Archive for September, 2008

Why the Jews Dominate the Muslims?

September 29, 2008 at 12:57 pm · Filed under Clash of Civilizations ·Tagged , , ,


 

 

 

 

o  World Jewish Population.  14 million
o  Distribution:  7m in America
                      5m in Asia
                      2m in Europe
                      100 thousand in Africa

o       World Muslim Population: 1.5 billion
o  Distribution: I billion in Asia/Mid-East
                     400 M in Africa
                     44 M in Europe
                      6 M in the Americas
 
o  Every fifth human being is a Muslim.
o  For every single Hindu there are two Muslims
o  For every Buddhist there are two Muslims
o  For every Jew there are 107 Muslims

o  Yet the 14 million Jews are more powerful than the   entire 1.5 billion Muslims
 
Why?
 
Here are some of the reasons.
 
Movers of Current History

o  Albert Einstein             Jewish
o  Sigmund Freud            Jewish
o  Karl Marx                    Jewish
o  Paul Samuelson           Jewish
o  Milton Friedman
 
Medical Milestones

o  Vaccinating Needle: Benjamin Ruben     Jewish
o  Polio Vaccine:         Jonas Salk             Jewish
o  Leukaemia Drug: Gertrude Elion            Jewish
o  Hepatitis B:            Baruch Blumberg     Jewish
o  Syphilis Drug:        Paul Ehrlich             Jewish
o  Neuro muscular:    Elie Metchnikoff       Jewish
o  Endocrinology:      Andrew Schally       Jewish
o  Cognitive therapy: Aaron Beck              Jewish
o  Contraceptive Pill: Gregory Pincus       Jewish
o  Understanding Human Eye: G. Wald    Jewish
o  Embryology:         Stanley Cohen          Jewish
o  Kidney Dialysis: Willem Kloffcame        Jewish
 
Nobel Prize Winners

o  In the past 105 years, 14 million Jews have won 180 Nobel prizes whilst 1.5 billion Muslims have contributed only 3 Nobel winners
 
Inventions that changed History

o  Micro-Processing Chip: Stanley Mezor            
o  Nuclear Chain Reactor:  Leo Sziland    
o  Optical Fibre Cable: Peter Schultz     
o  Traffic Lights: Charles Adler

o   Stainless Steel:  Benno Strauss  
o  Sound Movies:  Isador Kisee                  
o  Telephone Microphone: Emile Berliner          
o  Video Tape Recorder: Charles Ginsburg       
 
Influential Global Business

 o Polo                Ralph Lauren                  
o  Coca Cola                                           
o  Levi’s Jeans    Levi Strauss                   
o  Sawbuck’s      Howard Schultz             
o  

 

Google          Sergey Brin                  
o  Dell Computers  Michael Dell                 
o  Oracle           Larry Ellison                       
o  DKNY          Donna Karan                      
o  Baskin & Robbins     Irv Robbins           
o  Dunkin Donuts   Bill Rosenberg              
 
Influential Intellectuals/ Politicians

o  Henry Kissinger , US Sec of State                   
o  Richard Levin, President Yale University        
o  Alan Greenspan , US Federal Reserve              o  Joseph Lieberman                                          
o  Madeleine Albright , US Sec of State                o  Casper Weinberger , US Sec of Defence         
o  Maxim Litvinov , USSR Foreign Minister

o  David Marshal , Singapore Chief Minister

o  Isaacs Isaacs, Gov-Gen Australia                     o  Benjamin Disraeli, British Statesman

o  Yevgeny Primakov, Russian PM

o  Barry Goldwater , US Politician  

o  Jorge Sampaio, President Portugal                  
o  Herb Gray, Canadian Deputy – PM                   o  Pierre Mendes, French PM                              o  Michael Howard, British Home Sec.   

o  Bruno Kriesky, Austrian Chancellor               

o   Robert Rubin , US Sec of Treasury               
 
Global Media Influential

o  Wolf Blitzer, CNN                                           o  Barbara Walters

 

ABC News
o  Eugene Meyer , Washington Post
o  Henry Grunwald, Time Magazine
o  Katherine Graham , Washington Post
o  Joseph Lelyeld, New York Times
o  Max Frankel, New York Times
 
Global Philanthropists

o  George Soros  

o Walter Annenberg 
 
Why are they powerful?
 
So why are Muslims powerless?

Here’s another reason. We have lost the capacity to produce knowledge.

o  In the entire Muslim World (57 Muslim countries) there are only 500 universities.

o  In USA alone, 5,758 universities
o  In India alone, 8,407 universities
o  Not one university in the entire Islamic World features in the Top 500
Ranking Universities of the World
o  Literacy in the Christian World  90%
o  Literacy in the Muslim World     40%
o  15 Christian majority-countries, literacy rate 100%
o  Muslim majority – countries ,       None
o  98% in Christian countries completed primary
o  Only 50% in Muslim countries completed primary.
o  40% in Christian countries attended university
o  In Muslim countries a dismal 2% attended..
o  Muslim majority countries have 230 scientists per one million Muslims
o  The USA has 5000 per million
o  The Christian world 1000 technicians per million.
o  Entire Arab World only 50 technicians per million.
o  Muslim World spends on research/developmen t 0.2% of GDP
o  Christian World spends 5 % of GDP
 
Conclusion.
o  The Muslim World lacks the capacity to produce knowledge.
 
Another way of testing the degree of knowledge is the degree of diffusing knowledge.
 
o   Pakistan 23 daily newspapers per 1000 citizens
o   Singapore 460 per 1000 citizens.
o  In UK book titles per million is 2000
o  In Egypt book titles per million is only 17
 
Conclusion

o  Muslim World is failing to diffuse knowledge
 
Applying Knowledge is another such test.

o  Exports of high tech products from   Pakistan is 0.9% of its exports.
o  In Saudi Arabia is 0.2%
o  Kuwait, Morocco and Algeria 0.3%
o  Singapore alone is 68%
 
Conclusion.
o  Muslim World is failing to apply knowledge.
 
What do you conclude?

 

 

 

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Taliban is a Creation of Pakistan

September 29, 2008 at 6:03 am · Filed under Talibanization, War Against Terror ·Tagged , , ,

By Asif Haroon Raja

21/09/08 “Asian Tribune” — The US and its allies succeeded in toppling Taliban regime in November 2001 and replacing it with a puppet regime, but the Taliban were neither militarily defeated nor eliminated from the system. But for effective encirclement of Afghanistan from all directions and massive air support provided by USA, the Northern Alliance could not have made any progress. Once the Taliban realised that they were no more in a position to offer resistance particularly after Pakistan ditched them, they considered it prudent to carry out a tactical withdrawal from Kabul and most took shelter in Pashtun dominated southern and eastern Afghanistan. Some trickled into FATA and Baluchistan where they had their kith and kin and some moved into Iran. They remained inactive till 2002 but utilised this time to regroup and refit themselves to be able to strike back at the invading forces that had devastated their country. Bush and his teams of neo-cons felt complacent that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda had been taken care of and only the remnants had to be flushed out. It was this smugness which impelled them to invade and occupy Iraq in March 2003.

In the meanwhile, the vices that had been eliminated by the Taliban during their short rule reappeared in a big way. Besides lack of justice, war lordism, corruption, poppy growing, drug business and nepotism reigned supreme. The Taliban and their supporters were either brutally killed or put in Bagram jail and subjected to horrendous torture. The Pashtuns being in great majority were persecuted and power got concentrated in the hands of non-Pashtun Northern Alliance elements and war lords. The occupation forces inflicted heavy collateral damage on civilians whenever they confronted the militants. These developments disillusioned the Afghans and sympathy wave among the Pashtuns living both sides of the border started to shift towards the Taliban. Induction of NATO forces in 2003 together with deteriorating law and order situation provided the spark to ignite insurgency.

When Gen Musharraf submitted to US pressure after 9/11 and ditched the Taliban in Afghanistan, he provided air bases as well as logistics support and shared intelligence with CIA. He allowed CIA and FBI to recruit agents in FATA and other places and to establish their outposts. The focus of ISI and other agencies was shifted towards hunting and nabbing so-called terrorists all over the country, in monitoring dissident elements within the army and in political wheeling and dealings. The CIA acquired all the links ISI and MI had both sides of the Pak-Afghan border and gradually took most agents on ISI payroll within its fold. By virtue of having better technology and means the CIA was able to take over intelligence acquisition and dissemination system. As a consequence the troops operating in FATA became entirely dependent upon CIA inputs. Taking advantage of complete liberty of action, CIA succeeded in buying the loyalties of many tribal chiefs and notables in FATA by doling out dollars in sacks since it knew that the Pashtun could not be crushed by force but could be purchased. Those not falling in line were got killed.

In FATA, Nek Muhammad was first cultivated and provided logistic support. When he entered into a peace deal with Pak Army in July 2005, he was killed using precision guided missile. Abdullah Masood, an Afghan war veteran who had also fought the Northern Alliance in October-November 2001 was captured and brainwashed during his two years internment in Guantanamo Bay. He was released after agreeing to work on terms dictated by CIA and he soon was able to takeover the leadership role. His death at Zhob at the hands of Pak security forces was a loss for CIA.

Baitulah Masood and Fazlullah had not taken part in Afghan jihad and do not qualify to head Taliban; yet 30 year old Baitullah has managed to create Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Fazlullah calls the shots in Swat. Mulla Omar had never shown interest in establishing any links with Pakistani Taliban and had warned Nek Muhammad not to operate under the brand name of Taliban. It is being questioned as to how come Baitullah, Fazlullah and their spokesmen desperately wanted by Pakistan security forces have escaped the hawk eye of USA, particularly after they have been seen giving detailed interviews to media and using their cell phones? ISI had once given six figure coordinates of Baitullah and yet no Hellfire missile was fired on his hideout by CIA. The TTP that has spread its influence in all the seven agencies of tribal belt and in neighbouring settled districts of NWFP has succeeded in making inroads into Punjab, particularly southern Punjab. Large number has got recruited from Chiniot, Bahawalpur, Dera Nawab, Bahawalnagar, Faisalabad, Sialkot and other places. Though they do not speak a word of Pashto, but are fighting side by side with Pathan Taliban.

After Shakai peace deal with the militants in South Waziristan in July 2005, Pakistan was subjected to a calculated slander campaign. Having fixed more than one lac troops into the furnace of FATA it was scoffed at for not doing enough to control militancy in FATA. Pakistan was also accused of nuclear proliferation and IAEA kept up the pressure to hand over AQ Khan for interrogation. Musharraf accepted the charge and forced AQ Khan to make a confession to defuse the heat. The religious extremist threat was blown out of all proportions and it was repeatedly stated that Pakistan’s nuclear assets had become unsafe. Musharraf accepted this charge as well and promised to fight extremism and terrorism with full force.

After declaring Pakistan as the most dangerous country, FATA was declared as the most dangerous place on earth. Pakistan was blamed for growing turbulence in Afghanistan since in view of US military leaders and Karzai; Pak army was not doing enough to control militancy. The phenomenon of missile attacks by drones commenced in January 2006 when a suspected target in Damadola was attacked killing scores of innocent civilians. Another deadly missile attack was launched on a Madrassa in Bajaur in October that year killing 80 students. Ever since, this phenomenon continues unabated.

Once the ISI got freed from wild goose chase of so-called terrorists and came under pressure on account of missing persons, it started to concentrate on its primary task in the troubled spots. To its horror it found far too many militant groups and criminal gangs operating under the guise of religious militants and cultivated by foreign agencies. They were the ones involved in carrying out gruesome beheadings of security personnel and torching girls’ schools to defame the real Taliban who had a peaceful agenda. Besides CIA, RAW and RAM, even Iran and Uzbekistan had developed its tentacles in Baluchistan, Swat and Kurram Agency. Most of the pro-Pakistan groups had been purchased or neutralized and those not coming to terms were eliminated by groups sponsored by CIA. Things had gone topsy-turvy and ISI found itself at a loss how to differentiate between friend and foe.

It is when the ISI began to recover the lost ground and renewed its old contacts in FATA and started to expose and block clandestine activities of CIA, RAW and RAM that all hell broke lose on ISI. Instead of feeling ashamed of what they were doing, USA had the cheeks to start making hue and cry that ISI was linked with the Taliban and that it must be emasculated. The three colluding partners lost their cool when the Indian Embassy in Kabul was subjected to a suicide attack on 7 July 2008. The trio fumed with anger and blamed ISI without even carrying out preliminary investigations. It was alleged that the perpetrator of suicide attack belonged to Gujranwala. Adm. Mike Mullen and Deputy Director CIA Stephen Kappes came huffing and puffing to Islamabad on 12 July and expressed their concern in strong words. Both Gen Tariq and Gen Kayani were told to bring the ISI to heel and to control militancy on their side of the border. The details of suicide bomber provided by the visitors proved false. It transpired later on that it was a bomb planted in a parked jeep which was detonated with the help of a remote control and was master minded by Mossad.

