How to Handle Stroke?

When stroke strikes, the capillaries in the brain will gradually burst.

When a stroke occurs, stay calm..

No matter where the victim is, do not move her.

Because, if moved, the capillaries will burst.

Help the victim to sit up where he is to prevent him from falling over again and then the blood letting can begin.

If you have in your home an injection syringe that would be the best.

Otherwise, a sewing needle or a straight pin will do.

1.     Place the needle/pin over fire to sterilize it and then use it to prick the tip of all ……..10 fingers.

2.   There are no specific acupuncture points, just prick about an mm from the fingernail.  

3.  Prick till blood comes out.

4.   If blood does not start to drip, then squeeze with your fingers…

5.   When all 10 digits are bleeding, wait a few minutes then the victim will regain consciousness.

6.   If the victim’s mouth is crooked, then pull on his ears until they are red.

7.   Then prick each earlobe twice until two drops of blood comes from each earlobe.

After a few minutes the victim should regain consciousness.

Wait till the victim regains his normal state without any abnormal symptoms then take him to the hospital.

Otherwise, if he was taken in the ambulance in a hurry to the hospital, the bumpy trip will cause all the capillaries in his brain to burst.

If you could save his life, barely managing to walk, then it is by the grace of his ancestors.

I learned about letting blood to save life from Chinese traditional doctor, Ha Bu Ting, who lives in Sun Juke.

An Exit Strategy for US from Afghanistan

By Dr. Ved Pratap Vaidik

 Can America get out of the quagmire of Afghanistan? (Or to use a reference from Mahabharat, the famous Indian Epic, how can the American Abhimanyu can get out of the Afghanistan Chakravyuh (maze) that he is trapped in?)

In reply to this cardinal question I have devised a five-point strategy.

Point One: President Obama should not send a single new American soldier to Afghanistan and he must announce a definite date for the withdrawal of the American army from Afghanistan. Not a single American soldier should continue to stay in Afghanistan after that date.

In my opinion this deadline should be December 31, 2010.Of course, this withdrawal would include all foreign soldiers belonging to ISAF.

This announcement will make a magic impact on the public opinion of the US.

It will, then, be Obama’s second victory in one year. All the Democrats and even Republicans will rally around him. In far away Afghanistan there will rise a high tide of joy and relief because the people of Afghanistan have an age-long hatred for the presence of the foreign soldiers on their motherland. During the last 150 years they have taught a bitter lesson to the British Army thrice and to the Soviet Army in the recent past. Initially, the people of Afghanistan had welcomed the Western Armies but now they feel that the resurgence of Taliban has taken place basically due to the presence of foreign armies (ISAF).

Point Two: If all the foreign armies leave Afghanistan within a year the question comes up that, ‘would the Hamid Karzai Government survive’? Will anarchy not spread in Afghanistan? There is no doubt about it. So what are the options? 

At least a National Army of half a million Afghan soldiers and a Police Force should be raised immediately.

When Zahir Shah was over thrown 36 years ago, the Army and Police consisted of about  200,000 soldiers. Now the population has grown two-fold and since the last 30 years Afghanistan is passing through a war-like situation. If an Army of half a million soldiers becomes a reality then you won’t find any unemployed youth on the streets of Kandahar or Kabul. It is mostly the unemployed youth that is being trapped by the Taliban, smugglers and the mafia. If they find a place in the Army, the human source of the Taliban and smugglers will totally dry up. No youth will be left to be drafted by the Al-Qaeda and Taliban.

The expenses incurred on inducting five million youth to the Army will be less than the expenses of maintaining just five thousand soldiers of any Western Army in Afghanistan. If the US and other NATO countries take up the maintenance of the Afghan National Army for the next five years, they will still save billions of dollars and hundreds of precious lives. If the ISAF armies leave Afghanistan, the Taliban will automatically lose their rationale to operate.

India can take up the responsibility of training the soldiers and officers in Afghanistan. If we need to immediately step up the fighting strength of the present army set up, instead of sending new soldiers from the western countries, the friendly Asian and African countries can be approached to do the needful.

Point Three: What makes the Taliban and Al-Qaeda thrive is the ill-gotten wealth of opium. Afghanistan is the world’s largest producer of opium. You will be shocked to know if I recount the name of the people who are involved in the growing and smuggling of opium. The funds generated from opium far exceed the national budget. The opium money is the mother of corruption in Afghanistan. A total ban may be imposed on the cultivation of opium or it can be put under stringent laws as it is in India. If they clamp down on illegal wealth obtained through opium, the Karzai Government can not only break the back of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda but can also get rid of many rogue politicians.

