Belonging to Harkat-ul Jehad-ul Islami, he was arrested in 1995 for leading ‘Operation Khilafat’, aimed at toppling the Benazir regime and ushering in the Caliphate system. Releases in ’96, he went to Afghanistan where the Taliban’s Mullah Omar made him advisor on political affairs. After the US invasion, he fled Kandahar but was extradited from the UAE in August ’04 for plotting the twin suicide attacks on Gen Musharraf in December ’03. Was mysteriously set free weeks before Benazir returned to Pakistan in ’08. In a posthumous book, she named him as the main suspect in the assassination bid on her on October 18, ’07, in Karachi. Said to be in Waziristan now.Archive for Benazir Bhutto
Qari Saifullah Akhtar
Belonging to Harkat-ul Jehad-ul Islami, he was arrested in 1995 for leading ‘Operation Khilafat’, aimed at toppling the Benazir regime and ushering in the Caliphate system. Releases in ’96, he went to Afghanistan where the Taliban’s Mullah Omar made him advisor on political affairs. After the US invasion, he fled Kandahar but was extradited from the UAE in August ’04 for plotting the twin suicide attacks on Gen Musharraf in December ’03. Was mysteriously set free weeks before Benazir returned to Pakistan in ’08. In a posthumous book, she named him as the main suspect in the assassination bid on her on October 18, ’07, in Karachi. Said to be in Waziristan now.Jokers in the Pack: PPP Spokespersons
PPP never but never deals with dictators. It was the figment of our imagination that ‘Bezamir’ had cut a deal with Musharraf in Abu Dhabi to make a come back in Pakistan politics from where he had kept her out, in return for electing him as her own president. Not possible, because PPP never deals with dictators. Or so we are told.
It is also inconceivable that the Benazir deal with Musharraf could end up with a Zardari deal with Musharraf. Not possible, because PPP never deals with dictators. Or so we are told.
A letter in the Nation of Sep 14 titled ‘Jokers in the pack’ talks about PPP spokespersons on TV: You ask them a question about north, and they will tell you a story about south; you ask them east and the answer will be west. These people are so short of grey matter that they cannot speak a single sentence without including the name of ‘shaheed’ Zulfikar Bhutto or ‘shaheed’ Benazir Bhutto.
The best of these court jesters in order of their performance are: Jehangir Badar,
Qamaruzzaman Khaira,
Fauzia Wahab,
Farzana Raja or Mardana Raja or Maharaja
Pervez Ashraf,
Babar Awan,
Manzoor Watto and the bulky lady doctor.
It appears they are being paid to sing eulogies of Zardari and nothing else.
Had Hitler had the services of these people he would today be remembered as a great democrat who had given many sacrifices for democracy.
An Analysis of MQM’s Altaf Hussain in 1995
By JONATHAN FORD
LONDON, 13 July 1995 (The Independent) – A terrorist and
mass-murderer is at large in the north London suburb of Mill Hill,
according to Pakistan’s PM, Benazir Bhutto. She refers to him publicly as a “cowardly rat”, and her government has asked Interpol to issue warrants for his arrest and return to Pakistan, where he faces more than 100 criminal charges, ranging from arson to murder and torture.
But Altaf Hussain, the leader of MQM, is unlikely to be going anywhere in the near future. Since 1992, when he fled Pakistan, he has directed the day-to-day decision-making of his party from London, secure in the knowledge that as there is no extradition
treaty between Britain and Pakistan, he is unlikely to be deported to
face his critics back home. He was not deported from UK to Pakistan
and the UK citizenship wasgranted to him.
Most commentators say that the MQM, the party he founded 11 years ago to champion the interests of Pakistan’s Mohajirs – Urdu-speaking migrants from India – has brought parts of southern Pakistan close to civil war, threatening the disintegration of the Muslim homeland carved so bloodily out of British-India in 1947.
Hussain set up the MQM to protest against the discrimination suffered by the 20 million Mohajirs who represent 50 percent of the population of the southern province of Sind. The party demanded better housing, more access to education and greater representation in local and federal government. Many MQM activists say it still stands for these things, but what started out as a civil rights campaign has turned into a bloody tribal war between Mohajirs and the largely Sindhi government security forces.
In Karachi, the main battlefield, more than 1,000 people have died so far in 1995 – more than 400 of them in the past six weeks of intense fighting. The MQM is now talking about a separate province for Karachi, and some say that Hussain favours a separate state for the Mohajirs. Alluding to the traumatic dismemberment of the country in 1971 and the creation of Bangladesh from the then East Pakistan, he recently warned Ms. Bhutto: “Don’t push the Mohajirs to the wall. Or 1971 will be repeated.”
This is not an idle threat. For despite years of futile fighting (the
violence in Karachi has been going on, sporadically, since 1988) and
all the accusations of torture, murder and racketeering levelled
against him, Hussain remains fanatically popular among Pakistan’s
Mohajirs. “His hold over these people is extraordinary,” says one
journalist. “If he ordered them to jump off a cliff, they would
probably do it.”
A quiet street of Thirties semi-detached houses seems an unlikely
location for the headquarters of a protagonist in this high-stakes
poker game, but this is where Hussain lives. Hussain’s home is
slightly tattier than his neighbours’, with peeling window frames and
black plastic sheeting over the ground-floor windows. According to one of the volunteers who helps to run the office, this is not a security
measure, but has been done to allow the drawing room to be used as a makeshift film studio. “So many people are coming to film Mr. Altaf
Hussain at the moment”, he sighs happily.
Inside the house there is strong evidence of a personality cult.
Posters showing Hussain’s grinning face abound and party workers talk about him in hushed tones. “To us, Mr. Altaf Hussain is like the new Gandhi,” whispered one, as I waited for my audience with the leader.
Altaf Hussain is in fact a plump, bespectacled man, neatly dressed in
a blue blazer and flannel trousers. When I ask if he models himself on
the great independence leader, he laughs: “I don’t really have a model
of anyone in mind. But I share his belief in non-violence. I think
that as we approach the 21st century, it should be possible for people
to achieve rights peacefully.” He pauses, removes his spectacles, and
fixes me with a portentous look: “When my people come to me and say, ‘Altaf bhai, shall we take up weapons?’ I always say that
non-violence is the best weapon.”
Hussain was born in Karachi in 1953, the son of an Indian-Muslim who had been the station master in Agra under the Raj, and who fled to Pakistan at the time of partition. He grew up in a comfortable middle-class household, something he now downplays, preferring to describe himself as Pakistan’s first lower-middle-class politician. It is part of his political appeal that he is not a member of the aristocratic
feudal elite that dominates Pakistani politics. “What is this fascist
Benazir Bhutto who claims to speak for the Pakistani people?” he asks
rhetorically at one point. “She is a feudal landlord who treats the
peasants on her family estate like slaves, and yet she claims to be a
modern democrat. Only I speak for the downtrodden masses of Pakistan.”
According to Hussain, it was in the Seventies that he became aware of
the grievances of the Mohajir people, or nation, as he calls them. It
was under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government between 1971 and 1977 that these became open and acrimonious. Bhutto’s PPP government depended on its power base in Sind province, where the native Sindhis had long resented the presence of Mohajirs, who, being well educated and industrious, had come to dominate the economic
life of Sind’s two main cities, Karachi and Hyderabad. Hussain says
Bhutto, a Sindhi himself, blatantly discriminated against Mohajirs.
Urdu was banned as an official language and quotas were imposed
restricting Mohajirs’ access to education and government jobs.
Hussain became a victim of this discrimination when he was denied
entry to Karachi University to read pharmacy, despite having the
necessary qualifications. “When I found other Mohajirs who had been
refused places, I asked them: ‘Are you ready to struggle for your
rights?’” This led to the creation in 1978 of the All-Pakistan Mohajir
Students’ Organisation [APMSO], forerunner of the MQM. By all
accounts, the APMSO attracted little support from Mohajir students and was banned in 1981 after violent clashes with other student
organisations. Hussain went away to lick his wounds and rebuild his
political movement. Out of this emerged the MQM in 1984.
If the APMSO was a failure, the MQM has been, electorally at least, a
spectacular success. Ever since it first contested local elections in
1987 on Hussain’s 18-point programme to redress Mohajir grievances, it has dominated politics in Hyderabad and Karachi, where Hussain is the acknowledged “uncrowned king.”
MQM rule in Karachi has been something of a mixed blessing, however. While it ended some of the more blatant examples of discrimination against Mohajirs, such as the restrictive quotas in education and government employment, one businessman – a Mohajir – says: “The years of MQM rule from 1987-1992 did this city no favours. You can’t say Karachi was well governed: public services continued to decay. There was a massive increase in violence, with the ruling party engaging in street gun battles with its political opponents.”
Since 1992, when the army moved in to quell the street violence,
Karachi has been directly ruled from Islamabad. The restoration of
locally elected municipal government is one of the party’s main
demands.
Hussain rolls his eyes when I mention alleged MQM violence and
extortion and gives what is obviously a standard rebuttal: “This talk
of violence is all government propaganda. I give you my guarantee that no violent act has ever been carried out by MQM people under my orders.” As to extortion: “It is not the policy of the MQM.”
One of the striking things about Hussain is his intemperate language,
which sits ill with his claims to be a moderate political leader.
Although he claims to preach restraint, he harps with lurid relish on
the atrocities committed against the Mohajirs. But he sees no link
between his fiery oratory and the violence. When I ask if he doesn’t
feel he should tone down his apocalyptic talk given the combustible
atmosphere in Karachi, he shrugs: “If there is war, it will be the
government’s responsibility.”
That the government bears some responsibility for the current crisis
is not in doubt. Since Benazir Bhutto returned to power in 1993, the
historic enmity between the PPP and the Mohajirs has given it a
sharper edge, and the security forces have murdered, tortured and
intimidated at least as much as their Mohajir opponents. During this
period Ms. Bhutto has ostentatiously refused to have any contact with the MQM on the grounds that it is a “terrorist party”.
Now, in a sudden volte face, the government is offering negotiations,
scheduled to take place in the capital, Islamabad. One might expect
this to be the occasion for celebration in the MQM camp, but in Mill
Hill, Hussain remains as obdurate in his hostility to Ms. Bhutto as
ever. “We are not going to Islamabad to negotiate”, he says. “Only if
the government will concede our demands, which are reasonable and
within the constitution, is there a way forward.”