In the meanwhile Bush gave a green signal to Pentagon to extend the sphere of operations in Afghanistan into neighbouring FATA in July. He said that besides Iraq and Afghanistan, Pakistan is the third battleground. The military was told to hit targets whenever any actionable intelligence was available without notifying Pakistan. US troops started to man mobile posts all along Pak-Afghan border with Paktika as their main forward base camp. These hostile steps were taken in spite of the fact that the new government under Zardari had abandoned its policy of dialogue and resumed the policy of force against the militants. After a month long Frontier Corps led operation in Khyber Agency, the army was employed in Hangu to control the unrest. In continuation of offensive policy, the army launched powerful operations in Swat in July and in Bajaur on 6 August backed by jetfighters, gunship helicopters, tanks and artillery guns and started to make rapid progress against the well entrenched militants. Operations in these two restive areas are still going in with full steam and several hundred militants have been killed. Instead of getting pleased, the Americans got disturbed since they never intended to control militancy but to spread the flames of militancy into cities and create anarchic conditions.

The month of September saw intensification of missile attacks and each attack resulted in loss of innocent lives. To create fear and panic among the peaceful residents of Waziristan and also to target pro-government elements, missile attacks were intensified and each attack killed innocent men, women and children. The idea was to antagonise pro-government Waziris and also to force them to migrate as had happened in case of Bajaur. To further up the ante, Pakistan was declared as a battleground and a first ever ground attack was carried out by US troops on the night of 3 September at Angoor Adda killing 15 men women and children. A deadly missile attack was conducted on pro-Pakistan Jalaluddin Haqqani house in North Waziristan on 8 September killing 25 inmates mostly women and children. He was blamed for carrying out attack on Indian Embassy. The intruding drone was forced to beat a hasty retreat on 12 September when own jets got airborne and started to track it. A ground attack on 15th was also thwarted by the troops and locals. So far 62 border violations have been carried out by US-ISAF forces including 36 after the takeover by PPP government in March 2008. So far 30 missile attacks have been made killing innocent people. In none of the attack any Al-Qaada operative or militant Taliban was killed.

The nexus in Kabul is working upon a scripted plan to make FATA lawless and beyond the control of security forces, push militancy into settled areas and then into major cities and thus create a civil warlike situation to prove their contention that Pakistan was the most dangerous country in the world and that the extremists were on the verge of taking over power and nuclear weapons. After inflaming South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Mohmand Agency, Khyber Agency, Darra Adam Khel, Kurram Agency, Hangu and Swat, Bajaur Agency was built into a stronghold of militants where huge cache of arms and ammunition was dumped. By virtue of being located at the crossroad of the tribal belt and also linked with Dir, Swat and Afghanistan, it was to act as bulwark and a launching pad to provide reinforcement to other areas.

10,000 Indian troops are stationed in Afghanistan under the garb of supervising construction of road Jalalabad-Port Chahbahar project that has now been completed. Whereas India has officially declared 14 Indian consulates in Afghanistan, on ground they have 107 in which 20 intelligence units are burning their midnight oil to destabilise Pakistan. Many mercantile shops run by Indians have an intelligence office in the rear. In Wakhan, a religious Madrassa run by Indian Muslim clerics is functioning since 2002 under the patronage of RAW and Mossad. Very young boys, mostly orphans, destitute or homeless are recruited. Recruits are mostly Afghans, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Caucasians. The latter being fair skinned and resembling Europeans are trained to hit targets in Europe or in USA to once again create a 9/11 like situation.

Reportedly, 10,000 ideologically motivated terrorist and suicide bombers have been trained. Besides receiving military training, they have also been made to learn Pashto and customs of Pathans. They are regularly infiltrated into troubled spots of Pakistan. Posing as volunteers they join the rank and file of militants to fight the army. They are the ones who are destroying schools, CD shops, bridges and other installations and carrying out brutal beheading of captured personnel. The idea is to create chaos and confusion and also to defame the real Taliban that have not come under their influence. They are also responsible for creating cleavages within the people of FATA and in disrupting peace deals. In Kurram Agency, Afghan officers and soldiers are actively involved in the sectarian conflict by way of providing arms and ammunition to Shias belonging to Tori tribe and physically participating in duels with Sunnis. In Swat, Fazlullah led militants are supplied with war munitions as well as fighters.

Likewise, dissident tribal chiefs in Baluchistan including late Akbar Bugti were also taken on board. The CIA helped in reincarnating BLA and providing all sorts of war munitions to Baloch militants belonging to Bugti, Marri and Mengal tribes and establishing over 60 Farari camps in Baluchistan. Shamsi airbase that was handed over to USA in October 2001, houses Blackhawk helicopters primarily engaged in monitoring the entire length of Iranian border. CIA has cultivated Sunni Iranian Baloch Jandullah group (not the one that had operated against 5 Corps commander). It is anti- Iranian regime and was utilised by CIA to carryout acts of sabotage in Iran through Zahidan. Iran has now constructed a stone wall all along its border to prevent cross border terrorism from Baluchistan. It has clouded Pak-Iran relations since the latter feels that such activities could not have been undertaken without the blessing of Pak government.

It is now clear that our so-called friends have been playing a double game. Now that USA has bared its teeth and let its intentions known, to pretend that it would stop short of achieving its objectives will be like living in fools’ paradise. It is simply degrading to unashamedly say that we cannot fight the Americans. It is also preposterous to assume that Pakistan may not survive without American support. Pro-American elements within Pakistan on US payroll have been parroting this theme since creation of Pakistan to safeguard their vested interests. North Korea, Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Iran, Somalia are living examples who have survived despite adopting hostile posture against USA. It is high time that we gird up our loins and put our act together to face up to the challenge boldly.

The army under Gen Kayani has expressed its resolve to confront the threat and safeguard country’s sovereignty irrespective of the consequences. It is now up to our week-kneed rulers oblivious of the ominous threat and still busy in power game as to how they stand up to the test. It will be naive to expect that the threat will be warded off with diplomacy alone. We must make USA realise that it will become exceedingly difficult for US led allied troops to operate in Afghanistan if Pakistan opts out of fighting US war of terror and refuses to provide transit facility to carry oil and food supplies to its troops in Afghanistan. The magnitude of dependence can be gauged from the fact each day over 400 containers ply from Karachi and Quetta to Afghanistan transporting food, munitions and 300 million gallons of fuel for US-Nato troops in Afghanistan. We may also consider bridling CIA’s unchecked activities and closing down four bases in control of USA.

Asif Haroon Raja is a defence and a political analyst.

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Mass Blocking of SIMs Fails to Help Police Investigators

September 29, 2008 at 5:19 am · Filed under War Against Terror ·Tagged , , ,

By Imran Ayub

KARACHI, Sep 28/ 2008. Cellular phone companies’ claim to have blocked seven million unregistered connections has not helped the local police who, during the course of investigations, continue to find themselves helpless in locating criminals since personal details submitted to cell-phone service providers usually prove to be falsified.

Senior officials and investigators dealing with several criminal cases argue that their problems in terms of unregistered cell-phone connections have not come to an end, even though cellular phone companies have, on the directives of the Senate’s Standing Committee on Interior, traced and blocked some seven million subscriber identity modules (SIMs) whose data proved unverified.

“In a few recent cases of kidnapping, we checked dozens of cell phone numbers and followed the personal details of the people in whose names these connections were registered,” said Sharfuddin Memon, chairman of the Citizen-Police Liaison Committee. “We did not find the criminals, and neither could we guess at their whereabouts since the personal details with the cellular phone companies referred to innocent people who did not apply for the connections under suspicion and who enjoy separate and legitimate service.”

Following directives issued by the federal authorities, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) asked cellular companies to block some seven million SIMs last month, since the Senate’s Standing Committee on Interior found that there were serious violations of the rules designed by the telecommunications watchdog and the cellular phone companies. These violations were creating impediments in the path of the law enforcement agencies. However, the measures taken so far have not brought any positive change for investigators, who argue that the service providers are still not following the rules in terms of registering new subscribers.

“We have not yet witnessed the benefits of this step of blocking SIMs,” said Capital City Police Officer Wasim Ahmed. “The situation on the ground has not changed and during the course of our investigations, we have learned that the sale of illegal SIMs is continuing unchecked.” In this situation, he said, the police could not achieve much success since support was needed from the institutions concerned, in this case the cellular phone companies. “In recent kidnapping cases, fake data provided by subscribers has proved the major hurdle in our investigations,” he commented. “We have put these worries before the high-ups and hope that the issue will be addressed, so that our investigations can be more effective and achieve positive results.”

Process is to continue

Acknowledging the concerns expressed by the city police hierarchy, the legislators behind the move of blocking millions of SIMs said that this had been achieved as part of a year-long exercise, which could continue for the next few months in order to streamline the data once and for all.

“There is no doubt that the situation is not ideal,” said Senator Mohammed Talha Mahmood Aryan, chairman of the Standing Committee on Interior, who took the initiative of initiating the process of streamlining cellular subscribers’ data after the complaints from law enforcement agencies mounted up. “We have started the process, and it may take time but will ultimately bring positive results. The SIMs blocked by the companies were sold before Jan 2008 and in a few days. Recently we again to check the data of SIMs sold since then. Any unregistered SIMs will meet the same fate.”

The country has witnessed a phenomenal jump in cellular subscribers since 2004, when two foreign telecom companies launched operations and triggered a competition which led to more than 89 million users of mobile phones services across the country by July 2008. The technology attracted criminals to rely on the services as well as exploit the unchecked sale of connections.

PTA data shows that by July 2008, Mobilink led the market with more than 32.05 million subscribers across the country. It was followed by Ufone, with 18.36 million users. The Norwegian Telenor enjoys a total of 18.32 million subscribers, while 15.77 million people use the services provided by the UAE’s Warid. China Mobiles has attracted more than 4.4 million subscribers so far while Instaphone’s subscriber base has fallen to 321,201, says the PTA data. The authorities, however, say that the rules are violated by almost all companies, which poses serious challenges for law enforcement agencies.

“Cell-phone use has increased sharply in almost every crime, including serious crimes such as kidnapping for ransom and terrorism,” said Mr Memon at the CPLC. “But when we trace the record of a caller using a phone for criminal activity, most of the time the details turn out to be fake.” He suggested a ban on the irregular or unregulated sale of cell-phone connections and asked the PTA to design a policy that bound companies to provide connections at subscribers’ homes. “Another method of putting a check on such irregularities is for the companies to activate a SIM 48 hours after its sale, during which time it should verify the data provided by the subscriber,” added Mr Memon.

He said the CPLC, which facilitated police mainly in investigations of kidnapping for ransom cases, could also play an effective role between the law enforcers and the telecom bodies for an access to cellular data of subscribes to track down the source of criminals’ communication and locate them.

“Being a trusted and respected body, the CPLC can be provided access to cellphone call and SMS data to facilitate our police for investigating criminal cases,” suggested Mr. Memon.

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Christians in India Offend the Hindus

September 27, 2008 at 12:07 pm · Filed under Christians in India, Religion ·Tagged , ,

The Beam In Your Eye

M. V. Kamath.

I have often wondered whether Christians realise how much offence their missionaries give to non-Christians in India, mainly Hindus, by their activities. There are two kinds of Christianity. One is that of simple god-fearing people who go to church, say their prayers, do what little they can for lessening the suffering or ignorance of their fellow citizens, and be at peace with the world around them. They are respected, loved and honored.

The other is the ‘Institutional Christianity’, which came to India with the marauding Portuguese in the 16th century. It is this Christianity that has been causing trouble in India in recent times. The argument adduced by Institutional Christianity is that it is God’s command that his good word be spread all over the world. They insist on their ‘right’ to convert people becuase God ordained that people must be converted. Such an attitude is insulting to non-Christians.

Some time in late January, the South Asian correspondent of Le Figaro, France’s most popular newspaper, wrote a scathing peice against missionary activity in the Hindustan Times. Francois Gautier must have felt really incensed at the insensitivity of Indian Christians.

More recently, Jon Stock, New Delhi correspondent of the Daily Telegraph (a London paper) wrote a revelatory piece in the Spectator, another British journal, about the activities of missionaries in India. Put simply, Stock wrote, “The Indian subcontinent has become the principal target for a wide range of western Christian missions determined to
spread the Gospel to India’s ‘unreached’ people before the year 2000.” Christian missions in the US have become particularly nasty and offensive.

Stock quotes what the US-based Bethany World Prayer Centre has been writing about Hinduism. Any American who wants to pray for the Ho tribals of south Bihar and northern Orissa, for example, is given a photo, he says, a detailed map and a description of how tribals live and what they believe in, with the suggestion: “Pray against the spirits of
animism and Hinduism that have kept the Ho in spiritual darkness for centuries.” Stock comments: “Bethany’s exhortation to pray against animism and Hinduism is hardly a mark of respect.” He’s being kind. I call that a downright insult to Hinduism. But we are not supposed to protest.

Then Stock quotes ‘The Native Missionary Movement in India’ as saying about Orissa: “Satan has successfully camouflaged his grip on the people of Orissa with a thin veneer of religion.” Is Hinduism satanic? As for ‘AD 2000 and Beyond,’ it says that Varanasi, Hinduism’s holiest city, is full of temples dedicated to Shiva, “an idol whose symbol is a phallus. Many consider the city the very seat of Satan.” Why are our Indian
Bishops quiet in this matter?

