difficult, but once you’re in, there’s almost nothing you can do to get kicked out. Not the most abject academic failure, not the most heinous act of plagiarism, not even threatening a fellow student with bodily harm—I’ve heard of all three—will get you expelled. The feeling is that, by gosh, it just wouldn’t be fair—in other words, the self-protectiveness of the old-boy network, even if it now includes girls. Elite schools nurture excellence, but they also nurture what a former Yale graduate student I know calls “entitled mediocrity.” A is the mark of excellence; A- is the mark of entitled mediocrity. It’s another one of those metaphors, not so much a grade as a promise. It means, don’t worry, we’ll take care of you. You may not be all that good, but you’re good enough.

Here, too, college reflects the way things work in the adult world (unless it’s the other way around). For the elite, there’s always another extension—a bailout, a pardon, a stint in rehab—always plenty of contacts and special stipends—the country club, the conference, the year-end bonus, the dividend. If Al Gore and John Kerry represent one of the characteristic products of an elite education, George W. Bush represents another. It’s no coincidence that our current president, the apotheosis of entitled mediocrity, went to Yale. Entitled mediocrity is indeed the operating principle of his administration, but as Enron and WorldCom and the other scandals of the dot-com meltdown demonstrated, it’s also the operating principle of corporate America. The fat salaries paid to underperforming CEOs are an adult version of the A-. Anyone who remembers the injured sanctimony with which Kenneth Lay greeted the notion that he should be held accountable for his actions will understand the mentality in question—the belief that once you’re in the club, you’ve got a God-given right to stay in the club. But you don’t need to remember Ken Lay, because the whole dynamic played out again last year in the case of Scooter Libby, another Yale man.

If one of the disadvantages of an elite education is the temptation it offers to mediocrity, another is the temptation it offers to security. When parents explain why they work so hard to give their children the best possible education, they invariably say it is because of the opportunities it opens up. But what of the opportunities it shuts down? An elite education gives you the chance to be rich—which is, after all, what we’re talking about—but it takes away the chance not to be. Yet the opportunity not to be rich is one of the greatest opportunities with which young Americans have been blessed. We live in a society that is itself so wealthy that it can afford to provide a decent living to whole classes of people who in other countries exist (or in earlier times existed) on the brink of poverty or, at least, of indignity. You can live comfortably in the United States as a schoolteacher, or a community organizer, or a civil rights lawyer, or an artist—that is, by any reasonable definition of comfort. You have to live in an ordinary house instead of an apartment in Manhattan or a mansion in L.A.; you have to drive a Honda instead of a BMW or a Hummer; you have to vacation in Florida instead of Barbados or Paris, but what are such losses when set against the opportunity to do work you believe in, work you’re suited for, work you love, every day of your life?

Yet it is precisely that opportunity that an elite education takes away. How can I be a schoolteacher—wouldn’t that be a waste of my expensive education? Wouldn’t I be squandering the opportunities my parents worked so hard to provide? What will my friends think? How will I face my classmates at our 20th reunion, when they’re all rich lawyers or important people in New York? And the question that lies behind all these: Isn’t it beneath me? So a whole universe of possibility closes, and you miss your true calling.

This is not to say that students from elite colleges never pursue a riskier or less lucrative course after graduation, but even when they do, they tend to give up more quickly than others. (Let’s not even talk about the possibility of kids from privileged backgrounds not going to college at all, or delaying matriculation for several years, because however appropriate such choices might sometimes be, our rigid educational mentality places them outside the universe of possibility—the reason so many kids go sleepwalking off to college with no idea what they’re doing there.) This doesn’t seem to make sense, especially since students from elite schools tend to graduate with less debt and are more likely to be able to float by on family money for a while. I wasn’t aware of the phenomenon myself until I heard about it from a couple of graduate students in my department, one from Yale, one from Harvard. They were talking about trying to write poetry, how friends of theirs from college called it quits within a year or two while people they know from less prestigious schools are still at it. Why should this be? Because students from elite schools expect success, and expect it now. They have, by definition, never experienced anything else, and their sense of self has been built around their ability to succeed. The idea of not being successful terrifies them, disorients them, defeats them. They’ve been driven their whole lives by a fear of failure—often, in the first instance, by their parents’ fear of failure. The first time I blew a test, I walked out of the room feeling like I no longer knew who I was. The second time, it was easier; I had started to learn that failure isn’t the end of the world.