There has been a long-running debate in Pakistan about whether Altaf
Hussain represents the coming of age of truly democratic Pakistani
politics, in which the feudal elite has no place, or whether he is a
throwback to the old-style unprincipled and demagogic South Asian
leader, a sort of Nehru de nos jours. I left Mill Hill inclining
towards the latter interpretation, and with the feeling that his self-
imposed exile in London has hardened Hussain’s naturally authoritarian temperament. He enjoys playing the distant god, issuing instructions by telephone and fax to his acolytes. Given his largely unprintable views about Benazir Bhutto, he seems
likely to remain the uncrowned king of Karachi for some time to come.
Operation Blue Tulsi: Destroying Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets
PPP government was dismissed in 1996 because Rehman Malik, DG FIA and Asif Zardari had promised Indians and Israelis access to Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.
In 1994-95 Rehman Malik was working in tandem with this immediate boss Ghulam Asghar, head of the FIA, and under the auspices of Asif Zardari, collecting information about Pakistan’s nuclear installations. Malik offered the Indians direct access to Kashmiri and Afghan fighters he would capture.
In July 2001 Janes Information Group reported that RAW and Mossad were cooperating to infiltrate Pakistan to target important religious and military personalities, journalists, judges, lawyers and bureaucrats.
In the late eighties, two junior intelligence officers one Pakistani other Indian faced each other on opposite sides of the law. The Pakistani intelligence officer had caught the Indian agent on Pakistani soil with incriminating evidence. Indian agent knew his life had come to an end. However, everything has a price. And his freedom was worth a little less than half a million rupees. A few days later the Indian agent was sitting back at home, free as a bird. And life went on for several more years until the fateful year of 1994 when the two old “chaps” met again. This time officially. The Indian agent had climbed the ladder to an important post in the government. At this side of the border the junior Pakistani agent, against all odds had become one of the top bosses at Federal Investigation Agency. Of course, this was the infamous Rehman Malik.
The Indian side wanted Pakistani Government’s help in reducing cross-border terrorism. But Rehman Malik offered a lot more than mere reduction in “cross-border”. He had been appointed as Additional Director FIA and yielded immense power through the country. Additionally he had become the right-hand-man of Asif Zardari, stashing his looted money all over the world. He offered them direct access to the jihadists which he would capture. Somewhere along the line Israel also became a party to the deal and soon Mossad agents were carrying out investigations of the captured (ISI backed) jihadists on Pakistani soil. There were millions to be made from the deal and of course Rehman Malik was working in tandem with this immediate boss Ghulam Asghar, head of the FIA and under the auspices of Asif Ali Zardari. ISI, Pakistan Military and top brass quietly kept a close watch. Although painful but capture of a few foot soldiers was bearable in the bigger national interest.
By 1995 in a little over a year the Benazir Bhutto government had expelled 2000 Arab mujahidin of the Afghan-Soviet War and imprisoned number of Pakistani mujahidin.
Secondly and more significantly, Benazir Bhutto on her official visit to US in April 1995 met in secret with an Israeli delegation. On her return she faced stiff resistance from a block of military and civilian bureaucracy which had generated great suspicions of her dealings with India and Israel. Just four months later she thwarted a coup attempt against her headed by Major General Zahirul Islam Abbasi. Director General of Military Intelligence Major General Ali Kuli Khan tipped-off General Abdul Waheed Kakar who immediately ordered Chief of General Staff Lt. General Jehangir Karamat to suppress the coup. A total of 36 army officers and 20 civilians were arrested from Islamabad and Rawalpindi.
Then in November 1995 Egyptian Embassy blast occurred. Al-Qaeda was quick to claim it. Although the real reasons of the handlers of bombers remain hidden to this day, but in the next few days a silent but significant event happened. General Abdul Waheed Kakar who was given an extension in his tenure he refused it and Lt. General Jehangir Karamat was appointed as the Army Chief by the then President Farooq Leghari on December 18, 1995. Lt. General Jehangir Karamat was the senior most general at the time, therefore the least controversial within the military. The other three generals who were in the position to become COAS were Lt Gen Javed Ashraf Qazi, Lt Gen Naseer Akhtar, and Lt Gen Mohammad Tariq. Lt. Gen. Ghulam Muhammad Malik had already retired in October 1995.
Maj Gen Naseem Rana was heading the ISI at the time, taken his charge in October 1995. Lt Gen Shujat Ali Khan was heading the ISI’s Internal Wing.
In the backdrop of these events in Pakistan, in March 1995 Israel’s Air Force chief had visited India with an entourage that included key Mossad officials. It was at this point that in a meeting Pakistan’s nuclear program was discussed. A year later Indian nuclear and missile program head, Abdul Kalam had a “top secret” visit of Israel in June 1996. It was “top secret” because no one knew about it. As it turned out, everyone knew about it even before he left India. All the much publicized secrecy and visit of such a top level official achieved the aim and nearly nobody bothered with the entourage which included a manager from the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) – Alok Tiwari. The “top secret” meetings between Abdul Kalam and his Israeli counterparts were related to purchase of UAVs. However, in every single one of those “top secret” meetings Alok Tiwari was missing.
Just a few days later, after coming back to India Tiwari accompanied Air Chief Marshal S. K. Sareen to Israel in Israel in July 1996. In fact this was his third trip. He had also visited Israel in April 1996 along with India’s first Defence Attaché to Israel.
First Wave
In late July 1996 MQM organized a province wide strike. Simultaneously a large bomb exploded at Lahore airport and a second at Faisalabad railway station. On 14th August 1996 12 SSP activists were gunned down during an Independence Rally by unidentified gunmen. By end August Punjab had been engulfed in sectarian violence, Shias and Sunnis were being gunned down in broad daylight. The political and security situation worsened by the murder of Murtaza Bhutto and reinstatement of Manzoor Wattoo as Chief Minister of Punjab. The country seemed in a political and economic turmoil with violence erupting throughout the country. At the same time, out of blue Ataullah Mengal returned from his self-imposed exile.
While everyone was busy with the current crisis a team of agents working directly under Rehman Malik were gathering information on Kahuta and A.Q. Khan. Beginning November 1996 ISI saw an increase in Indian troops movement, which finally sent alarm bells ringing through the echelons of Rawalpindi and Islamabad.
Suddenly, all the pieces fell in place and Ghulam Asghar and Rehman Malik’s shenanigans seemed a lot deeper than mere money grabbing tactics. By fourth of November a thick load of evidence had been gathered on Ghulam Asghar and Rehman Malik working with the consent of Asif Zardari towards gathering information on the progress of Pakistan’s nuclear program.
On November 5, 1996, Farooq Leghari dissolved Benazir Bhutto’s government. At the other side of the border, this caused the immediate visit of Israeli naval chief Vice-Admiral Alex Tal to India. Back at home, Ghulam Asghar and Rehman Malik were imprisoned on undisclosed charges.
Second Wave
In February 1997, Indian Defence Secretary T. K. Banerji led a high level defence delegation to Israel to discuss the “exchange of technology” between two countries. Other than the official purpose the most important topic was Pakistan’s nuclear program. By the end of the visit the two countries had decided to do “whatever” it takes to neutralize the threat.
In March next year the BJP won Indian elections and one of the immediate policies adopted was to tackle Pakistan’s nuclear issue by any means possible. With such enthusiastic approach the government even decided to take the most extreme measures if needed. In the next two months the official and diplomatic delegations between India and Israel came to a halt, however, there was a sudden rise in non-diplomatic delegations between the two countries. The last official visit was of Gen. Prakash Malik to Israel in March 1998, who was also the first serving Indian Chief of Army Staff to visit Israel since normalization. In April 1998 two out-of-the ordinary incidents happened. Air India announced its discontinuation of Tel Aviv flight on 1 April 1998 and early April the Confederation of Indian Industry announced an unplanned “Study Mission” to Israel. This was the prelude to the second wave which officially started on 11th May 1998 when India exploded its nuclear bombs.
Night of 27-28 May
Pakistan resisted testing its nuclear bombs for nearly two weeks until 27th May 1998. On 27 May 1998 in a top level meeting Lt. Gen. Naseem Rana, (DG ISIP briefed the PM Nawaz Sharif and army chief of the increasing intelligence reports of possible Indian attack on Pakistan’s nuclear installations. However, the panic this created was nothing compared to the next two meetings.
The first report pertained to the sighting of an unidentified F-16 aircraft at the periphery of Pakistan’s airspace on 27th May. Knowing India did not have F-16, the obvious suggestion was presence of Israeli Air Force in the area (especially with the reports of Indian COAS visiting Israel just a month ago).
And the second report coming just before 1am on 28th May recorded unusual movements of Indian aircrafts just across the border which suggested India was preparing for preventive airstrikes against Pakistan. The obvious response of nuclear tests on 28th May.
The tests confirmed once and for all that Pakistan has nuclear capability.
Deduction
It seemed probable that BJP Government had decided to fire its nuclear bombs to force Pakistan into test firing its – if it has any. After a delay of two weeks, doubts had started rising in nearly every analytical discourse that Pakistan did not have the nuclear capability otherwise it would have responded. This was the golden opportunity to take out Pakistan/Pakistan’s nuclear installations before that Pakistan got the capability. The important visit of Indian COAS to Israel in March – in the light of proceeding events – could only be regarding Israel’s support for the planned attack. Whatever, the reasons and aims, the end result was establishment of Pakistan as a nuclear state, which completely changed the Great Nuclear Game.
Third Wave
Pakistan’s test firing of nuclear bombs was a shock for the rest of the world. No one expected, in the first place for Pakistan to have the capability and secondly to fire them if it had. For India and Israel, who were two top most interested parties in destroying Pakistan’s nuclear assets, this meant a complete overhaul of their strategy.
A year later Indian National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra came to meet Barak in September 1999 and this time he was accompanied with a familiar face – Alok Tiwari. Within a year, Alok Tiwari and another security analyst finalized a document based on their discussion the preceding year.
In June 2000 L. K. Advani visited Israel in which new deals related to Mossad and Shabak espionage and cooperation with RAW are finalized and as a result Israel was allowed to establish its own network to operate from India.
By July 2000 a heavy deployment of Israeli agents in Indian Occupied Kashmir was reported. Near the end of 2000 Israel’s top intelligence officers were reported to have visited India and discussed amongst other issues, Kashmir and Pakistan’s nuclear assets. By the end of the visit the top spies of the two country had agreed to cooperate on the operation detailed inside the thick volume titled: “Operation Blue Tulsi”.
Operation Blue Tulsi: Preparation
Preparation for the mega Operation Blue Tulsi began fervently in early 2001. By mid 2001 eyebrows were being raised over RAW and Mossad’s cooperation and in July 2001 Janes Information Group reported that RAW and Mossad are cooperating to infiltrate Pakistan to target important religious and military personalities, journalists, judges, lawyers and bureaucrats. In addition, bombs would be exploded in trains, railway stations, bridges, bus stations, cinemas, hotels and mosques of rival Islamic sects to incite sectarianism.