But Stock goes further. He writes: “Hundreds and thousands of dollars are being channeled into India through well-organised US-based evangelica missions. The  meticulously researched ethnographic data they are compiling on the region ensures that funds (as well as prayers) are being directed with military precision ot the right places, even to specific PIN codes, in remote tribal districts.”

Stock quotes ‘AD 2000 and Beyond’ as saying: “God is allowing us to spy on the land that we might go in and claim both it and its inhabitants for Him.” The kind of language being used by US evangelical missions to describe Hinduism is appalling. But there is not a word of apology from our Christian bishops.

According to Suresh Kumar Unnithan, writing in the Observer (March 23), “A detailed strategy for massive conversion of tribals, Dalits and backward classes and large-scale church planting was formulated at a meeting of church and missionary leaders in Bhpal recently.”  Unnithan quotes a document prepared by one Dr. Victor Choudrie,
co-ordinator of ‘Harvest Consultant’ (a proselytisation programme of the Protestant Church) and present at the meeting, as saying that “the goal is to plant about 30,000 churches and reach over 10 million ‘unreached’ in the state by the year 2007.” According to the report “MP has 70 million people in 70,000 villages and only 70,000 Christian families. We should strive to have one church in every village by 2010.”

I call this Institutional Christianity and it seems to be hell bent on creating trouble in the name of religion. And the money for all these church-building activities comes from the USS, where Christianity hardly exists. Fro that matter, what sort of Christianity exists in Europe? In Ireland, Catholics and Protestants are at each others’ throats. Not one
of Christ’s preachings are practised anywhere. Germans sent god alone knows how millions Jews to death during the Nazi era. The French ravaged Vietnam and Nigeria. Italians almost destroyed Ethiopia. The record of the Spaniards is despicable as is that of the Portuguese. Americans almost levelled Vietnam – a small nation that had done them no harm – to dust.

Is this Christianity in action? And they have the cheek to come to India to instruct us in pacifist ways? Eurpoean Christianity is the ntithesis of Christianity. It is an insult to Christ. US evangelists dare not send money to support proselytisation in Muslim countries. Let
them try to do so in any Muslim country and they would know what would happen. In India we allow our religion to be trampled upon, our gods insulted – all in the name of secularism.

I would like to know what Sonia Gandhi thinks of all this and what her Indian National Congress Party’s veiws are on this matter.

The government needs to be warned in advance so there is not repetition of the Staines incident. The missionaries need to be told to cry a halt to their activities. And foreign church bodies should be told to lay off.

The point can be made that if non-resident Indians can support the International Hindu Council (Vishwa Hindu Parishad or VHP) financially, why shouldn’t foreign Church bodies finance Indian churches?

The point is that these expatriates are not attempting to convert Christians. In any event, it is a matter of Indians supporting Indians. The people needing conversions are Europeans and Americans. We do not need US-style or European-style Christianity in India; thank you. We are quite happy and at peace with the local variety.

  Pastor

  unitedchurch@eml.cc

 

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Plight of Nuns in the Kerala Churches

September 27, 2008 at 12:02 pm · Filed under Christians in India, Religion ·Tagged , , ,

The Dreadful Dracula Houses of Kerala

Dr. C. I. Issac

The Central Kerala, particularly, the Kottayam district is the highest Christian populated [8, 95,000 or 45.83%] area and is the Vatican of India. It is the bastion of Christian vested interests also. In the recent Assembly elections also this Christian upper hand reflected well,
and to a certain extent it helped to save the face of Congress led front [UDF]. A sizable number of priests and nuns works all over India are haling from this particular area. So it is the nuclei of India’s Christian conversion programme [India for Christ Programme]. Above all, the contemporary European Church is facing spiritual crisis due to its youths reluctance to ordain as priests and nuns and the Churches of Central Kerala solves that through the export of the same. Through this thumbnail sketch of the present-day Kerala Church, this article is intended to draw the attention of the esteemed readers on the malady of those Christian girls who destined to be as nuns or ‘bride of the Jesus’, within the four walls of the convents.

For the last two decades the disastrous end of young girls who embraced the nun-hood turned to be a news item in the column of the vernacular newspapers of Kerala. So far a dozen such news catches the headings of the press. Of the first is the pathetic end of 19 year old student cum
nun Sr. [Sister] Abhaya of Pius X Convent in the heart of the town, Kottayam. She belongs to a lower middle class Catholic family of Kottayam district. On 1992 March 27th, her body was found in the well of the said convent. Her father Thomas Areekkara and mother Leelamma raised
serious doubts about the death of their daughter Beena [changed her name in to Sr. Abhaya after taking the veil]. They categorically say that her daughter has any raison d’être to commit suicide.

The dawn of 27th March was a sad day to the students and teachers of BCM college of Kottayam, where Sr. Abhaya was a student, who met disastrous end in the Pius X convent. The Christian police officer who rushed to the spot was given priority to destroy the evidences, instead of collecting evidences related to her suspicious death. No doubt it was with the political blessings from above. Later ups and downs in the investigations are much evident to justify this doubt. The growing economic and political power of Christians [particularly the Church] in Kerala considerably influenced the course of its investigation. The parents of the deceased nun and the philanthropists of Kottayam continued their legal battle to book the culprit, miserably failed. The
Christian CBI officer who was in charge of investigation resigned from the office while investigation was in progress. The suspected priest and the mother of the convent who ought to be the prime witness in the case were sent to Vatican by the Church authorities and subsequently they became the citizens of the Papal State. Even though the government of India has a healthy diplomatic relation with Vatican, the investigating agencies miserably failed to extradite them for interrogation.

The story of the disastrous deaths of nuns in the convents of Kerala not ends with the mysterious death of Sr. Abhaya. It was the beginning of a new turn in the history of church sponsored criminalism in Kerala. Subsequently, after two weeks, another nun called Sr. Mercy found dead
in a waterless pond in the compound of the convent at Mukkootuthara in the Kottayam district. The all-powerful church hierarchy was able to manipulate the course of investigation from its bud and write-off the death as an accident of drowning. The story of the disastrous death
coming out from the convents of Central Kerala is shrouded in mystery and equal or more than that in the 19th century detective novel Dracula of Bram Stocker.

Another scapegoat of the ‘convent-death’ is Sr. Paulcy of the Snehagiri [Hill of Love] Convent of Palai near Kottayam. It was on 17th May 2000. She died of the consumption of poisoned meet food. No other inmates of the convent is affected with food poison, is the paradox to be answered.
But the convent authorities had given obituary advertisement in leading vernacular newspaper that Sr. Paulcy [35] died of heart attack. Even though she lost her life in the night of 17th May, the matter was informed to her parents who reside very near to the convent only after eight O’clock in the morning of the next day. Parents of the unfortunate nun raised doubts about the death and the police intervened. The post-mortem report negated the Convent hierarchy’s argument of the ‘heart attack’. The sister and mother of the deceased nun recollected the story which told her a few weeks back that, “a lot of foreign remittance is flowing to the Convent and she happened to see the details of the remittance caused the wrath of the Mother superior of the Convent and she scolded a lot her”. [2nd largest circulated daily of Kerala; Matrubhoomi Daily, Kottayam, 25th June 2000]. Any way the story of mysterious deaths of nuns clearly giving some clue that most of the convents in the Central Kerala are not only the abodes nuns but also the
seat of mysterious transactions including the violation of the Commandments 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th. [For the details of the quoted Commandments, see Exodus, Chapter XIX, Aphorisms 2 – 17].

After a couple of months, Sr. Sofi, a 27 year old nun of Velliyappally Valakkattu Convent of Palai became the next victim of “Convent Tragedy”. Her body found in the well of the convent. As usual police has registered an FIR. But the investigation not yet reached any shore of conclusion. It is quite natural that a prominent leader of Kerala politics and his party is the product of the Catholic Church and he belongs to Palai. So in all the church/priest/nun related criminal offences are always shrouding in obscurity. Hence the unnatural death of Sr. Sofi also got the same destiny.

The story of the destiny of Sr. Anjo has yet another dimension. A 22 year old nun found solace in suicide on 29th December 2003. She was an intelligent and smart girl who opt the path of “Bride-ship of the Christ” owing to the compulsion of the family and parents. She was the inmate of SH Convent, Chanjodi near Kottaym. To the Anjo the life in the monotonous convent was boring and she thought about the deliverance. The parents and the Convent authorities insisted her to continue in veil. She lost all hopes of deliverance and finally she fond solace in hanging
on the fan. [Feature from Keralasabdham Weekly,- a prominent Malayalam news weekly - 19th January 2003, pp 12, 13].

The tragic death Sr. Ancy, 32, of Bethany Convent of Ranny-Perunnadu was the story of yet another unfortunate who found [it is said] her destiny in the well of the convent. She was a teacher of the school run by the church. Her dead body found in the well in the early morning. But the convent authorities informed the police only after 10′O clock in the morning. This response of the convent authorities was doubtful. The police investigation lost its momentum elsewhere in the deluge of time. Once again the name of one more nun, Sr. Ancy, was also written in the list of Christ’s Brides, which appears, on the walls of paradise.

Now the story of unnatural deaths in the convents is not at all news to an ordinary Malayalee. Even though, it is genuine to bring the news of the tragic end of the last but not least nun. On 23rd June 2006 Sr. Lisa of Saint Francis Clarist Convent of Iravuchira, a hamlet near Kottayam,
who ends her life in the convent by consuming poison. The relatives and guardians of the deceased Sr. Lisa strongly believe that her decision of ending life is the outcome of the torture and humiliation that met by her from the convent authorities. [Janmabhoomi Daily – a prominent Hindu news paper - Kottayam, 26th June 2006].

The above mentioned are only some identical incidents from a dozen convent tragedies that took place in the recent past. Those politicians who cast their covetous eyes on the vote banks of the Church have no sufficient will to ensure justice to the souls of the ill-fated women who forced to take veil. The parents of the unfortunate Sr. Abhaya’s fight for justice not yet produced any fruits. The power seeking politician’s interference in the investigation turned down as the stumbling block behind the way to ensure justice to the soul of Sr. Abhaya.

The wretched girls who fettered in the convents are hailing from economically poor Christian families of Kerala. The wealth and religion are not traveling together in the practical experience/case of Christianity in the west. The contemporary European Christian experience
substantiates this universal truth. The rich European region is now reluctant to contribute priests and nuns to cater the demands of the Church. Now this gap is filled from less prosperous countries of Asia and Africa. The Church in Kerala is booking profit out of the economic
backwardness that still exists amongst the Christian families and thus recruits girls from such families as nuns. Usually girls are enrolled in to the bandwagon of nunnery at the tender ages. The compulsions of the parents who are allured by the Church are grazing its lass to the
‘heavenly prisons’ [convents]. One cannot deny the role of convents schools to motivate young and innocent girls to the ’slaughter houses’ [convents].

The Syrian Christian community with immense wealth, celebrating their marriage ceremonies with the pomp of “Maha Kumba Melas”, is the real culprit behind the plight of poor girls behind the bars of convents. The seven-digit dowry and celebration turned as a nightmare to the poor
Christian families. So the economically weak in the Christian community can’t imagine marriage of their daughters. Kottayam, a small town of 25 lakhs of people and five Cathedrals with Christian economic dominance, has one and a half dozen ‘five star jewelers’ shows the extent of the pompous of richness of Syrian Christians. Now money is a deciding factor in this community. So, economically weak Christians are gearing to compete with the rest through acquiring money. As a result they are compelling their lasses to opt either to nursing or to nunnery. The convent is dam cheap as compared to nursing. So the economically too poor parents are forced to herd their damsels to the convents. Therefore, the Kerala’s Syrian Christian Church is the chief contributor
of the 95% of nuns required for the proselytism activities of the Churches in India.

The allegations both moral and material are the universal ghost haunting the Christendom all over the world. One Catholic Priest from India [Kerala] got four months jail term for sexually abusing a twelve year old laity girl in USA. The convicted Rev. Francis X Nelson [38] hailing
from Kerala served as the Confidential Secretary Kottar [Tamilnadu] Bishop Leon Tharmaraj. [The New Indian Express, Kochi, 28 March 2003]. Broklyn [USA] Diocese Bishop has forced to transfer 42 files related to sexual abuses involved by twenty five Catholic priests to the
authorities during the trial of the Rev. Nelson’s case. [Janmabhoomi Daily, Kochi, 28 March 2003]. The Vatican recently confessed that priests and nuns under the Roman Catholic Church in several countries including India and Italy involving in sexual relations. La Republica
daily of Italy reports that priests and nuns involved rape, conception and abortion are frequently reported from various regions. [Janmabhoomi Daily, Kochi, 22 March 2001]. Priests involvements in murder and other subversive activate are increasing at a high rate.