But if you’re afraid to fail, you’re afraid to take risks, which begins to explain the final and most damning disadvantage of an elite education: that it is profoundly anti-intellectual. This will seem counterintuitive. Aren’t kids at elite schools the smartest ones around, at least in the narrow academic sense? Don’t they work harder than anyone else—indeed, harder than any previous generation? They are. They do. But being an intellectual is not the same as being smart. Being an intellectual means more than doing your homework.

If so few kids come to college understanding this, it is no wonder. They are products of a system that rarely asked them to think about something bigger than the next assignment. The system forgot to teach them, along the way to the prestige admissions and the lucrative jobs, that the most important achievements can’t be measured by a letter or a number or a name. It forgot that the true purpose of education is to make minds, not careers.

Being an intellectual means, first of all, being passionate about ideas—and not just for the duration of a semester, for the sake of pleasing the teacher, or for getting a good grade. A friend who teaches at the University of Connecticut once complained to me that his students don’t think for themselves. Well, I said, Yale students think for themselves, but only because they know we want them to. I’ve had many wonderful students at Yale and Columbia, bright, thoughtful, creative kids whom it’s been a pleasure to talk with and learn from. But most of them have seemed content to color within the lines that their education had marked out for them. Only a small minority have seen their education as part of a larger intellectual journey, have approached the work of the mind with a pilgrim soul. These few have tended to feel like freaks, not least because they get so little support from the university itself. Places like Yale, as one of them put it to me, are not conducive to searchers.

Places like Yale are simply not set up to help students ask the big questions. I don’t think there ever was a golden age of intellectualism in the American university, but in the 19th century students might at least have had a chance to hear such questions raised in chapel or in the literary societies and debating clubs that flourished on campus. Throughout much of the 20th century, with the growth of the humanistic ideal in American colleges, students might have encountered the big questions in the classrooms of professors possessed of a strong sense of pedagogic mission. Teachers like that still exist in this country, but the increasingly dire exigencies of academic professionalization have made them all but extinct at elite universities. Professors at top research institutions are valued exclusively for the quality of their scholarly work; time spent on teaching is time lost. If students want a conversion experience, they’re better off at a liberal arts college.

When elite universities boast that they teach their students how to think, they mean that they teach them the analytic and rhetorical skills necessary for success in law or medicine or science or business. But a humanistic education is supposed to mean something more than that, as universities still dimly feel. So when students get to college, they hear a couple of speeches telling them to ask the big questions, and when they graduate, they hear a couple more speeches telling them to ask the big questions. And in between, they spend four years taking courses that train them to ask the little questions—specialized courses, taught by specialized professors, aimed at specialized students. Although the notion of breadth is implicit in the very idea of a liberal arts education, the admissions process increasingly selects for kids who have already begun to think of themselves in specialized terms—the junior journalist, the budding astronomer, the language prodigy. We are slouching, even at elite schools, toward a glorified form of vocational training.

Indeed, that seems to be exactly what those schools want. There’s a reason elite schools speak of training leaders, not thinkers—holders of power, not its critics. An independent mind is independent of all allegiances, and elite schools, which get a large percentage of their budget from alumni giving, are strongly invested in fostering institutional loyalty. As another friend, a third-generation Yalie, says, the purpose of Yale College is to manufacture Yale alumni. Of course, for the system to work, those alumni need money. At Yale, the long-term drift of students away from majors in the humanities and basic sciences toward more practical ones like computer science and economics has been abetted by administrative indifference. The college career office has little to say to students not interested in law, medicine, or business, and elite universities are not going to do anything to discourage the large percentage of their graduates who take their degrees to Wall Street. In fact, they’re showing them the way. The liberal arts university is becoming the corporate university, its center of gravity shifting to technical fields where scholarly expertise can be parlayed into lucrative business opportunities.

It’s no wonder that the few students who are passionate about ideas find themselves feeling isolated and confused. I was talking with one of them last year about his interest in the German Romantic idea of bildung, the upbuilding of the soul. But, he said—he was a senior at the time—it’s hard to build your soul when everyone around you is trying to sell theirs.

Yet there is a dimension of the intellectual life that lies above the passion for ideas, though so thoroughly has our culture been sanitized of it that it is hardly surprising if it was beyond the reach of even my most alert students. Since the idea of the intellectual emerged in the 18th century, it has had, at its core, a commitment to social transformation. Being an intellectual means thinking your way toward a vision of the good society and then trying to realize that vision by speaking truth to power. It means going into spiritual exile. It means foreswearing your allegiance, in lonely freedom, to God, to country, and to Yale. It takes more than just intellect; it takes imagination and courage. “I am not afraid to make a mistake,” Stephen Dedalus says, “even a great mistake, a lifelong mistake, and perhaps as long as eternity, too.”

