Does Islam Permit a Wife to Prostrate to Her Husband?

One maulana when invited to speak in a workshop of this title refused to come as he considered feminism un-Islamic. Is the use of this term objectionable from an Islamic viewpoint? Not at all.

In fact, Islam is the first religion which systematically empowered women when women were considered totally subservient to men. There was no concept of a woman being an independent entity and enjoying equal rights with dignity. What is feminism? Nothing but women’s movement to empower women and to consider them full human beings. Thus we see in western countries until the early 20th century that women did not enjoy an independent status. It was only after the 1930s that women won equal status legally and various western countries passed laws to this effect. Yet patriarchy still looms large in many societies.

Though the Quran empowered women and gave them equal status with men, Muslims were far from ready to accept gender equality. The Arab culture was too patriarchal to accept such parity. Many hadiths were ‘readied’ to scale down the woman’s status, and she, in most Islamic societies, became a dependent entity; often Quranic formulations were interpreted so as to make her subordinate to men. One such hadith even said that if sajdah (prostration) were permitted before human beings, a woman would have been commanded to prostrate before her husband.

This is totally contradictory to the Quran, but no one cares. It is patriarchy which influences our laws, not the Quran. In fact, when it comes to patriarchy its jurists make it prevail over Quranic injunctions. Either Quranic formulations were disregarded or interpreted so as to have them conform to patriarchy. The time has come to understand the real spirit of the Quran. But the Islamic world still does not seem to be ready. What is worse, due to poverty and ignorance Muslim women themselves are not aware of their Quranic rights. A campaign has to be launched to make women aware of their rights.

Another important question is: what is the difference between Islamic and western feminism or is there any difference at all? If we go by the definition of feminism as an ideology to empower women, there is no difference.

However, historically speaking, Muslim women lost the rights they had due mainly to the tribalisation of Islam, which was dominated by patriarchal values.

In the West, on the other hand, women had no rights but won them through a great deal of struggle known as ‘feminism’.

But there are significant differences between Islamic and western feminism. Islamic feminism is based on certain non-negotiable values, i.e. equality with honour and dignity. Freedom has a certain Islamic responsibility whereas in the West freedom tends to degenerate into licentiousness, not in law but certainly in social and cultural practices. In western culture, sexual freedoms have become a matter of human right and sex has become a matter of enjoyment, losing its sanctity as an instrument of procreation.

Though the Quran does not prescribe hijab or niqab (covering the whole body with a loose garment, including the face), as generally thought, it lays down certain strict norms for sexual behaviour. Both men and women have right to gratification (a woman has as much right as a man) but within a marital framework. There is no concept of freedom for extramarital sex in any form. In a marital framework, it is an act of procreation and has much sanctity attached to it.

It is important to emphasise that in a patriarchal society men decided the norms of sexual behaviour. It was theorised that a man has greater urge for sex and hence needed multiple wives and that a woman tended to be passive and hence had to be content with one husband at a time.

The Quran’s approach is different. It is not a greater or lesser degree of urge which necessitates multiple or monogamous marriages.

There is emphatic emphasis placed on a monogamous marriage in the Quranic verses 4:3 and 4:129. Multiple marriages were permitted only to take care of widows and orphans and not to satisfy man’s greater urge. Verse 4:129 gives the norm of monogamy and not to leave the first wife in suspense or negligence.

Thus, as far as the Quran is concerned, sexual gratification is a non-negotiable right for both man and woman tied in wedlock. Hence a divorcee and a widow are also permitted to remarry and gratify their urge.

In western capitalist countries, woman’s dignity has been compromised and she has been reduced to a commodity to be exploited. Her semi-naked postures and her sexuality are exploited commercially and unabashedly. It is totally against the concept of woman’s honour and dignity. Unfortunately, many western feminists do not consider this objectionable but accept it as part of women’s freedom. Some (though not as many) even advocate prostitution as a woman’s right to earn a living.

This is against the concept of Islamic feminism, which while sanctioning sexual gratification to be as much of a woman’s basic right as a man’s prohibits extramarital sexual liaison. This, on one hand, upholds a woman’s honour and dignity, and on the other, exalts marital relations to the level of sanctity, restricting it for procreation. Islamic feminists have to observe certain norms which western feminists are not obliged to.

The writer, Asghar Ali Engineer, is an Islamic scholar who also heads the Centre for Study of Society & Secularism, Bombay.

Why Did Qatar Return the Raped Libyan Woman?

Despite concerns for her safety,Qataron June 2, 2011 sent back toLibyaa woman who accused the soldiers of Qadhafi of having raped her.

A Qatari military plane flew Iman al-Obeidi to the Libyan port city ofBenghazi, which is held by rebels, and she was now staying there in a hotel.

She expressed her fears of returning toLibya, that there was no question of her returning toLibya.

There are people inLibyawho have an interest in shutting her up… Her fear is well founded in our opinion.

Obeidi had escaped fromLibyatoQatarwith the help of rebels.

Obeidi attracted international media attention when she stormed into the Rixos hotel on March 26, threw open her coat to reveal scars and bruises on her body to expose her ordeal.

But as she screamed: “Film me, film me, show the whole world all they did to me,” she was dragged off by security guards amid scenes of mayhem as journalists were shoved aside in their effort to intervene.

Obeidi said she had been stopped at aTripolicheckpoint because she was from the rebel stronghold ofBenghaziin easternLibya. “They tied me up and abused me for two days,” she said.

After a petition demanding her release, Obeidi said in telephone interviews that she was freed but not allowed to leaveLibya. A doctor had examined her and supported her claims of rape and torture.

Rapist Penis Cut-off by a Bangladeshi Woman

A 40-year-old Bangladeshi woman cut off a man’s genitalia during an attempted rape and took it to a police station as evidence, police in a remote part ofBangladeshsaid on May 30, 2011.

The woman, a married mother of three, was attacked while she was sleeping in her shanty in Jhalakathi district, some 200 kilometres south ofDhaka.

“As he tried to rape her, the lady cut his genitalia off with a knife. She then wrapped up the genitalia in a piece of polythene and brought it to the Jhalakathi police station as evidence of the crime,” police chief said.

The woman has filed a case accusing the man, who is also 40 and a married father of five, of attempted rape, saying that he had been harassing her for six months.

The severed genitalia has been kept at the police station and the rape suspect was undergoing treatment in hospital.

“We shall arrest him once his condition gets better,” police said.

Kidnapping an 11-Year Old School Girl & Raping Her since 1991

A California couple was jailed for life on June 2, 2011 for kidnapping a schoolgirl and repeatedly raping her while holding her captive for almost two decades, in a case which shocked America.

Phillip Garrido, who fathered two children with Jaycee Dugard after kidnapping her aged 11 in 1991, was given 431 years, while his wife Nancy was jailed for between 36 years and life, after a plea bargain with prosecutors.

Her lawyer, Stephen Tapson, said he read a statement to the court on behalf of his client acknowledging that “what she did was evil”, that she was sorry and that “words are not enough”.

Tapson filed a request asking thatNancybe allowed to see her husband one last time before they start their sentences and that she be allowed to remain in the courtroom for her husband’s sentencing. The judge denied both requests.

Dugard’s long ordeal in captivity with paroled sex offender Garrido and his wife came to light when she was freed in August 2009, 18 years after she was snatched while walking to a school bus stop.

The Garridos were indicted in October on 18 charges. In a deal with prosecutors agreed in April, he pleaded guilty to counts including kidnap, kidnap for the purpose of sex and forcible rape.

Burmese Girls Forced to Marry Chinese Men

Most cross-border human trafficking in Burma involves women tricked into travelling to China to get work, only to find a groom waiting for them on the other side.

Thazin* was trafficked to China from Yangon and forced into marriage in 2008. Now 29 and back in Yangon, she said that one day she drank a cup of coffee spiked by an acquaintance, woke up in China and was soon married against her will.

According to the UN Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP), [ http://www.no-trafficking.org/ ] 70 percent of Burma’s trafficking cases in 2010 involved stories like Thazin’s.

In 2010, the authorities recorded 122 cases of forced marriage, up from 104 in 2009, Burma’s Ministry of Home Affairs reported. For more than a decade, Burmese women have been trafficked across the 2,000km border to marry men who are unable to afford the dowry required by a Chinese bride, said national programme coordinator for UNIAP in the Mekong region.

 Chinese husbands-to-be pay upwards of US$8,000 to arrange these marriages, many believing their bride is willing. On the other hand, Burmese parents, looking for a better life for their children and themselves, accept as little as $1,000 for their daughters, according to UNIAP’s 2010 report.

It is a local custom and some think cross-border marriage is normal.