At the same time the Balouchistan Liberation Army rose out of dead like a second incarnation and Balach Marri a Moscow graduate declares himself as the leader of BLA. Within weeks in Balochistan numerous training camps sprouted with each camp reported to be training up to a 100 militants. Intelligence of RAW, Mossad and CIA agents operating in Balochistan started coming in.
In mid 2001 reports appeared that Special Operations Division of Mossad, also known as Metsada, specializing in assassinations and sabotage have been based in India since May 2001 to train RAW operatives and Mossad and Shin Bet or Shabak were operating a number of teams in Indian Held Kashmir and were also operating a delicate spy network from Indian soil. In July 2001 RAW increased its budget for Indian consulates in Afghanistan by nearly 10 times.
Within days after Sep 11, a story was leaked into press that Pakistan is dismantling and spreading its nuclear assets to safer places implying that it would be much more difficult to pinpoint them and much more easier for extremists to get hold of. These news stories were shortly followed by another piece on 28 October 2001 which stated that Pentagon was looking into plans to dispatch an elite unit into the Pakistan to disarm its nuclear arsenal. The special unit which was trained to slip into foreign countries to ferret out and disarm nuclear weapons and operated under Pentagon control with CIA assistance and would be getting special help from Israel’s Sayeret Matkal also known as Unit 262.
In December 2001 Indian PM, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, while addressing the parliament said, “the question was not whether there should be or should not be a war, the question was under what circumstances there will be war … and whether there will be a war.”
In December 2001 Benazir Bhutto while visiting India said in her interviews, “President, Musharraf, as an army general, had planned the Kargil invasion in Jammu and Kashmir while I was the PM.” Later she also said, “Pakistan army as an institution had brought back Osama bin Laden”.
This rhetoric of Benazir Bhutto was perfectly in line with the agreement signed by US and India in 2002. Late in 2002 US and India signed an agreement on cooperation in disarming Pakistan’s nuclear assets and the two player offensive team of Operation Blue Tulsi found a third partner in the form of CIA. As a result of this deal Abdullah Mehsud was freed from Guantanamo Bay and returned to Pakistan with millions in cash.
Benazir Bhutto’s statements in India were the major reason Musharraf’s declaration of Benazir Bhutto as a “security risk” during a chat with Pakistan’s leading editors and correspondents in April 2002. Pakistani security agencies already had a great deal of intelligence regarding Benazir Bhutto, Asif Zardari and Rehman Malik’s involvement with Mossad and India in 1995-96 and their collaboration against Pakistan’s nuclear assets.
In January 2002 under orders from L. K. Advani RAW and other intelligence agencies submited a detailed report on military options for solving Kashmir issue and in case of a full-fledged war, for neutralizing Pakistan’s nuclear assets. One major outcome of the report was creation of Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) in March 2002 with the authority to conduct external operations supported by a huge budget.
Also, a Lawyers’ Struggle surfaced in October 2003 under the leadership of Hamid Ali Khan (now drowned under the infamous Lawyers’ Movement). The first prominent protest of the “struggle” was held on 15 October 2003 in which the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) Hamid Ali Khan said, “Musharraf’s very presence within the army and holding of other important offices and Shaikh Riaz Ahmad’s continuation as chief justice after his retirement are undoubtedly illegal and unconstitutional… Let’s think collectively, move forward collectively and act collectively to outs usurper generals and judges (who had collaborated with Musharraf including Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. However, like a B-grade movie twist, four years later Iftikhar Chaudry becomes the hero to these same lawyers who wanted to oust him. Like a script from past, this protest had followed a “Long March”. And the “struggle” then moved to other cities one by one asking Musharraf, Riaz Ahamad and among others Iftikhar Chaudhry’s removal from office. At this point along with Hamid Ali Khan, Kazim Khan was at the forefront. Lacking the charisma and cunning of their successors, assassination of a leader, and shortage of “unlimited” billions of rupees their names and their Lawyers’ Struggles has been confined to the dusty pages of history with their names ascribed against the words, “traitors”.
Also, there is no evidence to support that assassination attempts on Pervez Musharraf were somehow related to the timing of the Lawyers’ Struggle.
By mid 2004 the government had ample evidence that BLA and some Baloch leaders were conspiring against the government, aided by foreign countries.
On 13th August 2004 the Chief Minister of Baluchistan, Jam Muhammad Yousaf is quoted by The Herald (Sep 2004-Karachi): “Indian secret services (RAW) are maintaining 40 terrorist camps all over the Baluch territory”. While this was happening on ground, there was talk of “Peace Talks” everywhere in the air. And Jan Muhammad Jamali had become a laughing stock of the media for his suggestion of foreign agents operating in Balochistan, which despite the ground facts forcefully opposed such thoughts.
Operation Blue Tulsi: Start
1st January 2005 was the starting date. The local agents got the signal and the operation started with the ominous rape of a female doctor in Sui on 2nd January 2005. As expected the incident created headlines all round and culprits not being found created a much supported backlash. This was shortly followed by rocketing of gas installation at Sui on 7th January which put a hole in Pakistan’s gas supply for nearly a week.
2005 was a busy year with Baloch terrorists continuously creating havoc in Balochistan and adjacent areas and ended with assassination attempts on Musharraf in December. After President Musharraf escapes a rocket attack on his life in December 2005 and the Inspector General Frontier Corps survives an assassination attempt, Navtej Sarna, the Indian External Affairs Ministry’s spokesman said, “The Government of India has been watching with concern the spiralling violence in Balochistan and the heavy military action, including use of helicopter gun-ships and jet fighters by the Government of Pakistan to quell it… We hope the Government of Pakistan will exercise restraint and take recourse to peaceful discussions to address the grievances of the people of Balochistan”.
The Indian Government had realized that the two assassination attempts would surely result in backfire on the Indian assets in Balochistan, which it needed to safeguard for its final aim, especially Akbar Bugti. Just as suspected, the Government of Pakistan intensifies its operation against Baloch militants.
And in April 2006 Government of Balochistan is setup with its offices in Jerusalem under Azaad Khan Baloch. In a laughingly stupid mistake, Azaad Khan Baloch who is representing Balochis of Pakistan decided to spell his name according to Hindi transliteration with double “a” in Az”aa”d, rather than a single “a” as used in Pakistan, i.e. Azad. Or more probable, “Azad Khan Baloch” is not a Pakistani.
Meanwhile in Balochistan the government operation against Akbar Bugti intensified who took shelter in the rugged mountain range and coordinated the activities of his militants from there. Ultimately the military found him and during the process of capture Akbar Bugti died because of cave-roof collapse on 26 August 2006.
Starting March 2007, every incident occurring in the country was tied to the aim of ousting Musharraf, including the much profitable Lawyers’ Movement. Intelligence agencies were having a field-day bringing in pile after pile of reports proving involvement of CIA, RAW, Mossad and MI6 towards Musharraf’s ouster. True to some extent but unlike analyzed, ouster of Musharraf was just one milestone towards the main goal, which every agency completely missed. Thus, all their efforts went into controlling the situation to secure Musharraf, while in the backdrop, silently the wheels kept turning. While Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan were burning Swat was sitting quietly, unnoticed and out of radar. Within a period of few months, the numbers of “Pakistani Taliban” in Swat surged and just as well their ammunition, latest military equipment a country like Pakistan would dream of. A portion of this ended up in the ill-fated Lal Masjid. While intelligence and military were busy keeping Musharraf’s seat safe in Pakistan, a new political game started in UAE.
Rehman Malik enthusiastically started pursuing the goal of National Reconciliation Ordinance. He became instrumental in the final deal between Benazir Bhutto, US and Pervez Musharraf and NRO. Since Benazir Bhutto did not have much to lose without NRO she was never interested in it. That was the reason two options were thrown at Musharraf, i.e. either eliminating the two term condition or NRO. Rehman Malik on the other hand was vehemently pursuing NRO, as of the three (Asif Zardari, Benazir Bhutto and Rehman Malik) the Government of Pakistan only had clear evidence against Rehman Malik and it was enough to put him in jail for life (i.e. involvement in espionage and working with Mossad and RAW). However, at that point no one knew the real motivations of Rehman Malik other than that he was working to get the path clear for Benazir’s return. Amazingly, FBI also was putting its weight behind NRO rather than eliminating the two term condition. While, if US had really wanted Benazir Bhutto as PM, logic dictates that they would want the two term condition eliminated to assure her easy succession to the premiership. It needs to be noted here that Rehman Malik had also tried to do a similar deal in 2005, which never materialized. This time it did.
Near the end of 2007, intelligence and military were convinced that a conspiracy had been hatched in the country with the sole aim of removing Musharraf from power. Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, simultaneous rioting throughout the country, terrorist activities occurring in every province had considerable similarities to the Bush Administration backed Color Revolutions. In order to keep Musharraf in power the government kept giving into one demand after the other. As a result Rehman Malik becomes head of Interior Ministry, Yusuf Raza Gilani becomes the PM and sweeping changes are made in the security and intelligence community. Still, the government saw the war finally over when in one move Gilani puts ISI under Interior Minister on 27 July 2008. Until that time ISI and top brass had thought all Rehman Malik wanted was to get-rid of extremist elements from ISI and Pakistan’s establishment.
It was the end of July 2008 when the alarm bells started ringing again in the high echelons. Intelligence machinery went into extra high gear and millions later it came back with the name: Operation Blue Tulsi.
Operation Blue Tulsi: the Revelation
The Establishment, only now realized the full extent of the operation which they had been witnessing since the beginning of 2000. More worryingly, the current operation had eerily similar modus operandi to the 1995-96 debacle – which left the country tethering onto its nuclear assets – just that this time it was vastly more sophisticated and greater in size. In matter of hours the priorities changed. Keeping Musharraf in power suddenly paled in comparison to the real threat.
In 1995-96 India came up with a plan to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear facilities before that Pakistan developed a nuclear capability. The plan was prepared by a RAW agent Alok Tiwari (who has recently been compromised). At that time Mossad was already active in Pakistan and once it heard about the project for elimination of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities jumped in by first streamlining the project further and then using its assets in Pakistan. Somewhere in early 1996 the operation was given go-ahead. At that point FIA Director General Ghulam Asghar and his ADG Rehman Malik in a deal with India and Israel were hunting down Pakistan based Kashmiri and Arab militants. These two proved to be the front line in the operation and when contacted by Indian agents fully agreed to supply all the necessary information regarding Kahuta and A. Q. Khan’s operations. Towards mid 96 demonstrations and chaos erupted throughout the country. The aim was to destabilize the country enough that when the two confirmed Pakistan did not have any nuclear capabilities India would go-ahead with all out assault. General Jehangir Karamat who was already weary of the two chaps and Asif Zardari’s complicity took immediate action and Benazir Bhutto’s government was dissolved. The duo of Asghar and Malik and Zardari had already come into military’s radar the year before when they tried to lure General Abdul Wahed Kakar.