It is believed that the Catholic Priests and Nuns are chronic bachelors and chronic spinsters respectively who practices Bramachariay/Sanyasaa Ashram/life of hermit are using high calorie fat food is one among several reasons of the increase of sexual appetite. This is the main
reason for the sex related crimes also. If the church is interested to maintain the purity of the concept of hermit life amongst its soldiers of proselytism, it is better to follow Hindu practices of vegetarianism and yoga. Otherwise papal effort to maintain hermitage in the Church order will be a futile effort.

Let us return to Kerala scenario. In September 2001 St. Alphonsa Church at Kolayad near Kannur was ransacked by some [the discontented laity] people. Those who are lamenting of Sanga Parivar attack on churches in other states followed lukewarm attitude towards this attack. This was happened so, because of the frustration that brewing inside the church. Fr. Job Chittilappally, a 71 year old padre of St. Varaprasada Matha Church, near Chalakudi in Trichur district found dead with stab injuries in August 2004. The Church has shown no enthusiasm in booking the culprit, is noteworthy. Earlier for petty problems nuns and priests along with laity display their might in the street. But in this case there were no such road shows. All these are the signs of the ever-deteriorating morale space of the Church and Christianity all over.

So here comes the question of social justice. The ill-fated girls who destined to the hellish suffering within the four walls of convents have the right to live. The government and constitution has moral and legal right to ensure the right of life of them. So the practice of recruiting girls to the convents before the growth of ‘wisdom teeth’ must go. The recruitment to the profession of nunnery at the tender age is not different from girl-foeticide. So it must be treated as criminal act and those who involve, with out considering the social status of person,
must brought before the law. If criminal laws are not sufficient to deal with, it should make further laws to book the culprits.

  unitedchurch@eml.cc

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Italy Summons Indian Ambassador Re Fate of Indian Christians

September 27, 2008 at 11:55 am · Filed under Christians in India, Religion ·Tagged , , ,

The Katherine Mayos and Pat Robertsons of India-II

V Sundaram
25 September 2008
NewsTodaynet.com

The chairman of the UPA Co-ordination Committee Sonia Gandhi has succeeded in converting India into a banana republic.  Ever since the minority UPA anti-Hindu Government came to power in New Delhi with the outside support of known fifth columnists from the days of Quit India Movement in 1942—I am referring to the Communists of all grades and shades—the sovereignty of India has been on sale in the International market under the malignant umbrella of ‘National Soul Destroying Secularism’.

When Swamy Laksmanananda was brutally murdered by Christian missionaries in Orissa on Krishna Jayanthi day on 23 August 2008, the Hindus of Orissa rose in revolt in Kandhamal District. At that time the Italian Government had the temerity to summon the Indian Ambassador in Rome to take ‘decisive action to curb anti-Christian violence in Orissa’. Even a first year graduate student of international relations will declare without much ado that the 62nd Government in Italy after the end of Second World War in May 1945 (almost at the rate of one new Government every Calendar year!) breached all known canons of diplomatic propriety, resulting in a public relations disaster of enormous magnitude, when it summoned the Indian Ambassador. The UPA Government, maintained an indifferent attitude of cold, neutral, and secular silence without even lodging a protest with the Government of Italy for brazenly interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign country like India.
   

The fascist Italian Government’s poor diplomacy followed the Pope’s condemnation of bloodletting in Orissa. As the head of a denominational commercial enterprise, which is what the Vatican is, Pope Benedict XVI is perhaps justified in raising questions about the security of Christians everywhere. However, in the immediate context of India, he chose to look at the issue only selectively. The fact of the matter is that in Orissa, like elsewhere in India, Christian evangelists — largely from Pentecostal and Baptist groups in the United States but sometimes from Catholic orders as well — look upon local populations as a viable market, and converts as ‘market share’. Their known business is ‘The Harvest of Pagan/Heathen Souls’.

Following the Government of Italy and the Pope in Rome, it is now the turn of the US Government to interfere in the internal affairs of India.  The disgraceful track record of blatant interference of American Government in the internal affairs of countries in Asia after the Second World War is too well known.  The American Government has been functioning as the self declared ‘Head Constable of the World’. The US State Department issues two significant reports annually—one on International Religious Freedom and the other on Global terrorism.  The report on terrorism is titled ‘Patterns on Global Terrorism’ and is issued normally in the first week of May. The report on Inernational Religious Freedom is issued in September of each year by the Office of International Religious Freedom of the US State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour.  This report is besides the other report on International Religious Freedom issued by the more infamous USCIRF!
  in May of every year.  Both the USCIRF and the Office of International Religious Freedom were constituted by an Act of Congress, the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.

Two days ago, the US Government has condemned violence against Christians in India during the last two months.  Ambassador at large for International Religious Freedom Thomas Hanford, has said: ‘We urge all parties to refrain from violence and urge government officials to protect religious freedom throughout India and thus preserve India’s longstanding tradition of religious tolerance.’  Our External Affairs Minister, perhaps awaits his instructions not from South Block (which he can ignore without any detriment to the safety of his (In!)- glorious ‘PUBLIC OFFICE’) but from No 10, Janpath, New Delhi. For all our Union Cabinet Ministers and more so for our Prime Minister, the Sovereignty of India can be compromised at any time, anywhere in any part of the world!.  What can never be compromised at any cost is the Sovereignty of Sonia Gandhi.

The political inspiration for Thomas Hanford’s uncalled for interference in the internal affairs of India stems from White House in Washington. President Bush has politically chased two things like an American Bull Dog during the last eight years—the first being Saddam Hussain and his ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ in Iraq and the second being Faith Based Social Service Initiative emanating from a White House Office to promote Government aid to Churches and Christian faith-based Organizations.

In these columns on 20 February 2007, in an article titled ‘Bush-sponsored Evangelization of India’, I had commented as follows: ‘One of the early and most important major policy decisions which President Bush took on 29 January, 2001, was in regard to a ‘Faith Based’ social service initiative that included a new White House office to promote government aid to churches and Christian faith-based organisations. This had the immediate effect of throwing the massive weight of the federal government behind religious groups and religious conversions. The Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives was set up in the White House in the first week of February 2002 and a man called Jim Towey was appointed as Director. The most interesting and important point to be noted in this context is that Jim Towey was the legal counsel to Mother Teresa in the late 1980s. Thus he was fully qualified in every sense of the term to play the role of an aggressive evangelist. What is mos!
t disturbing to note is that though Bush’s initiative as a 11th century Crusader to fund ‘salvation and religious conversion’ has been stalled in the Congress over constitutional and civil rights concerns, yet he has pushed for its implementation through his own executive orders. Consequently, new waves of aggressive evangelism have been emanating and issuing out from America and invading India, with its epicenter in Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh, under the control of Seventh Day Adventist Chief Minister Dr. Samuel (Rajasekhar Reddy). This White House-sponsored movement for the evangelization of India is well funded, superbly networked and backed by the highest of the land in America. This is being fully supported informally by the UPA government in New Delhi under the stranglehold of a de facto Prime Minister, tracing her spiritual and cultural roots to Italy in general and to Vatican in particular’.

I am very amused to see that Christian Leaders like Bengaluru Archbishop Dr Bernard Moras, V Devasahayam, Convenor of the Chennai Churches Fraternity, (CCF),  All India Christian Council (AICC!!) President Joseph Dsouza, National Integration Council Member John Dayal, etc. etc., are crying hoarse about the persecution of Christians in the India of today.  In this context I would like to invite their kind attention to what I had written in these columns on 10 July 2007 under the title ‘Genuine tears in Pakistan vs Hypocritical tears in India’: ‘Let us contrast this politically imagined situation of fictionalised atrocities against the Christians in India with what is actually happening in Pakistan today. It has been extensively reported in all forms of media during the last one week that Christian clerics in Multan District in Pakistan are being forced to convert to Islam or face death. Naveed Amer Jeeva, Pastor Joseph Daniel, Dr Elvin and Pastor Mehtab Masih, all front!
  rank leaders of the All Pakistan Minorities Alliance (APMA) stated at a joint news conference on 6 July 2007 in Multan: “As many as 10 Christian Clerics have received threatening letters from unidentified people reading  ‘Embrace Islam, Stop Preaching Christianity and quit your faith. Otherwise the count down of your life has begun’. Naveed Amer Jeeva of the APMA said: ‘A state of fear prevails in Shanti Nagar (Multan Town) because District and Provincial Governments have turned a deaf ear to our problems. We are feeling insecure and unsafe today because of these threatening letters from Muslim fanatics. Pastor Mukhtar Barkat had received a similar threatening letter from Muslim fanatics in 2004 and was assassinated on 5 January 2004 in Khurrampura Khanewal. The minorities in general and the Christians in particular are not safe in Pakistan. Recently, Christians in Charsadda also received threatening letters warning them to shut their Churches and convert to Islam.!
.. Even a petition has been filed against the appointment of J!
ustice B
hagawan Das as acting Chief Justice of Pakistan on the ground that he is a non-Muslim (a Hindu)’.

When a Church in Cochin near Nedumbassery International Airport was attacked recently, in an orchestrated Anti-Hindu chorus, many Christian Leaders unconscionably attacked the Sangh Parivar.  Now I have received the report that the Kerala Police have arrested a Christian named Elias in connection with this attack.  The pseudo-secular mafia of mass media in India—both print and electronic—which ran ‘sensational’ stories to link Hindu organisations with the attack along with Pinarai Vijayan is not uttering a word since the arrest of Elias – A laity of the Jacobite church!
         

Last year Swamy Dayanand Saraswati told me in Chennai that three leading Rabbis who met the Swamiji in New Delhi had told him that India is the only country in the world where the Jews have never been persecuted at any point of time in the last 2000 years. Our hypocritical Christian leaders should also take their lessons from them, if not from the fanatic Muslims of Multan District in Pakistan today. In this context, I cannot help quoting the brilliant words of VOLTAIRE (1694-1778):

‘Christianity is the most ridiculous, the most absurd and bloody religion that has ever infected the world- – -Where is the prince sufficiently educated to know that for seventeen hundred years the Christian sect has done nothing but harm?’ (LETTERS TO FREDRICK THE GREAT, 1767)’.

(The writer is a retired IAS officer)
e-mail the writer at
vsundaram@newstodaynet.com

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Christians in Tripura Supporting Separatists

September 27, 2008 at 11:52 am · Filed under Christians in India, Religion ·Tagged ,

y Subir Bhaumik

18 April 2000

The government in India’s north-eastern state of Tripura says it has evidence that the state’s Baptist Church is involved in backing separatist rebels. Tripura Chief Minister Manik Sarkar said state police had uncovered details of the alleged link after questioning a church leader.

Mr Sarkar said that allegations about the close links between the state’s Baptist Church and the rebel National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) have long been made by political parties and police. Now for the first time, he said, hard evidence supporting the allegations had been found.

Explosives

Mr Sarkar told the BBC that Mr Halam was found in possession of more than 50 gelatine sticks, 5kg of potassium and 2kg of sulphur and other ingredients for making explosives. Nagmanlal Halam, secretary of the Noapara Baptist Church in Tripura, was arrested late on Monday with a large quantity of explosives.

He said that two other junior members of the same church, arrested last week, had tipped the police off about the explosives which were meant for the NLFT rebels. The chief minister said that Mr Halam confessed to buying and supplying explosives to the NLFT for the past two years.

Another church official, Jatna Koloi, was arrested in south Tripura last week.

Police say Mr Koloi had received training in guerrilla warfare at an NLFT base last year.

Conversion

Guards have been placed outside the headquarters of the Baptist Church in Tripura’s capital, Agartala, to prevent possible attacks on it once the news of Mr Halam’s arrest spread. The NLFT is accused of forcing Tripura’s indigenous tribes to become Christians and give up Hindu forms of worship in areas under their control.

Last year, they issued a ban on the Hindu festivals of Durga Puja and Saraswati Puja.

The NLFT manifesto says that they want to expand what they describe as the kingdom of God and Christ in Tripura. The Baptist Church in Tripura was set up by missionaries from New
Zealand 60 years ago.

It won only a few thousand converts until 1980 when in the aftermath, of the state’s worst ethnic riot, the number of conversions grew. 