With education programmes, they begin to realize this is against the law, and they begin to think ‘We are putting our girls in a high risk position. But bride trafficking will continue for as long as people are poor.

Action Taken
According to Save the Children, which has been working on this issue along the China-Myanmar border since 2002, trafficking for the purposes of forced marriage has increasingly been in the spotlight since 2006.

China and Burma now consider such arranged marriages to be human trafficking, and in 2009 they signed a comprehensive trafficking memorandum of understanding.

As Burma”s five-year plan of action to combat trafficking comes to an end in 2011, the number of cases recorded has increased, along with the number of traffickers apprehended.

In 2010, the authorities prosecuted 502 perpetrators (197 male, 305 female) and rescued 381 people (89 male and 292 female).

Sting operations as well as education about the dangers of falling into a recruiter’s trap have made these arrests possible, said a senior official from Burma’s Central Body for the Suppression of Trafficking in Persons.

The 176-strong Trafficking Task Force, trained by the Asia Regional Trafficking in Persons Project [ http://www.artipproject.org/ ] and funded by the Australian Agency for International Development, has been deployed in 23 locations around Burma, including hotspots such as Muse, a border town, as well as source cities such as Yangon.

Prevention Strategies
Special attention is being paid to buses, the main mode of transport used by traffickers. But prevention efforts are still the primary need.

Anti-Trafficking work in Myanmar is primarily focused on rehabilitation and reintegration; there needs to be a greater commitment on the part of all towards more prevention strategies which are inherently sustainable.

Instead of helping, Thazin’s brother said the police in Yangon demanded $600 as a bribe before they would search for her. He was unable to afford this sum, so Thazin remained a captive of her “husband” – until she could take no more and managed to escape.

“I even tore off my clothes. I was running naked,” she said, until she reached a bus station near the border where people clothed her and returned her to Burma.

The woman who gave Thazin to the traffickers is serving a three-year prison term; it is not known if the traffickers have been found.

The US State Department releases its 2011 Trafficking in Persons report in the coming weeks. Burma has always ranked among Tier 3 countries, the lowest ranking possible in anti-trafficking performance. The 2010 report [ http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2010/ ] acknowledged the work done against international trafficking, but condemned Myanmar for continued in-country forced labour [ http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=88240 ].

China has been on the Tier 2 watch list for the past six years.

The Emergence of the Tamil National Question

by Danielle Sabai 

In February 2011, the President of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapaksa, celebrated the 63rd anniversary of the island’s independence. In his speech, he stressed the necessity of “protecting the reconstructed nation”, as well as protecting “one of the oldest democracies inAsia”, its unity and its unitary character.

This speech came nearly two years after the end of the war on 19 May 2009, between the Sri Lankan state and the “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam” (LTTE). The military command of the LTTE was decimated in the last two months of a merciless war which had led to tens of thousands of deaths since the early 1980s.

Some 30 years of civil war have transformed the Sri Lankan political landscape. Once an island characterised by a developed social policy and high development indicators,Sri Lankais today ravaged by state violence, the militarisation of society and an authoritarian state.

The end of the war has in no way opened a period of peace and still less settled the Tamil national question. The Sri Lankan government, whose powers are concentrated in the hands of Mahinda Rajapaksa and brothers, has not sought to remedy the structural causes which led to the civil war. The state remains Sinhalese nationalist and racist in its essence and rejects any devolution of powers which would allow the different communities to envisage the future together.

The President is at war against his people. State violence is also exerted against Sinhalese, journalists and political activists who oppose him but also against workers as a whole. Despite the end of the war, the government has maintained the Prevention of Terrorism Act which allows it to muzzle its opponents. All communities suffer from the collapse of the rule of law. No peace can last if it does not rest on any political will to settle disputes.

The history ofSri Lankais rich in lessons. It illustrates to what point attacks against minorities are the premises of more general attacks against workers whatever their ethnicity. They lead inevitably to a weakening, if not a collapse, of democracy. It is important and necessary to review the historic roots which are at the base of the formation of this specific state having led to the emergence of two antagonistic nationalisms: Buddhist Sinhalese nationalism and its reaction, Tamil nationalism.

The germs of inter-communal dissension

Sri Lanka,Ceylonuntil 1972, has been profoundly marked by several centuries of colonisation. The strategic position of the island in theIndian Oceanexplains its successive conquest by the Portuguese, Dutch and British.

The main communities of the island, the Sinhalese and the Tamils, originate from successive migrations fromIndia. The first took place in the 6th century BC by migrants coming from the North West of India and practicing Buddhism [1]. They slowly melted with other groups coming from southern parts ofIndiato form the Sinhala community [2]. This was followed around 300 years later by a smaller migration of Hindu Tamils from the south ofIndia. The Tamil migration continued in the north of the island for several hundred years and at the end of the 12th century, thepeninsulaofJaffnaconstituted a separate state with a culture and language different from Sinhalese.

Neither the Sinhalese nor the Tamils can claim to be the first to have peopled the island since when they arrived,Ceylonwas already occupied by a hunter gatherer people, the Veddah or Wanniyaletto, who are today almost completely assimilated in the different communities.

The different social formations which would emerge on the island were however not compartmentalised. In thekingdomofKandy, for example, the Nayakkar dynasty emerged from the Vijayanagar Empire of southernIndia. Although the dynasty had been Tamil and originally Hindu, they converted themselves to Buddhism and were fervent promoters of it.

Under Portuguese and then Dutch colonialism, the coastal regions of the island were integrated into world trade in agricultural products from the early 16th century, facilitating the rise of a merchant capitalism. The coastal population was in its majority Sinhalese and Buddhist but trade exchanges made it a place of interconnection where Arabs, Sinhalese, Tamils and Burghers mingled [3].

In the peninsula of the North, which was poorer, only the missionaries ventured, converting a minority of the population, previously mainly Hindu, to Christianity. Social relations of a feudal type, in particular a rigid caste system, persisted.

Upon their arrival at the end of the 18th century the British extended foreign domination to the interior of the island in thekingdomofKandy. They developed big plantations there, imposing a new mode of production, plantation capitalism. They grabbed the communal lands previously devoted to pasturing of herds and the forests where the peasants practiced slash and burn cultivation, characterising them as “waste lands” to better resell them at a derisory price to British colonists. They would develop infrastructures which would allow the direction of the products of the plantations onto the world market.

Even if it only partially destroyed the pre-capitalist modes of production, plantation capitalism imposed itself rapidly, coming to dominate the island’s economy from the beginning of the 20th century.

The dominant classes of the pre-existing formations became almost naturally the comprador bourgeoisie [4]. Whether of Sinhalese, Burgher, Muslim [5] or Tamil origin, they found a common interest with the nascent bourgeoisie of the planters. Imbued with the colonial culture, they would send their children to study atOxfordandCambridge, so as to ensure a place alongside the colonial aristocracy.

Numerous members of the Ceylonese bourgeoisie owned their own coconut, coffee or rubber plantations. Thus, unlike neighbouringIndia, inCeylona national bourgeoisie fighting for independence did not emerge. The latter did not play a motor role in the first movements of agitation against the colonial power at the end of the 19th century. Opposition first took the form of Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim religious movements who fought against the privileges of the Christian minority (made up of both Sinhalese and Tamils) and against Western culture.

The British colonial power, which feared a coming together of the interests of the Tamil and Sinhalese bourgeoisies, played upon division to the hilt. Specific and community-based interests became paramount. The Tamil elites demanded favourable treatment in exchange for their loyal service in the colonial administration. For their part, the Sinhalese built networks of communal associations, the Mahajana Sabha, resting on the rural Sinhalese elites – ayurvedic physicians, Buddhist monks, schoolmasters and so on.

The Ceylonese workers’ movement emerged at the same time as plantation capitalism. The Ceylonese workers were mainly Sinhalese peasants expelled from their ancestral collective lands by the colonial power to work in the construction of roads and railways and in the docks. They maintained a toehold in the rural world however. Meanwhile, to ensure work was carried out on the plantations and in the towns, the British colonist had called on Indian Tamil workers from Tamil Nadu who they kept apart from the local workers. The workers’ movement was thus divided from its birth.

Although there were in the early 20th century several workers’ struggles involving workers of all origins and confessions, the nationalist and xenophobic discourse of the Sinhalese nationalist leaders had a profound impact on the working class of Sinhalese origin.