Point Four:  There is no central control or accountability of the billions of dollars that pour into Afghanistan. President Karzai himself had shared with me this fact a few months ago that in Kabul his government has control on only four percent of the total foreign aid that comes into his country. The balance, 96% is allotted to provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). There teams operate on their own. They have very little say of the Central Afghans Government in their functioning. This gives rise not only to corruption and malpractices but also deals a blow to the image of the Central Government. The people of Afghanistan respect the government which is strong and assertive. Not only the foreign aid but also the overall control over foreign troops and their operations should be in the hands of the Central Government of Afghanistan.

Point Five: The Karzai Government has to put up a determined fight against the violent terrorists but at the same time it should not hesitate to enter into a dialogue with the Taliban.

After all they are also the sons of Mother Afghanistan ( Maadare-Watan). If their ideas are totally absurd why so many young men are out to sacrifice their lives ? I had been talking to Taliban and Al-Queda leaders.

About ten to twelve years ago in Kabul, Kandahar, Peshawar, Islamabad, London, Washington, DC and New York. They are abusive and acrimonious at times but they do also believe in the value of argumentation. They are open to the contrary view. I found them flexible, and helpful too. If it is not so, how the high jacked Indian airplane was released from Kandahar in 1999. The dialogue with the Taliban should be conducted by the Afghans and not the Americans. Assistance of some other knowledgeable persons may be sought.

If this Five-Point strategy is put together and implemented, the US can rescue itself from the quagmire of Afghanistan.

While putting this strategy into action, the policy makers may face several new questions.

While implementing this exit strategy, if the image of the Afghan Government is not built as all-powerful and sovereign body, chances of success would appear to be bleak. To bolster the image of Karzai Government it is absolutely imperative that President Karzai take a drastic and exemplary action against corruption. If need be, he might have to sideline some of his close friends and relatives even if it is meant to placate the public opinion.

                                                         Similarly, the deadlock between the President and the Parliament must be broken at its earliest. The Constitution of Afghanistan cannot be replaced now at this juncture, there is a plausible remedy in my view. Why can’t the political leaders be encouraged to set up viable political parties, which can become a bridge between the President and Parliament and also the Government and the ordinary people. How can you imagine a healthy democracy without the political parties?

Dr. V.P. Vaidik, A-19 Press Enclave New Delhi 110 017, (Phone) (0091-11) 2686 7700, 2651 7295 Mob. : (0091)98-9171-1947, e-mail : dr.vaidik@gmail.com

Why Pak Army is Not Fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan?

The success of Obama’s strategy in Afghanistan will depend heavily on Pakistan acting to stop its territory being used to attack Western forces next door.

And that’s bad news, because the demands of its own domestic counterinsurgency campaign, doubts about the duration of U.S. commitment in Afghanistan and looming political instability in Islamabad have left Pakistan in no hurry to help out.

Obama’s National Security Adviser General James Jones in November 2009 visited Islamabad carrying a message from his boss to Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari. 

Obama in the letter urged Zardari to rally his nation behind a joint campaign against militants who fight the Pakistani government and those who fight U.S. and allied troops in Afghanistan. Obama was also reported to have demanded more decisive action against al-Qaeda leaders hiding in Pakistan’s tribal areas. In return, he reportedly offered a range of fresh incentives, “including enhanced intelligence sharing and military cooperation.”

The problem, of course, is that Obama’s letter may have gone to the wrong address. As a weak and unpopular President scarcely seen in public and now the object of growing vilification at home, Zardari is in no position to lead a popular movement against militancy, much less to redirect his army’s focus.

As ever, it is the all-powerful military establishment that will make the key decisions in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s military has certainly moved decisively against those militants that pose a direct challenge to its authority on home soil.

Buoyed by its successes in last May’s campaign to drive the Taliban out of the Swat Valley, it has for the past month deployed some 30,000 troops to confront the militants in their main stronghold of South Waziristan, along the Afghan border. The army has steadily cleared territory eastward, seizing some of the Pakistani Taliban’s most prized bases, but also sparking a vicious wave of terrorist attacks that continues to claim innocent lives on a near daily basis.

The South Waziristan offensive, however, may be the limit of what the Pakistani military is willing to take on right now. It’s priority after clearing the area of Taliban elements will be to hold it — and there are signs that the militants have merely scattered to areas beyond the scope of the current offensive, waiting to stage a return. “We have not been defeated,” Taliban spokesman Azam Tariq told reporters at a secret location on Nov 18, dismissing the army’s claims. “We have voluntarily withdrawn into the mountains under a strategy that will trap the Pakistan army in the area.”

With a long fight ahead of it, the Pakistan army won’t welcome demands that it expand its range of operations. They will view this letter with some displeasure. Pakistan army is not going to go to North Waziristan before it completes its operation in South Waziristan.

Two of the militant groups that Washington would like to see Islamabad target are based in North Waziristan: the Haqqani network and the one led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur, both of whom mount cross-border attacks on NATO forces in Afghanistan.