Being an intellectual begins with thinking your way outside of your assumptions and the system that enforces them. But students who get into elite schools are precisely the ones who have best learned to work within the system, so it’s almost impossible for them to see outside it, to see that it’s even there. Long before they got to college, they turned themselves into world-class hoop-jumpers and teacher-pleasers, getting A’s in every class no matter how boring they found the teacher or how pointless the subject, racking up eight or 10 extracurricular activities no matter what else they wanted to do with their time. Paradoxically, the situation may be better at second-tier schools and, in particular, again, at liberal arts colleges than at the most prestigious universities. Some students end up at second-tier schools because they’re exactly like students at Harvard or Yale, only less gifted or driven. But others end up there because they have a more independent spirit. They didn’t get straight A’s because they couldn’t be bothered to give everything in every class. They concentrated on the ones that meant the most to them or on a single strong extracurricular passion or on projects that had nothing to do with school or even with looking good on a college application. Maybe they just sat in their room, reading a lot and writing in their journal. These are the kinds of kids who are likely, once they get to college, to be more interested in the human spirit than in school spirit, and to think about leaving college bearing questions, not resumés.

I’ve been struck, during my time at Yale, by how similar everyone looks. You hardly see any hippies or punks or art-school types, and at a college that was known in the ’80s as the Gay Ivy, few out lesbians and no gender queers. The geeks don’t look all that geeky; the fashionable kids go in for understated elegance. Thirty-two flavors, all of them vanilla. The most elite schools have become places of a narrow and suffocating normalcy. Everyone feels pressure to maintain the kind of appearance—and affect—that go with achievement. (Dress for success, medicate for success.) I know from long experience as an adviser that not every Yale student is appropriate and well-adjusted, which is exactly why it worries me that so many of them act that way. The tyranny of the normal must be very heavy in their lives. One consequence is that those who can’t get with the program (and they tend to be students from poorer backgrounds) often polarize in the opposite direction, flying off into extremes of disaffection and self-destruction. But another consequence has to do with the large majority who can get with the program.

I taught a class several years ago on the literature of friendship. One day we were discussing Virginia Woolf’s novel The Waves, which follows a group of friends from childhood to middle age. In high school, one of them falls in love with another boy. He thinks, “To whom can I expose the urgency of my own passion?…There is nobody—here among these grey arches, and moaning pigeons, and cheerful games and tradition and emulation, all so skilfully organised to prevent feeling alone.” A pretty good description of an elite college campus, including the part about never being allowed to feel alone. What did my students think of this, I wanted to know? What does it mean to go to school at a place where you’re never alone? Well, one of them said, I do feel uncomfortable sitting in my room by myself. Even when I have to write a paper, I do it at a friend’s. That same day, as it happened, another student gave a presentation on Emerson’s essay on friendship. Emerson says, he reported, that one of the purposes of friendship is to equip you for solitude. As I was asking my students what they thought that meant, one of them interrupted to say, wait a second, why do you need solitude in the first place? What can you do by yourself that you can’t do with a friend?

So there they were: one young person who had lost the capacity for solitude and another who couldn’t see the point of it. There’s been much talk of late about the loss of privacy, but equally calamitous is its corollary, the loss of solitude. It used to be that you couldn’t always get together with your friends even when you wanted to. Now that students are in constant electronic contact, they never have trouble finding each other. But it’s not as if their compulsive sociability is enabling them to develop deep friendships. “To whom can I expose the urgency of my own passion?”: my student was in her friend’s room writing a paper, not having a heart-to-heart. She probably didn’t have the time; indeed, other students told me they found their peers too busy for intimacy.

What happens when busyness and sociability leave no room for solitude? The ability to engage in introspection, I put it to my students that day, is the essential precondition for living an intellectual life, and the essential precondition for introspection is solitude. They took this in for a second, and then one of them said, with a dawning sense of self-awareness, “So are you saying that we’re all just, like, really excellent sheep?” Well, I don’t know. But I do know that the life of the mind is lived one mind at a time: one solitary, skeptical, resistant mind at a time. The best place to cultivate it is not within an educational system whose real purpose is to reproduce the class system.

The world that produced John Kerry and George Bush is indeed giving us our next generation of leaders. The kid who’s loading up on AP courses junior year or editing three campus publications while double-majoring, the kid whom everyone wants at their college or law school but no one wants in their classroom, the kid who doesn’t have a minute to breathe, let alone think, will soon be running a corporation or an institution or a government. She will have many achievements but little experience, great success but no vision. The disadvantage of an elite education is that it’s given us the elite we have, and the elite we’re going to have.