In the 1920s, new workers’ struggles allowed the development of an urban working class which was more unified, defending its own class interests beyond the castes which had survived and community based identities. A trade union confederation and a political party modelled on the British Labour Party emerged under the leadership of A.E. Goonesinha. The political control he exerted, both on the party and the trade union, was however fatal to the workers’ movement. During the great depression of the 1930s, Goonesinha did not hesitate to brand the Tamil plantation workers as being responsible for high unemployment and to accuse Indian merchants of dispossessing small Ceylonese landowners. The use of Sinhalese chauvinism was an easy and rapid means of constituting an electoral base which allowed him to win the parliamentary elections in the Sinhalese constituency of centralColombo. This was a fatal blow to universal suffrage – which had just been granted in 1931- by an unscrupulous politician who deployed it to electoralist ends.

The constitution of a Sinhalese nationalism

Nationalist and racist themes were subsequently regularly used by the ruling politicians for electoral ends or to implement a class policy. Thus, the first law adopted by the first independent Ceylonese government [6], the Citizenship Act, rendered stateless the Tamil “Indian” workers who had been settled for three of four generations in the island, under the pretext that they could not prove that they were Ceylonese by parentage or by naturalisation. The second law withdrew the right to vote under the pretext that they were not Ceylonese!

These laws took the vote away from all the plantation workers of the centre and south, or a tenth of the electoral body. That allowed the ruling UNP to eliminate a million votes, much of which have previously gone to the Left parties and the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), the main Ceylonese workers’ party. [7]. This party had been created in the 1930s by young intellectuals who had been won to Communist ideas during their studies in Britain and the United States of America.

The Tamil workers on the plantations would not find much help from among the North-Eastern Tamil members of parliament. Most of the latter voted for these retrograde laws. A dissident group led by S.J.V.Chelvanayakam founded the Federal Party [8]

This was a fatal blow against the Sri Lankan workers’ movement which became divided along ethnic lines. This major political defeat was a portent for the future. The use of nationalist appeals against a part of the population, considered wrongly as foreign, was soon applied to other ethnic minorities and in particular against the Sri Lankan Tamils from the north and east of the island. From 1949, the UNP government of DS.Senanayake put in place a policy of attribution of land to Sinhalese peasants who had been deprived of it. This policy was applied in the east of the island in a Tamil majority area. The arrival of these peasants modified substantially the demographic and therefore electoral composition of the constituencies concerned and thus gave a fiefdom to Sinhalese politicians who had lacked one.

In 1951, Bandanaraike [9], motivated by personal ambition, left the UNP to found the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP). It rested on the Maha Sabha [10], one of whose main objectives was to promote Sinhalese-Buddhist culture throughout the island. The SLFP was constituted on the basis of the Sinhalese petty bourgeoisie giving it support among the rural masses neglected both by the comprador bourgeoisie of the UNP and by the LSSP whose base was rather among the workers (even though it represented also paysants in some rural constituencies).

1956 constituted a major political turning point for the island. A year of presidential elections, 1956 also represented for the Sinhalese Buddhists the 2,500th anniversary of the death of Buddha as well as the anniversary of the “peopling of Ceylon” and the origins of the Sinhalese people. The electoral campaign was the opportunity for Sinhalese chauvinist outbidding.

Bandanaraike campaigned on the slogan “Sinhala Only” and proposed that Sinhalese replace English as the sole official language of the island. In the 24 hours following his investiture, the measure was decreed. This law was all the more unjustified in that before independence in 1944, the legislative council had voted by a very large majority for a law adopting Sinhalese and Tamil as official languages for education, examinations and parliamentary debates, recognising the importance of the equality of the languages.

The Sinhalese community was not however homogeneous. It was itself divided by lines of caste, class and regional differences. The state identified itself with Sinhalese nationalism but not with the Sinhalese community as a whole. It was the middle classes and the Buddhist clergy, through the Maha Sabha, who would contribute to the dissemination of Sinhalese nationalist ideology. This petty bourgeoisie was convinced that this chauvinist policy would bring it jobs by reducing the opportunities of the Tamil minority.

The renunciation of the left parties

Founded in 1935, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), Ceylonese section of the Fourth International from 1940 onwards, was the first party to demand the independence of the country against British imperialism. From its foundation, it developed significant work in the mass movements and trade unions. The second biggest party on the island in terms of size, the LSSP was the main workers’ party and also the main opposition party in parliament until the emergence of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party.

A multi-ethnic and multi-cultural party, it included among its members militants of different languages, religions, genders and castes. Its activists fought attacks on workers whatever they were as well as the inter-communal divisions of the working class. Thus, when after independence, the first UNP government voted through the Citizenship Act rendering the plantation Tamils stateless, the LSSP was one of only two parties which opposed it. The party denounced a racist decree, directed against the working class and damaging to democracy.

However, in 1956, the internal situation of the party had qualitatively evolved. Internal struggles and a first split in 1945 had weakened the party. The divergences mainly concerned the question of the construction of the party: branch of a South Asian party or party in the national framework. In 1950, after several years of political conflicts fed by personal rivalries and generational divergences, Philip Gunawardena, main founder of the LSSP, left the party and founded a new one, the Viplavakari – LSSP (LSSP-Revolutionary). A third of the party joined the VLSSP following the political reverse by the LSSP during the general elections of 1952. During the presidential election of 1956, the VLSSP allied with the Bandaranaike’s SLFP to form a coalition, the People’s United Front (MEP), which came first in the elections. The VLSSP openly betrayed the workers by voting for the “Sinhala Only Act” with all the majority parties. Only the Tamil minority parties and the LSSP opposed it in parliament. The leader of the LSSP, Colvin R. de Silva, presciently observed that this law, which made Tamils second class citizens, rested on a disastrous logic: “two languages, one nation; one language, two nations”.

The passing of the “Sinhala Only Act” in 1956 was followed by strong protests from the Federal Party. In 1957, the SLFP in government and the Federal Party signed the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam agreements promising a regional autonomy to the provinces of the North and East. Tamil, in particular, became the official language of the administration of these two regions. But the Sinhalese chauvinist forces organised by the Buddhist monks, on whose support Bandaranaike had relied to gain power, launched a virulent campaign against this agreement. On April 9, 1958, the United Front of Monks (Eksath Bhikku Peramuna-EBP), an organisation of reactionary and racist Buddhist monks, besieged the residence of the prime minister. The same afternoon, one year after having signed it, Bandaranaike renounced the pact. Subsequent Tamil demonstrations in Jaffna were severely repressed by the police. In Colombo and other regions Sinhalese nationalists launched pogroms against the Tamils leading to criminal arson and murders organised in complete impunity by Sinhalese hooligans and thugs. The violence unleashed soon escaped any control but Bandaranaike refused to intervene for fear of upsetting the Sinhalese nationalists. In vain. In 1959, he was assassinated by a member of the EBP.

The Buddhist monk making vows of abstinence and poverty gave way to a much less spiritual monk who used his traditional position to exercise power. Bandaranaike had utilised Sinhalese nationalism to come to power but he was incapable of detaching himself from it after he had succeeded in his aims. The Pandora’s box was opened, and it was impossible to contain the Sinhalese nationalist racist forces unleashed.

The LSSP could have been an important element to oppose this nationalist and racist drift. Its strength rested in its ability to organise the masses at the rank and file. It has shown this during the organisation of an immense hartal [11] against the UNP government in 1953 which paralysed the country. Overwhelmed, the government took refuge on a ship. But when it was in a position of strength, the LSSP did not push the struggle to its advantage. [12]

This positioning prefigured the capitulations to come. The working class base of the party shrunk under the pressure of the inter-communal conflicts and the electoral successes of the SLFP destabilised the leadership of the LSSP. Defeat in the elections of 1960 disoriented the party. N. M. Perera, the main organiser of the LSSP’s mass work, proposed forming a coalition government with the SLFP which was rejected by the majority of the party, but the LSSP parliamentary group supported the vote of confidence in the newly elected government against the “main enemy” of the UNP which had continuously ruled Ceylan since 1948 [13]. In 1964, Perera engaged the majority of the party in a coalition government with the SLFP and the Ceylon Communist Party [14], the government being led by Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the widow of the prime minister assassinated seven years earlier. The earlier political demands of the two left parties in favour of equal rights for the plantation Tamils and parity of status between Sinhalese and Tamil languages were put aside. In the same year, the LSSP was expelled from the Fourth International which saw entry into the SLFP government as a political treason.

A minority group around Bala Tampoe and Edmund Samarakkody continued to defend the traditional positions of the LSSP in a new party. But the only mass political party which had defended workers regardless of their ethnic origin had betrayed, leaving a political vacuum in the working class and strengthening Sinhalese nationalism. [15]

In 1968, the SLFP, LSSP and CP formed the United Front which won the 1970 elections. The LSSP and CP, definitively converted to parliamentarism, justified this alliance by the desire to oppose the UNP, “the party of foreign and Ceylonese capitalist interests” whereas the United Front campaigned for a policy of industrialisation through import substitution, the development of social protection and the nationalisation of the Bank of Ceylon, transport and the tea plantations.

