The CIA and ISI: Are Pakistan and the U.S.’s Spy Agencies Starting to Get Along?

After months of relations languishing at an all-time low, Pakistan and the U.S. may now be opening up a fresh phase of engagement.

Following U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’srecent apology for the loss of 24 Pakistani soldiers at a border checkpoint in November 2012, NATO supplies are rumbling through again. Washington has also released funds for Pakistani military operations it had previously withheld. And, perhaps most crucially, the two fractious allies’ top spies are talking again, with a view to enhancing their cooperation as the 2014 deadline for a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan looms.

The relationship between the CIA and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency has been at the core of Washington and Islamabad’s alliance for over a decade now — and sometimes the source of the mutual misery. After 9/11, both intelligence agencies collaborated closely to capture scores of al-Qaeda suspects. But over the past two years, as suspicions have grown, the two sides have become near adversaries.

The ISI is often accused of supporting jihadist proxies attacking U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan — and is widely considered to have been either incompetent or complicit when it came to Osama bin Laden’s presence in Pakistan. The CIA was found to be operating independently within Pakistan’s jealously guarded territory, running unauthorized contractors, recruiting local informants and showering drones at their fiercest pace yet.

But as bitter memories of those disputes begin to recede and new faces assume leadership roles, there is some cautious optimism going forward now — this despite domestic imperatives in both countries (an election year in the U.S., the heated anti-American populism in Pakistan) making rapprochement difficult. Last month the new head of ISI, Lieut. General Zaheer-ul-Islam, made his first visit to Washington, meeting with top intelligence, defense and Administration officials. Tentative agreements were made in terms of joint operations against militants in the region, theWall Street Journal reported. But, officials from both sides say, fundamental differences linger.

Little is known about General ul-Islam, but a change at the top of ISI will please U.S. security officials. The previous ISI chief, now retired Lieut. General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, had become fiercely hostile to Washington in his final year — engaging in “shouting matches” with then CIA director Leon Panetta, cutting cooperation down to a minimum, ordering the harassment of U.S. diplomats in Pakistan and locking up Shakil Afridi, the physician who ran a vaccination program in the town where bin Laden was found hiding.

Afridi is currently serving a 33-year sentence handed down to him by a tribal court. The charges were not explicitly for spying for the U.S., but there is little doubt in observers’ minds that this is the reason he was punished. Afridi wasn’t arrested for the alleged offenses he has been convicted for until the ISI discovered his vaccination program and links to the CIA. At one point, according to a Pakistani military official familiar with the discussions, the CIA suggested that the ISI strip Afridi of his nationality and hand him over to the U.S. General Pasha angrily refused, saying it would set a bad precedent — one that could encourage others to spy for foreign countries if there were no consequences. U.S. Congressmen reacted angrily to Afridi’s imprisonment, voting to cut $33 million of U.S. assistance to Pakistan, one million for each year he’s serving in prison. The question of Afridi’s fate will likely have come up during ul-Islam’s visit to the U.S. There may be no movement soon, but if relations between Washington and Islamabad grow warmer, the ISI may eventually be persuaded to arrange for Afridi’s quiet release.

The harassment of U.S. officials hasn’t changed much, says a U.S. official. Vehicles are constantly stopped, security personnel searched with unusual rigor, and there is even pressure on the U.S. to abandon the construction of a new consulate in Peshawar. On other fronts, ul-Islam has maintained a low profile, a decision thought to be influenced by his predecessor’s controversial visibility. “Unlike General Pasha,” says a senior politician from Pakistan’s opposition Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz party, “we don’t see the new head of the ISI interfering in politics — yet.”

During the new ISI chief’s visit, U.S. officials repeated their long-standing concerns about the Haqqani network, a potent jihadist group linked to al-Qaeda that is based in Pakistan’s North Waziristan tribal territory along the Afghan border. From their sanctuary there, say U.S. officials, the group contentedly plots terrorist attacks on U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, before slipping back across the border. The ISI is widely suspected of offering the group support, with Admiral Mike Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, even describing the Haqqanis as “a veritable arm of the ISI” in his valedictory testimony before Congress last year.

The Pakistanis deny backing the Haqqanis but concede links with them and their reluctance to confront them. They plaintively cite a lack of resources and insist their priority is targeting militants mounting attacks inside Pakistan, but tellingly add that the Haqqanis will be crucial to any future Afghan settlement that Pakistan hopes to be a part of. But a series of unremitting, violent attacks in and around Kabul, authored by the Haqqanis, has intensified the pressure on the Pakistanis.

Last October, Pakistan’s army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, discussed the possibility of “limiting the space” given to the Haqqanis in North Waziristan with Clinton during her visit to Islamabad. The Pakistani army said it had certain contingency plans in place for limited, surgical operations to reclaim territory in some of North Waziristan’s main towns. These plans were shelved soon after, with the deaths of the Pakistani soldiers in November 2011. Now, as pressure builds again, with enduring attacks and Congressmen calling for the Haqqani network to be designated as a foreign terrorist organization, the plans will have to be revisited. The new U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Richard Olson, told U.S. lawmakers during his confirmation hearings last month that he will be committed to taking on the Haqqanis.

Without a Pakistani military operation against the Haqqanis, the CIA has focused on drone strikes against them and other militants in the region. The strikes, U.S. officials insist, are effective. Some Pakistani military officials also have conceded improved accuracy. But there are limits to what can be achieved by a drone-only strategy, and there are political costs. Drone strikes have not only become hugely unpopular in Pakistan, where the parliament has united in denouncing them, but also across the world. A Pew Research Center survey published in June found that majorities in countries as diverse as France, Germany, the Czech Republic, China, Japan, Brazil and Turkey opposed the widespread use of drone strikes.