-- 
  Reverend D'souza  catholicunion@eml.cc
 

 


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Inter-Provincial Disputes Over Water in Pakistan

September 24, 2008 at 10:13 am · Filed under Pakistan ·Tagged , , ,

Indus Water Accord 1991

 

1.1 Historical Background

Pakistan’s agriculture and hence the country’s economy are heavily dependent on the Indus River system. Around 50% of the labour force is employed in agriculture; the agrarian sector accounts for some 25% of GDP. The Indus originates far north in the mountains of Tibet, and flows north-west through Ladakh-Baltistan into Gilgit, where it gradually turns south into Indian-administered Kashmir. The Indus River has five main tributaries: Sutlej, Ravi, Beas, Jhelum and Chenab. In its 2,900 km journey from the Himalayas to the Indian Ocean it is augmented by numerous other rivers, adding to its volume. The Partition of the Indian Subcontinent in 1947 raised issues about the distribution of water, and particularly about supply of water to Pakistan. However, under the terms of the 1960 Indus Water Treaty, India and Pakistan agreed to share the Indus’ water supply. The three eastern rivers Sutlej, Ravi and Beas went to India while the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab waters were allocated to Pakistan. The 1960 Treaty also made provisions for the transfer of irrigation water from the eastern rivers to parts of Pakistan formerly supplied by them. The Indus Water Basin Treaty is considered a landmark achievement in terms of resolving water disputes and reaching mutually acceptable terms for sharing supplies. There have been some issues with implementation of the Treaty, particularly related to the construction of new barrages and dams by India, but on the whole the Treaty remains an effective instrument. However, there are also significant issues with the distribution of water within Pakistan. One of the main problems to emerge as a result of the 1960 Treaty was the geographic mismatch between rivers flowing in the west and irrigated lands in the east. Tarbela Dam, the world’s largest earth-filled dam, and several link canals were built to ensure supply of water to these lands. Another issue was the distribution of water between provinces:

 

1991 Indus Water Accord

Inter-provincial disputes, particularly between Punjab and Sindh, considerably pre-date the creation of Pakistan. Pre-Partition attempts by Punjab to construct irrigation infrastructure on the Indus were opposed by Sindh. In 1945 the British imposed a solution on the two provinces, which gave priority to Sindh’s right to receive water from the Indus. No further sharing arrangement was made upon Partition, so the British formula remained in force and was followed until 1970. Thereafter the federal government began allocating water on an ad hoc basis: its decisions favoured Punjab. Disputes between the provinces continued because of the perceived pro-Punjab bias in allocations, and because of the impact of water infrastructure construction on the smaller provinces (see below). Numerous commissions were formed to resolve these issues but failed to reach agreement – until 1991.

 

In 1991 the four Chief Ministers agreed the Indus Water Apportionment Accord. This allowed for a minimum flow of water into the sea, and shared the remainder between the four provinces. In this way, the Accord allowed for the erratic flow of water in the Indus, and ensured that all provinces gained from surpluses or lost from shortages in supply. The distribution of water agreed was as follows:

 

Punjab: 55.94 MAF (million acre feet)

Sindh: 48.76 MAF

NWFP: 5.78 MAF (+ 3.00 MAF for ungauged canals)

Balochistan: 3.87 MAF

 

Balance river supplies (including flood waters and future storage) were to be distributed as follows:

 

Punjab: 37%

Sindh: 37%

NWFP: 14%

Balochistan: 12%

Total: 114.35 MAF (+ 3.00 MAF)

Total: 100%

 

In May 1994 the Punjab government again proposed a revision of the ten-daily figures to base these on historical use. An Inter-10Ministerial Committee allegedly reached consensus on this arrangement, but the decision was challenged in the courts which upheld the previous 1991 Accord arrangement. In practice, however, the smaller provinces accuse Punjab of using its ‘upstream’ position and control of water infrastructure to implement sharing on the basis of historic use.

 

1.3 Issues in Implementation

 

The formula for water distribution was based on ten-day average use, system-wise and seasonally adjusted (Kharif and Rabi) figures provided by the provinces. The Council of Common Interests (CCI) met in September 1991, six months after the Accord was signed, to agree the ten-daily use figures. Punjab had wanted the figures to be based on ‘historic use’ between 1977-82, the period during which ad hoc allocations by the federal government had favoured the province. This proposal was opposed by the smaller provinces, and rejected by the CCI. The formula for water distribution was based on ten-day average use, system-wise and seasonally adjusted (Kharif and Rabi) figures provided by the provinces. The Council of Common Interests (CCI) met in September 1991, six months after the Accord was signed, to agree the ten-daily use figures. Punjab had wanted the figures to be based on ‘historic use’ between 1977-82, the period during which ad hoc allocations by the federal government had favoured the province. This proposal was opposed by the smaller provinces, and rejected by the CCI.

 

In May 1994, the Punjab Government again proposed a revision of the ten-daily figures to base these on historical use. The smaller provinces accuse Punjab of using its upstream position and control of water infrastructure to implement sharing on the basis of historic use. Sindh in particular contends that it has received less water than its entitlement under the 1991 Accord. It says that the reduced flow is insufficient to meet minimum requirements for inflow to the sea; seawater now comes up to 100 km inland. The result of this is increased salination of lower Sindh agricultural lands, with subsequent adverse effects on ecosystems, soil quality and deterioration in the quality and quantity of water supply to Karachi (both due to increased salinity and increased concentrations of pollutants) causing diseases and health problems for vast populations. Another problem is the shrinking of the Indus basin mangrove forest, which is dependent on fresh water supplies. Once the sixth largest in the world, this has reduced in size by 38% between 1977 and 1990. The livelihood of thousands of people who depend on the mangrove forests is threatened.

 

In short, despite the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord, there are significant disputes between the provinces over the current distribution of water.

 

2. Pakistan’s (Looming) Water Crisis

Inter-provincial disputes are taking place against a backdrop of a looming water crisis for the whole country. Pakistan is one of the most arid countries in the world, receiving an average of just 240 mm rain per year. The rising population means per capita water availability has fallen dramatically: from 5,000 cubic metres per person in 1947, to 1,200 cubic metres currently. This is projected to fall to under 1,000 cubic metres by 2010. This makes Pakistan one of the most water-stressed countries in the world. Pakistan’s dependence on just one water supply system the Indus River makes it particularly vulnerable. Unlike other countries with multiple river systems, Pakistan has no alternatives to draw on if Indus supplies fall short. There are no new water sources that can be mobilized to meet increasing demands. Continued over-exploitation of groundwater, particularly by private farmers sinking tube wells, has depleted groundwater supplies and affected water quality. In some parts of Balochistan farmers have to plumb hundreds of metres to access water. The quality of the Indus water supply is also deteriorating: salinity is a major problem some 12 million tons of salt are added to the Indus basin each year; so too large-scale uncontrolled pollution of surface and groundwater by increased use of pesticides and fertilizers in agricultures, and rapidly expanding cities and industries. The accumulation of silt and other deposits in Indus system beds means rising water levels, leading to the danger of floods.

 

While there have been huge investments in new water infrastructure, the traditional neglect of maintenance means that much of this is in very poor condition. Furthermore, the quality of new project implementation has fallen. All this means that a lot of water is wasted through seepages and lack of storage/utilization infrastructure. Pakistan is not making optimal use of the limited water it has.

 

Already, millions of people in urban centres like Karachi, and in large parts of Sindh and Balochistan, suffer from severe water shortages. As Pakistan’s population, particularly in urban areas, expands there will be more demand for water for non-agricultural purposes. This raises the genuine danger of extreme water scarcity it is estimated Quetta will run out of potable water within 20 years – and ‘water conflicts’. Pakistan needs to act quickly to avert its looming water crisis.

 

3. The Dam Debate

In a system with variable water supply such as the Indus, storage capacity is needed to regulate water supply ensuring that surpluses are not wasted and there is sufficient water to meet needs in times of shortage. Pakistan’s water storage capacity is currently very limited. Both the United States and Australia have over 5,000 cubic metres of storage capacity per person; China has 2,200 cubic metres; Pakistan is way behind with just 150 cubic metres of storage capacity per person. Even the dams that have been built in Pakistan are dwarfed by those in other semi-arid countries. In the US, dams of the Colorado and Murray-Darling Rivers can hold a mammoth 900 days of average flow run-13off.India can store between 120 and 220 days river flow, but Pakistan can store only 30 days run-off. The Government of Pakistan argues that it has to increase the country’s water storage capacity, through the construction of large dams, in order to tackle the looming water crisis. These would have the added benefit of generating electric power, thereby helping meet the country’s expanding power needs. Among the dams being planned by the government as part of its strategy of dam construction to address water shortages and generate power are Kalabagh, Akhori, Kuram Tangi and Munda. The total estimated cost of three dams Kalabagh, Diamer-Bhasha and Akhori is Rs.1.027 trillion, Rs.432 billion of which will 14have to come from foreign sources. There is considerable opposition to the government’s dam construction strategy, and specifically to proposals to construct the Kalabagh Dam.

 

3.1 Kalabagh Dam Proposal

The Kalabagh Dam is to be built on the river Indus at Kalabagh in Punjab’s Mianwali district, on the border between NWFP and Punjab. The Government estimates construction will take until 2016, and will generate 35,000 jobs as well as 3,600 MW of hydro-electric power. Punjab sees the dam as vital to increasing agricultural and industrial productivity, and argues that it would prevent ‘wastage’ of water flowing into the Arabian Sea. According to the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) the total cultivable land to be permanently submerged by the dam will be around 14,000 hectares. Independent estimates put the figure as high as 74,000 hectares. Note that neither figure takes into account lands that would be inundated in a flood, or from rising river levels above the dam. There are also differences between WAPDA and other sources’ estimates about the number of people who will be displaced by the dam: 83,000 versus over 100,000 respectively.

 

3.2 Provincial Opposition

The proposal to construct a dam at Kalabagh was first put forward by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1984. Since then it has been the subject of almost continuous inter-provincial heated discussion and dispute, with Punjab on one side supporting construction and all three of the smaller provinces on the other side, vehemently opposed.

 

In NWFP the fear is not of diminished water supply, since the dam will be downstream, but of the environmental and physical impact of the dam itself on the surrounding areas. Figures for permanently submerged cultivable land and displaced people were given above the estimate of 100,000 displaced is endorsed by the NWFP Government. There is considerable skepticism about federal promises to recompense those affected and resettle them. The threat of flooding of the fertile Nowshera Valley and of Nowshera city (with a population of 200,000) is also taken very seriously in NWFP. Should this happen it would destroy the economic backbone of the province. The October 2005 earthquake highlighted the dangers of building a dam in what is a highly active seismic zone.

The Kalabagh Dam will generate hydro-electric power. The normal procedure is for royalties for power generation to go to the province where they originated. In NWFP there are concerns that the province will be denied royalties because of the dam’s location on the Punjab-NWFP border and because of plans to position the dam’s turbines in Punjab. Both the Punjab and federal governments have given assurances this will not happen.

 

In Balochistan opposition stems from the fear that the province’s water supply will be diminished by construction of Kalabagh Dam, but even more from the perception that it favours Punjab and reinforces traditional Punjabi domination. In other words, the dam is seen in the wider context of Balochi resentment at their treatment by the federal government, which they equate with Punjab. In Sindh, by contrast, the opposition is very much focused on the direct impact of the dam’s construction. The fear is that the detrimental consequences of diminished water supply already experienced by the province inflow of seawater, loss of agricultural land to desertification, loss of livelihoods, shrinking of the mangrove forests, deterioration in water quality and health problems will be exacerbated. The proposed construction of a new canal on the left bank of the Indus, to take water to the Rasul-Qadirabad area of Punjab and increase its agricultural potential, is seen by Sindhis as a further indication that they will get less water if the dam goes ahead. Assurances by President Musharraf, Prime Minister Aziz and other national leaders that Sindh will get its fair share of water after Kalabagh Dam is built, have largely fallen on deaf ears. Sindhis point to the failure to give them their share under the 1991 Water Accord. As in Balochistan, the dam issue is also viewed in Sindh through the wider lens of minority province resentment at federal-Punjabi domination. The three smaller provinces have been unequivocal in voicing their opposition to the Kalabagh Dam proposal. All three Provincial Assemblies have passed resolutions rejecting Kalabagh Dam. There have been numerous demonstrations against the government’s plans, led primarily by the nationalist parties Awami National Party (ANP) in NWFP; the Sindhi Awami Tehreek; and even by the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). Sindh Chief Minister Arbab Rahim described the dam project as ‘technically unviable and politically impossible’. Interestingly, the mainstream parties have been more reticent on the issue, no doubt concerned about losing support in pro-dam Punjab. Government attempts to promote dialogue and consensus-building on the dam’s construction appear to have had the opposite effect of catalyzing opposition to it.

 

3.3 Current Status: Bhasha Dam

In December 2005 President Musharraf made a ‘unilateral’ announcement that construction of the Kalabagh Dam would go ahead. However, following strong opposition from Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan, that plan appears to have been placed on a back burner. Instead the government has initiated construction of the Diamer-Bhasha Dam in the Northern Areas. The site for the Bhasha Dam is in Diamer, some 314 km upstream of Tarbela. With an estimated capacity of 7.3 million MAF, it is expected to generate 3,360 MW of power. In April 2006 President Musharraf laid the foundation for what the government hopes will be the first of five dams to be built in the next decade.

 

Initiation of work on the Bhasha Dam has, not surprisingly, caused the focus of opposition to shift away from Kalabagh to it. The issues involved are remarkably similar. In the region where the dam will be located, the Northern Areas, there is alarm about its environmental and physical impact. The Bhasha dam will cover an area about 110 km displacing some 100,000 people (government estimates are for 33,000 displaced persons); there is nowhere in the Northern Areas for these people to be resettled, and their unique culture means it will be hard for them to adjust to a new, distant locality. There are also fears that Chilas could be flooded.