The policy of this government was however less progressive than it appeared. It was Sirimavo Bandaranaike who pushed further the political logic of discrimination against North_Eastern origin and plantation Tamils to satisfy her electoral clientele. That had significant repercussions on the economic policy pursued. In a difficult economic conjuncture owing to the first generalised world recession in 1974-75, with an unprecedented increase in unemployment, the UF government sharpened discriminatory policies which were already in place and invented new ones: the “Sinhala Only Act” was used to exclude Tamils from the police, army, courts and governmental services in general; the policy of colonisation of Tamil areas was accentuated; the plantation Tamils were voluntarily or forcibly repatriated to Tamil Nadu. Standardisation of access to universities, which was deeply discriminatory against part of the Tamil community, was imposed. This racist policy was implemented by parties who identified themselves with the workers’movement. How could the coming generations of young Tamils still have confidence in the Left parties?

All these discriminatory policies had the goal of transferring resources to the Sinhalese to the detriment of the Tamils. In 1971, however, the government faced a significant insurrection from the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a group made up of young Sinhalese living in the south of the country, mainly rural and members of the petty bourgeoisie. Such an uprising of youth, supposedly the main beneficiaries of the political measures taken, show how much the discrimination against the Tamils did not benefit the majority of Sinhalese and did not alleviate poverty and unemployment. The ruling coalition responded with a terrible repression. Several thousand youths were killed by the army and the police and more than 10,000 were jailed [16]

The emergence of the Tamil national question

Colvin R. de Silva

In the early 1970s, the crisis in relation to the Tamil minority deepened. In 1972, Colvin R. De Silva, the former historic leader of the LSSP and then minister for constitutional affairs, drew up a new constitution which, among other things, gave Sinhalese the status of sole official language, established Buddhism as virtually the state religion. It removed section 29 of the 1947 Soulbury Constitution that guaranteed certain protection clauses for ethnic and religious minorities. It also introduce a new fundamental rights chapter that was applicable to North-eastern Tamils but not to those plantation Tamils who were stateless because it only protected citizens.

At the economic level, the policy of the government was profoundly discriminatory with respect to the Tamil community. The nationalisation of the plantations was accompanied by a redistribution of land in favour of the Sinhalese majority. The linguistic policy of the government deprived young Tamils of jobs after their studies. The new standards of access to the university were perceived by middle class youth as one discriminatory measure too far with respect to their community. This measure mainly affected the young Tamils of Jaffna, who were more educated. It did not affect the youth of the East, from Vanni and the plantations of the centre who for the most part did not go to university. It was nonetheless the detonator for big mobilisations and the entry into politics of a new generation of Tamil youths.

The Federal Party and the Tamil United Front (TUF) [17] began to distil a nationalist rhetoric which proclaimed the unity of all Tamils beyond class and caste inequalities. At this time, the notion of Tamil identity was real but it was not the substance of the Tamil community. In everyday life, belonging to a caste and a village constituted the main vectors of identity and dominated social relations.

The battles of the FP and TUF did not go outside of parliament, leaving a vacuum occupied by these young Tamil militants in Jaffna. Since independence, the attempts at political negotiations with the different parliamentary parties (SLFP and UNP) and the campaigns of Satyagraha [18] of the Federal Party had brought no solution to the Tamil cause. The refusal of the state to accord a minimum of autonomy and devolution led these young militants to reject the policy followed by the traditional Tamil political parties.

The young Tamil generations no longer believed in the possibility of developing their rights by democratic means. Only a separate state seemed to them to guarantee their linguistic, religious and cultural rights. Thus the question of a separate Tamil state emerged as the sole alternative and the means of winning it could rest neither on parliamentary battles or traditional campaign of agitation.

A major event marked the beginning of a cycle of violence [19]. In January 1974, a literary meeting to celebrate Tamil language and culture was organised in Jaffna. It was supported by the TUF. The coalition government led by Sirimavo Bandaranaike did not like it but did not dare to oppose it directly. When a final meeting attracted nearly 50,000 participants, the riot police attacked the crowd leading to the death of seven people. Following this event, the TUF and FP accentuated a campaign against the mayor of Jaffna [20], launched from 1972, accusing him of being a “traitor”. These vicious attacks ended with him being assassinated on July 27, 1975 by a member of an organisation formed in 1974, the Tamil New Tigers. This new organisation changed its name to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 1976.

No less than thirty groups engaged in violent actions of which the assassination of the mayor of Jaffna was the symbolic beginning. Among these groups, some like the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) were left-wing organisations. The LTTE for its part was situated on a nationalist and pragmatic terrain. But they were above all fashioned by the origin of most of the founder members, educated young students from the Jaffna middle class and rather high caste.

Ethnic tensions worsened throughout the 1970s but the armed Tamil groups remained marginal until the mid 1980s. In July 1983 a second major rupture took place. Following an ambush in which 13 police officers were killed by the Tigers, Sinhalese nationalists unleashed a pogrom in Colombo and its surrounding areas. Several thousand Tamils were killed, houses burned, shops looted. That led to a significant wave of immigration of Tamils to the north of the island and abroad. Following this tragic event thousands of young Tamils joined the armed struggle and the guerrilla struggle turned into civil war.

No progressive organisation was in a position to offer a political alternative. Sri Lankan democracy had been profoundly sapped for too long a time. In 1977, Junius Richard Jayawardene, elected Prime Minister following the victory of the UNP against the United Front, again changed the constitution, concentrating powers in the hands of a super President. He had created the National Union of Workers (Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya – JSS), in fact an organisation of hooligans used to intimidate, indeed kill his opponents, break strikes, and attack Tamils. The Sri Lankan working class was more than ever divided according to ethnic lines. The main left parties, the LSSP and the CP, had been contributors to this situation having for a long time renounced their convictions and political principles in exchange for ministerial posts. Everything was in place for a civil war which would lead to new massacres and precipitate the retreat of the workers movement as a whole especially after the defeat of the July 1980 strike movement.

The 1980s and the domination of the LTTE

On the other said of the Palk Strait, India was not indifferent to the pressure exerted by the 50 million Tamils living in Tamil Nadu and sympathising with the Lankan Tamil cause. During the 1980s, certain Tamil groups were militarily trained, armed and financial supported by the Indian state’s intelligence arm, the RAW.

Following the Indo-Lanka accords of 1987, India intervened directly in the north of the island. It deployed a “peacekeeping force”. The agreements, signed in July 1987 by the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the Sri Lankan President J. R. Jayawardene, sought to establish a certain autonomy in the North and East where Tamils were in the majority, the fusion of its two provinces (fusion which should be validated by a referendum) and the recognition of an equal status between the Tamil and Sinhalese languages.

But despite a common reference to the Thimphu Declaration [21] which aimed to present a unified and common basis for the many Tamil groups, the political divisions and personal antagonisms remained. Among them, the LTTE would emerge as the dominant group. From the early 1980s, the Tigers organised the brutal killing of the main leaders of the other armed Tamil groups, in particular those organisations identified with Left and therefore mass-based politics

Moderate Tamil activists, pro-Indian activists, and democrats not supporting the objective of a separate Tamil state were forced into exile or killed. The TULF was considerably weakened politically by the LTTE’s assassination of its main leaders, A. Amirthalingham and Yogeswaran. By eliminating or forcing into exile the main leaders of the other organisations of struggle, the LTTE destroyed all democracy inside the Tamil national liberation movement. They did not seek to unite the different Tamil-speaking communities of Sri Lanka. On the contrary, in 1990, they were guilty of ethnic cleansing, notably by the expulsion of almost 100,000 Tamil speaking Muslims from Jaffna district in the space of 48 hours. In a certain way, the LTTE shared with the Colombo government that they fought the same criminal conception of an ethnically pure society, rid of every minority.

In the early 1990s, the Tigers no longer had any real opposition. They could then present themselves as the “sole legitimate representatives of the Tamil people” and seek external political support. Their objective of a separate Tamil state became the sole proclaimed objective, separating it from the question of the rights demanded by Tamils and mortgaging any democratic resolution of the civil war.

Some lessons from the history of an oppression

This historic recapitulation of the Tamil question in Sri Lanka allows us to draw valid political lessons for other continents and other struggles which give it a universal scope.

