Archive for Indo Pak Relations

To Understand Pakistan, 1947 Is The Wrong Lens

December 4, 2009 at 6:17 pm · Filed under Indo Pak Relations ·Tagged , , , ,

As a Pakistani living in the United States, I feel thatAmericans do not understand Pakistan because they do not care. And there is no real knowledge without caring. Indians certainly do care.

Pakistan has been on the Indian mind since the moment of their co-creation. India and Pakistan are like two ends of a thread tied in a fantastic Gordian knot; their attachment magically survives their severance.

And how the love grows! The recent Jaswant Singh controversy over Jinnah only partially unveiled how Pakistan is critical to the ideological coherence of Indian nationalism in both its secular and Hindutva varieties.

But behind this veil, Pakistan has always been internal to Indian politics. It should come as no surprise then that establishment Indians (bureaucratic and political elites, intellectuals, media types, and the chattering classes) are well-versed in the nuances of Pakistani society. Indians understand Pakistan like no one else does, or can.

Still, there is this curious blind spot: no one in India appears to remember 1971. Worse, no one seems to think it relevant. For all their sophistication, Indian elites continue to understand Pakistan primarily with reference to the events of 1947. Anything else is incidental, not essential. The established Indian paradigms for explaining Pakistan, its actions and its institutions, its state and society, have not undergone any significant shift since the Partition. The tropes remain the same: religion and elite manipulation explain everything. It is as if the pre-Partition politics of the Muslim League continues to be the politics of Pakistan—with slight non-essential variations. More than 60 years on, the factors may be different but little else has changed.

This view is deeply flawed. It reflects a serious confusion about the founding event of contemporary Pakistani society. The Partition has a mesmerising quality that blinds the mind, a kind of notional heft that far outweighs its real significance to modern South Asian politics. The concerns of the state of Pakistan, the anxieties of its society, and the analytic frames of its intellectual and media elites have as their primary reference not 1947 but the traumatic vivisection of the country in 1971. Indians have naturally focused on their own vivisection, their own dismemberment; but for Pakistan, they have focused on the wrong date. This mix-up has important consequences.

First, Indians tend not to remember 1971 as a Pakistani civil war, but rather as India’s “good” war. It is remembered as an intervention by India to prevent the genocide of Bengalis by Pakistanis. The fact that the Bengalis themselves were also Pakistanis has been effaced from the collective memory of Indian elites. This makes 1971 merely another Kargil, or Kashmir, Afghanistan or Mumbai—an instance of Pakistan meddling in other people’s affairs, and of the Pakistani military’s adventurism in the region. This is why mention of Balochistan at Sharm el-Sheikh created such a stir in India. It was literally incomprehensible to Indians that Pakistan could accuse India of meddling in its internal affairs. Surely, this is the pot calling the kettle black. But what the Indian mind perceives as Pakistan’s ongoing divorce from reality is in fact Pakistan’s most fundamental political reality. The Pakistani establishment has internalised the memory of 1971. In all things, and at all times, it must account for India. Dismemberment has the requisite effect of focusing the mind on existential matters. Nothing can be taken for granted.

Second, the Indian establishment routinely misconstrues as ideological schizophrenia the Pakistani intellectual classes’ complicated responses to India. The nuances of the Pakistani experience of India are the very picture of incoherence to them. Worse, Pakistanis often frustrate the project of creating a common South Asian sensibility to bridge the political gaps between the two communities.

But again, no one in India accounts for 1971 when making such grand universalising (and, if I may add, genuinely noble) plans for the future of the region. Pakistani intellectual elites share with their Indian counterparts the normative horror of what the West Pakistani military did in the East. How can anyone in their right mind not deem such behaviour beyond the pale? But horror does not preclude abiding distaste for the Indian state’s wilful opportunism in breaking Pakistan apart. It is for this reason that while the intellectual classes in Pakistan, especially the English language press and prominent university scholars, have almost always condemned their state’s involvement in terrorist activity inside India proper, they have remained largely quiet concerning Kashmir. What’s good for the goose is good for the gander. Kashmir does not seem so different to them than East Pakistan.

It is for this same reason that there was no great outcry about the isi’s supposed involvement in the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul. The general sense among the educated elites was that India deserved it for trying to “encircle” Pakistan through Afghanistan. Indians process this either as paranoia or as a visceral hatred of India that blinds Pakistanis to facts. Perhaps there is some of this too. But it bears appreciating that Pakistan is a post-civil war society. Fear and anxiety concerning India’s intentions in the region are hardly limited to the so-called ‘establishment’ in Pakistan. It is a general fear, a well-dispersed fear, a social fear. And a relatively coherent fear at that.

This leads to the third, and perhaps the most important point. The Indian establishment does not see Pakistan as a ‘normal’ society. The substance of this abnormalcy is religion, which is also the irreducible difference between the two societies. It is the original sin and a foundational incoherence that is ultimately inescapable. And it has tremendous explanatory power. It explains both the ideological nature of the Pakistani state’s hatred of India and, simultaneously, the state’s manipulation of the zealous masses for its own ends. That these two explanations do not hold together coherently is besides the point to most Indians. This is an old story and is as such sensible. In the Indian imagination, Pakistan is endlessly regurgitating the politics of Jinnah and the erstwhile Indian Muslim League. While Indian politics moves on, Pakistan’s holds eerily still. I am certainly not one to deny that there are some obvious asymmetries between India and Pakistan. The nature of the relationship between religion and politics is certainly one of them. But it bears mentioning that perhaps the most relevant asymmetry concerns the repeated defeats suffered by the conventional Pakistani forces at the hands of their Indian counterparts. This asymmetry is neither that complicated nor particularly abnormal. It illuminates the actions of the Pakistani state as essentially strategic and only incidentally ideological. And in that sense, it allows an interpretation of Pakistan as a fairly pedestrian, even ‘normal’ post-conflict society in its relations with its much larger neighbour.

Ultimately, this is the real value of a renewed focus on 1971 rather than 1947. It normalises Pakistan. It allows for discussion of real differences between the two societies and the two states, rather than of reified stereotypes that have little political relevance any more. This is not to justify the actions of the Pakistani state, which are in many cases entirely unjustifiable on both moral and political grounds. It is merely to hope that a mutual comprehension of normalcy may lead to peace and progress. Certainly, no one will deny that there is value in that.

(The author is with the Religious Studies Department at Yale University. He is also a member of the MacMillan Initiative on Religion, Politics and Society at Yale and a doctoral fellow at the Centre for Global Islamic Studies at Lehigh University.)

Leave a Comment

India Desires Current Ground Positions Authenticated in Siachen

October 25, 2009 at 2:07 pm · Filed under Indo Pak Relations ·Tagged ,

siachin_map_20091019The military conflict over the Siachen glacier began 25 years ago, catapulting it to the world’s highest battle zone and demonstrating the limits to which human endurance and military ingenuity can be pushed.

The strategic consequences of the conflict, like the slow but relentless movement of the glacier, have been irreversible. 

Pakistan had linked with China not only with the road over the Khunjerab Pass but also with cartographic intrusion by unilaterally joining the lac (Line of Actual Control) in j&k with the Karakoram Pass on the India-China border. China was clearly complicit by insisting with India that the area was disputed.

Pakistan had also commenced permitting foreign mountaineering expeditions into Siachen. This was confirmed by Indian military mountaineers sent to the area, leading to military teams going up the Saltoro mountain range to deny the passes for entry into Siachen.

Pakistan initiated a major military venture to occupy these passes, and Indira Gandhi wouldn’t countenance this. The Indian army pre-empted Pakistani plans by a daring operation, and the rest is history.

What started as a small-scale military action became a permanent military occupation, having lasting consequences on both countries.

siachen_20091019For one, the Indian occupation of Siachen was tantamount to another humiliation for the Pakistani military. Benazir Bhutto rubbed this in by her scathing criticism of Gen Zia. The Pakistani military was forced in the many rounds of Siachen talks with India to insist on one point—seek an Indian withdrawal. When that didn’t work, Pakistan started planning military moves to evict Indian forces. Its attempts were roundly defeated, and Bana Post and Sia La became permanent fixtures in India’s military folklore.