 

Given this potentially huge price the Northern Areas could well end up paying for the new dam, the people there are demanding compensation and that they receive royalties from generation of hydroelectric power at Bhasha. But plans for the dam indicate its electricity-generating turbines will be located in NWFP; that province is already laying claims to the revenue from power generation. Should this happen, there will be great anger in the Northern Areas at what they perceive as a denial of natural justice.

 

In NWFP opposition to Bhasha Dam is muted if not absent. This is not surprising, given that NWFP will be saved the environmental and physical disruption and damage caused by dam construction, and could well profit from power generation at the new dam.

 

But in Sindh, Bhasha is opposed as vehemently as Kalabagh. There the worry is that Bhasha will lead to diminished water supply and all its consequent negative effects. An additional ‘international’ dimension to opposition to the Bhasha Dam comes from India, which asserts that parts of Indian Kashmir will be submerged by it. Despite all the opposition, work on the Bhasha Dam has started.

 

4. Recommendations

Pakistan’s looming (some would say ‘existing’) water crisis is something that will affect all Pakistanis in all provinces. The key to addressing this water crisis, and averting the very real danger of extreme water scarcity within just a few decades, is collective action. The Council of Common Interests and the 1991 Indus Water Treaty were supposed to provide the foundation for collective, inter-provincial action on water issues. Unfortunately, various factors prevented this happening, and the situation today is that there is a wide gulf between Punjab and the other three provinces. If Pakistan is to meet the challenges ahead, this gulf has to be bridged. Possible steps to achieve and prepare Pakistan to deal with future water issues include: a. Implement the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord in full, ensuring all provinces get their fair share of water. b. Reconstitute the Council of Common Interests and give it the power to make decisions on water disputes. c. Carry out feasibility studies to obtain an accurate assessment of the impact of constructing various dams. d. Consider alternatives to controversial dams projects such as Kalabagh, e.g. an increased number of smaller dams. e. Seek consensus from all stakeholders through open and informed policy dialogue before making decisions to construct new dams: avoid imposed decisions. f. Ensure that plans for new dam construction include compensation and resettlement provisions for affected communities. g. Allocate more resources for water infrastructure and strengthen water management so that optimal use is made of available supplies.

 

Conclusion

In October 1999, as part of his seven-point agenda for reform, General Musharraf promised to work towards ’strengthening the federation, removing inter-provincial disharmony and restoring national cohesion.’ The distribution of fiscal and natural resources between federal and provincial governments is one of the main causes of disharmony in the Pakistani federation. As this paper shows, there are serious problems with the distribution of fiscal resources, of natural gas and hydel power revenue, and of water. All could have a very detrimental impact on the future of the federation as seen in the conflict underway in Balochistan. Institutionalized systems and procedures need to be developed which will allow fair and equitable sharing of resources, so that all provinces can deliver basic services to citizens, and none feels it is being exploited.

 

Institutionalization of these mechanisms is the key to achieving consensus and sustainability. On paper, many of these mechanisms already exist the National Finance Commission, the Council of Common Interests, the 1991 Indus Water Accord. While some bodies require modification in their membership and/or mandate (notably the NFC), the prime issue is weak implementation. The various bodies established to regulate the division of resources between the federal government and the four provinces are not functioning as they should be. This has to change, and it is the federal government which must take the lead in bringing about reform and ensuring proper implementation. Pakistan faces many challenges in lifting its human development indicators, increasing long-term economic growth and ensuring the country is able to meet the demands of globalization and shrinking resources. It is only through collective action, based on trust and mutual respect, that it will be able to meet these. No single province can prosper and advance if the rest of the country suffers from poor growth and development. A disunited Pakistan, with provinces feuding amongst themselves and with the federal government, will be to the detriment of all Pakistanis.

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Constitutional Distribution of Natural Gas & Hydro-Electric Power

September 24, 2008 at 10:03 am · Filed under Pakistan ·Tagged , ,

Natural Gas and Hydro-Electric Power

1. Provisions for Distribution

 

Article 161 of the 1973 Constitution makes explicit provisions for the allocation of royalties from natural gas production and generation of hydro-electric power. It stipulates that the net proceeds from excise duties and royalties on natural gas collected by the federal government shall be paid to the province in which the well-head of the gas is situated. Similarly, for hydro-electric power the stipulation is that net profits earned by the federal government shall be paid to the province in which the hydro-electric station is situated. The National Finance Commission follows Article 161 when it decides the allocation of natural gas and oil royalties. These do not go into the Federal Consolidated Fund (from which the Divisible Pool is derived), but form a separate fund which after deduction of fixed percentage collection charges by the federal government is returned to the province of origin.

 

This would appear to be a simple and straightforward mechanism for allocation of royalties, but in practice it has been fraught with problems and is another source of dispute between various provincial governments and the federal government, as well as of inter-provincial disputes. The key disputes are as follows:

 

2. Balochistan

Balochistan is the largest province by land-mass in Pakistan: it covers 44% of the country, and has a bigger area than Punjab and NWFP combined. The province’s population, however, is the smallest in the country, accounting for just 7% of the total. The consequent sparse population distribution raises significant development challenges. Balochistan is one of the most resource-rich provinces in Pakistan. It has considerable reserves of natural gas accounting for almost half the country’s total gas production, as well as coal and minerals including platinum, silver, copper and uranium. However, there is considerable resentment in the province at what is perceived as exploitation of its natural resources by the federal government.

 

It is estimated that 36-45% of Pakistan’s gas is produced in Balochistan. Production infrastructure has been installed under the aegis of the federal government, bringing in large numbers of non-Baloch technicians and workers. Balochis resent the fact that they are not employed in these projects, or are only hired as unskilled labour. They concede that there is a skills shortage in the province, but assert the federal government should provide locals the training to carry out the requisite tasks.

 

The second bigger Baloch grievance with regard to natural gas is about its use and royalties. Gas was discovered at Sui in 1953, and supplied to cities in Punjab in 1964. But it was not until 1986 that Balochistan’s capital Quetta received gas and only then because a military cantonment had been established there. 17% of the gas produced in Balochistan is used in the province; even today, just four of Balochistan’s 26 districts have a gas supply. The gas from Balochistan that goes to the rest of the country is sold at a much lower price than gas produced in Punjab and Sindh. The province has received only 12.4% of the royalties due to it from the federal government. The backlog dating back to 1953 owed to Balochistan runs into tens of billions of Rupees. The federal government claims it does not have the funds to pay this back; Balochis fear the payment will be written off. Baloch resentment at the usurping of its natural gas by the federal government and other provinces is manifested in political opposition and in armed action. There have been numerous attacks on gas pipelines in the province. Some of these are the major supply routes to parts of Punjab: disruption in gas supply has caused industrial production in Punjab to shut down for prolonged periods. It should be stressed that anger over natural gas use and royalties is only one of several Baloch grievances against the centre. Baloch leaders point to the lack of development in the province, which lags behind the other three in all human development indicators. The government counters that it is resistance to modernization by local sardars and tribal chiefs, fearful that education and health facilities would lead to their power being weakened, that is the real obstacle. There is definitely some substance to these claims. The federal government has announced a massive package of development assistance for Balochistan, running into several billion Rupees, but Balochis are skeptical about who will really benefit from the money. Much of the money will go on large-scale infrastructure projects. The Musharraf government has put great emphasis on these, seeing improved infrastructure across the country as the key to long-term economic growth. Many of the projects are situated in/planned for Balochistan. One that is underway is the development of Gwader on the coastline into a deep-sea port. Gwader was chosen for strategic reasons: it is closer to the Gulf and further from India than Pakistan’s current only port of Karachi. Gwader Port is being built with Chinese assistance, and is due to be completed in 2010; it will be able to receive oil tankers of over 200,000 tons. Linked to the Port is the creation of a free-trade zone, and a road and rail network connecting Gwader to Central Asia. The Chinese are discussing setting up an oil refinery at Gwader.

 

The government claims Gwader Port will bring prosperity to Balochistan, but locals see it differently. They point to the influx of non-Baloch workers and residents to the region something that is expected to increase massively as the Port is completed and liken it to the ‘colonization’ of their province. There are complaints that the Government made little effort to involve local people in plans for Gwador and to secure consensus for the project. Tribal leader Nawab Akbar Bugti accused the government of ‘trying to change the Baloch majority into a minority by accommodating more than five million non-locals in Gwader and other developed areas.’ As with the development of natural gas fields, there are complaints that local labour is only being used for unskilled tasks and fears that revenue from the Port will go outside Balochistan. The fact that much of the land around Gwader has already been bought by property developers and investors living outside the province, adds credence to Baloch concerns about marginalization.

 

Alongside infrastructure development, the government has announced plans to establish three more military cantonments in the province: at Gwader, Dera Bugti and Kohlu, adding to the two already present at Quetta and Sibi. The latter are in addition to numerous military/police roadblocks and check-posts across the province. Balochistan has the heaviest concentration of military personnel in the country greater even than in Azad Kashmir. Balochis see the planned cantonments as a further attempt by the federal government to control their province by force, and specifically to facilitate the exploitation of its natural resources.

 

2.3Current Situation: Simmering Conflict

Baloch anger at the perceived exploitation of the province’s natural resources, coupled with alarm at recent development projects and the planned military cantonments, erupted into sporadic armed action in 2004 and more intense conflict in January 2005. The catalyst for the latter was the rape of a female doctor working at the Sui gas plant, allegedly by a military officer. Baloch insurgents attacked the gas plant. During the course of the year there were frequent attacks on military and other targets in the province. The federal government responded by increasing the number of military personnel in the province and launching counter-attacks on insurgent strongholds. President Musharraf warned the Balochis in a television address to end the attacks on pipelines and other insurgency, otherwise the government would deal with them even more harshly than in the previous 1973 Baloch insurgency. However, criticism and political pressure from other national politicians and parties, and no doubt a desire to avoid a repeat of the 1970s war, prompted the government to simultaneously engage with the Balochis and seek a negotiated solution. A parliamentary committee headed by Pakistan Muslim League President Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain was formed in 2004 ‘to examine the current situation in Balochistan and make recommendations thereon’ and divided into two sub-committees. One, headed by former-Senate Chairman Wasim Sajjad, was mandated to address the question of provincial autonomy. The second, headed by Senator Mushahid Hussein, was to address the immediate crisis in the province.

 

In March 2005 Wasim Sajjad’s sub-committee recommended a complete revision of the Concurrent List; announcement of the National Finance Commission award before budget; distribution of federal resources on the basis of provincial poverty, backwardness, unemployment and development levels, rather than just on population size; and activation of the Council of Common Interests.

 

The Mushahid Hussain sub-committee’s recommendations included: increasing gas royalties and surcharges; maximising provincial representation on the boards of oil and gas companies operating in the province; implementing job quotas; shifting the Gwadar Port Authority head office to Balochistan and giving 7% of the port’s revenue to the province; holding in abeyance the construction of cantonments at Gwadar, Dera Bugti and Kohlu; and a host of infrastructure-development and confidence-building strategies. It thus endorsed many of the key Baloch demands. A powerful committee was formed to implement these recommendations. It was to meet monthly, but had done so just twice in its first eight months. Not surprisingly, virtually nothing has been done in terms of implementation of the Wasim Sajjad and Mushahid Hussain committees.

 

Lack of implementation was one factor in continuing violence in the province. In December 2005 a rocket attack was launched on Kohlu, when President Musharraf was present. Subsequent clashes between armed forces and insurgents loyal to Nawab Akbar Bugti, who had by then openly joined the insurgency and was in hiding from the authorities, led to the latter’s death. This further fuelled Baloch resentment at the centre. Periodic attacks on gas pipelines, military installations and other targets continue. The province could be described as a site of low-intensity conflict, but with the very real danger that full-fledged conflict could erupt at any moment.

 

While there is much to criticize in Baloch insurgent actions and the leadership of the tribal chiefs – often working for their own vested interests rather than those of the Baloch people they claim to represent – there is no doubt that many of the Balochi grievances against the centre are justified. The recommendations of the Mushahid Hussain sub-committee, if implemented, would be an important step in addressing long-standing Baloch grievances and promoting trust and cooperation. Balochistan has to be developed, and large infrastructure projects are one part of that effort, but so too is the provision of health, education, water and sanitation and other services to all parts of the province. Furthermore, development should be carried out in a manner that is participatory, based on consensus and has local ownership: development should not be imposed from outside.

But equally important is the introduction of genuine democracy and political participation in the province. Unless an effort is made by all sides – to bridge the widening gulf between Balochistan and the federal government, there could well be a repeat of the 1970s civil war with potentially catastrophic consequences for Pakistan.

 

3. NWFP

 

3.1 Hydro-Electric Power

Much of Pakistan’s hydro-electric power is generated in NWFP, site of the largest dam at Tarbela. The mechanism for allocation of hydel power revenues is provided in Article 161 of the Constitution, as seen above. The Article explains that ‘”net profits” shall be computed by deducting from the revenues accruing from the bulk supply of power from the bus-bars of a hydro-electric station at a rate to be determined by the Council of Common Interests, the operating expenses of the station, which shall include any sums payable as taxes, duties, interest or return on investment, and depreciations and element of obsolescence, and over-heads, and provisions for reserves.’ The Council of Common Interests (CCI) did not meet until 1991, and it was actually the National Finance Commission which agreed a formula for allocation of hydel profits. In 1986 the NFC constituted a committee under the chairmanship of A.G.N. Qazi to determine the rate of net profits on hydel power. The committee comprised members of WAPDA, the federal and NWFP governments. It came up with the so-called

A.G.N. Qazi formula, which was subsequently endorsed by the CCI in 1991.