 


William Deresiewicz taught English at Yale University from 1998 to 2008.

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ISI & CIA: Is it a Bad Marriage?

As they complete their training at “The Farm,” the Central Intelligence Agency’s base in the Virginia tidewater, young agency recruits are taught a lesson they are expected never to forget during assignments overseas: there is no such thing as a friendly intelligence service.

 

MASTER SPY Pakistan’s new army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, (with Pervez Musharraf, left) used to run the I.S.I.

Foreign spy services, even those of America’s closest allies, will try to manipulate you. So you had better learn how to manipulate them back.

But most C.I.A. veterans agree that no relationship between the spy agency and a foreign intelligence service is quite as byzantine, or as maddening, as that between the C.I.A. and Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or I.S.I.

It is like a bad marriage in which both spouses have long stopped trusting each other, but would never think of breaking up because they have become so mutually dependent.

Without the I.S.I.’s help, American spies in Pakistan would be incapable of carrying out their primary mission in the country: hunting Islamic militants, including top members of Al Qaeda. Without the millions of covert American dollars sent annually to Pakistan, the I.S.I. would have trouble competing with the spy service of its archrival, India.

But the relationship is complicated by a web of competing interests. First off, the top American goal in the region is to shore up Afghanistan’s government and security services to better fight the I.S.I.’s traditional proxies, the Taliban, there.

Inside Pakistan, America’s primary interest is to dismantle a Taliban and Qaeda safe haven in the mountainous tribal lands. Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan, and especially the I.S.I., used the Taliban and militants from those areas to exert power in Afghanistan and block India from gaining influence there. The I.S.I. has also supported other militant groups that launched operations against Indian troops in Kashmir, something that complicates Washington’s efforts to stabilize the region.

Of course, there are few examples in history of spy services really trusting one another. After all, people who earn their salaries by lying and assuming false identities probably don’t make the most reliable business partners. Moreover, spies know that the best way to steal secrets is to penetrate the ranks of another spy service.

But circumstances have for years forced successful, if ephemeral, partnerships among spies. The Office of Strategic Services, the C.I.A.’s predecessor, worked with the K.G.B.’s predecessors to hunt Nazis during World War II, even as the United States and the Soviet Union were quickly becoming adversaries.

These days, the relationship between Moscow and Washington is turning frosty again, over a number of issues. But, quietly, American and Russian spies continue to collaborate to combat drug trafficking and organized crime, and to secure nuclear arsenals.

The relationship between the C.I.A. and the I.S.I. was far less complicated when the United States and Pakistan were intently focused on one common goal: kicking the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. For years in the 1980s, the C.I.A. used the I.S.I. as the conduit to funnel arms and money to Afghan rebels fighting Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

But even in those good old days, the two spy services were far from trusting of each other — in particular over Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons. In his book “Ghost Wars,” the journalist Steve Coll recounts how the I.S.I. chief in the early 1980s, Gen. Akhtar Abdur Rahman, banned all social contact between his I.S.I. officers and C.I.A. operatives in Pakistan. He was also convinced that the C.I.A. had set up an elaborate bugging network, so he had his officers speak in code on the telephone.

When the general and his aides were invited by the C.I.A. to visit agency training sites in the United States, the Pakistanis were forced to wear blindfolds on the flights into the facilities.

Since the Sept. 11 attacks, C.I.A. officers have arrived in Islamabad knowing they will probably depend on the I.S.I. at least as much as they have depended on any liaison spy service in the past. Unlike spying in the capitals of Europe, where agency operatives can blend in to develop a network of informants, only a tiny fraction of C.I.A. officers can walk the streets of Peshawar unnoticed.

And an even smaller fraction could move freely through the tribal areas to scoop up useful information about militant networks there.

Even the powerful I.S.I., which is dominated by Punjabis, Pakistan’s largest ethnic group, has difficulties collecting information in the tribal lands, the home of fiercely independent Pashtun tribes. For this reason, the I.S.I. has long been forced to rely on Pashtun tribal leaders — and in some cases Pashtun militants — as key informants.

Given the natural disadvantages, C.I.A. officers try to get any edge they can through technology, the one advantage they have over the local spies.

For example, the Pakistani government has long restricted where the C.I.A. can fly Predator surveillance drones inside Pakistan, limiting flight paths to approved “boxes” on a grid map.

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Barbaric Practices in the British Army

 

How Britain wages war

John Pilger

Published 10 July 2008

The military has created a wall of silence around its frequent resort to barbaric practices, including torture, and goes out of its way to avoid legal scrutiny

Five photographs together break a silence. The first is of a former Gurkha regimental sergeant major, Tul Bahadur Pun, aged 87. He sits in a wheelchair outside 10 Downing Street. He holds a board full of medals, including the Victoria Cross, the highest award for bravery, which he won serving in the British army.