It then planned the ambitious venture to cut the Srinagar-Leh road in the Kargil sector, a plan mooted by Musharraf, the then dgmo. Benazir rebuffed him. Not willing to relent, Musharraf, as army chief, put the aborted plan into action, with long-term consequences for himself and Pakistan’s political future. Then followed the attack on Indian Parliament with a military mobilisation by both countries. These strategic blunders of raising the stakes for war, and the A.Q. Khan episode, seriously damaged Pakistan’s credibility as a nuclear power. Siachen was thus the starting point of the negative strategic outcomes Pakistan has incurred.

Islamabad wants to negotiate the Siachen issue only to seek an Indian withdrawal. This is necessary for the military to reinforce the dissimulation in Pakistan that it’s present on the Siachen glacier when, in fact, it’s nowhere near it.

And secondly, to show it has imposed heavy costs on the Indian military and forced it to withdraw.

On the Indian side, negotiations are linked to demilitarising the area as one amongst many steps towards a lasting peace. This doesn’t suit Pakistani interests which are best served by the continuing military standoff along the lac. Over the years, public opinion in India has evolved into taking tremendous pride in its military achievements in Siachen, thus making it difficult for its political leadership to act on a settlement which would be seen as a concession to Pakistan. This reality is often ignored by major powers which have more than once suggested to India that a concession on Siachen can strengthen the Pakistan’s hand in making progress on j&k. When the Indian military leadership took public positions against such concessions, the political establishment quickly left the matter alone.

Defence minister A.K. Antony has clearly said there can be no withdrawal from Siachen, reiterating the military view that current ground positions should be authenticated before other steps can be examined. Above all, New Delhi doesn’t know who will deliver on a Siachen agreement—while the weak Pakistani political leadership definitely can’t, its military command shows no signs of new thinking. Siachen, thus, remains one amongst many crucial elements that explain Pakistan’s journey on the slippery strategic road.

——————————————————————————–

(The author, VR Raghavan, is director, Delhi Policy Group. He was the commanding general in Siachen and the author of Siachen: Conflict Without End.)

Leave a Comment

Another Indian View of Jinnah

September 4, 2009 at 12:23 pm · Filed under India, Indo Pak Relations, Pakistan ·Tagged , , , ,

01

02

Comments (1)

Why Did Manmohan Agree to include Balochistan in the Joint Statement at Sharmel Sheikh?

August 21, 2009 at 7:32 pm · Filed under Indo Pak Relations ·Tagged ,

After electorally vanquishing the opposition in the 2009 Elections, which had been scathingly critical of the Indo-American nuclear agreement, Manmohan finds yet another foreign policy issue casting a looming shadow over his government. Barely two months into his second term, the prime minister is being pilloried by the opposition for the joint statement he and his Pakistani counterpart Gilani signed in late July at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. India was seen to have granted two important concessions: the joint statement delinked the Indo-Pak composite dialogue from action on terror by Islamabad; and it included Pakistan’s worries about Balochistan, unwittingly conveying the impression that New Delhi was fomenting trouble in that troubled Pakistani province.

To this hackneyed Indo-Pak tale there was an American twist. That the joint statement was signed a day before US secretary of state Hillary Clinton arrived in India provoked the opposition into seeing an American hand in New Delhi’s reversal of its Pakistan policy. For months post-26/11, India had been demanding that Pakistan punish the Mumbai mastermind and dismantle the terror infrastructure before the stalled composite dialogue could be resumed. This policy reversal, and the B-word in the joint statement, triggered cries of a sellout, of the UPA dancing to America’s tune and compromising the national interest. Even Indo-US agreements hammered out during Hillary’s visit came under scrutiny.

Pakistan wanted to introduce the words “threats from India in Balochistan”; the Indian delegates successfully warded off that proposal. The joint statement, instead, stated: “Prime Minister Gilani mentioned that Pakistan has some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas.” But this has many in the foreign policy establishment in Delhi quite worried. Some saw it as a serious error as it would give Pakistan a chance to mention Indian involvement in Balochistan. They saw it as giving Pakistan an opportunity to put India on the defensive by accusing it of being a sponsor of terror, in line with its obsession with achieving parity with India in every respect. This worry was proved prescient. Within days of the joint statement, the Pakistani media started claiming that Gilani handed over a dossier to Manmohan listing India’s involvement in Balochistan and the terrorist attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore in early 2009.

Indian officials, however, denied having received any dossier from Pakistan, though they do acknowledge that the two leaders did discuss the issue. It remains a mystery whether or not Gilani had shared any “evidence” with Manmohan. A close aide of the PM says that the decision to include Balochistan in the joint statement showed that India was confident that its hands were clean. Others say India agreed to include Balochistan, where a decades-long secessionist movement has gathered fresh momentum since 2004, in order to deter Pakistan from “internationalising” Kashmir in future. This spin, though, is rejected by Pakistan-watchers, who feel Islamabad’s only motive is to internationalise the “Indian involvement” in Balochistan—and consequently neutralise India’s charge of Pakistan fomenting terrorism in Kashmir and elsewhere.

So why did Manmohan make this huge concession to Pakistan? Some say it was aimed at ensuring that Pakistan takes action against the masterminds of Mumbai 26/11. But others feel it was done to keep the Americans happy. When Manmohan snubbed Pakistani President Zardari in Russia, his undiplomatic act earned the displeasure of Americans and roiled public opinion in Pakistan. This was why, sources say, before arriving in Egypt, Manmohan clarified through the media that his intention wasn’t to hurt Zardari. The joint statement was aimed to soften Pakistan and simultaneously appease the Americans.

Why should India keep the Americans happy? It’s now quite evident that New Delhi’s strategy of countering terror emanating from Pakistan depends crucially on American assistance. India barely has the leverage to make Pakistan fall in line. It consequently depends on the Americans to put pressure on Pakistan and make it take action against terrorists operating from its soil. And America is willing to play ball because it fears that renewed tension between India and Pakistan would distract Islamabad from the war against terror in Afghanistan, thereby undermining its plan to stabilise Afghanistan and withdraw from there as soon as possible.

America’s Afghanistan plan has consequently prompted the Obama administration to play a balancing act between India and Pakistan. Aware that the Indians would come to the negotiating table with Pakistan only if Islamabad showed some action against the Mumbai masterminds, the American agencies shared information with the Indians. They said that though it was difficult to link Lashkar-e-Toiba founder Hafiz Saeed to the Mumbai terror attack, the involvement of other Lashkar leaders like Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Zarar Shah and others could be established—and Islamabad could act against them. This American assurance was affirmed through the dossier Pakistan handed India before the meeting in Egypt. For the first time, Islamabad officially accepted LeT’s role in the Mumbai attack, prompting India to come to the negotiating table.

In the outcry against the statement, Pakistan’s categorical assurance of taking urgent action against the Mumbai masterminds was forgotten. It was in this backdrop that Hillary arrived in India. Even as America nudged India and Pakistan to the negotiating table, her visit was aimed at assuring New Delhi that Indo-US relations would continue to grow under Barack Obama, just as it had under George Bush. Her discussion of issues, both bilateral and global, with the Indian leaders was an attempt to offer a Washington perception of India as a future power, irrespective of the trajectory Indo-Pak relations take. Hillary made it clear that bilateral relations were now based on five crucial pillars—strategic cooperation (on issues like non-proliferation, counterterrorism and defence); energy & climate change; education & development; trade & agriculture; and science & technology. She also managed to hammer out a technology safeguards agreement and an end-user monitoring arrangement (EUMA) with India.

Both have provoked opposition talk of a sellout and that inspections under these agreements could compromise national interest. But officials say such agreements are insisted upon even by Russia; India too seeks such an agreement while supplying sensitive technology to other countries. The US is actually trying to broadbase its relationship with India and demilitarise the ties from what they had become under the Bush presidency. Hillary stated that Indo-US relations have now moved on to a higher level. India always faces this dilemma about its relations with the US. The relationship brings in many benefits, but there is always a price tag attached to it. But the fear over loss of sovereignty is all hype. The past shows that even at its weakest moment—in the years following independence and after India lost the 1962 war—the Indian leadership had never succumbed to pressure and compromised on national interest. The US cannot extract things out of India that are against national interest.