I don’t think that the Pakistan army will target Haqqani. The reason being that they don’t want to open a front with every militant group. The army has long insisted that it does not have the resources to counter the full range of militants based in the tribal areas. Already, military officials argue, heavy numbers are committed all along the tribal areas and in the Swat Valley. It is also forced to commit forces to guard against upsurges of militancy in other parts of Pakistan.

And, of course, the army’s priority remains guarding the eastern border with India. Indeed, the fact that India continues to be viewed as the principal security challenge by the Pakistani military establishment also dictates a policy toward Afghanistan that does little to help the U.S. there.

Pakistan’s generals are concerned by what they perceive as growing Indian influence in Afghanistan, through the Karzai government and massive development projects. They also accuse India of using Afghanistan as a base from which to wage a proxy war on Pakistan. Its priorities make the Pakistan army unlikely to turn its fire on the Haqqani and Hafiz Gul Bahadur networks, as Obama is demanding.

Instead, the army has revived a nonaggression pact with Bahadur and with Maulvi Nazir — both of which use Pakistani soil as a base from which to wage war on NATO forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s priority is simply to get them to agree to stay neutral or join in the fight between the army and the Pakistan Taliban. Nazir, who was freed from Pakistani custody to fight al-Qaeda-linked Uzbek militants, controls the areas of South Waziristan where the Pakistan army has positioned troops to seal off a line of retreat for the Pakistan Taliban. The danger for the U.S. is that such deals involve a nod and a wink for continued cross-border attacks, making the militants an even more potent threat.

The Haqqani network is believed to have long-standing links with the ISI, while senior Western diplomats allege that Mullah Omar and the leadership of the Afghan Taliban continues to operate out of Quetta.

Many suspect that the reason that the Afghan Taliban manages to operate unmolested on Pakistani soil is Pakistan’s need to maintain leverage in Afghanistan, where the U.S. presence is viewed as temporary. Indeed, some Pakistani observers suggest that even if a U.S. surge is successful, it will at best lead to a negotiated settlement with the Taliban, in which Pakistan would play broker.

You need an increased U.S. troop strength to countervail the Taliban in the south and the east, so that you can bring them to the negotiating table. The Pakistani military also thinks that if they succeed in Afghanistan, the Taliban will be less powerful in Pakistan. The Americans should see Pakistan as an interlocutor for trying to handle these groups politically.

The U.S. troop surge in Afghanistan is unlikely to work unless the Taliban and their allies are denied the sanctuary they enjoy across the border in Pakistan. That’s why two top U.S. military commanders, General David Petraeus, head of U.S. Central Command, and Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Islamabad in Dec 2009 to press their Pakistani counterparts for action on Afghan Taliban networks based in Pakistani North Waziristan and around the city of Quetta. But even as the Pakistani military fights a full-scale counterinsurgency war against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, also known as the Pakistani Taliban), it remains reluctant to extend its targets to include the groups that most concern the U.S.

The argument most often used by Pakistani officials to rebuff Washington’s demands for action against the Afghan Taliban–allied Haqqani network and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami, as well as the Afghan Taliban leadership core in Quetta, is about resources and priorities.

Pakistan has committed 30,000 troops to its offensive against the TTP in Swat and South Waziristan, and officials say they simply don’t have the resources to open a second front against the Haqqani network in North Waziristan (which is also where al-Qaeda’s leaders are believed to be hiding). General Ashfaq Kayani reportedly told Petraeus that Pakistan’s priority, given its limited resources, was the TTP insurgency, which directly challenges the Pakistani state.

If Pakistan is overstretched, then even the current operation against the Afghan Taliban will be directly affected. Pakistani officials advancing this argument often imply that once the domestic insurgency has been suppressed, the army can move on to tackling the groups that most concern the U.S. But many analysts believe that Pakistan’s reluctance to go after Haqqani, Hekmatyar and the Afghan Taliban leadership in Quetta is based not only on resources and priorities, but also on the Pakistani military’s assessment of its long-term interests in Afghanistan after the US leaves.

The fearsome North Waziristan–based network, led by ailing former Afghan mujahedin commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and run by his son Sirajuddin, controls three key Afghan provinces that border Pakistan — Khost, Paktia and Paktika. The network has a long-standing relationship with the ISI and is viewed by many in the Pakistani military as an important strategic asset in the regional struggle for influence in Afghanistan. (Some reports suggest that this has become a matter of debate within the Pakistani military.) Those who share this view believe that the group can be separated from al-Qaeda and could form part of a compromise political solution in Afghanistan, which Pakistan hopes to play a key role in brokering. A similar logic is probably at work with respect to Hekmatyar and even the Afghan Taliban leadership. It’s a view based on seeing the Afghan Taliban as a Pashtun nationalist movement challenging the new Tajik-dominated political order in Kabul — which is deemed by many in Pakistan to be a proxy for India. There’s also concern that mounting an offensive against Taliban groups that confine their attacks to Afghanistan will rouse Pashtun fury on both sides of the border, imperiling Pakistan’s domestic counterinsurgency effort.