He has been refused entry to Britain and treatment for a serious heart ailment by the National Health Service: outrages rescinded only after a public campaign. On 25 June, he came to Down ing Street to hand his Victoria Cross back to the Prime Minister, but Gordon Brown refused to see him.

The second photograph is of a 12-year-old boy, one of three children. They are Kuchis, nomads of Afghanistan. They have been hit by Nato bombs, American or British, and nurses are trying to peel away their roasted skin with tweezers. On the night of 10 June, Nato planes struck again, killing at least 30 civilians in a single village: children, women, schoolteachers, students. On 4 July, another 22 civilians died like this. All, including the roasted children, are described as “militants” or “suspected Taliban”. The Defence Secretary, Des Browne, says the invasion of Afghan istan is “the noble cause of the 21st century”.

The third photograph is of a computer-generated aircraft carrier not yet built, one of two of the biggest ships ever ordered for the Royal Navy. The £4bn contract is shared by BAE Systems, whose sale of 72 fighter jets to the corrupt tyranny in Saudi Arabia has made Britain the biggest arms merchant on earth, selling mostly to oppressive regimes in poor countries. At a time of economic crisis, Browne describes the carriers as “an affordable expenditure”.

The fourth photograph is of a young British soldier, Gavin Williams, who was “beasted” to death by three non-commissioned officers. This “informal summary punishment”, which sent his body temperature to more than 41 degrees, was intended to “humiliate, push to the limit and hurt”. The torture was described in court as a fact of army life.

The final photograph is of an Iraqi man, Baha Mousa, who was tortured to death by British soldiers. Taken during his post-mortem, it shows some of the 93 horrific injuries he suffered at the hands of men of the Queen’s Lancashire Regiment who beat and abused him for 36 hours, including double-hooding him with hessian sacks in stifling heat. He was a hotel receptionist. Although his murder took place almost five years ago, it was only in May this year that the Ministry of Defence responded to the courts and agreed to an independent inquiry. A judge has described this as a “wall of silence”.

A court martial convicted just one soldier of Mousa’s “inhumane treatment”, and he has since been quietly released. Phil Shiner of Public Interest Lawyers, representing the families of Iraqis who have died in British custody, says the evidence is clear – abuse and torture by the British army is systemic.

Shiner and his colleagues have witness statements and corroborations of prima facie crimes of an especially atrocious kind usually associated with the Americans. “The more cases I am dealing with, the worse it gets,” he says. These include an “incident” near the town of Majar al-Kabir in 2004, when British soldiers executed as many as 20 Iraqi prisoners after mutilating them. The latest is that of a 14-year-old boy who was forced to simulate anal and oral sex over a prolonged period.

“At the heart of the US and UK project,” says Shiner, “is a desire to avoid accountability for what they want to do. Guantanamo Bay and extraordinary renditions are part of the same struggle to avoid accountability through jurisdiction.” British soldiers, he says, use the same torture techniques as the Americans and deny that the European Convention on Human Rights, the Human Rights Act and the UN Convention on Torture apply to them. And British torture is “commonplace”: so much so, that “the routine nature of this ill-treatment helps to explain why, despite the abuse of the soldiers and cries of the detainees being clearly audible, nobody, particularly in authority, took any notice”.

Arcane rituals

Unbelievably, says Shiner, the Ministry of Defence under Tony Blair decided that the 1972 Heath government’s ban on certain torture techniques applied only in the UK and Northern Ireland. Consequently, “many Iraqis were killed and tortured in UK detention facilities”. Shiner is working on 46 horrific cases.

A wall of silence has always surrounded the British military, its arcane rituals, rites and practices and, above all, its contempt for the law and natural justice in its various imperial pursuits. For 80 years, the Ministry of Defence and compliant ministers refused to countenance posthumous pardons for terrified boys shot at dawn during the slaughter of the First World War. British soldiers used as guinea pigs during the testing of nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean were abandoned, as were many others who suffered the toxic effects of the 1991 Gulf War. The treatment of Gurkha Tul Bahadur Pun is typical. Having been sent back to Nepal, many of these “soldiers of the Queen” have no pension, are deeply impoverished and are refused residence or medical help in the country for which they fought and for which 43,000 of them have died or been injured. The Gurkhas have won no fewer than 26 Victoria Crosses, yet Browne’s “affordable expenditure” excludes them.