Leave a Comment

Indians Should Stop Stealing our Water: Ibrahim Sajid Malick

August 17, 2009 at 6:24 am · Filed under Indo Pak Relations ·Tagged ,

Posted on 15 August 2009 by Ibrahim Sajid Malick

Sat Sari Akal from Pakistan!

As a native of Pakistan – I am excited to have a sagacious leader at the helm of affairs next door. Especially as our countries have a history of bitter relations having fought three wars since our independence from Britain in 1947. We both claim the Himalayan region of Kashmir, which is divided between us.

I feel it’s about time that we both re-visit the concept of ‘sous rature’, (a term usually translated as ‘under erasure)’ in our bilateral discussions. I am proposing a sous rature for Kashmir – because the conflict is inadequately represented thus far as a territorial issue. Since this is an important issue, I propose we keep it legible yet cross it out. And, going forward use a more accurate term; water conflict.

Water is linked to the crises of climate change, energy and food supplies, and in our case, a territorial dispute. Unless Kashmir’s link with water is addressed and resolved, these other crises may intensify leading to further political insecurity and conflict at various levels.

It is abundantly clear to most educated Pakistanis that the Kashmir dispute cannot be resolved until every Pakistani citizen is assured access to water – today, tomorrow and for times to come. I am hoping that in your second term you will demonstrate the courage expected of a ‘fair’ regional power and not insist on building dams that will deprive Pakistani farmers of vital water supplies.

I am hoping that you will address the critical issue of the Tulbul Navigation project on Wular Lake in the Indian-controlled portion of Kashmir. I am sure you are aware of our position that this dam will disrupt the flow of water into the Jhelum River, which flows into Pakistan. This dam clearly violates the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. You must know that the World Bank-mediated 1960 Indus Water Treaty stipulates that we share the Indus River and its five tributaries – the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. Under the treaty, we received exclusive use of waters from the Indus and its westward flowing tributaries, the Jhelum and Chenab, while the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej rivers were allocated for your country’s use.

In your haste to win this second term you have withheld millions of cubic feet of water upstream on the Chenab in Indian-administered Kashmir, and you are storing it in the massive Baglihar dam in order to produce hydro-electricity. Mr. Prime Minister you know it is in breach of the 1960 treaty. I know you decided to stop entertaining this discussion after the Mumbai attacks- but why are you punishing the poor farmers of Pakistan for the crimes committed by a few mercenaries?

We have heard your position that India has a right to ‘’run-of-the-river’’ projects but ask 10 independent scientists and they will confirm that the Baglihar dam reduces the flow of water to Pakistan in violation of the 1960 treaty. Come down to Pakistan and bring those World Bank appointed experts who had cleared the Baglihar project so they can understand the implication of their decision as well. If these experts are not blind- I am sure they will notice that the levels of both the river and groundwater have fallen substantially. Indeed, from our side this doesn’t even look like a river anymore; it is more like a puddle.

I don’t want to bore you with details, but the 1960 treaty guaranteed us 55,000 cusecs of water. Yet, this year we have received between 13,000 cusecs during the winter and a maximum of 29,000 cusecs during summer.

We have also heard the Indian argument for the Wular dam; that you will make a shallow 12 mile stretch of the river in order to ease “navigation” during the dry summer months. And that this is allowed under the 1960 treaty.

This is an open attempt to store water and control how much will be allowed to flow to Pakistan. It may not happen overnight – but there are no guarantees that you will continue to win elections in India for next 30-40 years.

You may ignore this appeal but at least pay attention to more than 20 different UN bodies who have warned that the world may be perilously close to its first water war. Take these dam projects off the table and you will win the hearts and minds of Pakistanis. Moreover, you will bring the two nations closer to a more peaceful and pClip_22rosperous coexistence.

Comments (2)

ISI Tells the Indians to Talk to ISI Directly

July 29, 2009 at 7:14 am · Filed under ISI, Indo Pak Relations ·Tagged , ,

by Nirupama Subramanian and Siddharth Varadarajan

Days before PM Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Gilani met in Egypt, the head of the ISI floated a suggestion that India deal not just with Pakistan’s civilian government but also directly with its Army and intelligence agency.

Lt. Gen. Shuja Pasha made the out-of-the-box overture during a meeting earlier this month with the three Indian defence advisers representing the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force attached to the Indian High Commission in Islamabad.

The sit-in at Lt. Gen. Pasha’s office in Rawalpindi on July 3 took place entirely at his initiative, though it was ostensibly convened in response to a request made by the Indian High Commission “years before.” It is normal for defence advisors attached to various diplomatic missions in Islamabad to seek and be granted calls on the ISI director-general — a wing of the ISI is the co-ordinating agency for them — but Indians have rarely had an audience.

During their discussion, Lt. Gen. Pasha and the defence advisors did not refer to the Mumbai attacks or the investigations into it, either on the Indian or Pakistani side. Nevertheless, senior officials in Delhi saw the interaction as an attempt by the ISI to “reach out” to India in the run-up to the Sharm el-Sheikh meeting of the two Prime Ministers.

During the course of the extremely cordial meeting, Lt. Gen. Pasha came clean in stating that the ISI and the Pakistan Army were involved in framing Pakistan’s India policy, along with the Foreign Office. He made the oblique suggestion that India deal directly with these three institutions if it had a similar three-way mechanism.

In their effort to understand the genesis of this idea, Indian officials sought to establish whether the ISI chief — who has a reputation for speaking his mind freely — had merely made an off-the-cuff remark or was floating a trial balloon after consultations with all other “stakeholders” in the Pakistani establishment.

Ministry of External Affairs officials asked Pakistan’s High Commissioner to India Shahid Malik about the ISI chief’s suggestion, but the envoy was unaware that the meeting had even taken place. This led the MEA to conclude that the Pakistani foreign office may not be in the loop.

Major-General Athar Abbas, the Pakistani military spokesman, said he had no knowledge of the meeting. Officials at the Indian High Commission in Islamabad also refused comment.

Highly placed South Block officials said that India is not averse to talking to the Pakistani military or the ISI even as it engages with the civilian government but there were two problems with the suggestion. First, any proposal to open new lines of communication must come from the Pakistani government. And second, the power structures in India and Pakistan cannot really compare with each other.

Although Prime Minister Singh and PM Gilani agreed the ISI chief could come to India in the immediate aftermath of last November’s terrorist attacks in Mumbai, Islamabad quickly backtracked. Since then, no formal proposal for interaction between the ISI and an Indian intelligence agency has been made. Indeed, Mr. Gilani told The Hindu at Sharm el-Sheikh that the question of an intelligence chiefs’ dialogue did not come up in his meeting with Dr. Singh, a fact confirmed by Indian officials.

But apart from form, it is the question of structure that poses an obstacle. “The Research & Analysis Wing operates within the law and is subordinate to the government,” a senior intelligence official told The Hindu. “There, the government is subordinate to the ISI, which is a law unto itself.”

South Block officials said the Indian High Commissioner and his officers could and should be in touch with the Pakistani army and intelligence chiefs. “But I wonder what would be the point of the Indian Army Chief talking to his Pakistani counterpart … their job definitions are so different.”

Comments (3)

Operation Blue Tulsi: Destroying Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets

July 13, 2009 at 9:41 am · Filed under Asif Ali Zardari, Benazir Bhutto, CIA, ISI, Indo Pak Relations, Lawyers' Agitation ·Tagged , , , , ,

PPP government was dismissed in 1996 because Rehman Malik, DG FIA and Asif Zardari had promised Indians and Israelis access to Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. 

In 1994-95 Rehman Malik was working in tandem with this immediate boss Ghulam Asghar, head of the FIA, and under the auspices of Asif Zardari, collecting information about Pakistan’s nuclear installations. Malik offered the Indians direct access to Kashmiri and Afghan fighters he would capture.