Then five years later, Alok Tiwari submited an updated version of his older report. Israel was again consulted and this time L. K. Advani vehemently pursued it. Towards the end of 2000 a delegation of top Mossad brass visited India and the combined operation titled: Operation Blue Tulsi was finalized and put into operation which had only one aim:
Destroy Pakistan’s nuclear assets followed by its Balkanization.
Approach
Resurrect Baloch insurgency. Pakistan was fine with it, as it had 30 years of experience with it, starting with the Afghan-Soviet War.
Buy officials in military, bureaucracy, politics and law. ISI was fine with it, as it had 60 years of experience in dealing with traitors.
Plant agents in top positions in Taliban, FATA and NWFP. A shocker for everyone.
Taliban were the foster child of ISI and the agency had no contingency for enemy agents in top positions. The best option they came up with was to buy back the agents with more money and as a result they were deceived time and again and again. Top on the list, Baitullah Mehsud. The twenty million dollars he got in suitcases was one of the stupidest moves in the world espionage history and ISI top brass to this day are vengefully pursuing him.
Milestones
Friendly political government. Asif Zardari in place, Aslam Raisani in Balochistan (though first choice Akbar Bugti unfortunately dead, MQM’s omnipresence in Sindh, Fazlur Rehman and ANP in NWFP)
Friendly judiciay. Iftikhar Chaudhry, Munir A. Malik, Atizaz Ahsan
Friendly Civil Society. Ansar Burney, Asma Jehangir
Unrest in NWFP and immediate threat of Taliban taking control of Islamabad. Back in 2002 US had agreed with India that if ever Pakistan seemed to destabilize or falling into the hands of extremists, it would help India in destroying Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. The situation they agreed upon is well defined by the Pakistani media’s current theme song of “Taliban are coming to Islamabad”
Immediate Countermeasures
By August 2008 the operation was too deep rooted and it was clear if attention was diverted towards saving Musharraf there was more than a probability of loosing nuclear capability in near future. With Musharraf gone, ISI estimated a window of opportunity of 18 to 20 months before either Taliban or Asif Zardari with his shenanigans destabilized Pakistan. In the greater interest Musharraf decided to step down peacefully.
Operation Blue Tulsi: In Operation
Musharraf stepped down and Asif Ali Zardari took over, but by then the order had been sent and the agents in Swat Valley and FATA who had been preparing for the day for the last eight years launched an all out assault on the military with a single aim of destabilizing Pakistan.
In the eventful month of December 2007 Baitullah Mehsud had already announced officially the formation of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. Although right after the victory of PPP Baitullah Mehsud has negotiated peace with the government which led to the great debacle of US$ 20 million by August 2008 he was again involved with the military in a full on battle. ISI and military by this time had realized the foremost importance of ridding the Taliban off foreign agents and assets by any means and costs.
At one end Pakistan military still is trying to safeguard its own assets while tracing out and eliminating foreign agents, while at the other end US is trying its best to safeguard its prime asset of Baitullah Meshud who had taken over after the death of Abullah Mehsud. Until recently, there had been not a single drone attack on Baitullah Mehsud, while ISI aligned Taliban had been bombed repeatedly, as a result of which many have turned their backs against Pakistan. Only in the recent months four drone attacks on Baitullah Mehsud’s territory have been reported.
Operation Blue Tulsi and Future
Currently the entire country is gripped by the ongoing operations of military against the Taliban. Media which once championed itself as the sympathizers of the Taliban and were chanting “Taliban are coming to Islamabad” have suddenly changed their tunes, especially after being declared by the Taliban as kafirs and thus “killable”.
The economy is in doldrums and corruption is rampantly high but the top brass knows Pakistan is first and for Pakistan nuclear assets come first. Thus, until the country is cleansed of all the foreign agents in FATA and Taliban, the military and intelligence has only one goal, to stop Operation Blue Tulsi at this stage, making sure it never goes into Phase TWO – attacking and destroying Pakistan’s nuclear assets because extremist elements have destabilized Pakistan.
The Present Rulers Will Leave After Finishing the Last Penny
At least 11 big and small, known and unknown, lobbying companies have been hired by Pakistan and state-owned Pakistani organisations in the US, paying them hundreds of thousands of dollars every month, some of them having mysterious names and almost dubious credentials.
Although lobbying is a legal profession in Washington, the way it is conducted has earned it the nickname of “officially certified corruption” and what the Pakistan government, Pakistan Embassy and Pakistani organisations are doing may come close to this unofficial definition, analysts say.
The information about these lobbying firms is public record and is available on official websites of US government agencies and organisations. But somehow Pakistani clients of these lobbying firms have tried to camouflage their widely spread activities under different names and different categories so that at one time not more than two or three companies could be officially acknowledged as government lobbyists.
All lobbyists are registered in the US as “foreign agents” under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and have to disclose their activities and operations under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. All this data is then made available to the public through information posted on their official websites.
Under FARA data seven Pakistani entities are listed as clients of at least 11 lobbying companies. One such firm was de-listed in March and its client was the PPP.
Likewise lobbyists’ info, an official organisation that keeps all the data on lobbyists for the last 40 years and is the best recognised source of latest information on lobbying and lobbyists, lists seven Pakistani entities, which have hired the 11 lobbying firms in the US. These in their order of listing include:
- Council on Pakistan Relations (CPR): This is said to be based in Michigan but no other information is available except an expensive Washington DC address, 1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, one block away from the White House and next to the famous Willard Hotel. There is a website for this organisation, www.pakistanrelations.org, but it does not name any one or any organisation, which can be identified. The details of the website are also hidden. CPR has hired one of the most expensive firms in Washington, Cassidy and Associates which has former Assistant Secretary Robin Raphel as one of the senior vice presidents. General Musharraf had also hired this company in October 2007 at $1.2 million per year to lobby for him just before the imposition of the emergency in Nov 07.
- Pakistan American Business Association: This is described as a non-profit organisation and has hired a big firm Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, ranked by The National Law Journal in 2006 as one of the 100 largest law firms in the country. Who are these Pak-American businessmen and where are they getting the huge dollars to pay this firm and for what results is not yet known.
- Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) has hired Benazir Bhutto’s personal lobbyist, Mark Siegel’s firm Locke Lord Strategies on a one-time payment of $150,000 to lobby for PIA’s landing rights in the US.
- Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) until recently had three lobbyists, BKSH, a subsidiary of Burson Marsteller, Mark Siegel’s firm LLS and a firm owned by one T Dean Reed. Lakhs of dollars were paid by PPP before the elections 2008 when Benazir Bhutto was trying to win over the US leaders to replace General Musharraf. On March 9, 2009 PPP terminated the contract of BKSH.
- Embassy of Pakistan in Washington: The latest information on lobbyists.info shows that the Pakistan Embassy has currently retained three main lobbying firms: Moses Boyd, Mark Siegel’s LLS and Ogilvy Public Relations (one of the names in this firm’s list of associates is Irfan Kamal. Who is he and what role he plays, whether any, is not known).
- Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Government of Pakistan: Under this name, a mysterious firm named ‘Team Eagle’ has been hired as one of the two lobbying companies, the other bang White & Case LLP in which one Pakistani name, Imran R Mir, is mentioned as an associate.
- Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting: Under this name only one name of a Pakistan-based company Asiatic Advertising is registered. No details of transactions are available for this firm.
These seven Pakistani organisations have thus hired 11 firms, separately and mysteriously in some cases, but what output and results are these companies providing is unknown and not clear. It would be a suitable case for parliamentary oversight bodies like the Public Accounts Committee to look into the details of these firms and how much they were paid for what results.
The data provided by US government under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) until June 2008 is as follows. This lists some of the firms hired and paid by the Musharraf regime and some by the PPP government. It is amusing to note that the purpose of payment in some cases is just ridiculous like training Pakistani officials in the Embassy on how to deal with US media. The following is the data as listed on FARA web site:
- BKSH & Associates #5402, 1110 Vermont Avenue, NW Suite 1000 Washington, DC 20005
Pakistan People’s Party (t) Nature of Services: Public Relations.
The registrant contacted congressional staffers, members of the Congress, and the US government officials to check on status of Resolution 445 and to assist the foreign principal in its effort to promote democracy in Pakistan and in providing its views on the current political, economic and humanitarian situation on the ground in Pakistan. The registrant also contacted congressional staffers to discuss upcoming visit of representatives of the foreign principal to the United States. $31,299.65 for the six-month period ending June 30, 2008.
- Burson-Marsteller #2469 1110 Vermont Avenue, NW, 12th Floor Washington, DC 20005-3544
Pakistan People’s Party (t) 60 Nature of Services: Media Relations.
The registrant developed media monitoring reports, spoke with media representatives, secured and attended meetings for party representatives, and secured and staffed interviews for party representatives on behalf of the foreign principal. $49,837.13 for the six-month period ending April 30, 2008.
- Cassidy & Associates, Inc #5643 700 13th Street, N.W. Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005
Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (t) 60 Nature of Services: Lobbying.
The registrant contacted congressional staffers and the US government officials to promote a better understanding of the foreign principal’s political, social and economic developments. $100,000.00 for the six-month period ending March 31, 2008. Printed as of: February 11, 2009 Page 160 of 229 Pakistan.
- Dewey & LeBoeuf, LLP #5835 1101 New York Avenue, NW Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20005-4213
Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan, Embassy 60 Nature of Services: Legal and Other Services/Lobbying.
The registrant provided services to the foreign principal including developing action plans that advance Pakistan’s commercial and trade objectives vis-‡-vis the US government and the private sector. $294,042.83 for the six-month period ending April 30, 2008.
- JWT Asiatic, a division of WPP Marketing Communications (Pvt.) Ltd #5722 ABN Amro Bank Building 16 Abdullah Haroon Road Karachi
Government of Pakistan 60 Nature of Services: Advertising. Activities: None Reported Finances: None Reported.
- Locke Lord Strategies, LP #5856 401 9th Street, NW Suite 400 South Washington, DC 20004
PPP; Asif Ali Zardari, Co-Chairperson of the PPP 60.
Nature of Services: Lobbying.
The registrant agreed to promote the democratic transition of Pakistan and to encourage the international investigation of the assassination of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Finances: None Reported
- Locke Lord Strategies, LP #5856 401 9th Street, NW Suite 400 South Washington, DC 20004
The Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 60. Nature of Services: Lobbying.