An even more imposing wall of silence ensures that the British public remains largely unaware of the industrial killing of civilians in Britain’s modern colonial wars. In his landmark work Unpeople: Britain’s Secret Human Rights Abuses, the historian Mark Curtis uses three main categories: direct responsibility, indirect responsibility and active inaction.

“The overall figure [since 1945] is between 8.6 and 13.5 million,” Curtis writes. “Of these, Britain bears direct responsibility for between four million and six million deaths. This figure is, if anything, likely to be an underestimate. Not all British interventions have been included, because of lack of data.” Since his study was published, the Iraq death toll has reached, by reliable measure, a million men, women and children.

The spiralling rise of militarism within Britain is rarely acknowledged, even by those alerting the public to legislation attacking basic civil liberties, such as the recently drafted Data Com muni cations Bill, which will give the government powers to keep records of all electronic communication. Like the plans for identity cards, this is in keeping what the Americans call “the national security state”, which seeks the control of domestic dissent while pursuing military aggression abroad. The £4bn aircraft carriers are to have a “global role”. For global read colonial. The Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office follow Washington’s line almost to the letter, as in Browne’s preposterous description of Afghanistan as a noble cause. In reality, the US-inspired Nato invasion has had two effects: the killing and dispossession of large numbers of Afghans, and the return of the opium trade, which the Taliban had banned. According to Hamid Karzai, the west’s puppet leader, Britain’s role in Helmand Province has led directly to the return of the Taliban.

Loans for arms

The militarising of how the British state perceives and treats other societies is vividly demonstrated in Africa, where ten out of 14 of the most impoverished and conflict-ridden countries are seduced into buying British arms and military equipment with “soft loans”. Like the British royal family, the British Prime Minister simply follows the money. Having ritually condemned a despot in Zimbabwe for “human rights abuses” – in truth, for no longer serving as the west’s business agent – and having obeyed the latest US dictum on Iran and Iraq, Brown set off recently for Saudi Arabia, exporter of Wahhabi fundamentalism and wheeler of fabulous arms deals.

To complement this, the Brown government is spending £11bn of taxpayers’ money on a huge, pri vatised military academy in Wales, which will train foreign soldiers and mercenaries recruited to the bogus “war on terror”. With arms companies such as Raytheon profiting, this will become Britain’s “School of the Americas”, a centre for counter-insurgency (terrorist) training and the design of future colonial adventures.

It has had almost no publicity.

Of course, the image of militarist Britain clashes with a benign national regard formed, wrote Tolstoy, “from infancy, by every possible means – class books, church services, sermons, speeches, books, papers, songs, poetry, monuments [leading to] people stupefied in the one direction”. Much has changed since he wrote that. Or has it? The shabby, destructive colonial war in Afghanistan is now reported almost entirely through the British army, with squaddies always doing their Kipling best, and with the Afghan resistance routinely dismissed as “outsiders” and “invaders”. Pictures of nomadic boys with Nato-roasted skin almost never appear in the press or on television, nor the after-effects of British thermobaric weapons, or “vacuum bombs”, designed to suck the air out of human lungs. Instead, whole pages mourn a British military intelligence agent in Afghanis tan, because she happens to have been a 26-year-old woman, the first to die in active service since the 2001 invasion.

Baha Mousa, tortured to death by British soldiers, was also 26 years old. But he was different. His father, Daoud, says that the way the Ministry of Defence has behaved over his son’s death convinces him that the British government regards the lives of others as “cheap”. And he is right.

www.johnpilger.com

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US State Department Official Convicted for Racism Against Arabs

July 11/ 2008 – W. Patrick Syring, a former foreign service officer with the US Department of State, was sentenced today in federal court in Washington, DC, on federal civil rights charges for threatening employees of the Arab American Institute (AAI) because of their race and national origin.
Syring was sentenced by the Honorable Colleen Kollar-Kotelly to two concurrent sentences of 12 months of imprisonment followed by 3 years of post-release supervision, 100 hours of community service and was ordered to pay a $10,000 fine.

On June 12, 2008, Syring, age 50, pleaded guilty to a federal civil rights charge for race- and national origin-based interference with the victims’ federally protected right to employment, and to a second
charge for the interstate transmission of threatening communications. Syring admitted that in July 2006 he sent a series of threatening email and voicemail communications to six employees of AAI, a
nonprofit organization that promotes Arab-American participation in the US electoral system and public policy issues. Syring also admitted that he intended to intimidate the victims and interfere with
their employment because of their race as Arab-Americans and their national origin as Lebanese-Americans.