The organisations of the workers’ movement should never abandon a part of their own. One cannot claim to emancipate the workers from exploitation while allowing a minority among them to become the victims of vindictive racism, indeed worse, directly participating in their oppression. Discrimination and violence exerted against an ethnic minority will return later against the workers as a whole and their organisations. Sri Lanka is the sad illustration of it. The Sinhalese workers have gained nothing from the oppression of the Tamils and the LSSP and CP, in allowing them to fall, precipitated their degeneration.

So far as the Tamil Tigers are concerned, full scale militarisation and maximalism were fed by the negation of the democratic rights of the Tamils themselves and thus the possibility of self-organising struggles. No socialist and democratic society can be created by organisations which justify murder in the name of the necessities of the armed struggle.

In all fights against national oppression, or against the oppression suffered by certain ethnic groups, there is the need to recognize the right to self-determination. The only progressive solution is the defence of equality between citizens, whatever their origin, sex or religion. Today the material and political conditions for the exercice of self-determination rights do not exist. Since Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state, its minorities should be granted rights including political, cultural and linguistic rights, to reverse historical oppression or discrimination.

Today, there is an urgent need to address justice and reparations for the Tamils and Muslims who were displaced and dispossessed during the war and for the Hill-country Tamils who are still economically disenfranchised. Rather than so doing, the current government of Sri Lanka has profited from the military “victory” over the Tamil Tigers in 2009 to restrict still further democratic liberties, block any opposition and on this basis attack all workers whatever their ethnic origin. The new trend in economic development further causes uneven development and inequality for the majority of the Sri Lankan people. Therefore, there will not be any progress toward social justice and democracy without linking the political settlement of minorities’ demands with the class struggle of all workers for social justice and redistribution. In that perspective, devolution of state power could be an important step to empowering local communities and minorities against this authoritarian and centered State.

NOTES

[1] Buddhism, which emerged in the 6th century BC in India, was originally an interpretation of Hinduism based on tolerance and moderation. Its main divergence with Hinduism rests on the rejection of the caste system. Ceylon is the only place where Buddhism developed by maintaining the caste system

[2] See, Meyer Eric Paul (2009). The Specificity of Sri Lanka: Towards a Comparative History of Sri Lanka and India.Economic and Political Weekly

[3] Descendants of mixed marriages between Dutch or Portuguese and Ceylonese

[4] The word “comprador” designates a bourgeoisie in a developing country drawing its wealth from foreign trade rather than a bourgeoisie having interests in the production of national wealth

[5] In Sri Lanka, Muslim identity does not rest only on religion but has developed as a specific ethnic identity. Although most Muslims speak Tamil, they do not consider themselves as “Tamil Muslims” but as Tamil-speaking Muslims

[6] The first independent government in 1948 was led by D.S. Senanayake and his party the United National Party (UNP).The UNP was the party representing the interests of the comprador bourgeoisie. It won power at independence without ever having led the struggle against British imperialism

[7] For more details on the LSSP refer to Pierre Frank, The Fourth International: The long march of the Trotskyists published by Ink Links, London, 1979, pp 112-117. Ervin, Charles Wesley. “Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and Sri Lankan radicalism,”in The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest Ness, Immanuel (Ed). Blackwell Publishing, 2009. Blackwell Reference Online. 07 May 2009

[8] The Federal Party was a party of parliamentarians representing the interests of the Tamil bourgeoisie. The Tamil name of the Federal Party was the Lankan Tamil Self-Governement Party. However, its programme was not addressed to the Tamil workers of the plantations who fought for their political rights but to the Sri Lankan Tamils originating from the North and East of the island.

[9] Solomon Bandaranaike was a rather distant relative of Senanayake in the hierarchy of the UNP, the party of “nephews and uncles”, too distant to hope to come to power .This is what led him to set up his own party, the SLFP, to ensure himself as rapidly as possible an electoral base. There were Tamils among the founders of the SLFP but they left the leadership once the party became aggressively Sinhala Bouddhist. Nevertheless the SLFP always had Tamil members and supporters including in Jaffna and the East even during the years of war

[10] A Sinhalese association defending Sinhalese culture based on the Mahajana Sabha which grouped the rural elites

[11] A general strike and a complete cessation of any activity

[12] For a critical analysis of the position of the LSSP following the hartal of 1953, see: Sivanandan Ambalavaner. Racism and the Politics of Underdevelopment. Race & Class- XXVI-1, and Hensman, Rohini; The Role of the Socialist in the Civil War in Sri Lanka.

[13] The Fourth International publicly disavowed this vote as well as the budget vote the same year

[14] The Ceylon Communist Party was formed in 1943 after the expulsion of the Stalinist current of the LSSP in 1940. This current refused to lead the struggle against colonialism because of the alliance between the USSR and British imperialism during the war

[15] Up to 1985, the RMP (Revolutionary Marxist Party), led by Bala Tampoe, was recognized as the Sri Lankan section of the FI. Another prominent RMP leader was Upali Cooray. Following a division in this organisation in 1981 there was not de facto a functioning section until 1991 when the World Congress recognised the Nava Sama Samaja Pakshaya, although Bala Tampoe and the comrades around him continued as individual members.

The origins of the NSSP are in a Left or “Vama” tendency that emerged inside the post-1964 LSSP. This tendency, leaders of which were expelled by the LSSP in the early 1970s, developed around students and lecturers in Peradeniya University then broadened to include working class members of the LSSP as well as more radical older leaders of the LSSP. The Vama tendency became an open organisation in 1977, after several years of maintaining an inside/outside relationship with the LSSP and took the name of Nava Sama Samaja Pakshaya (New Socialist (or Social Equality) Party). The NSSP was banned in 1983 after the July pogroms and only legalised again in 1985. Some of its leaders and members were killed by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) during the 1987-1990 insurrection and also by the LTTE in the same period. The NSSP is one of the few parties that has consistently defended the right to self-determination for the Tamil people.

The Vama tendency had come into contact with the Militant Tendency (Ted Grant) through its supporters who went to Britain to study. They became affiliated with the Militant international current but developed ideological differences as well as strategic differences on Sri Lanka. The NSSP broke with the Militant tendency in 1988-89 and developed relations with the Fourth International.

[16] The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna was a revolutionary movement but since its beginning it had xenophobic tendencies, regarding Hill-Country Tamil workers saw as fifth-colomnists for india expansionism . It became an unbridled Sinhala chauvinist Party.[[For more on JVP see Skanthakumar, Balasingham. “People’s Liberation Front of Sri Lanka (JVP)” in The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest, Ness, Immanuel (Ed), Blackwell Publishing, 2009. Blackwell Reference Online. 07 May 2009.

[17] Coalition formed in 1972 comprising several Tamil parties including the Tamil Congress (ACTC) and the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) and which became the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in 1976 after the Federal Party had joined the coalition

[18] Peaceful mobilisations of the type advocated by Mahatma Gandhi

[19] On this subject see UTHR (J) – Chapter 2.

[20] He was elected as an independant but supported the SLFP

[21] On July 13, 1985, the different Tamil groups, meeting in the capital of Bhoutan Thimphu, agreed on three key points: recognition of a distinct Tamil nation and its right to self-determination, the guarantee of the territorial integrity of an independent Tamil state, the safeguarding of the fundamental rights of Tamils outside of their state

‘Winning the War’: Gen. Sarath Fonseka Reveals the Real Sri Lankan War Experience

The document published below: ‘Winning the War’, is an original manuscript written by General Sarath Fonseka in his attempt to bring this Government façade to light; as the government carries on with an event of this kind while the man behind the victory is still behind bars.

*WINNING THE WAR – SRI LANKAN EXPERIENCE*:
————————————————-
-By General GSC Fonseka (Retd) RWP, RSP, rcds, psc – former Commander of the Sri Lanka Army-

1. The war victory was achieved mainly due to the success of the military on the ground campaign supported by the other services. Although the politicians are trying to claim the credit, they did not do anything extra than what was done by the previous heads of state or defense officials. All successive heads of state gave equal support to the forces and had given clear orders to finish the war. However, due to the failure in the part of the services during that time prevented any victory against the LTTE.

Although, the present President says that he withstood the out side pressure and allowed the forces to continue the battle uninterruptedly, even the previous Presidents would have done the same thing that time, if the forces had gone closer to the Terrorist leadership as we did during the final operation. The LTTE would have then requested foreign powers to exercise pressure on the government by asking for cease-fires etc as they did during the final stages of the operation.

As the Army successfully moved forward and reached, the point of no return, the President or the defense officials had no way in asking the Army to halt the operations at that stage.

Therefore, the credit for moving forward until the victory was achieved has to go to the Military and not to the politicians. Of course, the President on 31 Jan and 01 Feb 2009, at the very critical stage of the operation wanted to give a cease-fire despite the protest from the Army Commander.

