Archive for Religion

Hinduism

Can one tell a history of the Hindus through their stories? That is the challenge that American scholar and Sanskritist Wendy Doniger sets herself in this book, a culmination of many years of teaching and engagement with Hindu thought and writing. One thing those years have made clear to Doniger is the difficulty of defining Hinduism. The term itself lacks any roots within India—only after the seventeenth century can we find the first usage of the title ‘Hindupati’ or Lord of the Hindus—and there is no agreed doctrine, founder, or church-like institution with which it is identified. There is no Hindu canon. Nor do the Hindus themselves form a race, or inhabit a narrowly specified territory.

What does connect them and set them apart, Doniger argues, is the fact that their imaginations, and many of their social practices, are structured by a vast web of stories—texts that spin across and through the languages and cultures of the subcontinent. Doniger calls it ‘intertextuality’, the self-conscious reference to stories that came before, all the way back to the Rig Veda. And from there on, the Brahmanas, Upanishads, Mahabharata, Ramayana, Shastras, Puranas, Tantric texts, the philosophical schools whose networks extended from the Tamil South up to Kashmir, the poetry and song of the Bhakti movements. There is no comparable output in any of the other great instances of the moral and religious imagination still available to us today.

Such texts can’t, however, be read as open windows on the societies that produced them. We don’t even know when some of the most fertile Hindu texts were composed. The Mahabharata and Ramayana, for instance, can only be dated to some time between 300 BC and AD 300 and 200 BC and AD 200 respectively. Still, Doniger is interested in the tensions between history (what exactly happened) and what societies tell themselves about what is happening. Her passion is the human imagination.

Doniger calls her book an ‘alternative history’ because she believes the other histories overemphasise the Brahminic wellsprings of Hindu stories. She argues, effectively, that the ‘high’ texts have quite often fed off low tales. She shows in particular how the voices of women, Dalits and tribals have energised many Brahminic scripts. So too, she makes us hear the voices of Buddhist and Jain thought, and later of Islam and Christianity, in dialogue with the Hindu texts. Just as those lower in society sought to Sanskritise and Kshatriyise, so the Sanskrit texts were permeable to what she terms ‘deshification’—the absorption of local, ‘small’ traditions.

She draws out the layered cruelties and conflicting natures of Hindu texts with verve, among them the story of Ekalavya, the expert tribal archer in the Mahabharata. He displays his skill by unleashing arrows into the mouth of a dog. Arjuna, outraged that someone of lower caste can do this and threatened by his prowess, tells Ekalavya’s guru, Drona, to put a stop to it. Drona requires Ekalavya to cut off his thumb, which he does. The story reveals and revels in the injustice of caste. But Doniger also cites other versions—for instance, a Jain text in which Arjuna is shown as cruel and vindictive. These constitute what Doniger calls the ‘intertextual’ argument and conversation of the Hindus—with the Mahabharata as a central clearing house for this vast network of disputation. One of her arresting comparisons likens the Mahabharata to ‘an ancient Wikipedia, to which anyone who knew Sanskrit…could add a bit here, a bit there’.

But the central insight driving her argument concerns the Hindu way of telling stories, a capacity to make not just art, but ethics, out of ambiguity. It’s a characteristic embodied in the Sanskrit figure of speech known as ‘slesha’. Slesha—literally ‘embrace’—holds together at once two different stories or images, allowing the listener or reader to switch between them. This is essentially a metaphoric capacity: to see something as something else. It also offers a way out of any impasse. As E.M. Forster put it, ‘Every Indian hole has at least two exits’.

In such a universe, meaning is never settled—and so, neither, is authority. Claimants to authority, from the gods themselves to the human scribes who record their doings to modern-day gurus who hold forth on the texts, climb up ladders but also slide down snake chutes. This fosters an internal pluralism: within the individual, the possibility of internal conflict between the demands of society’s moral code and a more universal ethics is never resolved or far from the surface. The recognition of ambiguous meaning also enables, though in more complex and sometimes attenuated ways, an attitude of pluralism towards other moral cosmologies and religions.

The eighteenth century Scottish philosopher, David Hume, put this capacity for pluralism down to polytheism, a religious view that saw nature as distinguished not by order and beauty, but “by the various and contrary events of human life”. “So sociable is polytheism,” wrote Hume, “that the utmost fierceness and aversion which it meets with in an opposite religion is scarcely able to disgust it and keep it at a distance”. Now, this sociability is hardly one that would guarantee survival in a biological species; and polytheism has been a characteristic mainly of ancient religions, which rarely got beyond the lower branches of the Darwinian tree of human belief systems. Why, then, has Hinduism been able to survive, with some vigour, across such a span of human history? Some, of course, over the past century and more have feared that it possibly cannot—and have hoped to make Hinduism more mono in its theism.

It’s precisely the capacity of the Hindu imagination to keep telling and re-telling stories, rather than to box them up into a single authorised narrative or code, which has kept it in business—and enabled it to flourish within a society at once of great internal complexity and which has also regularly encountered tough external pressures.

Doniger takes an obvious joy in the stories she analyses, and one of many pleasures in the book is her consideration to animals in the Hindu world—as objects of sacrifice, consumption, devotion and protection, sometimes all at once. The idea of non-violence, ahimsa, is first developed in relation to the treatment of animals—a matter of public concern to rulers, who encouraged forms of casuistry to justify animal sacrifice. The cow, of course, figures. But Doniger more interestingly tracks the importance of dogs. The Mahabharata, she notes, begins and ends with stories about justice for dogs. She also brings the horse back to the centre of the Hindu imagination. From the great Ashvamedha sacrifice, described in shudder-inducing detail in the Vedas, to the raging hooves of Kalki, it is the horse—an animal not native to the subcontinent—that has fascinated Hindus.