The indictment to which Syring pleaded guilty charged that he sent four emails and three voicemails to AAI employees from approximately July 17 to 29, 2006. The emails included repeated use of threatening phrases. An additional email condemned AAI for a fatal shooting at the Jewish Federation of Greater Seattle in July 2006 that was committed by a lone gunman who had no affiliation with AAI.

A career foreign service officer and a resident of Arlington, VA, Syring retired from the U.S. Department of State in July 2007.  “Threats of violent hate crimes have an impact far greater than the
impact on the individual victim,” said Grace Chung Becker, Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division. “These are crimes against the fundamental ideals on which America was founded.” “There is no room in our society for the intolerance of other races or national origins, particularly by those who hold positions within the government,” stated Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney for the Distict of Columbia. “This prosecution reflects our steadfast commitment to address violations of our civil rights laws.”

This case was investigated by Special Agents Greg H. Bristol and Jay Greenberg of the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]. This case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Julieanne Himelstein for the District of Washington, DC, along with Civil Rights Division Deputy Chief Mark Blumberg, Trial Attorney Karen Ruckert and Special Legal Counsel Barry F. Kowalski, from the Department of Justice.

Prosecuting the perpetrators of bias-motivated crimes is a top priority of the Justice Department. Since 2001, the Civil Rights Division has convicted 166 defendants in 127 cases involving bias-
motivated crimes.

http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/July/08-crt-608.html

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Muslim Developing Nations’ Aim for Food Self-Sufficiency

July 17/ 2008 – “Self-sufficiency is our objective and our main goal,” Alam Dipo, secretary-general of the so-called D-8, or Developing Eight Countries for Economic Cooperation, stated on July 15 from Istanbul, where the group’s secretariat is based.

The D-8 was formed in 1997 and is made up of the Muslim nations of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey.
 
He said member nations wanted to develop their agricultural sectors – neglected in favour of industrialisation in recent decades – by boosting capacity and investment in food production.

“In the next two years, we are looking at how we can solve the food crisis problem and relate it to opportunities,” he said. The D-8 has just endorsed a 10-year development roadmap that includes more cooperation in areas such as agriculture, and a preferential trade agreement.

“All of these related agricultural products – fertilisers, pesticides and animal feed – will be in the frame of the preferential trade agreement, so exporting and importing will be facilitated by this cooperation,” Alam Dipo stated.

Summit in Kuala Lumpur

On July 8, at a summit in Kuala Lumpur, the D-8 talked about revitalising the agricultural sector in a bid for self-sufficiency in response to rising food and fuel prices.

At the summit, a number of leaders said the price rises posed serious challenges to achieving national development plans.

“To delay concerted action on this great challenge of our time is to court disaster,” said Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

“The least we can do in our respective countries is to strive for national food self-reliance that will support the domestic economy and meet the food requirements of the peoples,” he said. The countries also pledged to deepen cooperation to boost food production in the short, medium and long-term by easing supply constraints for agricultural inputs. Initiatives, which include support from the private sector, will create a seed bank, and increase the production of fertilizer and animal feed.

Biofuel

The leaders also touched on the impact of rising oil prices, with Malaysia and Indonesia calling for restraint in the use of arable land for biofuel crops, which have been partly blamed for boosting food prices.

The World Food Programme (WFP) and some NGOs welcomed the D-8’s statements.

“In the longer run, food production increases country by country are clearly in the best interests of all populations,” WFP spokesman for Asia Paul Risley stated.

“Self-sufficiency and assuring national food supplies are now recognised by the World Bank and other international organisations as very critical steps for national development,” he added.

ActionAid calls for more help for small farmers

Anti-poverty group ActionAid commended the first-time appearance of food security on the D-8’s agenda as a “good sign”.

But the organisation called on D-8 nations to formulate agricultural policies which prioritise food production and include impoverished small-scale farmers who are scarcely able to afford inputs such as seed and fertilizer.

“In many of the countries, small-hold farming is being discouraged in the name of big farms and corporate agriculture,” said ActionAid’s head of communications in Asia, Shafqat Munir. “The D-8 countries should agree on policy that promotes agriculture right from the small farm to the broader level production of food crops,” he stated.

While the D-8 has earned some praise for trying to tackle food security, the challenge lies in translating political intentions into workable domestic policies in member countries such as Indonesia.

Dilemma

There, food production is mainly by small-scale subsistence farmers, said Benyamin Lakitan, secretary to Indonesia’s State Ministry for Research and Technology and a former government food affairs adviser. “They are not enthusiastic about increasing food production, especially at the expense of high production costs, since prices of food commodities are not attractive,” Lakitan stated. An “increase in food production does not directly translate into an increase in a farmer’s welfare,” he said, adding that D-8 countries needed regulations to ensure reasonable incomes for farmers.