 In July 2001 Janes Information Group reported that RAW and Mossad were cooperating to infiltrate Pakistan to target important religious and military personalities, journalists, judges, lawyers and bureaucrats.

In the late eighties, two junior intelligence officers one Pakistani other Indian faced each other on opposite sides of the law. The Pakistani intelligence officer had caught the Indian agent on Pakistani soil with incriminating evidence. Indian agent knew his life had come to an end. However, everything has a price. And his freedom was worth a little less than half a million rupees. A few days later the Indian agent was sitting back at home, free as a bird. And life went on for several more years until the fateful year of 1994 when the two old “chaps” met again. This time officially. The Indian agent had climbed the ladder to an important post in the government. At this side of the border the junior Pakistani agent, against all odds had become one of the top bosses at Federal Investigation Agency. Of course, this was the infamous Rehman Malik.

The Indian side wanted Pakistani Government’s help in reducing cross-border terrorism. But Rehman Malik offered a lot more than mere reduction in “cross-border”. He had been appointed as Additional Director FIA and yielded immense power through the country. Additionally he had become the right-hand-man of Asif  Zardari, stashing his looted money all over the world. He offered them direct access to the jihadists which he would capture. Somewhere along the line Israel also became a party to the deal and soon Mossad agents were carrying out investigations of the captured (ISI backed) jihadists on Pakistani soil. There were millions to be made from the deal and of course Rehman Malik was working in tandem with this immediate boss Ghulam Asghar, head of the FIA and under the auspices of Asif Ali Zardari. ISI, Pakistan Military and top brass quietly kept a close watch. Although painful but capture of a few foot soldiers was bearable in the bigger national interest.

By 1995 in a little over a year the Benazir Bhutto government had expelled 2000 Arab mujahidin of the Afghan-Soviet War and imprisoned number of Pakistani mujahidin.

Secondly and more significantly, Benazir Bhutto on her official visit to US in April 1995 met in secret with an Israeli delegation. On her return she faced stiff resistance from a block of military and civilian bureaucracy which had generated great suspicions of her dealings with India and Israel. Just four months later she thwarted a coup attempt against her headed by Major General Zahirul Islam Abbasi. Director General of Military Intelligence Major General Ali Kuli Khan tipped-off General Abdul Waheed Kakar who immediately ordered Chief of General Staff Lt. General Jehangir Karamat to suppress the coup. A total of 36 army officers and 20 civilians were arrested from Islamabad and Rawalpindi.

Then in November 1995 Egyptian Embassy blast occurred. Al-Qaeda was quick to claim it. Although the real reasons of the handlers of bombers remain hidden to this day, but in the next few days a silent but significant event happened. General Abdul Waheed Kakar who was given an extension in his tenure he refused it and Lt. General Jehangir Karamat was appointed as the Army Chief by the then President Farooq Leghari on December 18, 1995. Lt. General Jehangir Karamat was the senior most general at the time, therefore the least controversial within the military. The other three generals who were in the position to become COAS were Lt Gen Javed Ashraf Qazi, Lt Gen Naseer Akhtar, and Lt Gen Mohammad Tariq. Lt. Gen. Ghulam Muhammad Malik had already retired in October 1995.

Maj Gen Naseem Rana was heading the ISI at the time, taken his charge in October 1995. Lt Gen Shujat Ali Khan was heading the ISI’s Internal Wing.

In the backdrop of these events in Pakistan, in March 1995 Israel’s Air Force chief had visited India with an entourage that included key Mossad officials. It was at this point that in a meeting Pakistan’s nuclear program was discussed. A year later Indian nuclear and missile program head, Abdul Kalam had a “top secret” visit of Israel in June 1996. It was “top secret” because no one knew about it. As it turned out, everyone knew about it even before he left India. All the much publicized secrecy and visit of such a top level official achieved the aim and nearly nobody bothered with the entourage which included a manager from the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) – Alok Tiwari. The “top secret” meetings between Abdul Kalam and his Israeli counterparts were related to purchase of UAVs. However, in every single one of those “top secret” meetings Alok Tiwari was missing.

Just a few days later, after coming back to India Tiwari accompanied Air Chief Marshal S. K. Sareen to Israel in Israel in July 1996. In fact this was his third trip. He had also visited Israel in April 1996 along with India’s first Defence Attaché to Israel.

First Wave

In late July 1996 MQM organized a province wide strike. Simultaneously a large bomb exploded at Lahore airport and a second at Faisalabad railway station. On 14th August 1996 12 SSP activists were gunned down during an Independence Rally by unidentified gunmen. By end August Punjab had been engulfed in sectarian violence, Shias and Sunnis were being gunned down in broad daylight. The political and security situation worsened by the murder of Murtaza Bhutto and reinstatement of Manzoor Wattoo as Chief Minister of Punjab. The country seemed in a political and economic turmoil with violence erupting throughout the country. At the same time, out of blue Ataullah Mengal returned from his self-imposed exile.

While everyone was busy with the current crisis a team of agents working directly under Rehman Malik were gathering information on Kahuta and A.Q. Khan. Beginning November 1996 ISI saw an increase in Indian troops movement, which finally sent alarm bells ringing through the echelons of Rawalpindi and Islamabad.

Suddenly, all the pieces fell in place and Ghulam Asghar and Rehman Malik’s shenanigans seemed a lot deeper than mere money grabbing tactics. By fourth of November a thick load of evidence had been gathered on Ghulam Asghar and Rehman Malik working with the consent of Asif Zardari towards gathering information on the progress of Pakistan’s nuclear program.

On November 5, 1996, Farooq Leghari dissolved Benazir Bhutto’s government. At the other side of the border, this caused the immediate visit of Israeli naval chief Vice-Admiral Alex Tal to India. Back at home, Ghulam Asghar and Rehman Malik were imprisoned on undisclosed charges.

Second Wave

In February 1997, Indian Defence Secretary T. K. Banerji led a high level defence delegation to Israel to discuss the “exchange of technology” between two countries. Other than the official purpose the most important topic was Pakistan’s nuclear program. By the end of the visit the two countries had decided to do “whatever” it takes to neutralize the threat.

In March next year the BJP won Indian elections and one of the immediate policies adopted was to tackle Pakistan’s nuclear issue by any means possible. With such enthusiastic approach the government even decided to take the most extreme measures if needed. In the next two months the official and diplomatic delegations between India and Israel came to a halt, however, there was a sudden rise in non-diplomatic delegations between the two countries. The last official visit was of Gen. Prakash Malik to Israel in March 1998, who was also the first serving Indian Chief of Army Staff to visit Israel since normalization. In April 1998 two out-of-the ordinary incidents happened. Air India announced its discontinuation of Tel Aviv flight on 1 April 1998 and early April the Confederation of Indian Industry announced an unplanned “Study Mission” to Israel. This was the prelude to the second wave which officially started on 11th May 1998 when India exploded its nuclear bombs.

Night of 27-28 May

Pakistan resisted testing its nuclear bombs for nearly two weeks until 27th May 1998. On 27 May 1998 in a top level meeting Lt. Gen. Naseem Rana, (DG ISIP briefed the PM Nawaz Sharif and army chief of the increasing intelligence reports of possible Indian attack on Pakistan’s nuclear installations. However, the panic this created was nothing compared to the next two meetings.

The first report pertained to the sighting of an unidentified F-16 aircraft at the periphery of Pakistan’s airspace on 27th May. Knowing India did not have F-16, the obvious suggestion was presence of Israeli Air Force in the area (especially with the reports of Indian COAS visiting Israel just a month ago).

And the second report coming just before 1am on 28th May recorded unusual movements of Indian aircrafts just across the border which suggested India was preparing for preventive airstrikes against Pakistan. The obvious response of nuclear tests on 28th May.

The tests confirmed once and for all that Pakistan has nuclear capability.