Probably this was done after secret discussions with Kumara Pathmanadan alias KP to allow them to take the terrorist leaders out from the war zone.

The terrorist made use of this opportunity and launched a massive counter attack during this period where the Army had to under go a large set back and almost collapsed. However, the Army commander’s personal influence together with the determination of the GOC’s save the day for all Sri Lankans during that LTTE counter attack. It should be mentioned here that through out all serious situations, the Secretary Defense was only a spectator and only contribution from him for the war was attending to procurement process once the service Commanders project their arms and ammunition requirements. Purchase of all arms and ammunition was carried out by the Secretary Defense and the prices for purchases were discussed and agreed by him with the suppliers. There were instances where certain purchases negotiated by the Secretary Defense were questionable. For an example at the beginning of the war, the Army purchased a 130 mm Artillery round for US$ 250 and towards the latter stages of the war, Secretary Defense paid US$ 650 for a round of 130 mm Artillery.

Although at early stages of the war, the President and the Secretary Defense listened to the advice of the Service Commanders about the purchases however, towards the latter stages they were not willing to listen to the Service Commanders regarding the arms and ammunition requirements and preferred to decide themselves about all purchases after discussing directly with the suppliers.

2. Moment the war was over and on the very first day, the President said no more recruiting to the Army and totally ignored the recruitment of manpower for the consolidation phase. After Jaffna was captured with 15000 troops in 1995, we had to deploy 35000 troops to hold the captured area. However, after we finished the war and the area we had to hold became four times bigger. The request made by Army Headquarters to recruit new cadres to cater to this additional requirement was turned down by the President and that made the troops more exhausted, resulting in large-scale desertion in the
Army, although there was no fighting.

President and Secretary Defense also did not take any interest to kit up and equip troops after the war victory.

The present Army Commander being a highly unprofessional officer who is only carrying out the job of a political stooge does not take any interest to care about his troops. Instead, he is employing soldiers in all types of unprofessional work such as cleaning drains, paddy cultivation and selling of vegetables etc to please the Secretary of Defense who thinks all types of problems faced by the government due to its inability to take proper development measures could be over come by deploying the Army. Outcome of that is we have now ended up with a poorly administered low morale Army.

What was Jagath Jayasooriya, present Army Commander doing during the war and his background.

3. He was just another officer who had applied to retire from the Army after 20 years of service. In 1999 as he was posted to a Division deployed in operation “Jaya Sekurui” (Victory Certain) in Vanni. As he did not, had confidence to Command a Division in a major offensive operation and scared to go to Vavunia he applied to retire from the Army. After that, he even applied for a job at Ceylinco Security and got selected. However, the Army insisted that he report to Vavunia and take over the appointment until his retirement papers are approved. Due to that, he had to report to Vavunia.

One day when he was in Vavunia, he had been driving around sight seeing and his vehicle went over an old land mine buried in own rear area. He was seriously injured owing to that incident and made him bed ridden for almost two years. Due to his injury and he had to take treatment from the Military hospital, he withdrew his retirement papers. After he recovered, a cease-fire was in force and he decided to continue in the Army. This is his background in the Army and has never commanded troops in any high intensity operation. During the Ealam war IV he was the Security Forces Commander Vavunia carrying out the tasks of a holding Formation and providing the logistic backing for the Divisions involved in the offensive operations forward of his area which were under the direct command of the Army Commander.

All strategies and operational plans of Elam war IV was worked out purely by the Commander of the Army and all tactical plans of the GOC’s
were closely monitored and directed by the Army Commander himself. During Elam war IV, there was no Overall Operations Commander commanding the offensive operations as done in the past. Only time an offensive Division was kept under the Command of Jagath Jayasooriya was 59 Division, which was launched along the Eastern axis during its formative stage and later deployed in the rear area of the holding Brigade in Welioya for a period of two months. All other times Jagath Jayasooriya’s job was either going on sight seeing in the operational area, receiving the Army Commander during his visits to Vavunia and giving the welcome speech at the Commander’s weekly Operations Review Conference welcoming the Army Commander.

4. During Army Commanders weekly operations review conferences in Vavunia, sometimes Jayasooriya used to ask stupid questions and get pulled up by the Commander. One day when the Army had moved even beyond Thunukai, half way on the western axis, Jayasooriya asked the Commander, “what would happen if the terrorist employ all their resources and attack the Army in one single place”? This led the Commander to severely reprimand him for being so negative and unprofessional and lacking the ability to understand the tactical picture. In addition to this, Jayasooriya’s (then a Major General), conduct was well below that of a General Officer Commanding. The day the Army launched the biggest rescue operation taking a very high risk at Pudumatalan where a large amount of logistic problems were expected once over 115000 civilians were rescued from the crutches of the terrorist causing immense logistic problems, Jayasooriya was staying at home on leave.

He was not bothered to make an effort to return and attend to any urgent requirements in the field. Due to this, the Army Commander had to berate him and summon him to Vavunia like a Young Officer and asked him to attend to the urgent logistic matters.

5. During Elam war IV, the Commander had banned alcohol in the North and East operation areas as he expected all officers to be fully sober and
committed all the time as the operations continued. However, during this time it was reported to Army Headquarters by one of the escorts of
Jayasooriya who gave an anonymous call to Army HQ saying that Jayasooriya was consuming liquor in his room every day and indulging in homosexual activities with his Aid de Camp. Based on the report the Army Commander got his Aid de Camp arrested by the Military police where the officer had given a statement saying that he used to drink with Jayasooriya in his bedroom while Jayasooriya was lying down in bed and the Aid de Camp sitting next to him.

However, the officer had denied involvement in any sexual activates.
Anyway, Jayasooriya keeping a junior Lieutenant as his Adc, instead of a Captain and retaining the same officer even as the Commander of the Army when the normal rank of the Commanders Adc is a Major, the allegation of homosexual behavior with this young officer was seems to be quite true although it was not proved.

6. During Ealam war IV, not only Jayasooriya, even in the East the Security Force Commanders or even the GOC’s on holding role, except the GOC of Trincomalee Division were not involved in offensive operations. Trincomalee GOC commanded the Mavil Aru and Sampur operation. The Army Commander placing the Task Force Commander directly under his command commanded all other operations in the East. Only Jaffna offensive operations were commanded by the Security Forces Commander Jaffna and two Reserve Division Commanders but
not the holding role Division Commanders. It is sad to mention that
Jayasooriya was clueless about the maneuvers of Divisions and Task Forces and did not have even any proper control over the holding Divisions. There were many instances where the Commander of the Army had to interfere and sort out problems pertaining to his holding Formations. Major General Rajitha De Silva who was a holding role Division Commander under him will justify this.

7. There were many other allegations against Jayasooriya’s conduct and the Army Commander was to initiate many other inquiries against him and remove him from Command when the President acting against Gen Fonseka’s advice appointed him as the Commander of the Army. Jayasooriya, is now trying to change the history of the war victory together with Secretary Defence who is a man suffering from an inferiority complex to claim the credit for the victory. He has shamelessly removed the name of General Fonseka, which had
been put up on all the monuments erected to felicitate the war victory to
please the politicians. In fact in short, Jayasooriya has never commanded any offensive operation during his career and did not understand the a thing about new tactical concepts introduced by General Fonseka for the Infantry units to achieve the great victory with his own past experiences.

8. The war was won mainly due to the strong command of the Commander at that time and the concept, tactics and training introduced by him in addition to his ability to identify and detail the correct people for the job, due to his vast experience in offensive operations over a long time at various ranks. Commander not only selected the correct field commanders but also efficient staff officers who formed the backbone of his war machinery.

Commander had to take the unpopular decision of side lining weak officers and create a Command Stream of selected officers, which was not a popular decision, which previous Commanders never wanted to take. This motivated the capable officers and the Army Commander streamlined this system after studying the existing systems in the Indian and the Pakistan Armies. These were the basic reasons for the reawakening of the Sri Lanka Army, which fought a loosing battle for over 30 years. Although the stupid political leadership and the Defence Secretary tries to claim the credit for the war victory and the cowardice present Army Commander has shown his willingness to give the credit to politicians, present President and the Secretary defence did not do anything more than previous heads of state did towards the war effort. It was nothing other than the Army Commander’s commitment and the dedication of troops under his command, which paved the way for the
great victory.

9. The Sri Lanka Army’s contribution towards the war victory is
unexplainable and may be about 90% of the total effort when compared with what the other services had to do. Nevertheless, the present cowardice Army Commander as he is ready to do anything to please politicians, will never be prepared to claim its due credit for the Army although the contributions of the Army could be highlighted as below.