The registrant will conduct strategic and governmental affairs communications on behalf of the foreign principal. Finances: None Reported
Printed as of: February 11, 2009 Page 161 of 229 Pakistan.
- Ogilvy Public Relations Worldwide #5807 1111 19th Street, NW 10th Floor Washington, DC 20036
Embassy of Pakistan (t) 60 Nature of Services: Media Relations.
On behalf of the foreign principal, the registrant provided media training to embassy staff, drafted informational materials for distribution to journalists and other media outlets, facilitated the embassy’s interactions with journalists and other media outlets, and provided strategic guidance with respect to the United States media. $256,809.00 for the six-month period ending May 31, 2008.
- Reed, T Dean #5044 37277 Branchriver Road Purcellville, VA 20132-1922
PPP (t) 60 Nature of Services: Public Relations.
The registrant provided public relations advice and consultation to the foreign principal and the editing of a newsletter. $10,500.00 for the six-month period ending March 31, 2008.
- Van Scoyoc Associates, Inc. #5401 101 Constitution Avenue, NW Suite 600 West Washington, DC 20001
Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Embassy (t) 60
Nature of Services: Legal and Other Services/Lobbying.
The registrant monitored, advised and evaluated legislative issues, as well as arranged meetings and accompanied Pakistani government officials to meetings with members of the Congress, and congressional staffers to discuss general US-Pakistan issues. Representatives of the registrant also traveled to Pakistan to meet with Pakistani government officials. $330,000.00 for the six-month period ending June 30, 2008.
Was Dick Cheney Behind Benazir’s Assassination?
Benazir Bhutto was assassinated on the orders of the special death squad formed by former US vice-president Dick Cheney, which had already killed the Lebanese PM Rafique Al Hariri and the army chief of that countryThe squad was headed by General Stanley McChrystal, the newly-appointed commander of US army in Afghanistan. It was disclosed by reputed US journalist Seymour Hersh while talking to an Arab TV in an interview.
Hersh said former US vice-president Cheney was the chief of the Joint Special Operation Command and he clear the way for the US by exterminating opponents through the unit and the CIA. General Stanley was the in-charge of the unit.
Seymour also said that Rafiq Al Hariri and the Lebanese army chief were murdered for not safeguarding the US interests and refusing US setting up military bases in Lebanon. Ariel Sharon, the then prime minister of Israel, was also a key man in the plot.
A number of websites around the world are suspecting the same unit for killing of Benazir Bhutto because in an interview with Al-Jazeera TV on November 2, 2007, she had mentioned the assassination of Usama Bin Laden, Seymour said. According to BB, Umar Saeed Sheikh murdered Usama, but her words were washed out from the David Frosts report, he said.
The US journalist opined that it might have been done on purpose because the US leadership did not like to declare Usama dead for in the case the justification of the presence of US army in Afghanistan could no more be there, hence no reason for operation against Taliban.
On the other hand, the diplomatic analysts believe that BB murder is still a fable and it is for the reason Asif Zardari and other govt authorities are stressing UN probe in the murder case, also paying huge sums for it.
Another website has disclosed that Benazir was put to death in order to roll back Pakistan nuclear programme and the take over its nukes and India, Israel and the US, were making hectic efforts to deprive Pakistan of its atomic capability so as to bring to under their control.
Differences in the Bhutto Family?
Zardari is about to face another crisis of credibility from his own family members. Even Bilawal Zardari, at this young age, may have to come in public and support his beloved Aunt Sanam Bhutto against his father’s claims of material and political inheritance of Benazir Bhutto.

A source close to an international interviewer Daphne Barak has confirmed that Sanam Bhutto has already spoken loud and clear about her brother-in-law, Zardari. Though the contents of this interview have not been revealed, sources close to Daphne Barak saud that “Zardari, who was elected, using his late wife’s legacy and the Bhutto family would be embarrassed by Sanam Bhutto’s cold and determined disclosures.”
The bold and sometimes angry remarks of Sanam Bhutto may create such controversy that Bilawal Bhutto, at this young age, may have to take his own stand in this dispute. Very likely, he will support his favorite aunt Sanam Bhutto against his father, with whom he is already at odds on certain issues after her mother’s death.
Sanam Bhutto does not want to see Bilawal’s studies disturbed, but she also does not want to see the welfare of three young children of her sister being compromised. She has spoken as time is running out. Moreover, Sanam has been upset with Zardari’s handling of the PPP that is the most precious political legacy of her father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and her sister Benazir Bhutto. He betrayed her sister’s promises to the nation about restoration of judges, caused political friction to the point that led Pakistan to the brink of civil war and caused historic damage to the popular Pakistan People’s Party to the maximum extent. Reportedly Sanam Bhutto has said, “My father, my brothers, my mother all of us suffered and made sacrifices for PPP and Asif Zardari has usurped it. He has made this party unpopular by his acts, purging of loyalists and politically seasoned elements, betraying the pledges and goals defined by Benazir Bhutto.”
In addition to political legacy of Benazir Bhutto, some issues of properties and financial fortunes are also cause of friction. Sanam Bhutto is acting as the watchdog of Bilawal, Bakhtawar and Assefa’s interests and is concerned that other members of Zardari family are working to derive benefits.
Daphne Barak and Benazir Bhutto have been friends for over 15 years and had very close relationship. She has insight into Benazir-Zardari relationship during the last 12 years. She is an insider of Bhutto family on many issues.
Ms Barak is going to be one of the first witnesses before the UN Commission to investigate the murder of Benazir Bhutto. She has already been invited by the UN officials for help and Daphane Barak has provided all her record, notes and recordings of Benazir Bhutto to the Chairperson of this Commission.
The UN secretary-general has yet not announced the name of the third member of this UN Commission while Chile’s ambassador to UN has been designated as the chairman.
Musharraf linked Benazir’s Security to Her Ties with Him

By Umar Cheema
Saturday, August 09, 2008
The US intelligence agencies taped Benazir Bhutto’s phone calls, prior to her arrival in Pakistan, in a bid to “play under-the-table, cut-throat games more effectively”, a new book has revealed.
“The Way of the World” authored by a Pulitzer Prize winning US journalist Ron Suskind, is full of disclosures, with its fair portion about Musharraf-Benazir conversation including Musharraf’s quote “You should understand something, your security is based on the state of our relationship”.
Suskind writes that Benazir Bhutto’s case of returning to Pakistan was strongly backed by Condoleezza Rice-led State Department and equally opposed by Vice President Dick Cheney who considered Bhutto “complicated and unpredictable”.
The book said whenever Benazir Bhutto went harsh on Musharraf, the US ambassador in Islamabad advised her to “tone down any criticism of Musharraf”. The author said Bhutto often regretted that Vice President Cheney never called Musharraf asking him to “behave” and instead kept her pressing for coming to terms with him.
As Musharraf, during telephonic conversations, refused entertaining her demand of revoking provision barring her becoming PM for third time, Bhutto said: “What you can give me (then)? May be some real reform in election commission”.
Musharraf said: “She should not be hoping for much there (reforms), either”. The book revealed US intelligence once intercepted Bhutto’s conversation with her son, Bilawal. “They’ve been listening to her calls for months, including an earlier call she made to her son.”
In that call, the book said, she told him (Bilawal) about the secret bank accounts that hold the family’s fortunes that investigators have long suspected are ill-gotten. Therefore when Bhutto once floated the idea of freezing foreign accounts of “key people around Musharraf”, a US official let her understand that the United States could, if need be, “constrain her assets” just as she was now suggesting they do to Musharraf.
According to the author, Bhutto’s representative started approaching the State Department, in spring 2006 to work out a plan for her return, but White House began taking her seriously after the widespread demonstrations in backdrop sacking of Chief Justice. And this plan was aimed to shore up an embattled Musharraf, a single-issue ally.
Bhutto would consider, the book said, the lawyers and especially Iftikhar Chaudhry were a “problem” and that they owned the “high ground of principle. While she was sprouting democratic rhetoric, the book said, she was caught in the deal room — a position in which she came close to mirroring the “say one thing but do another” behavior of the United States.
The book also discloses details of Bhutto’s meeting with US Senator John Kerry requesting for her security and his reply that “United States is generally hesitant to ensure the protection of anyone who is not a designated leader”.
The notable excerpts from the book related to Pakistan have been given below:
Telephone tapes:
Author said the US National Security Agencies (NSAs) were doing this job. Regarding Bhutto’s conversation with Bilawal, he writes: “The NSA was listening. They’ve been listening to her calls for months, including an earlier call she made to her son, Bilawal. The subject of the secret is often aware that evidence has been collected that may be used to drive judgments and may be even destructive actions…The NSA, meanwhile, has harvested a number of portentous conversation of Benazir Bhutto. This should help the United States play its under the table, cut-throat games more effectively. The intercept will be cited inside the US government as evidence of Bhutto’s unfitness, her corruption. It will be used as part of a wider “carrot and stick” programme in which the United States let Bhutto know they were happy to work with her in setting up a marriage with Musharraf, but they could make her life difficult if she started to improvise and freelance. What they’ll overlook is the context and her tone in the many calls they eavesdrop or overlook the fact that she’s scared and preparing for the possibility of imminent death… Bhutto didn’t know about the NSA’s intercepts, but a US official let her understand that the United States could, if need be, “constrain her assets,” just as she was now suggesting they do to Musharraf.”
Telephonic conversation with Musharraf:
Referring to conversation that took place three weeks before her return when she was meeting US lawmakers at Capitol Hill, including John Kerry, and State Department officials, he writes: “Suddenly the couple (Bhutto-Zardari) turns. One of Bhutto’s aides is rushing towards them, saying he’s just gotten a call from one of Musharraf’s aides. The aide says that Musharraf can’t support Bhutto on a key demand — the repeal of the provision prohibiting a third term for the prime ministers — and he wants to talk to her… Bhutto takes the call from Islamabad. “The twice-elected provision is important to me,” she tells Musharraf. “If you’re retreating from that, what can you give me? May be some real reform in the election commission?” He says she shouldn’t be hoping for much there, either. In their many calls, he’s been surprisingly cordial, often quite reasonable. But something has changed. His voice is harsh, almost mocking her. She asks if the US officials have had conversation with him that makes it clear that her safety is his responsibility. “Yes, someone has called”, Musharraf says, and then laughs. “The Americans can call all they want with their suggestions about you and me, let them call,” he tells her… He finishes the call with a dose of fair warning. “You should understand something,” Pervez Musharraf says, finally to Benazir Bhutto. “Your security is based on the state of our relationship.” She hangs up the phone feeling as though she might be sick.