Deduction

It seemed probable that BJP Government had decided to fire its nuclear bombs to force Pakistan into test firing its – if it has any. After a delay of two weeks, doubts had started rising in nearly every analytical discourse that Pakistan did not have the nuclear capability otherwise it would have responded. This was the golden opportunity to take out Pakistan/Pakistan’s nuclear installations before that Pakistan got the capability. The important visit of Indian COAS to Israel in March – in the light of proceeding events – could only be regarding Israel’s support for the planned attack. Whatever, the reasons and aims, the end result was establishment of Pakistan as a nuclear state, which completely changed the Great Nuclear Game.

Third Wave

Pakistan’s test firing of nuclear bombs was a shock for the rest of the world. No one expected, in the first place for Pakistan to have the capability and secondly to fire them if it had. For India and Israel, who were two top most interested parties in destroying Pakistan’s nuclear assets, this meant a complete overhaul of their strategy.

A year later Indian National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra came to meet Barak in September 1999 and this time he was accompanied with a familiar face – Alok Tiwari. Within a year, Alok Tiwari and another security analyst finalized a document based on their discussion the preceding year.

In June 2000 L. K. Advani visited Israel in which new deals related to Mossad and Shabak espionage and cooperation with RAW are finalized and as a result Israel was allowed to establish its own network to operate from India.

By July 2000 a heavy deployment of Israeli agents in Indian Occupied Kashmir was reported. Near the end of 2000 Israel’s top intelligence officers were reported to have visited India and discussed amongst other issues, Kashmir and Pakistan’s nuclear assets. By the end of the visit the top spies of the two country had agreed to cooperate on the operation detailed inside the thick volume titled: “Operation Blue Tulsi”.

Operation Blue Tulsi: Preparation

Preparation for the mega Operation Blue Tulsi began fervently in early 2001. By mid 2001 eyebrows were being raised over RAW and Mossad’s cooperation and in July 2001 Janes Information Group reported that RAW and Mossad are cooperating to infiltrate Pakistan to target important religious and military personalities, journalists, judges, lawyers and bureaucrats. In addition, bombs would be exploded in trains, railway stations, bridges, bus stations, cinemas, hotels and mosques of rival Islamic sects to incite sectarianism.

At the same time the Balouchistan Liberation Army rose out of dead like a second incarnation and Balach Marri a Moscow graduate declares himself as the leader of BLA. Within weeks in Balochistan numerous training camps sprouted with each camp reported to be training up to a 100 militants. Intelligence of RAW, Mossad and CIA agents operating in Balochistan started coming in.

In mid 2001 reports appeared that Special Operations Division of Mossad, also known as Metsada, specializing in assassinations and sabotage have been based in India since May 2001 to train RAW operatives and Mossad and Shin Bet or Shabak were operating a number of teams in Indian Held Kashmir and were also operating a delicate spy network from Indian soil. In July 2001 RAW increased its budget for Indian consulates in Afghanistan by nearly 10 times.

Within days after Sep 11, a story was leaked into press that Pakistan is dismantling and spreading its nuclear assets to safer places implying that it would be much more difficult to pinpoint them and much more easier for extremists to get hold of. These news stories were shortly followed by another piece on 28 October 2001 which stated that Pentagon was looking into plans to dispatch an elite unit into the Pakistan to disarm its nuclear arsenal. The special unit which was trained to slip into foreign countries to ferret out and disarm nuclear weapons and operated under Pentagon control with CIA assistance and would be getting special help from Israel’s Sayeret Matkal also known as Unit 262.

In December 2001 Indian PM, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, while addressing the parliament said, “the question was not whether there should be or should not be a war, the question was under what circumstances there will be war … and whether there will be a war.”

In December 2001 Benazir Bhutto while visiting India said in her interviews, “President, Musharraf, as an army general, had planned the Kargil invasion in Jammu and Kashmir while I was the PM.” Later she also said, “Pakistan army as an institution had brought back Osama bin Laden”.

This rhetoric of Benazir Bhutto was perfectly in line with the agreement signed by US and India in 2002. Late in 2002 US and India signed an agreement on cooperation in disarming Pakistan’s nuclear assets and the two player offensive team of Operation Blue Tulsi found a third partner in the form of CIA. As a result of this deal Abdullah Mehsud was freed from Guantanamo Bay and returned to Pakistan with millions in cash.

Benazir Bhutto’s statements in India were the major reason Musharraf’s declaration of Benazir Bhutto as a “security risk” during a chat with Pakistan’s leading editors and correspondents in April 2002. Pakistani security agencies already had a great deal of intelligence regarding Benazir Bhutto, Asif Zardari and Rehman Malik’s involvement with Mossad and India in 1995-96 and their collaboration against Pakistan’s nuclear assets.

In January 2002 under orders from L. K. Advani RAW and other intelligence agencies submited a detailed report on military options for solving Kashmir issue and in case of a full-fledged war, for neutralizing Pakistan’s nuclear assets. One major outcome of the report was creation of Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) in March 2002 with the authority to conduct external operations supported by a huge budget.

Also, a Lawyers’ Struggle surfaced in October 2003 under the leadership of Hamid Ali Khan (now drowned under the infamous Lawyers’ Movement). The first prominent protest of the “struggle” was held on 15 October 2003 in which the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) Hamid Ali Khan said, “Musharraf’s very presence within the army and holding of other important offices and Shaikh Riaz Ahmad’s continuation as chief justice after his retirement are undoubtedly illegal and unconstitutional… Let’s think collectively, move forward collectively and act collectively to outs usurper generals and judges (who had collaborated with Musharraf including Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. However, like a B-grade movie twist, four years later Iftikhar Chaudry becomes the hero to these same lawyers who wanted to oust him. Like a script from past, this protest had followed a “Long March”. And the “struggle” then moved to other cities one by one asking Musharraf, Riaz Ahamad and among others Iftikhar Chaudhry’s removal from office. At this point along with Hamid Ali Khan, Kazim Khan was at the forefront. Lacking the charisma and cunning of their successors, assassination of a leader, and shortage of “unlimited” billions of rupees their names and their Lawyers’ Struggles has been confined to the dusty pages of history with their names ascribed against the words, “traitors”.

Also, there is no evidence to support that assassination attempts on Pervez Musharraf were somehow related to the timing of the Lawyers’ Struggle.

By mid 2004 the government had ample evidence that BLA and some Baloch leaders were conspiring against the government, aided by foreign countries.

On 13th August 2004 the Chief Minister of Baluchistan, Jam Muhammad Yousaf is quoted by The Herald (Sep 2004-Karachi): “Indian secret services (RAW) are maintaining 40 terrorist camps all over the Baluch territory”. While this was happening on ground, there was talk of “Peace Talks” everywhere in the air. And Jan Muhammad Jamali had become a laughing stock of the media for his suggestion of foreign agents operating in Balochistan, which despite the ground facts forcefully opposed such thoughts.

Operation Blue Tulsi: Start

1st January 2005 was the starting date. The local agents got the signal and the operation started with the ominous rape of a female doctor in Sui on 2nd January 2005. As expected the incident created headlines all round and culprits not being found created a much supported backlash. This was shortly followed by rocketing of gas installation at Sui on 7th January which put a hole in Pakistan’s gas supply for nearly a week.

2005 was a busy year with Baloch terrorists continuously creating havoc in Balochistan and adjacent areas and ended with assassination attempts on Musharraf in December. After President Musharraf escapes a rocket attack on his life in December 2005 and the Inspector General Frontier Corps survives an assassination attempt, Navtej Sarna, the Indian External Affairs Ministry’s spokesman said, “The Government of India has been watching with concern the spiralling violence in Balochistan and the heavy military action, including use of helicopter gun-ships and jet fighters by the Government of Pakistan to quell it… We hope the Government of Pakistan will exercise restraint and take recourse to peaceful discussions to address the grievances of the people of Balochistan”.
The Indian Government had realized that the two assassination attempts would surely result in backfire on the Indian assets in Balochistan, which it needed to safeguard for its final aim, especially Akbar Bugti. Just as suspected, the Government of Pakistan intensifies its operation against Baloch militants.