 

Until 1991, NWFP did not receive any royalties for the hydel power generated in the province. Hence, when the CCI met, the NWFP government insisted that the President should become guarantor for WAPDA to ensure regular payment of net profits as well as backdated dues. The President Ghulam Ishaq Khan agreed and issued a Presidential Order stating that in case of default by WAPDA or any other authority making bulk purchases of electricity from the provinces, the federal government would guarantee the payments. In FY 1991-92 the NWFP government received Rs.5.99 billion as net profits. This figure increased in subsequent years, but then the federal government imposed a cap of Rs. 6 billion on annual payments.

 

Successive provincial governments attempted to recover the arrears from WAPDA and, failing that, from the federal government which under the agreed formula was guarantor for hydel profit payments. Little progress was made, not helped by frequent changes of government (and President) in the 1990s. In 1996 the then Advisor to the PM on Finance assured the NWFP government that the Ministry of Finance would adjust the hydel payments to NWFP, and that this would be included in the budget for FY1997-98. And the federal government agreed to the 1996 NFC Award, which stipulated that in the event of consensus on arrears not being reached, payments to NWFP would increase by 11% each year. However in 1996 the government was again dismissed and fresh elections returned Nawaz Sharif to power in 1997. The NWFP government formed a committee in 1997 to pursue the recovery of net profits on hydel power. The military coup of October 1999 dissolved national and provincial assemblies and suspended the Constitution so the matter was again dropped. It was the restoration of elected assemblies in 2002 which paved the way for renewed discussion and efforts to recover back dues from WAPDA.

 

3.2Tribunal Ruling

An Arbitration Tribunal was set up to resolve the dispute between the NWFP Government and WAPDA over payment of net profits from hydel power. The MMA government agreed that pre-1991 dues could be decided later, so the Tribunal decided just on the dues owed from FY1991-92 to FY2004-5. The Tribunal heard arguments from both sides from March 2005 to September 2006. It was unable to arrive at a ’satisfactory calculation of NHP’ and therefore used the formula originally suggested by the NFC, i.e. calculating a 10% annual increase from 1990 onwards. Significantly, the Tribunal interpreted Constitutional provisions for ‘net profits’ as being counted after WAPDA had taken its profits. Other parts of the Tribunal’s judgement suggested the CCI’s role was limited to setting the rate of hydel power, and not to determine net profits. In sum, while the Arbitration Tribunal ordered that dues had to be paid by WAPDA to the NWFP government, it considerably slashed the amount that had been claimed by the latter.

 

As new dams are built, some in NWFP, outstanding issues of payments to provinces need to be resolved, and clear guidelines set for future allocation of hydel power revenue.

 

 

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Pakistan Constitution: National Finance Commission

September 24, 2008 at 9:59 am · Filed under Pakistan ·Tagged , ,

Troubled History of Federal-Provincial Relations

 

Pakistan is a federal state, comprising four provinces (and Azad Jammu and Kashmir), but relations between the centre and the smaller provinces in particular, have often been fraught. This situation can be traced back to the creation of Pakistan in 1947, at a time of great uncertainty and conflict. The new country’s leaders faced a litany of problems a virtually non-existent administrative structure, shortage of funds, ethnic divisions, two ‘wings’ (East and West Pakistan) separated by India, differing views on whether Pakistan was created to be an Islamic state or merely a safe-haven for the Subcontinent’s Muslims from Hindu domination, and before long war with India over Kashmir. The solution they came up to deal with these many challenges had three related elements:

 

bureaucratization, centralization and homogenization. Under the British it was the bureaucrats who had been responsible for daily management of affairs. Motivated by the urgent need to develop an effective administrative structure, and aware that the Muslim League’s main support base had been left behind in India, the new leaders opted to continue bureaucratic rule, and play down the political participation and the democratic process. This laid the foundation for weak democracy, which persists to this day. Muhammed Ali Jinnah, the country’s founder, believed the best way to ensure the survival of the new state was through a unitary, central government. Central domination was established early. The NWFP provincial government was dismissed within a fortnight of Pakistan’s creation, and the Sindh government of M.A. Khuhro seven months later. Noted analyst Khalid Sayeed writes that civil servants ‘effectively controlled the entire administration in the provinces and thepoliticians there were kept in power subject to their willingness to obey central government directives.’

 

To overcome the many ethno-linguistic divisions in the new country, its leaders sought to forge a new national Pakistani identity based upon loyalty to the state, Urdu and Islam. Urdu was chosen as the national language because it was a legacy of India’s last Muslim rulers, the Mughals, and thus the medium of ‘high’ Muslim culture and literature. Urdu was also spoken by many of the powerful bureaucracy. It should be stressed that Urdu was not native to any of the provinces of Pakistan. Opposition to Urdu was particularly vocal in East Pakistan but the government dismissed this by telling Bengalis: ‘(w)ithout one State language, no Nation can remain tied up solidly together and function’.

 

Within a few years of Pakistan’s creation the centre of power shifted from the bureaucracy to the military. This is something that also persists to this day. Pakistan’s sixty-year history has been dominated by military government: Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf. Stints of civilian government in between have been marked by corruption and inefficiency, paving the way for renewed military government. Political parties argue that the early suppression of democracy and the continued domination of the military have prevented them developing the institutional strength needed for stable government. For much of Pakistan’s history the main thrust of the military was on controlling the country’s foreign policy, particularly with regard to India and Kashmir, and the nuclear program. But increasingly, the military is becoming entrenched in the economy and spreading its tentacles into business and money-making ventures. This gives it a new, arguably more potent, motive to remain at the helm of affairs. What has not changed over time is the drive for centralization and the suppression of provincial autonomy. Under Ayub Khan all four provinces of West Pakistan were amalgamated into One Unit. Years of economic exploitation of East Pakistan and denial of political power culminated in the 1971 War and the creation of Bangladesh. Z.A. Bhutto’s dismissal of the Balochistan provincial government on the pretext that it had been plotting to secede from Pakistan, led the Balochis to try to follow the example of East Pakistan. They waged a five-year insurgency against the centre in the 1970s which was eventually quelled by the army. Punjab, the largest of the country’s remaining provinces, rapidly became the most dominant. As the army displaced bureaucrats from power, Punjab’s influence grew. Many now equate Punjab with the central government. Resentment among smaller provinces at what they see as their exploitation by the centre, is thus often targeted towards Punjab. Pakistan’s troubled history of federal-provincial relations and the domination of the military (in turn dominated by Punjabis) has led to a strong sense of distrust towards the centre among the constituent units specifically the smaller provinces. They do not see the central government as an ‘honest broker’, they do not believe it will protect their interests. The issues over resource distribution between federal and provincial governments have to be viewed against this backdrop. It helps explain why there are so many problems in resource distribution and why finding solutions is so difficult.

 

 

PART A: FINANCIAL RESOURCES

1. Fiscal Federalism in Pakistan: National Finance Commission

 

Pakistan is a federal state and as such has different tiers of government: federal in the centre, and four provincial governments. Since 2001 there has also been a third tier of local governments (comprising district, tehsil and union administrations). The Constitution divides functions between federal and provincial governments. The federal list – functions that belong exclusively to the federal government – includes foreign policy, currency, and defence. The concurrent list, with subjects that can be dealt with both federal and provincial governments, includes education and health. Anything that does not fall in either list automatically becomes the responsibility of the provincial governments. Assignment of functions has to be matched by assignment of funds to carry them out. In an ideal situation, each tier of government would have access to sufficient funds to carry out the functions assigned to it. However, in Pakistan the bulk of revenue is collected by the federal government, leading to what is known as ‘vertical imbalance’: differences between taxation powers (revenue) and expenditure assignment. Vertical imbalances are addressed by fiscal transfers from federal to provincial governments. Different provinces have different fiscal capacities and needs. Some generate more funds than others; some are more developed than others. Furthermore, in some provinces it costs more to deliver public services and promote development than in others. All this leads to what are known as ‘horizontal imbalances’ between provinces. These too are addressed through fiscal transfers with, ideally, more resources going to poorer, less developed provinces. In the case of Pakistan both vertical and horizontal imbalances are addressed by fiscal 1. Fiscal Federalism in Pakistan: National Finance Commission transfers decided by the National Finance Commission.

 

The National Finance Commission was established under Article 160 of the Constitution. It decides the division of financial resources between federal and provincial governments, as well as between provincial governments. The NFC comprises the following members:

 

Minister of Finance of the Federal Government;

Ministers of Finance of the Provincial Governments;

 

Such other persons as may be appointed by the President after consultation with the Governors of the Provinces; generally one technical person is appointed from each province according to provincial government’s nomination.

 

The Constitution provides for a new NFC Award to be made every five years. This ensures predictability, while leaving room for adjustments to be made in accordance with changing circumstances.

 

The NFC Award has three components:

 

Divisible Pool – This comprises all major federally collected taxes (including personal and corporate income tax, GST on goods, customs duties, etc).

 

Provincial Origin Revenue – Revenue that originated in the provinces but was collected by the federal government, e.g. income from gas royalties.

 

Special Transfers – These are lump-sum transfers in the form of grants or loans, with or without conditions attached, that the federal government makes to select provinces to meet particular needs.

 

The main aspect of the NFC Award is the size and distribution of the divisible pool. The NFC decides what percentage of federal resources is retained by the federal government, and what percentage goes to the provinces. This should be sufficient to enable the provinces to discharge their constitutional functions and meet the socio-economic development targets set by the federal government. The NFC then decides the distribution of the provincial share. Since 1974, population has been the sole criteria for horizontal distribution of resources between the four provinces. The last full NFC Award was made in 1997 [See Box 1]. It allocated 37.5% of the Divisible Pool to the provinces, with this amount being sub-divided among the four on the basis of population alone.

 

Provincial origin revenue is returned to the provinces as straight transfers, once a collection charge has been taken by the federal government. In the 1997 Award the federal government deducted a 2% collection charge. Special grants of Rs.3-4 billion each were made to NWFP and Balochistan in that Award, because of their relative backwardness compared to Sindh and Punjab. There was also provision for transfer of matching grants to the provinces. In total, including special grants, the provincial share of the 1997 NFC Award came to 43.6%.

 

Agreement could not be reached on the 2002 Award, so the 1997 Award remained in force. However, in 2005 President Musharraf announced an Interim Award whereby the provincial share of the Divisible Pool would increase to 41.5% in FY2006/7 and to 46.25% in FY2010/11. This is a substantial increase in the provincial share of the Divisible Pool in the 1997 Award, but still This section assesses some of the main issues with fiscal resource distribution in Pakistan. Under each issue, the basic problem with the current system is outlined, followed by a review of various points to be taken into consideration when devising solutions. short of the provinces’ demand for at least 250%. A further Rs.27.75 billion is to be given to the provinces as grants, to be distributed in the following proportions: Punjab 11%; Sindh 21%; Balochistan 33%; NWFP 35%. Grants-in-aid will be increased annually in line with the growth in net proceeds of taxes forming the Divisible Pool.

 

2. Issues in Distribution of Financial Resources

 

This section assesses some of the main issues with fiscal resource distribution in Pakistan. Under each issue, the basic problem with the current system is outlined, followed by a review of various points to be taken into consideration when devising solution

 

2.1 Vertical Imbalance:

Assignment of Taxes a) Problem At the moment, most ‘buoyant’ (productive) taxes in Pakistan are assigned to the federal government. These include income tax, GST, import and excise duties. The Constitution assigns very few taxes to the provincial governments. As a consequence, federal revenue is much greater than provincial revenue. But since considerable functions have been assigned to the provinces, this leads to vertical imbalances and the necessity for substantial fiscal transfers from federal to provincial governments.