Regarding Musharraf’s call to Bhutto after assassination attempt on her arrival in Karachi, the author writes: “By the next day, Musharraf calls Bhutto at her estate near Karachi. She accepts his sympathies reluctantly. “I’m not the enemy, Bibi.” She says little. She knows the lines are tapped. It’s a new hand and she is not showing her card.”
Conversation with Senator John Kerry:
As Bhutto met John Kerry in Washington, three weeks before going back to Pakistan, author writes: “The priority of this trip is to get Bhutto the security support she lacks. October 18 is only three weeks away. Kerry is swift off the mark: “This is a volatile situation you’re walking into, Benazir.” The United States, he says, is generally hesitant to ensure the protection of anyone who is not a designated leader, a provision to prevent US forces from becoming embroiled in the internal disputes of sovereign nations. “Senator Kerry, I want Pakistan to provide me with the security I am entitled to under the laws of my country. I’d be grateful if you would talk to the Musharraf government and tell him the US expects he will fulfill those obligations.” Kerry sighs. Of course, he, a senator, can’t conduct unilateral foreign policy. “Well, Benazir, I will certainly talk to the State Department about that point being made to Musharraf,” he says as forcefully as credulity will allow… Her current fortune, however, are in hands of a half-a-dozen people beyond her orbit: a tight circle of policy makers in senior posts at the State Department and in the Vice President’s Office. All official contacts with Pakistan on Bhutto’s behalf must be channeled through this small group, overseen, in essence, by Cheney and Rice, a duo with a long history of internecine combat. Most of it dominated by the vice president.”
Condoleezza Rice Vs. Dick Cheney:
“The initiative to reinsert Bhutto into Pakistan, was, in fact, launched and led by Rice and her State Department. Cheney’s position, expressed to the president on several occasions, was ‘don’t mess with this,’ according to one of his senior foreign policy advisers. ‘Our feeling,’ said Cheney’s adviser, summing up the view of the vice president, “was that arranging this marriage can only backfire on us. Bhutto is complicated and unpredictable. It’s best to just support Musharraf, give him whatever he wants or needs to stay in power.’ ‘Our position,’ the advisor added, ‘is that this whole thing with Bhutto is being run out of state. Let them fly or fall on their own.”
Rice-Bhutto telephone talk:
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher, who’s been handling the Bhutto-Musharraf talks, falls ill and needs to be hospitalized. Condi Rice tries to step in. She calls a London hotel where Bhutto is meeting Pakistani supporters. Bhutto does not take the call. “Someone said that Condi Rice was on the phone,” she (Bhutto) said later, I thought they were joking”… She and Bhutto talk several times through a long night and into the next morning, ironing out some sticking points with Musharraf. Bhutto tells her she’s concerned about her security… She’s suspicious that the United States sees her value mostly as a means to shore up Musharraf — rather than as a champion of democratic ideals — and to describe her exchange with the general would show just untenable a couple they would make.
Musharraf’s visa denial to security firm:
Two days before she boards the plane, Bhutto is concerned. Her team has been frantically trying to beef up her security… Mark Siegel and Larry Wallace, Bhutto’s American advisers, have been working the problem with Blackwater. In September, representatives from the firm flew to meet with Bhutto at her home in Dubai and laid out several security plans, each costing about $400,000 per month. They intended to work in conjunction with affiliated firms inside of Pakistan, because Musharraf had blocked visas from being issued to imported Americans security personnel for Bhutto… She turns the firm down. She knows that the United States has accepted Musharraf’s assurance that he had her security under control, but she does not trust him and sends an “in the event of my death” note, identifying various hard-line Islamist officials in his orbit who should be held responsible in the event that she is killed.
My One & Only Meeting with BB: MP Bhandara
The News Op-ed, February 3, 2008)
M P Bhandara
Fatima Bhutto Tries to Reveal the Truth About Murtaza Bhutto’s Assassination
Fatima Bhutto: living on the edge
Six months after her aunt Benazir Bhutto was assassinated, Fatima Bhutto is fighting to reveal the truth surrounding the murder of her father in 1996 — and making some very dangerous enemies
William Dalrymple
As the convoy neared home, the street lights were abruptly turned off. The police snipers were ready in position; some had climbed up the trees lining the avenue to get clear shots. Their guns were loaded, the roadblocks had been erected, the surrounding lanes sealed off. The guards outside the different embassies nearby had been told to retreat within their compounds in expectation of trouble. By nine o’clock, all 80 police were in position, commanded by four senior officers. There was complete silence, but for the occasional buzz of static on the police radios.
It was September 20, 1996, and Murtaza Bhutto, Benazir’s younger brother, was returning late from campaigning in a distant part of Karachi. He had come home to Pakistan the previous year after a long period in exile to challenge his more famous sister for a role in the leadership of the family party, the Pakistan People’s Party, or PPP. Benazir was then the prime minister, and Murtaza’s decision to take her on had put him into direct conflict not only with his sister, but also with her ambitious and powerful husband, Asif Ali Zardari.
Murtaza had an animus against Zardari, who he believed was not just a nakedly and riotously corrupt polo-playing playboy, but had pushed Benazir to abandon the PPP’s once-radical agenda fighting for social justice. By doing so, believed Murtaza, Zardari had turned their father’s socialist-leaning party into a political moneymaking machine for the PPP’s wealthy feudal leadership. But Benazir was deaf to the voluble complaints being made about Zardari, which had led to him being dubbed “Mr Ten Per Cent”. Instead of reprimanding him, she appointed her husband minister for investment, so making him the channel through which passed all investment offers from home and abroad.
A few weeks earlier, according to a widely reported story, an incident took place the truth of which is now difficult to establish. In view of their worsening relations, Murtaza is said to have rung Zardari and invited him for a chat at the Bhutto headquarters, 70 Clifton. It was agreed he should come without bodyguards, in order that the two might meet privately and try to settle their differences. Zardari agreed. But as the two men were walking through the garden, Murtaza’s guards suddenly appeared and grabbed Zardari. Murtaza took out a cut-throat razor, and after slowly sharpening it, personally shaved off half of Zardari’s moustache. Then he threw him out the house. A furious Zardari, who had presumably feared much worse than a shave, was compelled to remove the other half of his moustache once he got home.
Whether there is any truth to this story – and Murtaza’s family strongly deny there is – the two brothers-in- law had become irreconcilable by the end of the summer of 1996, and few believed the rivalry was likely to end peacefully. Both men had reputations for being trigger-happy. Murtaza’s bodyguards were notoriously rough, and Murtaza was alleged to have sentenced to death several former associates, including his future biographer, Raja Anwar, author of an unflattering portrait, The Terrorist Prince. Zardari’s reputation was, if anything, worse.
Around the time of the alleged moustache shaving, when Benazir’s mother, the Begum Bhutto, suggested that Murtaza be made the chief minister of Sindh, Benazir and Zardari’s response was to remove the Begum as chairperson of the PPP. Zardari was also said to have leant on Abdullah Shah, the man who held the chief ministership the Begum had wanted Murtaza to be given, and asked him to get his Karachi police to harass Murtaza and obstruct his election campaign. There were also hints of worse to come. So insistent had these rumours become that at 3pm earlier that afternoon, Murtaza had given a press conference saying he had learnt that an assassination attempt on him was being planned, and he named some of Shah’s police officers he claimed were involved in the plot. Several of the officers were among those now waiting, guns cocked, outside his house.
According to witnesses, when the leading car drew up at the roadblock, there was a single shot from the police, followed by two more shots, one of which hit the foremost of Murtaza’s armed bodyguards. Sizing up the situation immediately, and guessing that the police wanted to provoke his guards into retaliating, Murtaza immediately got out of his car and urged his men to hold their fire. Even as he stood there with his hands raised above his head, urging calm, the police opened fire on the whole party with automatic weapons. The firing went on for nearly 10 minutes.
In the silence that followed, as the wounded men lay bleeding on the ground, the police circled the bodies with pistols, administering the coup de grâce to several of the prostrate figures with assassin’s shots to the back of the neck. One of Murtaza’s aides, Ashiq Ali Jatoi, the Sindh president of Murtaza’s faction of the PPP, was standing up cradling a broken arm and begging to be taken to hospital when he was shot at point-blank range in the back of the head. It was all over in quarter of an hour, leaving seven men either dead or dying. The remaining more lightly wounded men were left to bleed on the road for nearly an hour before being taken for treatment.
Two hundred yards down the road, inside the compound of 70 Clifton, the house where Benazir Bhutto had spent her childhood, was Murtaza’s wife Ghinwa, his daughter, the 12-year-old Fatima, and the couple’s young son, Zulfikar, then aged six. When the first shot rang out, Fatima was in Zulfikar’s bedroom, helping put him to bed. She immediately ran with him into his windowless dressing room, and threw him onto the floor, protecting him by covering his body with her own. When the firing had stopped, Ghinwa had tried to leave the house, but the police told her to stay inside as there had been a robbery nearby. After another 45 minutes, an increasingly worried Fatima called the prime minister’s house and asked to speak to her aunt. Benazir’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari, took her call. Fatima recalls the following conversation:
Fatima: “I wish to speak to my aunt, please.”
Zardari: “It’s not possible.”
Fatima: “Why?” [At this point, Fatima says, she heard loud, stagy-sounding wailing.]
Zardari: “She’s hysterical, can’t you hear?”
Fatima: “Why?”
Zardari: “Don’t you know? Your father’s been shot.”
Fatima and Ghinwa immediately left the house and demanded to be taken to see Murtaza. By now there were no bodies in the street. It had all been cleaned up: there was no blood, no glass or any sign of violence at all. Each of the seven wounded had been taken to a different location, though none were taken to emergency units of any of the Karachi hospitals.
“They had taken my father to the Mideast, a dispensary,” says Fatima. “It wasn’t an emergency facility and had no surgeons or any facilities for treating a wounded man. We climbed the stairs, and there was my father lying hooked up to a drip. He was covered in blood and unconscious. You could see he had been shot several times. One of those shots was from point-blank range, at the back of his jaw, and it had blown away part of his face. I kissed him and moved aside. Then my mother sat with him, speaking to him, holding his hand. He never recovered consciousness. We lost him just after midnight.”
The two bereaved women went straight to a police station to register a report, but the police refused to take it down. Benazir Bhutto was then the prime minister, and one might have expected the assassins would have faced the most extreme measures of the state for killing the prime minister’s brother. Instead, it was the witnesses and survivors who were arrested. They were kept incommunicado and intimidated. Two died soon afterwards in police custody.