And in April 2006 Government of Balochistan is setup with its offices in Jerusalem under Azaad Khan Baloch. In a laughingly stupid mistake, Azaad Khan Baloch who is representing Balochis of Pakistan decided to spell his name according to Hindi transliteration with double “a” in Az”aa”d, rather than a single “a” as used in Pakistan, i.e. Azad. Or more probable, “Azad Khan Baloch” is not a Pakistani.

Meanwhile in Balochistan the government operation against Akbar Bugti intensified who took shelter in the rugged mountain range and coordinated the activities of his militants from there. Ultimately the military found him and during the process of capture Akbar Bugti died because of cave-roof collapse on 26 August 2006.

Starting March 2007, every incident occurring in the country was tied to the aim of ousting Musharraf, including the much profitable Lawyers’ Movement. Intelligence agencies were having a field-day bringing in pile after pile of reports proving involvement of CIA, RAW, Mossad and MI6 towards Musharraf’s ouster. True to some extent but unlike analyzed, ouster of Musharraf was just one milestone towards the main goal, which every agency completely missed. Thus, all their efforts went into controlling the situation to secure Musharraf, while in the backdrop, silently the wheels kept turning. While Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan were burning Swat was sitting quietly, unnoticed and out of radar. Within a period of few months, the numbers of “Pakistani Taliban” in Swat surged and just as well their ammunition, latest military equipment a country like Pakistan would dream of. A portion of this ended up in the ill-fated Lal Masjid. While intelligence and military were busy keeping Musharraf’s seat safe in Pakistan, a new political game started in UAE.

Rehman Malik enthusiastically started pursuing the goal of National Reconciliation Ordinance. He became instrumental in the final deal between Benazir Bhutto, US and Pervez Musharraf and NRO. Since Benazir Bhutto did not have much to lose without NRO she was never  interested in it. That was the reason two options were thrown at Musharraf, i.e. either eliminating the two term condition or NRO. Rehman Malik on the other hand was vehemently pursuing NRO, as of the three (Asif Zardari, Benazir Bhutto and Rehman Malik) the Government of Pakistan only had clear evidence against Rehman Malik and it was enough to put him in jail for life (i.e. involvement in espionage and working with Mossad and RAW). However, at that point no one knew the real motivations of Rehman Malik other than that he was working to get the path clear for Benazir’s return. Amazingly, FBI also was putting its weight behind NRO rather than eliminating the two term condition. While, if US had really wanted Benazir Bhutto as PM, logic dictates that they would want the two term condition eliminated to assure her easy succession to the premiership. It needs to be noted here that Rehman Malik had also tried to do a similar deal in 2005, which never materialized. This time it did.

Near the end of 2007, intelligence and military were convinced that a conspiracy had been hatched in the country with the sole aim of removing Musharraf from power. Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, simultaneous rioting throughout the country, terrorist activities occurring in every province had considerable similarities to the Bush Administration backed Color Revolutions. In order to keep Musharraf in power the government kept giving into one demand after the other. As a result Rehman Malik becomes head of Interior Ministry, Yusuf Raza Gilani becomes the PM and sweeping changes are made in the security and intelligence community. Still, the government saw the war finally over when in one move Gilani puts ISI under Interior Minister on 27 July 2008. Until that time ISI and top brass had thought all Rehman Malik wanted was to get-rid of extremist elements from ISI and Pakistan’s establishment.

It was the end of July 2008 when the alarm bells started ringing again in the high echelons. Intelligence machinery went into extra high gear and millions later it came back with the name: Operation Blue Tulsi.

Operation Blue Tulsi: the Revelation

The Establishment, only now realized the full extent of the operation which they had been witnessing since the beginning of 2000. More worryingly, the current operation had eerily similar modus operandi to the 1995-96 debacle – which left the country tethering onto its nuclear assets – just that this time it was vastly more sophisticated and greater in size. In matter of hours the priorities changed. Keeping Musharraf in power suddenly paled in comparison to the real threat.

In 1995-96 India came up with a plan to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear facilities before that Pakistan developed a nuclear capability. The plan was prepared by a RAW agent Alok Tiwari (who has recently been compromised). At that time Mossad was already active in Pakistan and once it heard about the project for elimination of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities jumped in by first streamlining the project further and then using its assets in Pakistan. Somewhere in early 1996 the operation was given go-ahead. At that point FIA Director General Ghulam Asghar and his ADG Rehman Malik in a deal with India and Israel were hunting down Pakistan based Kashmiri and Arab militants. These two proved to be the front line in the operation and when contacted by Indian agents fully agreed to supply all the necessary information regarding Kahuta and A. Q. Khan’s operations. Towards mid 96 demonstrations and chaos erupted throughout the country. The aim was to destabilize the country enough that when the two confirmed Pakistan did not have any nuclear capabilities India would go-ahead with all out assault. General Jehangir Karamat who was already weary of the two chaps and Asif Zardari’s complicity took immediate action and Benazir Bhutto’s government was dissolved. The duo of Asghar and Malik and Zardari had already come into military’s radar the year before when they tried to lure General Abdul Wahed Kakar.

Then five years later, Alok Tiwari submited an updated version of his older report. Israel was again consulted and this time L. K. Advani vehemently pursued it. Towards the end of 2000 a delegation of top Mossad brass visited India and the combined operation titled: Operation Blue Tulsi was finalized and put into operation which had only one aim:

Destroy Pakistan’s nuclear assets followed by its Balkanization.

Approach

Resurrect Baloch insurgency. Pakistan was fine with it, as it had 30 years of experience with it, starting with the Afghan-Soviet War.

Buy officials in military, bureaucracy, politics and law. ISI was fine with it, as it had 60 years of experience in dealing with traitors.

Plant agents in top positions in Taliban, FATA and NWFP. A shocker for everyone.

Taliban were the foster child of ISI and the agency had no contingency for enemy agents in top positions. The best option they came up with was to buy back the agents with more money and as a result they were deceived time and again and again. Top on the list, Baitullah Mehsud. The twenty million dollars he got in suitcases was one of the stupidest moves in the world espionage history and ISI top brass to this day are vengefully pursuing him.

Milestones

Friendly political government. Asif Zardari in place, Aslam Raisani in Balochistan (though first choice Akbar Bugti unfortunately dead, MQM’s omnipresence in Sindh, Fazlur Rehman and ANP in NWFP)

Friendly judiciay. Iftikhar Chaudhry, Munir A. Malik, Atizaz Ahsan

Friendly Civil Society. Ansar Burney, Asma Jehangir

Unrest in NWFP and immediate threat of Taliban taking control of Islamabad. Back in 2002 US had agreed with India that if ever Pakistan seemed to destabilize or falling into the hands of extremists, it would help India in destroying Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. The situation they agreed upon is well defined by the Pakistani media’s current theme song of “Taliban are coming to Islamabad”

Immediate Countermeasures

By August 2008 the operation was too deep rooted and it was clear if attention was diverted towards saving Musharraf there was more than a probability of loosing nuclear capability in near future. With Musharraf gone, ISI estimated a window of opportunity of 18 to 20 months before either Taliban or Asif Zardari with his shenanigans destabilized Pakistan. In the greater interest Musharraf decided to step down peacefully.

Operation Blue Tulsi: In Operation

Musharraf stepped down and Asif Ali Zardari took over, but by then the order had been sent and the agents in Swat Valley and FATA who had been preparing for the day for the last eight years launched an all out assault on the military with a single aim of destabilizing Pakistan.

In the eventful month of December 2007 Baitullah Mehsud had already announced officially the formation of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. Although right after the victory of PPP Baitullah Mehsud has negotiated peace with the government which led to the great debacle of US$ 20 million by August 2008 he was again involved with the military in a full on battle. ISI and military by this time had realized the foremost importance of ridding the Taliban off foreign agents and assets by any means and costs.