ARMY NAVY AF POLICE CIVIL DEF FORCE
OWN DEATHS 5,200 300** 8 50 25
OWN WOUNDED 27,000 150 10 25 25
TERRORIST KILLED 23,000 200 1,500 50 20
TERRORIST CAPTURED 12,000 10 0 10 0
**50% of the above Navy deaths were out of the battle area and was due to the suicide bomb explosion in Dambulla.

10. Even with above statistics the President or the Secretary Defence and even the present cowardice Army Commander will never want to say that the credit of the war victory should go to the Army because they know that General Fonseka directed the Army to Victory. The contribution of other services and all other citizens of the country, which helped the Army to achieve this victory against the LTTE, which was some years back, was only a dream to all Sri Lankans as well as the international community, which the Army always appreciates with gratitude.

Strategies, Tactics, Training and Command Techniques of the Sri Lanka Army 

11. General Fonseka started preparing for the future battles when he was the Jaffna Commander in 2002. He knew one day when the war starts again he will be asked to Command the war the same way the authorities asked him to Command the Jaffna Defence, giving only two hours to take over when Jaffna was about to fall in 2000. As the Security Forces Commander Jaffna in 2002 and being No 5 in the overall Army seniority, the first thing the General did was ensuring that Jaffna defences are strengthened and kept ready for any future eventuality although, there was a cease fire in force. As the Chief of Staff (Army’s No 2) again in 2005, he visited Jaffna several occasions and every time he visited, he made it a point to walk along the defences, and to ensure that the defences are well prepared and could sustain any major terrorist attack. This readiness was the only reason, which helped the Army defences to sustain the massive terrorist assault at the beginning of Elam war IV in 2006. In 2002 as the Jaffna Commander, the General was trying to find out the tactics and strategies, which should be adopted by the Army if it had to go on the offensive again as against the previous tactics of the Army. The previous tactics adopted by the Army always confined them to the main road net work system and the terrorist had
already worked out all the counter tactics, which they employed very
successfully. General realized that if we are to avoid confining the
movement of the Army astride main roads, the other alternative was to enter into the jungles and be prepared to do that in wide fronts to deny the enemy’s ability to use asymmetric tactics to hit the flanks and rear of the Army advance. In addition, the General realized that it was better to engage the terrorist’s strong points and to engage them in large numbers in many fronts to inflict more casualties on him rather than commit the Army for soft targets leaving the initiative to the terrorist. Therefore, the Army advance had to be prepared for jungle terrain in wider fronts and thin front lines. To meet this type of deployment according to the General’s thinking, the Army had to deploy in versatile small teams preferably of four man teams within the framework of eight man teams and platoons. As per this thinking of General, he introduced a new training concept for regular Infantry what he named as Special Infantry Operations Training. During this course of strenuous and tough training, an Infantry soldier learned not only the Infantry skills within a four man team but also learned basic communications, field engineering, first aid, calling for air and artillery fire etc. At the end of the 6 1/2 months training course, the Infantry soldier was very confident of himself and became a fighting machine in the battlefield. With this advance training given to all Infantry soldiers, which even continued throughout Elam war IV, the Section Commanders and the Platoon Commanders became very confident to take on any difficult task in the battlefield. This included even going through enemy lines or fighting behind enemy lines and they really gave a tough time to the terrorists in the battlefield. The Infantry soldiers who had received this training together with a one month training leg in Commando and Special Forces Training Centres could even operate shoulder to shoulder with the Commando
and Special Forces troops in the immediate distance beyond our own lines, up to about 5 km in to the enemy territory. This even gave a good back up for Commandos and SF operations and totally put the terrorist’s defensive deployment paralyzed.

Overall Strategy
12. Army Commander wanted to take the Eastern and the Northern theaters in peace meal and cleared eastern province in one year. In the eastern province, it was only an Infantry Brigade together with about two Commando or Special Forces battalions, which were deployed at any stage of the operation. The Commander of the Army personally drew out even the tactical plans of Batticaloa west and Thoppigala Operation and the Task Force Commander had only to execute it. Although the Eastern Province operations always found the troop levels below the real requirement, the Commander decided to deploy 57 Division in the North for offensive in the middle of the Eastern Province Operation to prevent terrorists moving reinforcements to the East.

These were difficult decisions to take at the early stage of the war as Army had only a Brigade as reserve. Then, as the East was cleared
after one year of fighting Army Commander kept on creating new Battalions as he had a very successful recruiting campaign. By the time the war ended, he had created and inducted three new Divisions and six Task Forces of Six Battalions in each into the Northern Theater. Induction of new Formations, their timings and locations of induction was purely done as per the Commander’s overall strategy. Commander’s Strategy was to open up more fronts as much as possible in wide frontages and to ensure that all the fronts contribute towards the each other’s tactical move forward as they move forward deep into enemy territory. Finally, the plan was to join up all fronts and form as encirclement on the worn off and withdrawing enemy.

Commander aimed at engaging the terrorist where they were strong as against the Sun Tzu’s theory of attacking the enemy where he is weak because the aim was to draw the terrorist and get the maximum kills. Therefore, the General’s plan was to go for the kill during the first two years of the battle rather than capturing land as he new very well that the terrorists would pull out and vacate the ground little by little when they are worn off. This is what exactly happened at the end on the Eastern Coast, exactly according to the Commander’s overall plan. Commander wanted first to deny the Western Coast to the terrorist to ensure no movement of terrorists to take place between India and Sri Lanka and finally they can be eliminated on the Eastern Coast. When the Commander was inducting troops in a wide front especially facing difficult jungle terrain, the President and the Secretary Defence was never happy due to lack of knowledge on tactics adopted by the
Infantry troops. In addition, during the first two years the President and
the Secretary Defence used to become very impatient at times as troops were not moving forward fast but only concentrating on the kills. Secretary Defence had the habit of asking to induct Divisions from various places after talking to some junior officers in the field as if Commander could create Divisions over night. Commander had to handle these situations patiently although their conduct was painful at times.

Personal Involvement of the Commander in Commanding the Operations down to Tactical Levels at All Times

13. During this Operations, the Commander used to decide even down to
Battalion deployments and Battalion Fronts. He directed Division and Brigade Commanders about the exact deployment on ground, down to Battalion level and monitored the progress of even four-man team deployments of all the front line Battalions. He also ensured that his Operation map had the entire deployment, including the deployment of four man teams are marked on his map, which was updated, twice daily in the morning and evening. Commander always directed the Division and Brigade Commanders about the Battalion maneuvers during the advance and consolidation phases. Especially during the times when Davison and Brigades were stuck unable, to breach the terrorists
defences on ditches and bunds. During this time, the Commander used to direct and tell the GOC’s and Brigade Commanders where they should breach the bund /defences and how they should hold or consolidate to face the frequent daring counter attacks of the terrorists.

14. As the Commander personally got involved in the Command aspect the GOC’s, Brigade Commanders and Battalion Commanders used to take difficult and risky decisions and lead the troops from front with confidence. This involvement by the Commander directly with the field Commanders not only kept the Commander in the exact picture all the time but also ensured that there were no lapses or negligence in the part of the field Commanders who were also under pressure to complete the job given to them. During last stages of the war there were daring counter attacks launched by the terrorists on our front lines and there were occasions where they managed to breach our front lines and the GOC’s and Brigade Commanders were rendered unable to manage with their own resources. During such situations, the Army Commander used his personal influence, shifted Commander’s reserves of Commando and Special Forces troops and took appropriate action to take the
situation under control. This system and relationship gave confidence to
field commanders, as they knew that the Commander was right behind them to help during a crisis. Good example is the cease-fire granted by the president on 31st Jan and 01st Feb 2009 having succumbed to the external pressures and connived with the terrorist leaders like KP alias Kumaran Pathmanadan to grant a cease-fire at the height of the battle, against the advice of the Commander of the Army. Probably, this would have done to give respite for the terrorists to take their leaders away from the country. KP revealed this plan during a press interview lately and the terrorists launched a massive counter attack forcing the Army to pull back nearly four kilometers. At this stage, the Army lines began to fall and created a disorganized situation with some GOC’s even loosing control. If the Army fell back another three kilo meters on that day it would not have been possible to hold on to our gains and it would have been the end of all what we have achieved after 2 1/2 years of fighting. Nevertheless, at this stage, the Army Commander managed to pullout the Commando and the Special Forces Troops who were operating deep inside the jungles and heli lift them to the area.