 

B) Points to Consider Ideally, taxation powers should match expenditure assignments. However, in Pakistan there is limited scope to reform the tax system because for practical reasons, efficiency and economy, many taxes have to be collected centrally. Provincial collection of GST on manufactured products, for example, would be difficult to calculate because goods are sold throughout the country. Many national companies file tax returns where their head offices are located, but have offices/factories in all provinces. Modern-day work practices mean many people’s jobs take them all over the country; provincial income tax collection would be a logistical nightmare. Provincial assignment of import and excise duties would lead to Sindh benefitting disproportionately since Karachi is Pakistan’s only port. However, even under the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, there are significant revenue-raising options for provincial governments which are not being fully utilized largely due to weak tax and user charge collection. If the provincial collection system was strengthened, increased own source revenue generation would bring about significant reductions in vertical imbalances would be significantly reduced. Furthermore, there are some options for revenue reassignment from federal to provincial governments, e.g. giving provinces control over agricultural land tax. a) Problem One of the key principles of fiscal decentralization is that sub-national tiers of government should have access to a secure source of funds and should have the autonomy to decide for themselves how those funds are allocated and utilized. The NFC Award was supposed to ensure provincial autonomy by making fiscal transfers formula-based and predictable. However, provincial dependence on federal transfers clearly reduces provincial autonomy. The federal government has the power to hold back/delay release of funds, and can exert considerable influence on how funds are spent. Furthermore a lot of non-Divisible Pool fiscal transfers are discretionary in nature, and not formula-based. The related problem is the currently limited size of the provincial share of the Divisible Pool, which does not sufficiently provide fiscal autonomy to the provinces. Add to this the fact that provincial governments have to work under much harder budget constraints than the federal government; their borrowing capacity is limited. What this means in practice is that many provincial functions are undertaken by the federal government because it has the fiscal capacity to do so and the latter do not. Road construction, for example, is a provincial responsibility, but major road and other infrastructure projects are frequently undertaken by the federal government. B) Points to Consider As just seen, if the provinces were to take full advantage of current provisions their own source revenue and thus fiscal autonomy would greatly increase. However, the major way to enhance autonomy is by increasing the provincial share of the divisible pool on the basis of defined formulae. The provinces have consistently demanded that at least 50% of federal revenues (and ideally 60%) go into their share of the Divisible Pool. But there is great reluctance on the part of the federal government to do this. The other mechanism to ensure fiscal autonomy is to make all transfers formula-based and not discretionary.

 

2.1 Incentivizing Fiscal Effort and Promoting Accountability a) Problem Since the provinces are so dependent on fiscal transfers from the federal government they have little incentive to raise their own revenue. Fiscal transfers also reduce accountability because one tier of government collects funds while another spends them. With own source revenue generation, since the same government that received money as taxes is responsible for spending those funds, it is easier for the public to hold it accountable for how it does so.

 

b) Points to Consider

Own source revenue is an important means of promoting fiscal autonomy. Seen in this context, any increase in the provincial share would mean even more transfers to provincial governments and thus – if suitable incentives are not built in even less fiscal effort on their part. The problem is how to ensure that provincial governments get adequate resources from the federal government, and yet have strong incentives to strive to raise their own revenue as well. One way to achieve this is through matching grants, whereby provinces are rewarded for their fiscal effort with additional funds. The counter-argument to this is that provinces that already have strong fiscal capacity will benefit from this, thereby increasing inter-provincial differences. In order to promote accountability, a system should be designed such that provincial government revenues comprise an appropriate mix of own-tax revenue as well as transfers from above.

2.1 Horizontal Imbalances

a) Problem Currently, population is the only factor used in deciding the distribution of the provincial share of the Divisible Pool between the four provinces. There are a number of problems with the use of just this one criterion: b) Points to Consider Punjab, which has the biggest population and thus benefits the most from the current arrangement, is the only province that would like to see this retained. NWFP and Balochistan would both like to see backwardness included as a criterion in the NFC formula. An important argument against this is that it would provide a big incentive for provinces to remain backward it would deter development and progress. Sindh, which has the largest per capita income of the four provinces, is demanding fiscal effort be taken into account. As discussed above, this would incentivise greater OSR generation by the provinces, but would unfairly advantage those provinces that are already in a strong financial position. These inter-provincial differences, as well as disagreement between provincial governments and the federal government on the distribution of the Divisible Pool, have been the major obstacles in finalizing a new NFC Award. there is a minimum threshold administrative æcost of service delivery which all provinces incur, irrespective of population size; some provinces are more backward than æothers, and hence in need of greater resources; this encourages population growth, when æwhat Pakistan desperately needs is to control its expanding population; it gives no reward, and hence no incentive, æfor fiscal effort on the part of individual provinces.

 

Clearly, there are arguments in favour of and against demands for both backwardness and fiscal effort to be included in the NFC formula. What is needed is a formula that promotes fiscal effort whilst at the same time reducing inter-provincial inequities.

 

2.1 Composition of NFC

a) Problem

The National Finance Commission is mandated to carry out what is a highly technical task. Yet over half of its members are elected representatives politicians rather than fiscal decentralization experts. b) Points to Consider The predominance of elected representatives in the NFC has implications for both the quality and objectivity of its decision-making. ‘Quality’ because it will be difficult for non-technical people to understand complicated fiscal decentralization concepts and the full implications of different options for intergovernmental transfers; hence, through lack of expertise, they could make decisions that are not best suited to address the challenges faced. ‘Objectivity’ because, as politicians with vested interests, their decisions could well be influenced by what is needed to protect those interests rather than what is in the greater national interest. Having majority technical experts on the Commission would ensure quality and curb political bias.

 

3. International Experience and Options for Pakistan

There are many other countries with federal structures like Pakistan, and which face similar challenges with regard to resource distribution, ensuring fiscal effort, promoting horizontal fiscal equity, and so on. Pakistan can draw lessons from their experience. It would be impossible in a discussion paper of this limited size to exhaustively describe resource distribution mechanisms in other countries. Instead, select examples are given to illustrate particular practices relevant to Pakistan: In , provinces have access to virtually all tax bases, including some not available to the federal government. All provinces levy personal and corporate income taxes, payroll taxes and excise duties on specific items such as alcohol and tobacco; all but one have a general sales tax; all levy taxes on resource revenues or profits generated within their jurisdictions. The federal government levies many of the same taxes, but there are federal- provincial income tax and sales tax harmonization systems which result in a reasonably harmonized income tax system [ though otherwise provincial tax systems differ substantially, generating horizontal imbalances]. Overall, provinces and municipalities (local governments) raise more revenue than the federal government, and finance a substantial portion of their own expenditure. The assignment of taxes in favour of provinces in Canada thus reduces vertical imbalances.

 

Option for Pakistan: Increase taxation powers of the provinces, but ensure tax harmonization measures are in place to avoid duplication of federal and provincial taxes.

 

3.2 Vertical Imbalances: Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers

 

In Germany, the Constitution sets out in detail provisions relating to revenues and expenditures of the federal government and of the various Lander (provinces). This includes general economic indicators. Finally, various federal ministries make transfers for specific purposes. A major concern about the Indian fiscal transfer system is that, although formula-based, it does not specifically target fiscal disabilities of state; and it has disincentives for improved fiscal management by the states. specifying constitutionally mandated sharing of federal tax revenues with the Lander: this effectively makes them non-discretionary, unconditional transfers to the Lander. Thus, even though these transfers constitute around 40% of the revenue of the Lander, their unconditional nature and constitutionally mandated status, mean the Lander enjoy considerable fiscal autonomy. Option for Pakistan: Give provinces a fixed share of federal tax revenues (as opposed to net proceeds), thereby addressing vertical imbalances and promoting fiscal autonomy. In the the vertical fiscal gap is considerable, since states raise only some of the revenue they need themselves. The gap is closed by a wide array of conditional transfers, both block and specific. Conditional transfers are used to promote accountability in state executive branches, and they serve as important instruments by which the federal government can encourage state governments to design their public service provision programs in such a way as to be compatible with national objectives. Option for Pakistan: Increase fiscal transfers to provinces, but use conditional transfers to ensure provincial spending on national priorities such as health and education. In , the Constitution provides for transfers from the central government to the states by way of tax devolution and grants in aid or revenues. The Constitution also provides for a Finance Commission to determine every 5 years the transfer of funds to the states. In 2000 the Eleventh Finance Commission recommended the distribution of 28% of net proceeds of sales tax to the states. The Planning Commission is the second biggest dispenser of funds: 22% of transfers to states in 1998-99 were from the Planning Commission (60% from the Finance Commission). It distributes resources according to a formula developed and periodically modified by the National Development Council. Both Finance and Planning Commissions base their transfers primarily on United States India

 

Option for Pakistan: Design fiscal transfers to address fiscal disparities in provinces, favouring those with lesser fiscal capacity, but at the same time providing incentives for fiscal effort.

 

3.3 Horizontal Fiscal Equalization (HFE)

 

In Germany HFE is achieved in three main ways. Firstly, 75% of the VAT share of the Lander is distributed on an equal per capita basis. This is an effective form of equalization given that expenditure needs will be heavily influenced by population size. Second, there is an explicit equalization system entailing transfers between the Lander. There is an interstate revenue pool into which rich Lander pay and poorer Lander draw money according to specific criteria. The major factors determining the amount of equalization funding are revenue capacity and population density. The third component of German equalization is something unique to Germany the German Unity Fund. This is geared towards raising the fiscal capacity of Lander in the former East Germany to levels comparable with those of the former West. The German system of equalization is reasonably successful at ensuring that all Länder have the financial means to provide reasonably comparable public services to their residents.

 

Option for Pakistan: Establish an interprovincial equalization system in which richer provinces put money into a joint fund, and poorer provinces draw resources out. [Note: there is likely to be strong political opposition to this from richer provinces.] Alternatively include revenue capacity and population density as criteria in deciding distribution of resources between provinces.

 

In, the principle of HFE is that ‘each State should be given the capacity to provide the average standard of State-type public services’ operating at average efficiency and making an average fiscal effort to raise OSR. The States receive both specific purpose payments (SPPs) and unconditional block grants. The total pool of block grants is negotiated between federal and state governments. This pool is distributed between states using a formula that starts with hypothetical per capita distribution but then adjusts this figure taking into account expenditure needs, revenue needs and receipt of SPPs. This results in more populous states, such as New South Wales and Victoria, getting less in block grants than they would if the money was distributed on per capita basis only; but less populous states in which services cost more, getting more money. The sparsely populated Northern Territories, for example, receive A$1 billion as opposed to the A$0.2 billion they would get on the basis of population alone. The Australian fiscal equalization system is often seen as a model for other countries. Option for Pakistan: Include revenue capacity and expenditure needs as criteria in deciding the distribution of resources between provinces. [Note: inclusion of grants received could be problematic.] In the Constitution makes a similar provision; requiring federal equalization payments to ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation. The country has a systematic system of unconditional equalization transfers. Unconditional transfers came about as a result of political pressure exerted by the provinces, who were concerned about their autonomy. Option for Pakistan: Provide additional fiscal transfers from the federal government to those provinces which are unable to provide a basic standard of services. Ensure that everyone in Pakistan has access to basic Australia Canada quality services. Note: use of conditional fiscal transfers would probably be more appropriate in Pakistan.

 

3.4 Composition of Resource Distribution Bodies

 

In Australia the Commonwealth Grants Commission provides advice to the Commonwealth (federal government) and state governments on the distribution of the pool of general revenue assistance. The CGC is only concerned with the distribution of the revenue pool and not with its size: the latter is negotiated annually between federal and state governments. The CGC has a permanent staff of around 50, the majority of whom are ‘technical people’ with backgrounds in accounting, statistics and economics. The CGC is headed by four part-time members, appointed through a consultative exercise between federal and state governments. Commissioners are appointed for their particular expertise rather than their representational role. The CGC works on technical aspects of fiscal equalization, sharing with the states its methodology and assessments. The states, even those ‘losing out’, are generally very accepting of the CGC’s judgements because they know they are dealing with an expert body.

 

Option for Pakistan: Increase the proportion of technical members on the NFC and reduce political representation: turn it into a primarily expert body making impartial decisions, whose authority and judgments are respected by federal and provincial governments alike.

 

4. Recommendations

 

Overall, Pakistan’s fiscal transfer system has to be modified to:

 

  • ensure fiscal autonomy to the provinces whilst also promoting fiscal effort and accountability; 
  • ensure all provinces can provide a minimum basic level of services; 
  • reduce inter-provincial disparities. There are clearly a wide range of options for Pakistan to choose from in striving to achieve a more optimal distribution of funds between federal and provincial governments. Fiscal transfers, in particular, offer considerable scope to help Pakistan overcome the issues it currently faces and promote effective service delivery and horizontal equalization. Based on the preceding analysis and review of examples from international practice, it is possible to come up with some specific recommendations to improve the distribution of fiscal resources in Pakistan:
  • Change the composition of the NFC to make it a technical body, whose judgments will be accepted as expert and objective. Finalize a new NFC Award after extensive consultation with all provinces and key stakeholders to ensure consensus. Increase the size of provincial share of federal resources to ensure provincial governments have adequate funds to meet their expenditure responsibilities. Add fiscal effort and backwardness as criteria along with population in deciding the distribution of funds between the four provinces. Promote the use of conditional fiscal transfers to provinces, geared to reward fiscal effort, efficiency and to ensure spending on national priorities such as health and education. Provide special assistance to backward areas æto reduce provincial differences in service delivery and development indicators. Assign additional taxes to provincial governments to reduce vertical imbalances, whilst ensuring there is no duplication with federal taxes and/or making provision for tax harmonization measures. The current system can be considered as taking Pakistan part of the way to where it needs to be. The NFC provides for an institutional, formula-based and predictable system of resource distribution and transfers. But given the obvious inequalities between different parts of the country and the effort needed to ensure Pakistan will achieve the MDGs on time, more is needed.

 

 

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