At one end Pakistan military still is trying to safeguard its own assets while tracing out and eliminating foreign agents, while at the other end US is trying its best to safeguard its prime asset of Baitullah Meshud who had taken over after the death of Abullah Mehsud. Until  recently, there had been not a single drone attack on Baitullah Mehsud, while ISI aligned Taliban had been bombed repeatedly, as a result of which many have turned their backs against Pakistan. Only in the recent months four drone attacks on Baitullah Mehsud’s territory have been reported.

Operation Blue Tulsi and Future

Currently the entire country is gripped by the ongoing operations of military against the Taliban. Media which once championed itself as the sympathizers of the Taliban and were chanting “Taliban are coming to Islamabad” have suddenly changed their tunes, especially after being declared by the Taliban as kafirs and thus “killable”.

The economy is in doldrums and corruption is rampantly high but the top brass knows Pakistan is first and for Pakistan nuclear assets come first. Thus, until the country is cleansed of all the foreign agents in FATA and Taliban, the military and intelligence has only one goal, to stop Operation Blue Tulsi at this stage, making sure it never goes into Phase TWO – attacking and destroying Pakistan’s nuclear assets because extremist elements have destabilized Pakistan. 

Leave a Comment

Zardari Says Jihadist Groups Created by Pakistan

July 10, 2009 at 8:58 am · Filed under Asif Ali Zardari, ISI, Indo Pak Relations, Talibanization, Terrorism in Pakistan ·Tagged , , , , ,

by Nirupama Subramanian, The Hindu

Clip_14Pakistan has, for the first time, acknowledged at the highest level that militant groups were created and nurtured by it for “tactical” objectives. Speaking to retired civil servants, who met him on July 7 night to discuss national issues, President Zardari said militants and extremists had been “deliberately created and nurtured” as a policy for “short-term tactical objectives.” 

Apparently, a reference to the use of jihadist groups by the Pakistan security establishment to further strategic goals in Kashmir and Afghanistan, the statement was the first acknowledgement by a government leader of a policy that has been an open secret for years and is widely blamed for the country’s present troubles. 

Before this, the former President, Musharraf, came close to a similar acknowledgement in a January 2004 joint statement with PM Vajpayee, in which Pakistan committed itself to not allowing militant groups to use its territory to carry out attacks in India. 

But Zardari has articulated it in brutally clear terms. Importantly, there has been no denial yet by the Presidency or a clarification that he was misquoted, or quoted out of context. “Let us be truthful and make a candid admission of the reality,” the President told the retired federal secretaries and senior bureaucrats who met him as part of a consultative process on the issues facing the country. 

“The terrorists of today were the heroes of yesteryear until 9/11 occurred and they began to haunt us as well,” Zardari said. According to a report of the meeting by the State-run Associated Press of Pakistan, Zardari said: “Militants and extremists emerged on the national scene and challenged the State not because the civil bureaucracy was weakened and demoralised but because they were deliberately created and nurtured as a policy to achieve some short-term tactical objectives.” 

He made the statement apparently in response to an observation that the weakness of civil bureaucracy had resulted in the emergence of militants and militancy. While such a bold admission by a civilian leader in Pakistan is usually fraught with the risk of antagonising the all-powerful military, Zardari appears to have made the remarks with great political confidence.

One reason could be the civilian leadership’s conviction that the security establishment is now fully on board in the fight against militancy and extremism. 

Three meetings in quick succession by Pakistan’s “troika” – President, PM and the Army Chief – within seven days have also fostered the belief of far greater coordination between all “stakeholders” on this grave national issue. 

That belief was also apparent in remarks by Zardari to The Daily Telegraph last week that groups once regarded as “strategic assets” no longer had any backing in Pakistan.

Comments (14)

Agenda of the New Indian Government: Foreign Policy

June 1, 2009 at 10:07 am · Filed under India, Indo Pak Relations ·Tagged ,

Diplomacy: An Agenda

1. Ensure Pakistan dismantles the terror appartus

2. Prevent future Nepali governments from playing the China card to isolate India

3. Nudge Colombo to urgently address the alienation of the Tamil people

4. Strengthen the pro-India government in Dhaka

5. Provide South Asian countries greater access to Indian markets

***

India’s neighbourhood is  on the boil, often counted amongst the world’s most dangerous places. Of the eight countries constituting the SAARC, at least five—Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka—are rocked by political instability and violence. Some of these countries pose a global threat, prompting (or allowing) the US and its western allies to extend their politico-military presence to douse fire in South Asia. In addition, China is expanding its growing economic and political clout over many South Asian nations.

This has made many in the Indian foreign policy establishment feel “hemmed in” in a region New Delhi traditionally saw as its backyard. Managing the neighbourhood should be on top of the list of the new government. The most important challenge is to re-establish India’s influence in the neighbourhood. India’s foreign policy can’t be outsourced. It’s we who have to evolve an effective policy.

Considering the situation in South Asia, this is a tall task. Pakistan is on a downward spiral; its inability to take on the Taliban and Al Qaeda has turned large swathes of land along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border into ‘liberated zones’. Worse, the influence of jehadis has seeped into Islamabad and Lahore, much to the alarm of the foreign policy establishment here. An uneasy calm prevails in Bangladesh following the revolt of the Bangladesh Rifles, which brought to the fore the challenge the Hasina government faces from the Islamists. In Nepal, the Maoists have pulled out of the government, but retain the capacity to now paralyse a new ruling coalition. In Sri Lanka, the army is on the verge of vanquishing the LTTE, but doubts persist about peace returning to the island.

Worryingly, policy planners find it difficult to defend the idea of South Asia being India’s “exclusive zone” in a globalised world. Economic opportunities and terrorism have lured big powers to the region. America is flexing muscles in Afghanistan and Pakistan, compelling Islamabad to undertake military operations against militants. This suits India well. New Delhi has insisted that no solution in Afghanistan is possible without India. But many fear that once a new government takes guard in Delhi, Washington could mount pressure on India to kickstart the suspended dialogue with Islamabad. The corollary to the US’s attempt to play the neighbourhood policeman is the diminishing of India’s influence.

Beijing is also fast expanding its presence in South Asia, promising to assist the nations of South Asia in boosting economic growth. India can’t complain: with Sino-Indian trade reaching almost $40 billion, New Delhi can scarcely pressure other nations into not pursuing a similar trade policy. Beijing has increasingly become active in Kathmandu; the emergence of the Maoists as a stakeholder in Nepal potentially enhancing its importance.

This explains the growing opinion that India can no longer remain indifferent to the neighbourhood.

The need of the hour is to evolve a neighbourhood doctrine. The key elements of this doctrine—provide generous terms in trade and commerce to the smaller countries and allow them greater access to India’s market, and its technological and knowledge resources. In return, New Delhi should demand that the neighbours not compromise India’s security. “We must have well-defined red lines. They should be made to understand that under no circumstances should these lines be crossed.

But officials argue that such “red lines” have to be flexible, not rigid. They change according to the evolving situation. Moreover, we can’t be prescriptive. These are all sovereign nations to whom we can give suggestions when they seek it. Furthermore, not all developments in the neighbourhood are inimical to India. It’s a mixed bag. Bhutan and Maldives, for instance, witnessed political changes for a more democratic and inclusive society, and their governments have taken serious steps to usher in economic progress.

There’s a sliver of hope even in countries facing serious challenges to their nationhood. For instance, the Hasina government, after crushing the BDR revolt, has taken steps to restore peace and ensure the schism in society doesn’t lead to a civil war. Even in Nepal the Maoists have been trying to resolve their differences with other political formations through negotiations, rather than take to the gun. The strife in Sri Lanka has neither arrested the economic growth nor crushed hopes of Colombo meeting the aspirations of the Tamil people.

If South Asia hasn’t spun out of India’s influence, it isn’t because of New Delhi. In fact, such was PM Manmohan’s obsession with the nuclear deal that he visited only Afghanistan and Bhutan during his tenure. He did go to Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, but to attend the SAARC summit. He didn’t even visit Pakistan and Nepal, where India’s stakes are extremely high. We need a very high and sustained political engagement in Nepal. As for the Maoists’ charges that India has been meddling in Nepal, doing nothing cannot be an option. We’ll never get a good certificate from the Maoists. So, we might as well interfere to safeguard our interests.