Finally, the Commandos and the SF troops managed to block the
terrorists counter attack almost at the last moment after fighting a bitter
battle. Such was the involvement of the Commander of the Army who was virtually the Overall Operation Commander during the Elam War IV. It was hilarious that one day just one month before the Army finished the war, the Secretary Defence, asked the Army Commander why he was not getting Major General Jayasooriya who was only the holding Formation Commander in Vavunia to Command the overall offensive operation. This made the Secretary Defence’s dirty attempts clear to prevent any credit coming to the Army Commander for commanding the offensive personally. It was not only the offensive operation that the Commander had to personally monitor but even the holding operations in Vavunia, where regular terrorist activities were taking place had to be monitored by the Commander. As and when terrorist’s infiltrations and strikes took place in holding formations, especially in Vavunia, the Commander had to arrange Re-deployment of troops, as Jayasooriya lacked control and initiative to take control over any crisis situation.

During the weekly visits by the Commander to Vavunia, all Offensive and Defensive Operations were reviewed; in addition to Commander’s
daily Operation discussions with the Commanders of Offensive Formations, through the Operations Communication system and Operation maps.

During this entire operation, the Commander of the Army did all Strategic and Operational level planning and the GOC’s and the Brigade Commanders did all tactical planning.

15. During the year 2008 and early months of 2009, the fighting was heavy and use of support weapons by own troops were controlled largely to avoid civilian casualties where by rate of own casualties went up as a result. By this time, troops have been in heavy fighting in difficult
terrain and weather conditions for nearly two years and due to unbearable strain, troops started deserting the Army leaving battalion strengths going down rapidly. At this stage, the Commander had to take the difficult decision of Court Marshaling the deserters and this prevented the troops deserting the Army.

Subsequently, the ungrateful government after Court Martialing the Commander on spurious charges to take revenge from him for
contesting for the Presidential Election, started saying that if the Army
Commander could Court Martial 4000 soldiers, why the Commander cannot be Court Martialed.

Such is the ungrateful behavior of the present Sri Lankan Government. The President and the Secretary Defence believes that Army need
not to be credited for winning the war. Their conduct only indicated that
they have no respect for those who won the war to save the country, but they are now honey mooning with the terrorist leaders.

16. In addition to the above, during the war Commander created a Mechanized Brigade for the Sri Lanka Army to get more mobility, mainly for the Infantry reserves. Armoured vehicles were operating giving intimate support to Infantry wherever the terrain permitted. Army Commander personally ensured that limited financial allocations for the Army were efficiently used and no corruption took place during the war. Ensuring that the logistics matters were attended to on time, made things easy for field Commanders and boosted the morale of the troops in the battlefield. As the troops realized that, the Commander was sincere and committed troops gave their best to the country and the Army with a sense of sacrifice.

17. The significant feature in the Ealam war IV that was personally directed by the Commander of the Army was it had no H-hrs and Start lines. However, it was continuous fighting day and night, 24 hrs in all weather in difficult terrain for two years and nine months and all over in wide front lines, on flanks and in the rear without any respite. As much as the troops had no rest, the Commander and his Staff at AHQ also had no rest or breaks.

Commander kept thmashas and other ceremonials to the minimum and followed all principles of efficient Command to the last letter. All in all, it was the new concepts and tactics along with hard work by every body, which paid devidence. Some politicians and officials in the Defence Ministry and even some in the Army, who were enjoying the booze and sex, never realized the stress on the Commander and field troops. Commander and the field troops had no private life for 3 years, Operations continued under tremendous constraints. At times in worst weather conditions and even with limitations on ammunition stock levels. Operations were totally launched as per the tactical requirements with least attention for auspicious timings or political agendas, etc. Finally, it was the soldier behind the weapon with dedication and ready to sacrifice with sound strategies, operation and tactical plans with exemplary leadership of the Commander of the Army, GOC’s and downward Commanders as well as the commitment of the Staff and Logistic troops made the victory a reality.

18. During Elam War IV offensive, operation command was exercised down to eight down level as against the accepted one down in offensive
conventionally. Army Commander monitored even the platoon, section and four man team operations. This was the case even with GOC’s and Brigade Commanders. As a result, Army Commander downwards every one had to take responsibility for all Operational matters down to four-man team level. For example, when an Operation in Muhamalai Defence in Jaffna ended up with heavy casualties and the media criticized the operation heavily, The Army Commander took the total responsibility for the Operation but greedy politicians claiming credit for the war victory never came out to accept blame for bad results Army achieved in certain battles. Even in Defensive Operations, the deployment down to platoon level were always decided by the Army Commander and when he was No 5 in the Army and holding the appointment of Jaffna Commander and No2 as Chief of Staff of the Army used to go from
bunker to bunker and even supervised the sighting of machine guns.

19. During last one year of the Elam War, as the Army was moving forward and capturing large new areas, the troop requirement to hold those areas were heavy and as all the new recruits were absorbed into offensive battalions Commander decided to raise Re inforcement Battalions with Battle Casualties for the holding role in newly captured areas. Some battle casualties still undergoing treatment as P3 casualties (priority 3) were used to raise Re-inforcement Battalions and about 10000 such soldiers willingly joined these Battalions as they realized that they had to support the Commanders Operation plan to ensure smooth progress of the offensive.

20. Although some Commanders believed in doing their own job and tasks, the Commander of the Army considered the whole war effort as the task of everyone. Therefore, whenever there were troop requirements in areas allocated to other Services or the Police and whenever they faced with any difficulties Army Commander undertook the their tasks voluntarily.

Especially, when the Army was operating in the North and the terrorists
tried to regroup in the East and started attacking the police in the area,
the Army Commander on his own initiative sent troops and Commandos to the East. This was again an additional deployment for the Army amidst its heavy commitments in the North. However, it enabled the Security Forces to take control of the East again. Not only that, but during the Northern operations there were many instances where the terrorists launched attacks on civilians deep in the south to divert the attention of the Army elsewhere. In order to overcome this situation Army Commander had to raise two new Battalions with Army deserters who had surrendered including some Commando and Special
Forces troops. After speaking to these deserters and motivating them, the Army was able to deploy them deep inside jungles in the South. In this manner, all the terrorists operating in the South were eliminated and the area was secured. These were difficult commitments which the Army under took amidst its main commitment in the North. These were the problems, which the Army overlooked in the past and which prevented success in the offensives as the terrorists were able to strike in the South when ever the Army gain any success in the North and not due to the lack of political leadership or political will. As the Army Commander on his own initiative addressed all these issues, politicians were able to enjoy life in the south as the Army was accomplishing its task. All these additional deployments were personally controlled by the Commander himself going down to Platoon level Operations
and not leaving anything unattended.

Normally in conventional deployments, the Army Commanders do only coordination of Operations, provide resources, and leave the battle and Operations to be commanded by the Formation Commanders.

Nevertheless, the Sri Lanka Army Commander took the whole Elam
war IV under his personal Operational Command and directed the Operation to Victory.

21. Although, the Army Commander had selected the best available Divisional Commanders to Command Divisions there were times where some showed their own weaknesses. Some were good in pushing troops but lacked ability to ensure the security of flanks or to stabilize the consolidation. Some led very well from the front but were poor in tactical planning. Some were very capable but lacked commitment. As per above situation, the Commander had to always be fully involved with what happens in the forward areas and fill the vacuum
whenever it arose. There were occasions where Divisional Commanders failed to coordinate between Divisions. If one Division comes under a counter attack, some times the Commander had to intervene and direct the adjoining Divisional Commander to extend the necessary support to the Division under attack. Although, these are not normally done by the Army Commander, in the case Elam war IV the Commander willingly attended to these problem areas as past experiences have shown that any delays in taking appropriate remedial measures at the correct time frame could lead to major setbacks to the whole operation.

22. Lastly, although the President and Secretary Defence claim the credit for eradicating terrorism in Sri Lanka, in Mahinda Rajapaksha’s Presidential campaign manifesto in 2005 he stated that he will solve the North East terrorist problem by personally meeting and talking to the LTTE leader Prabahakaran and never left any room for the Military Option. When the terrorist leader commenced hostilities in July 2006 in the East, Mahainda Rajapaksha went behind various parties and requested them to negotiate with Prabahakaran to settle the Mavil Aru problem in the East. He was not willing to go for the Military option.

Luckily the Army Commander who was hospitalized for three months after getting seriously injured after the suicide attempt on his life came out of the hospital the same day and decided to go on the offensive to recapture the Mavil Aru sluice. Major General N. Mallawarachchi who was the Chief of Staff and Acting Commander when the Commander was in hospital have said that he has no troops to go on any offensive. Army Commander having decided to go on the offensive decided to bring down the only Brigade, which was available in Jaffna as a reserve
and commenced the offensive operations. This is how the offensive against the world’s most ruthless terrorist organization began and ended up at Nandikadal as per the Commanders strategy three months before he anticipated.

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