An acknowledgment of the accumulating political costs may temper the frequency with which the CIA uses drone strikes. General David Petraeus, the new CIA director, is said to appreciate that the program is unsustainable. Previous CIA director Panetta was seen as being indulgent of “the CT guys and their shiny toys,” says the official. Drone strikes increased to a pace of one every four days at their height.

But there are certain points at which they are seen as a necessity — and they will continue to be used despite ul-Islam’s insistence last month in Washington that they stop. Just days after Clinton’s apology and the reopening of the NATO supply lines, a drone strike in North Waziristan reportedly killed 20 suspected militants. The actual figure, the U.S. official says, was lower. But it was a truck packed with explosives heading across the border. “It was a clear shot,” the official says. “We had to take it.” And that is one of the many differences in opinion that both sides will somehow have to learn to live with.

 

Nepalis Speak Out On Federalism

The debate on federalism in Nepal, and how to share political power and natural resources, has centred on the issue of recognizing ethnic groups. A constitution still remains to be written six years after a decade of civil war ended, but the Constituent Assembly, elected to draft a new constitution and function as a parliament, has been dissolved.

An understanding of how to recognize identity, and how to balance diversity, is still unresolved. And what does identity mean. individual, group, or national?

The devolution of power from Kathmandu is another difficult issue. Nine out of 10 people live outside cities, and most are small-scale farmers. If state restructuring is not properly planned, taking into account the distribution of Nepal’s natural resources, people will eventually be at each other’s throats.

In a survey published in May 2012, [ http://www.nepalitimes.com.np/ads/himal%20_survey_2012.pdf ] 73 percent of the 3,200 participants said federal units should not be ethnically based, 13 percent said they should, and another 14 percent either did not know or want to respond.

As party leaders try to forge a consensus government to continue the debate on state restructuring – three months after parliament disbanded, people generally are of the view that federalism is good for the country but should not be based on ethnicity because it is a dangerous issue to build states based on one’s ethnicity. Nepal has over 100 ethnic groups, and what if every ethnic and caste group wants their own state? How will the nation deal with such a situation?

The main problem is that this issue has not been clearly explained to ordinary people, who are the ones who will be victims of misunderstanding. The issue of ethnic-based federalism has to be explained to the masses, and that has unfortunately not happened yet. So far, the issue has been confined to political debates, and the politicians and journalists have done a poor job in communicating with the people.

They have not interacted with them at all on such a sensitive subject. Nepalese society has yet to become equal among all ethnic groups, but that does mean it has to take such a drastic decision of dividing the country into ethnic states?

Others, however, believe that Nepa should rebuild the nation with the concept of federal states based on its ethnicities. This is very important for oppressed ethnic groups. Federalism gives them a chance to make the society equal in every way in education, economy, political participation and representation in the government.

The high-caste community is worried because of their assumption that they will be evicted from the new federal states. The fact is that they are afraid of losing their power that they have been enjoying for hundreds of years.

The political leaders have a responsibility to explain to all Nepali people that this will never divide the nation. They are of the opinion that it will unite the country, which has been always divided based on one group’s dominance in every sector, and that being the high castes.

They say that the people should be more open minded, but it depends on how the political leaders will guide them, and until now are only misleading them. We hope that federalism will also create a new society that treats women equal to men, and not as second-class citizens.

Some say that people have always been brainwashed by the leaders and misused by their leaders. They have acted so irresponsibly towards their citizens who are now very sceptical of them. If you look at the issue of federalism – they have done such a poor job of educating people on its concepts. In fact, they have not even met the ordinary people to ask their views on federalism.

There are many in Nepal who are really scared to even talk about ethnic-based federalism because we still don’t know the details of how a federal state will be like, what will be the norms and rules.

Instead, there are many politicians and their leaders who often make people nervous by saying that the restructuring of the state, based on federalism, will only divide the country and cause ethnic war. It is time that they went to the villages and educate the people first, and get their vote on whether they want federalism or not. They cannot decide for the whole Nepali population by sitting in their party offices.

Will federalism make the lives better for the common man? Will their children have free education? Will they have water in our villages? Will they have jobs in the villages? Will it make women’s status better?

Instead, political leaders go to the villages only when they need votes. They come and organize mass meetings, delivering angry speeches. People only hear them insulting each other’s political parties.

Dalits say that for so long, and even until now, they have been suppressed and discriminated [against] by the high castes. They thus feel that it will be a big political change for the low-caste community and they thus generally support federalism. They look at it as ending all forms of discrimination.

They think that federalism will finally give them a state that are able to run on their own, even if it is run by a certain ethnic group.

They say that if they continue with the same old system then there is no hope, because even after being ruled under so many democratic parties, they never helped to end discrimination. People in Kathmandu think that discrimination against Dalits has ended. They should visit the villages and see the reality.

A recent UN publication [ http://reliefweb.int/report/nepal/field-bulletin-issue-42-federalism-discourse-three-districts-eastern-region ] notes that the debate, at times violent, over how to restructure the country has largely overlooked “the relationship between the states and the centre, the form of governance within the provinces, or even the rights of various populations within these proposed states.”

A Nepali constitutional lawyer and UN consultant on a constitution-building project, [ http://www.ccd.org.np/ ] Budhi Karki says the federalist debate delaying the constitution is only one hurdle in state-building.

People have been heavily obsessed about things to put into the constitution, but my concern is whether promises will materialize. Implementation is the challenge.