In the past, India has actively intervened to salvage the situation in its neighbourhood. It did so in 1971 in East Pakistan that led to the creation of Bangladesh. It intervened in the Maldives in the mid-1980s to prevent a coup, and, a few years later in Sri Lanka, it sent in peacekeepers to deal with the ethnic conflict. As recently as 2005, it brought the Maoists and other democratic parties together in Nepal.

Yet these interventions have earned little gratitude among its neighbours. Some say this is typical of a small country paranoid of its bigger neighbour. Others find fault with India’s attitude. Having inherited the largest share of human, economic and natural resources of the subcontinent in 1947, successive Indian governments have regarded others in South Asia as camp followers. New Delhi’s failures to treat many of these countries as sovereign nations having the right to take independent decisions according to their national interests has been one of the big factors for the trust deficit in the neighbourhood.

India’s neighbourhood policy abounds with ironies.While India has little influence over Pakistan, its policy is Islamabad-centric. This has prompted other nations to wonder if a belligerent anti-India policy is the best method of attracting its attention. The India-Pakistan template is the worst one to follow.

So, what then are India’s options? India’s biggest failure has been its inability to project itself as a ‘soft power’ in the region. New Delhi should stress on engagement between the civil societies rather than limit its interaction to politicians and bureaucrats. There is an urgent need to establish a group comprising people from different walks of life in India to draw up a cogent neighbourhood policy. It’s important that while developing such a policy they should not wear the Indian hat. Rather the emphasis should be on winning the trust and confidence of neighbours that we all share a common destiny of peace, progress and prosperity. And it can only happen if we stay together and work with each other and not against one another.” In other words, it is time India stops playing the big brother and learns to appreciate the sensitivity of smaller nations in the region. Simultaneously, the smaller nations need to introspect. It takes two to tango.

Leave a Comment

Sherry Rehman on Indo-Pak Relations

April 12, 2009 at 6:43 pm · Filed under Indo Pak Relations ·Tagged

By Sherry Rehman

clip_26Like all episodes that trigger trans-national crises, the Mumbai attacks have seemingly altered our world. Not since the 2000-2001 military standoff between India and Pakistan have relations between the two stood at such a low point as they do today. We were not always like this, mired in a debilitating tableaux of the cold war.

In 1988-89, on the sidelines of a SAARC conference in Islamabad, the groundwork for peace was laid, and years later, amid cheering populations on both sides of the border, the two countries had embarked on a historic composite peace dialogue. It was a fragile sapling, but by 2004 the Indo-Pak peace process had begun ?to spread its roots.

After 26/11, the vulnerability of the peace process stood too quickly exposed. Of particular alarm was the recent statement by Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee that the composite dialogue between the two countries was meaningless, and that Pakistan’s position had put a large question mark on the achievements and utility of the peace process. This disappointing statement came on the heels of Pakistan’s setting up a three-member committee to probe within 10 days the evidence on 26/11 provided by India, followed by trials of any suspects inside Pakistan.

In fact, one can trace a curious pattern in the Indo-Pak relations during the last two months. Pakistan’s consistent and steadfast offer to India for cooperation and joint investigations, coupled with appeals not to let the Mumbai attacks reverse the peace process, has been met with a baffling intransigence. The insistence on implicating Pakistan’s involvement in the Mumbai attacks is unhelpful and refutes Pakistan’s efforts as meaningless. In this context, India’s questioning of the efficacy of the composite dialogue only ratchets up a war of words that is as unhelpful as it is dangerous. Where will this war of words lead to? Does anyone profit from it? If not, does Pakistan have to carry the burden of terrorism alone?

For a start, Pakistan is now a different country from the one that was engaged in a proxy war in Afghanistan as part of a superpower game. Today, non-state actors make its citizens victims of a war with no name. There is now a democratic government in place, which is challenged by a global financial crisis as well as high food and oil prices at home. The struggle to create a national security consensus is long and hard, but it has found space in a plural arena where democracy co-exists with unprecedented security challenges. The world does not think that Pakistan alone can fight a most critical battle that defines the 21st century.

While acknowledging its numerous sacrifices made in the continuing fight against terrorism and its ongoing efforts to root out extremism, the international community has expressed a clear opinion that ?terrorism can only be eradicated from South Asia by a closely coordinated and collaborative effort of Pakistan and India. This vision naturally includes Afghanistan as well. Speaking in Islamabad last month, Interpol secretary-general said, “Any country that has suffered as much at the hands of terrorists as Pakistan is in need of international support.

We should have learned from the September 11 terrorist attacks that the only way to fight terrorism effectively is by sharing information nationally and internationally. Both Pakistan and India are important and essential components of Interpol and the world’s anti-terrorist and anti-crime struggle. They need to cooperate.”

Earlier this month, the US ambassador to India, said the evidence given by India to Pakistan was credible, but India should give Pakistan time to act on it. Recently, British Foreign Secretary argued in an article published in The Guardian: “The best antidote to the terrorist threat in the long term is cooperation.” The world is beginning to realise that Pakistan is itself a primary victim and target of terror. No country has offered and, in turn, suffered more in the global fight against terrorism since 9/11 than Pakistan. In doing so, it has incurred tremendous loss of life and erosion of peace, economic stability and political security. There are no pre-packaged, instant solutions, but the world now understands that only a democratic Pakistan can defeat extremism. Its fledgling democratic government has made a clear policy departure by owning, with the clear stamp of legitimacy, the fight against violent extremism as its own.

Having lost its leader Benazir Bhutto to a cowardly terrorist attack, the PPP-led government is committed to tackling this scourge on multiple fronts. The historic National Security Resolution that was unanimously passed by parliament in October 2008 was a step in that direction. It was an endorsement of the government’s efforts to build a national political consensus for fighting extremism. The point here is simple: Pakistan does not need more external pressure to fight terror. Yet, it cannot fight this borderless enemy alone. We need the international community, particularly our neighbours, to understand and pursue our shared goals of countering extremism. A recent RAND Corporation report tells us that 26/11 indicates “an escalating terrorist campaign in south Asia and the rise of a strategic terrorist culture”. According to the report, the focus on Pakistan should not obscure the fact that the terrorists had help from inside India.

Local radicalisation is a major goal of the terrorists, and will be a major political and social challenge for India. As it is today for Pakistan. India’s prevarication is not productive. To shoot down the importance of the peace process as an exercise in futility is a grave miscalculation, the repercussions of which would be disastrous. For south Asia’s stability and security, there cannot be and must not be an alternative to peace.

The ongoing developments in the Middle East hold important lessons for India and Pakistan. History and Gaza have shown us that violence begets violence. Gaza teaches us that a military confrontation only takes human lives, brutalises the region and earns international renunciation. India and Pakistan need to understand and value this contemporary reality, and look for ways to provide its citizens with economic and human security. India must understand that a military confrontation with Pakistan will only serve to make our populations more vulnerable than they already are. Ending the endangered peace process will only empower the non-state extremists who are challenging both countries. Putting a premium on tactical military action at the sheer cost of human security is not an answer. This kind of solution flies in the face of the political traditions of any democracy. Terrorism cannot be eliminated from any region without letting the local democratic political order take ownership of this battle in cooperation with neighbours and the international community. The democracy-loving people of India and Pakistan have worked long and hard to build a strong constituency of peace, which gave birth to the composite dialogue between the two countries.

Let not an impulse for muscle-flexing spin events out of control, when one state is compelled to use force against the other out of the sheer cold war imperative to equate posturing with maturity. No nation will leave its borders and its citizens undefended. So, let us not throw India and Pakistan into a vortex of claim and counter-claim, action and matching response, so that our far larger strategic goal of sustainable peace is jettisoned along the way. None of this is rocket science. All sane minds across south Asia know this truth-the region needs bridges, not bombs. We must collectively use this moment to translate it into a reality. Sherry Rehman was the federal minister of information and broadcasting and the central information secretary for the PPP.

Leave a Comment

Older Posts »