In due course the police who were part of the operation were all promoted, except one, Haq Nawaz Sial, who was instead found shot, having “committed suicide”; his wife says she saw a gunman running away from the scene of the alleged self-shooting. This Fatima interprets as another killing by those behind the operation, who feared that the man would talk. “I rang my aunt several times to ask why none of those who did the shooting had been arrested,” says Fatima. “She just said, ‘Fati, you don’t understand how this works.’ There were never any criminal proceedings. Benazir claimed in the West to be the queen of democracy, but at that time there were so many like us who had lost family to premeditated police killings. We were just one among thousands. Nobody got justice.”
Benazir always protested her innocence over the death of Murtaza, and claimed that the killing was an attempt to frame her by the army’s intelligence services: “Kill a Bhutto to get a Bhutto,” as she used to put it. But the failure to properly investigate the murder, along with the highly suspicious circumstances of the ambush, all led Fatima and Ghinwa to conclude that Benazir and her husband had to be directly connected to the killings: “If she didn’t sign the death warrant, then who else had the power to cover it up?” asks Fatima. She wrote to Benazir, accusing her of, at best, failing to protect her father. It was the last direct contact between the two Bhutto women. “What does it all point to?” Fatima asks. “I would love to believe in the innocence of my aunt, but why else did she so obviously obstruct the investigation?”
Murtaza was, after all, clearly a direct threat to Benazir’s future, and she gained the most from the murder. For this reason her complicity was widely suspected well beyond the immediate family: when Benazir and Zardari attempted to attend Murtaza’s funeral, their car was stoned by villagers who believed them responsible.
The judiciary took the same view, and the tribunal set up to investigate the killing concluded that the assassination could not have taken place “without approval from the highest level of government”. There was no shoot-out, as the police had claimed; the police had suffered no injuries; it was clearly a premeditated ambush. The tribunal concluded that Benazir’s administration was “probably complicit” in the assassination. Six weeks later, when Benazir fell from power, partly as a result of public outrage at the killings, Zardari was arrested and charged with Murtaza’s murder.
Twelve years on, however, the situation is rather different. Fatima is now a strikingly beautiful 25-year-old, fresh from a university education in New York and London. She is sassy and clever, a respected poet and an outspoken columnist in the Pakistani press.
She has a razor-sharp mind and a forceful, determined personality.
Meanwhile, the man Fatima Bhutto holds responsible for her father’s death is not only out of prison, after 11 years behind bars without conviction on murder and corruption charges, but is suddenly, in one of those dramatic reversals of fortune for which Pakistan is remarkable, the most powerful man in the country Since Benazir’s death in December, Zardari has been the co-chairman of Benazir’s PPP with his son Bilawal. And since the party’s victory in February’s election, Zardari has become both kingmaker and potential king. As he is not currently an MP, he could not immediately make himself prime minister, but the appointment of a relative nonentity – one Yusuf Raza Gillani – to the position makes it a strong probability that, come the next by-election, Zardari will put himself forward to be elected, then take the top position for himself. He has explicitly stated that he would take the job “if called upon to do so”.
The various murder charges against Zardari – there are three others in addition to that relating to Murtaza – stood until last month, when he was acquitted under the terms of the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), mid-trial, with half the witnesses still to give evidence. The NRO was a highly controversial law signed by President Musharraf under pressure from the US, which dismissed all outstanding charges against political figures, and which Benazir insisted on being passed before she agreed to return to Pakistan. To cap it all, the man Zardari has appointed as law minister, whose duty it is to oversee the cases against Zardari, is Zardari’s former defence lawyer and personal attorney.
While the various murder and corruption charges were undoubtedly used as a weapon against Benazir by her enemies, there is equally no question that some of the cases have real substance, and that Zardari has credible charges to answer and, if possible, refute. As well as the four murder charges, there are a stack of corruption charges against Bhutto and Zardari that have also been dropped, even though they have substance to them and their dismissal leaves many unanswered questions about the disappearance of huge sums of money. There is, for example, the evidence from independent banks, US congressional reports and the governments of several countries that Zardari was getting huge kickbacks from government contracts, for everything from power and gas projects to French fighter aircraft and Polish tractors. It is for this reason that Zardari has been trying to block the reappointment of the chief justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Chaudhry, who has a reputation for integrity and has publicly stated that he wishes to challenge the constitutional legality of the NRO – an issue that has seriously divided the newly elected coalition and threatened its future. The issue has nearly led to the current fragile coalition breaking up, and Zardari has been dragging his feet about allowing the chief justice to resume his position.
All this leaves Fatima Bhutto in a difficult and unenviable position, standing between the probable next prime minister of her country and the clearing of his name. After a long period of military rule, few in Pakistan now wish to dig up this old case or rock the boat. Many others have died since Murtaza Bhutto, including of course Benazir herself, and there is strong pressure to let the past go and to allow the new civilian government a chance to prove itself after eight years of military dictatorship. Few wish to see the country dragged into a new round of political wrangling, so there are unlikely to be many supporting Fatima Bhutto in her continuing bid to see justice done over her father’s murder.
“In Pakistan we live with this historical amnesia,” Fatima told me recently. “Such are the difficulties of the present that there is a strong urge to forget those of the past. But there are those of us who are not willing to forget.
We are currently waiting for Zardari’s acquittal judgment. But I am not going to give up this struggle. I am not going to stand down quietly. This is bigger than us – this is about justice. I will continue to do all I can to stand between Asif and a clean record.”
Fatima Bhutto was born in Kabul on May 29, 1982. General Zia had recently seized power in one of Pakistan’s periodic military coups, and the Bhuttos were in disarray: the patriarch of the family, the deposed prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had been hanged three years earlier, and Murtaza was in exile from Pakistan in Soviet-controlled Afghanistan. From there he tried to organise the struggle against Zia, though Kabul was under daily assault by Afghan mujaheddin. Fatima’s life thus began as it has continued: as a stowaway in the hold of Pakistan’s history, shaped by her country’s succession of crises.
When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was arrested on July 5, 1977, his children reacted in various ways and disagreed on the best method with which to carry on his legacy and return Pakistan to democracy. Benazir believed the struggle should be peaceful and political. Her brothers initially tried the same approach, forming Al-Nusrat, the Save Bhutto committee; but after two futile years they decided in 1979 to turn to the armed struggle. Murtaza was about 24 and had just left Harvard. Forbidden by his father from returning to Zia’s Pakistan, he flew from the US first to London, then on to Libya, Riyadh and Damascus, and finally to Beirut, where he and his younger brother Shahnawaz were adopted by Yasser Arafat. Under his guidance they received the arms and training necessary to form the Pakistan Liberation Army, later renamed Al-Zulfikar, or the Sword. The idea was to harass the regime by targeting “collaborators”, especially those who had helped arrest, try and hang their father. They also tried to stir up younger officers in the army to topple or assassinate Zia.
Murtaza and his brother found shelter in Kabul, as guests of the new pro-Soviet government. There they had married the Afghan sisters Fauzia and Rehana Fasihudin, beautiful daughters of a senior Afghan official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Fatima’s mother was Fauzia.
For all its PLO training in Syria, Afghanistan and Libya, Al-Zulfikar achieved little except for two failed assassination attempts on Zia and the hijacking of a Pakistan International Airways flight in 1981, when a plane going from Karachi to Peshawar was diverted to Kabul. It secured the release of around 50 political prisoners, but also caused the death of an innocent passenger, a young army officer. Zia used the hijacking as a means of cracking down on the PPP, and had the two boys placed on the Federal Investigation Agency’s most-wanted list. Benazir was forced to distance herself from her two brothers, even though they subsequently denied sanctioning the hijack, and claimed only to have acted as negotiators once the plane landed in Kabul.
Murtaza was posthumously acquitted of organising the hijack in 2003. But at the time, the operation gave Zia the excuse he needed to send out his agents to try to track down and assassinate the two Bhutto boys. After Moscow leant on Kabul to expel them from Afghanistan in the aftermath of the hijack, they were forced to keep moving: first back to Libya, then to Damascus. In the summer of 1985 the different Bhutto children were all reunited in Cannes, where Shahnawaz had set himself up with Rehana in an apartment on the Lido.
Despite the increasingly bitter rows between Shahnawaz and his wife, it was initially a blissful summer: Benazir once told me of the thrill of walking down the Cannes Lido with her hunky younger brother and being “the centre of envy: wherever Shahnawaz went, women would be bowled over”. It soon turned to tragedy, however, when one morning the family woke to find that Shahnawaz had been found dead from poison.
The chief suspect was immediately Rehana. She claimed her husband had committed suicide, but nobody believed her. There were signs of forced entry and a struggle in the flat, implying that a third party had entered, presumably a Zia agent. Moreover, the bruised and battered body was already cold by the time Rehana called for help, and she was immaculately turned out. While the family went off to report the death to police, Fatima was taken to the park by her aunt Benazir, who looked after her for the rest of the day.
In the aftermath of the murder, Rehana was arrested while her sister Fauzia supported her. She was charged with not coming to the aid of a dying man, spent three months in jail and was then whisked away to asylum in the US. This caused a permanent breach with Murtaza, who was understandably distraught and certain of Rehana’s guilt. After Shahnawaz was buried, Murtaza left for Damascus with the three-year-old Fatima; the child was not to see her mother again for nearly two decades.
While Benazir went on to make her home in New York and London, Murtaza chose to settle in Damascus, where he was given shelter by the government of Hafez al-Assad. It was there that Fatima grew up, speaking English and Arabic but knowing hardly a word of Urdu. A year after he arrived in Syria, Murtaza met a Lebanese teacher named Ghinwa Itaoui. Ghinwa had fled to Damascus following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The two married three years later, and it was Ghinwa who brought Fatima up and whom she now regards as her mother.
“We lived in a two-bedroom apartment,” says Fatima. “We had no cash and no servants. My father would drop me at school, do the cooking and look after me. Until he married Ghinwa, he brought me up entirely on his own. He was a wonderful parent. But he missed Pakistan and constantly dreamt of going back.”
Benazir visited her brother in Damascus and she and Fatima became close. But the political differences between Murtaza and his sister grew more marked as the 1980s progressed. After Benazir married Zardari in 1987, she increasingly urged Murtaza to stay away from Pakistan, saying she needed time to settle the outstanding charges against him. When there was no sign of progress, the two gradually became estranged. “There are two Benazirs I remember,” says Fatima. “When she was in exile aged about 25, she was very brave and very sad. She had lost her father and brother and was in pain and fragile and vulnerable. But later, once she was in power, she changed. She became very far from fragile. In power she was unrecognisable from the figure I loved as a child.”