To eliminate al-Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, it must be separated and isolated from the Taliban ‘sea’ in which it is currently hiding. But the U.S. troop surge will be mainly directed against the Taliban insurgency. It will push al-Qaeda and the insurgents closer together, making it more difficult to isolate and target al-Qaeda. Pakistan’s going after the Afghan Taliban, which is seen as America’s enemy, would weaken Pakistan’s national consensus supporting the offensive against the TTP, many Pakistanis like Munir Akram believe.

The immediate focus of discussion between the U.S. and Pakistan is North Waziristan. While the Pakistan army has cleared swaths of territory once controlled by the TTP in South Waziristan and claims to have killed more than 600 militants, it has not managed to kill or capture any of the leadership, who have largely fled north, along with many fighters. That certainly gives Pakistan’s army a pretext for pushing into North Waziristan — as the U.S. is urging — although any such operation would probably be a limited one, focused on TTP groups and concentrated in areas where they would avoid clashing with Haqqani fighters.

If the Pakistani military declines to go after the Afghan Taliban, the U.S. faces limited options for turning up the heat. Unable, politically, to commit ground forces to Pakistani territory, it would be forced to rely on the remote-controlled drone strikes that have been effective in killing al-Qaeda leaders in the area. Conflicting reports in the U.S. media suggest that President Obama either plans to expand those operations precisely to target the Afghan insurgent groupings that remain largely unmolested in Pakistan or is reluctant to authorize strikes that go beyond the targets agreed by Pakistan, for fear of jeopardizing cooperation and triggering a political crisis. But if the goal is to reverse the Taliban’s momentum in Afghanistan, the U.S. may feel it has no choice. And that’s certainly the message it wants Pakistan — and the Taliban — to take from the current conversation.

When Will the Judiciary Start to Confront State Agencies about the Missing Persons

Pakistan is seeing little progress in the hundreds of missing person’s cases still pending. Pakistanis continue to be regularly ‘disappeared’ after arrest.

With the police force exposed as increasingly negligent and corrupt, the responsibility of identifying such cases and intervening has long fallen to the judiciary. Judges taking suo moto action is widely believed to have been a major motive behind the sacking of the Supreme Court judges in 2007 by Musharraf.

Yet despite the restoration of the Judiciary with its Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry in March after a long civil struggle and with the support of current Chief of Army Staff General Kiyani, there has been a marked decline in the response from the courts to appeals from the family of the missing.

Leading figureheads in the lawyers’ movement, such as Mr. Ali
Ahmed Kurd, former president of Supreme Court Bar Association, have been renewing their criticism of its performance. The change has been raising questions about the court’s allegiance to civil society versus its sense of obligation to his supporters in the army.

In response to this institutional indifference, family members of the missing have taken to camping outside the Supreme Court complex in protest. The court recently relented to one group, stationed there from 2 to 17 November, and assured them that the fate of their loved ones would be examined and their cases tried. But the judges involved have since done little more than make clichéd remarks about the ultimate good of the Supreme Court, while showing no willingness to flex the judicial muscle; suspected perpetrators from the state agencies have not been called or held to account. The proceedings are, in fact, starting to resemble a publicity stunt.

Over the past few years the court has heard from various persons who were arrested illegally by intelligence agents and who were tortured in covert military torture cells for months at a time; more than enough to paint a convincing picture. On this basis alone, as people continue to vanish after arrest, the court is obliged to pursue the issue to the very extent of its ability.

The most prominent case of state abduction is that of three political activists from the Balochistan province who were kidnapped on April 3; they were taken from a lawyers’ office by plain clothed officials in one of the state’s conspicuous white vans. Their bodies were found six days later (http://www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2009/3145/)
The lawyer and other eye witnesses are willing to testify, but the
courts are not looking into the case.

The most recent case brought to attention is the struggle of a couple in Punjab to ensure a credible investigation into the disappearance of their son, who vanished during a hospital transfer under the custody of police tp://www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2009/3306).

NGOs have estimated that during the current civilian government around 100 persons have gone missing after their arrest, and efforts to uncover their fate have mostly led nowhere.

Political groups in Balochistan have reported that out of the 4,000 supposedly arrested there, not more than 200 have been brought to trial in courts and the remainder are unaccounted for, out of the reach of their relatives or lawyers.

The Supreme Court itself has more than 400 cases of disappeared persons pending.

Though statistics may vary, the size of the problem is beyond dispute.

Enforced disappearances thrive in societies with ill-functioning,
dependent judiciaries, which fail to hold state agents accountable for their actions. Under autocratic governments and military regimes a nation’s judges become markedly subordinate, and these are the issues Pakistan continues to struggle with.