The liberalisation of Indonesia’s food market, including the axing of subsidies for farmers, has also undermined domestic food production, said Don Marut, executive director of the International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development. “If they change the policy by providing subsidies for farmers, the government will risk making the state budget vulnerable… It will be a dilemma for the government,” he stated.

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Narendra Modi Should Be Denied US Visa

US Congresswoman Betty McCollum (D-MN) has urged U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in her letter of  July 8/ 2008, to deny any U.S. visa to Narendra Damodardas Modi, Chief Minister of the state of Gujarat, India, because he has violated the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the U.S.
International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA).

Many human rights defenders, lawyers and media-press reports have pointed out that BJP criminal tyrant Narendra Modi ordered Indian- Hindu terrorists, Gujarat state officials and corrupt, repressive
police to murder, rape and harm Indian-Muslims during the anti-Muslimriots and state-supported massacres of 2002 in Gujarat, India.

Under the orders of Narendra Modi and with the official support of the Modi Mafia regime, in 2002, Hindu mobsters killed over 2,500 Muslims; Hindu rapists gang-raped and sexually mutilated hundreds of Muslim women and girls; and Hindu gangsters burned or destroyed homes,
businesses and mosques of Muslims in Gujarat, India.

The Human Rights Watch (HRW-USA) report of July 2003, titled “Compounding Injustice – The Government’s Failure to Redress Massacres in Gujarat,” states: “The groups most responsible for the anti-Muslim violence include the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council, VHP),
the Bajrang Dal ([BD] the militant youth wing of the VHP) and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer Corps, RSS). Collectively they RSS, BJP, VHP and BD form the sangh parivar (or
“family” of Hindu nationalist groups). The BJP is the political wing of the sangh parivar…. State officials of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist party that also heads India’s national coalition government, were directly involved in the attacks. In many cases, the police led the charge, killing Muslims who tried to block the mobs’ advance. The violence was unprecedented in its organization and unmatched in its brutality in the state of Gujarat, India.”

Read the following letter of U.S. Rep. Betty McCollum to U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice:

July 8, 2008

The Honorable Condoleezza Rice
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Secretary Rice:

It has come to my attention that Mr. Narendra Modi, Chief Minister of the state of Gujarat, India has been invited to attend and speak at the World Gujarati Conference, scheduled to take place August 29-31, 2008, in Edison, New Jersey. As a result of this invitation Mr. Modi may be seeking a visa to enter the U.S. In light of Mr. Modi’s long documented record of violations of religious freedom in India, I am writing to urge the Department of State to deny Mr. Modi a visa to enter the U.S.

As you know, Mr. Narendra Modi was Chief Minister of Gujarat during the 2002 riots that resulted in the deaths of over 2,000 lndian- Muslims and non-Hindus and the rape, gang rape and molestation of
hundreds of Muslim women. In 2003, the lndian Supreme Court found that the state government of Gujarat, led by Mr. Modi, had actively supported the anti-Muslim violence and ordered the police not to interfere. This grave violation of the freedom of India’s religious minorities is simply intolerable and puts Mr. Modi in severe breach of the International Religious Freedom Act.

In 2005, under your leadership, the Department of State appropriately denied Mr. Modi a visa on the basis that any foreign government official responsible for ‘particularly severe violations’ of religious
freedom is inadmissible under the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act.

Since 2005, Chief Minister Narendra Modi has continued to violate the religious freedom of not only Indian-Muslims, but also Christians. Mr Modi has used state police forces to routinely beat Christian pastors and priests and to conduct extra-judicial killings of Muslim youth. In addition, Mr. Modi has interfered with the safe return of more than 100,000 people displaced from the 2002 riots.

Given the continuing violations of religious freedom in India, Narendra Modi should once again be denied admission to the US under the provisions of the International Religious Freedom Act. Granting a visa to Narendra Modi would be contradictory to international law and would only serve to validate the Chief Minister’s abhorrent policies and actions.

Maintaining an open and vibrant diplomatic, economic and military relationship between the U.S. and lndia must be a continued foreign policy priority for Congress and the Executive Branch. Therefore I
want to be clear that this letter is solely directed at Mr Modi and not in any way directed at the Indian Government, the BJP as a political institution, or the Gujaratis’ community in lndia or the US. The Gujaratis’ community in the U.S. should be commended for their contributions to the U.S. and for supporting a strong US-India relationship.

Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,

Betty McCollum
Member of Congress
http://www.mccollum.house.gov

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