When Benazir returned to power for a second term, Murtaza decided the moment had come to return home and face in court the charges of terrorism that were still pending against him, and which Benazir had refused to quash.
“He was always saying, in one year, in six months, we’ll go home,” says Fatima. “Then when I was 10 he suddenly, finally made up his mind. Ghinwa, Zulfikar and I went ahead and filed his nomination papers for the Sindh assembly. He was elected with a huge majority and he flew home shortly afterwards to take up his seat. When he arrived, police surrounded the plane on Benazir’s orders and he was arrested on the tarmac. He spent eight months in Landhi jail in northern Karachi before he got bail.
“I was 11. I remember him leaving the flat in Damascus. I was crying. I was scared for him, but he told me, ‘I am going home. Everything will be okay.’ We tried to have a normal day. It was late at night in Damascus by the time we heard he had landed. For years my father had spoken about returning to Pakistan, to his friends, his life, his home. We knew he’d been arrested, but strangely I was happy because I knew he was alive and home, and I thought it would all be okay.”
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A month after Murtaza’s arrest, in February 1994, I arrived in Karachi in the course of writing a profile of Benazir for this magazine. Given the scale of the challenge Murtaza posed to Benazir’s future, I thought it was important to talk to him, so I went over to the court where he was then being tried on terrorism charges.
A convoy of Jeeps followed by four pick-ups full of police gunmen brought Murtaza to the trial court where his case was being heard.
In noise and style it was identical to one of Benazir’s elaborate prime-ministerial processions. The only difference was that Murtaza was unable to wave to passers-by, as his hands were handcuffed to the policeman beside him.
I found Murtaza with his mother, Begum Bhutto, and a lawyer in an annexe beside the courtroom. He was strikingly like his father: handsome, very tall and slightly chubby, with an air of self-confidence and charisma. He said he was very pleased to talk: “Benazir doesn’t care what the local press says about her,” he said, “but she’s very sensitive to what her friends in Paris, London and New York get to read about her.”
“Has your sister got in touch with you since you returned to Pakistan?” I asked.
“No. Nothing. Not one note.”
“Did you expect her to intervene and get you off the hook?” I asked.
“I didn’t want any favours,” he replied. “I just wanted her to let justice take its course, and for her not to interfere in the legal process. As it is, she has instructed the prosecution to use delaying tactics to keep me in confinement as long as possible: the prosecution has told several people these are her instructions.”
“But you can understand why she feels threatened by your return,” I said.
“She should regard my return as an aspect of strength [for the family], not a threat. I don’t want to lead the PPP. I’m not demanding any party or government post. I just want to be an MNA [Member of the National Assembly, or Pakistani parliament] and represent the people of my father’s constituency. But she’s become paranoid and is convinced I’m trying to topple her.”
“And why do you think that is?”
“Probably been listening to one of her fortune-tellers. She thinks her first government fell because she sought the advice of one pir [Muslim holy man] and another stronger pir got jealous and cursed her. When you base your political decisions on that sort of thing you’re in serious trouble.” He giggled: “When she came to Damascus in 1990 I had to find an astrologer for her, some Bedouin woman. Benazir spent two hours with her. I had to smuggle her into the presidential guesthouse through the servants’ entrance… It’s easy to realise why she thinks I’m a threat if she’s that easily influenced.”
“Do you think she has become harder – more ruthless – over the past few years?” I asked.
Begum Bhutto answered: “My daughter would not have been capable of her actions today five years ago. The things she is doing now even General Zia wouldn’t have done.” She recounted the incident that took place at the Bhutto country estate of Al-Murtaza in Larkana on January 5 of that year. The date was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s birthday, and to mark the occasion both the rival claimants to his mantle, mother and daughter, had planned pilgrimages to his grave. Anticipating trouble if the two groups of supporters clashed, the security forces surrounded the Bhutto compound in Larkana, the Begum’s base, and banned her procession.
When the Begum ordered the compound gates to be opened and got ready to leave, the police opened fire. One person was killed immediately and two others died after the police refused to let the ambulances through. That night, as the three family retainers lay bleeding to death, 10 miles away in her new farmhouse, Benazir celebrated her father’s birthday with singing and dancing.
“After three deaths, she and her husband danced!” said the Begum, near to tears. “They must have known the police were firing at Al-Murtaza. Would all this have happened if she didn’t order it? But the worst crime was that they refused to let the ambulances through. If only they had, those two boys would be alive now.”
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After Murtaza’s assassination 2½ years later, the 14-year-old Fatima took on the mantle of keeping her father’s memory alive and attempting to seek justice for his murder – a strange echo of Benazir’s own quest to vindicate her father’s struggles. “You learn to deal with it,” she says, “but it won’t end until he’s got justice.”
Fatima’s first action was to publish the book of poems she had been working on, which her father had titled Whispers of the Desert. She also fought to keep the family together when Benazir encouraged Fatima’s biological mother, Fauzia, to return from the US to seek custody of Fatima from Ghinwa in the Pakistani courts.
One decade after this, Fatima first got in touch with me by e-mail. She had spent four years in the US studying Middle Eastern politics at Columbia University; she had been in New York during 9/11 and in London during 7/7. Shortly after that, visiting her mother’s family in Lebanon, she had been in Beirut during the Israeli invasion of that country.
Now, however, Fatima was back in Karachi, and sent me an article she had written about the assassination of her father to mark the 10th anniversary of his death. It was a campaign she had kept up relentlessly, using her new prominence as a writer and columnist to publicise her cause. While her aunt Benazir prepared for a political comeback in Pakistan, Fatima ratcheted up her own counter-campaign. As Benazir came increasingly to be depicted in the western media as the embodiment of Islamic moderation, liberalism and decency, Fatima popped up in newspapers to remind readers that her aunt’s record was not the saintly one that this simplistic hagiography liked to make out.
Benazir duly returned to Karachi on October 18. The very night of her return a suicide bomb aimed at her convoy killed 134 of her followers and left around 450 dead. The bombers, or perhaps a marksman – the matter has never been resolved – finally killed her on December 27, after a rally in Rawalpindi, throwing Pakistan into chaos and bloody rioting yet again.
Fatima and her mother were campaigning for the election when the blast took place, and hurried home before Larkana erupted into violence. “It was too familiar,” Fatima says. “My father’s murder all over again. Every 10 years it seems we have to bury a murdered Bhutto.” Fatima and Ghinwa went to the funeral, and sat, heads bowed in black veils, behind Benazir’s immediate family during the mourning. Though they were sitting only a few yards from each other, no words were exchanged between Fatima or Ghinwa and the newly widowed Asif Zardari: “I was looking at him, but he didn’t look back or even acknowledge our presence.”
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The following month, while covering the February election in Pakistan, I went to meet Fatima in Larkana, the Bhutto family stronghold. I wanted to ask her if, in light of her aunt’s violent death, she had regrets.
A small figure in a lavender-coloured dupatta, she was moving through the bazaars of Larkana. It was the last day before the polls opened – the election had been delayed because of the violence after Benazir’s death – and though Fatima was not standing for election herself, she was campaigning hard on behalf of her mother. Ghinwa was doing her best against the odds to keep afloat Murtaza’s political party, the PPP-SB. She had so far failed to retain the provincial assembly seat Murtaza had won when he was alive, but everyone seemed hopeful that this time she might succeed.
The campaigning went on for the rest of the day. It was only much later that night that Fatima was able to sit back and talk about the death of her aunt: “I’ve no regrets,” she said. “I write about political issues in Pakistan. When Benazir did her deal with Musharraf, I couldn’t keep quiet. Surely the point of a democracy is to hold elected officials accountable, yet here in Pakistan we pass a law aimed at wiping out corruption cases so they can whitewash all the criminals, extortionists, drug dealers and murderers who enter our parliament.
“I didn’t just write about Benazir as a niece. I wrote as a Pakistani. I’m clear I made the right decision.”
We were sitting in her grandfather’s sprawling country house in Larkana. All over it were family pictures: images of the young Benazir and her brothers as teenagers; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as prime minister, addressing meetings and shaking the hands of leaders of the 1970s such as the Shah of Iran and Colonel Gaddafi.
“Of course, I was angry at what Benazir did to my father,” Fatima continued, “but mainly because I expected more. I do feel sad that the idealistic Benazir I knew as a child had turned into a person so tragically mired in corruption and compromise. The person who was killed was a completely different person to the one I loved.
“I cried when I heard the news of her death. She was shot in the neck, just like my father. Only one of my father’s four siblings is alive now, all killed in these terrible ways. Benazir lived the longest – she didn’t die until she was 54. Her father was hanged at 51. Murtaza was 42. Shah was just 26.”
I asked whether she would consider entering politics herself.
“I am political, but I don’t think becoming an MP and sitting in Islamabad is necessarily the best way to influence people here. A writer has other options.
“There is much to be done. Power in Pakistan never changes hands – it’s only the victims who change. The people of this country are so dispossessed – they have no access to justice or basic necessities. There is so much corruption. We have to teach the people to stand together and protect themselves.
“For now I want to be a writer. But if in the future there was a way I could serve my country that did not involve becoming yet another part of dynastic birthright politics, maybe I could envisage putting my name forward. If I stood I would want it to be on my own merits, not as a member of a dynasty.”
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In the event, two days after we spoke, Ghinwa was wiped out at the ballot box, though only after some very blatant ballot-stuffing, some of which was captured on film. This was effected not by the pro-Musharraf parties, as had been expected, but in the case of Larkana by Zardari’s PPP, which had won the largest share of the vote. Musharraf was being slowly eclipsed, and Fatima’s nemesis, Zardari, was suddenly the biggest power in the land. The obvious candidate for PPP prime minister, Amin Fahim, was pushed aside and replaced with a Zardari loyalist, Yusuf Raza Gillani.
I rang Fatima and asked: “So, with Zardari in power, are you now afraid for your own safety?”
Fatima considered for a second before answering: “Well, I am certainly very afraid for this country,” she said. “Even before Zardari, this was a country where anything can happen, a country that regularly disappears its own people. The state here is, in the worst way, expedient. You just don’t know what’s waiting for you, especially if you stand up and say what you think. And I have never been an especially diplomatic person. I certainly don’t belong to the silent majority.”
She paused. “So perhaps I should be anxious,” she said. “After all, this man knows no limits. He has a record. He has, as they say, form. And he is now clearly indulging in the politics of revenge and retribution. It’s nothing new – it’s how he has always been.” She paused again. “But what can you do? You just have to carry on as you can, and try to tell the truth as you see it. That’s all you can do.”
William Dalrymple is the author of The Last Mughal: The Fall of a Dynasty, Delhi, 1857 (Bloomsbury) ;