But for all the delights in Doniger’s scholarship, there is a deeper question she might have done well to confront. How did the Hindu capacity for moral pluralism actually stand in relation to Indian society? Doniger notes and celebrates the presence in many texts of challenges to hierarchy and caste. She shows that caste was not invariably an intellectual or philosophical prison. It was possible to think oneself out of it, to criticise its injustice, mock its absurdities. But she doesn’t probe a central paradox: Why did such critical thoughts and stories gain such little purchase on the social order? The astonishing plurality of Hindu thought—its vast ocean of polydox beliefs—is only matched by its equally staggering orthopraxy, the unchanging rigidity of social patterns and practices. The old Hindus seem to have perfected ‘repressive tolerance’ well before Herbert Marcuse discovered it in California.

Similarly, Doniger sets out but does not fully unravel some of the central dilemmas embodied in texts like the Mahabharata. The Mahabharata poses the problem of the world’s moral irrationality. If the concept of Karma appears to suggest a rational moral economy—that my present action will have a future pay-off—this idea is constantly subverted in the Mahabharata, where one more throw of the dice again and again determines the moral horizon. “The Mahabharata sees a vice behind every virtue, a snake behind every horse, and a doomsday behind every victory,” Doniger writes, and so every moral choice and act is somehow the wrong choice. In fact, the notion of Karma so diffuses the location of merit and de-merit, makes them such mobile and transferable qualities that it is impossible to track causality. Sinners too, can go to heaven, despite their intentions—if they happen simply to be in contact with some salvaging ritualistic practice. What sort of moral universe can be sustained if there is such a weak relation between intention and consequence?

More disappointing in this important book is Doniger’s treatment of recent history. Kipling and Foster are her orienting stars in discussing the colonial period, and she conveys little sense of the intellectual ferment in India at the time—the many experiments with religion, politics, caste, and the different meanings that Hindu ‘reform’ came to hold. This leads directly to the book’s greatest weakness—the absence of any serious explanation of Hindutva. Doniger has a potent—indeed, quite felt—sense of its presence and projectile capacity, and has had occasion to reflect on it. But while she has roustabout fun at the expense of the adepts of Hindutva, she doesn’t stop to ask what it is about the potentialities within Hinduism, and what it is about the Hindus at this point in their history, that have conspired to breathe life into such versions of Hinduism. Her capacity for ‘double vision’, for empathy and criticism, here fails.

Doniger is an unstoppable teller of tales and a brilliant interpreter of them also. Yet, occasionally, one feels that, rather than delve deeper into the contradictions of history, she too, like her subjects stretching back many thousands of years, prefers just to tell one more story.

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G Vishvas Blames Islam for the Sorry State of Affairs in Pakistan

Mubarak Ali says in Dawn (25 Oct 2009) that “as far as Pakistan is concerned, we can say that it has no history of ideas because its society has neither the capacity to face the challenge nor the creativity to invent anything in science and technology to improve its skill to compete with others nations. In art, literature, painting, and architecture, it has produced nothing original and substantial. It has neither original philosophers, scientists, poets, writers, artists, and historians nor politicians and statesmen who could lead the nation in the right direction. Pakistani society depends on the ideas, thoughts, and inventions of others. It is not creating any knowledge but just consuming it. Therefore, it is not contributing to the civilisation of the world. It is one of those nations which are not making history but passively watching those who are making it. That is why its social and cultural life is shallow and stagnant.”

Comment: This sorry perfromance of Pakistan is the result of islam and its indoctrinations.  G.Vishvas (nvhab@yahoo.co.in)

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The Status of Saudi Women is Improving but Slowly

In Riyadh, capital of Saudi Arabia, women normally adhere to a strict dress code in public — a black cloak called an abaya, a headscarf and a veil, the niqab, which covers everything but their eyes.

There are some establishments, however, now in Saudi Arabia where men and women are working side by side. The sight unnerves enough men who come looking for a job in such places. Some men go into a state of shock to see a woman in a position of authority and to have to ask her for a job.

Saudi men may have to start getting used to such situations. Global investor Prince Alwaleed bin Talal bin Abdulaziz al-Saud is taking a lead in this respect.

ClipSaudi women, however, still can’t drive and legally can’t even leave the house to shop, let alone get a job, without a male family member’s permission.

Yet under the guidance of a few members of the Saudi royal family — in particular the current King, Abdullah — the kingdom is slowly changing.

Mixed-gender workplaces are becoming more common, especially in banks and good hospitals, where female doctors are not unusual. “People used to say, ‘Why is she working? Why does she need the money?’ Now they say, ‘It takes a woman to solve a problem,’” says an administrator at King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Center in Riyadh.

The government is expanding educational opportunities for women by building women’s universities (as opposed to segregated campuses at male-dominated universities); last month it even launched the kingdom’s first coeducational university.

The state is trying to encourage women’s entry into the workforce, and is sponsoring initiatives to protect women and children from domestic abuse.

And it is pushing Saudis to discuss the notion of empowerment, formerly such a taboo subject that even the word was off-limits in newspapers. “The message is that women are coming,” says Dr. Maha Almuneef, one of six women named earlier this year to the Shura council, a 156-person advisory body appointed by the King. “It’s a good first step. The King and the political system are saying that the time has come. There are small steps now. There are giant steps coming.

But most Saudis have been taught the traditional ways. You can’t just change the social order all at once.” For the country’s feminist and human-rights activists, and the many others who would like more freedom, the pace of change remains painfully slow.

Why, they wonder, doesn’t the King snap his fingers and remove some of the more obviously absurd obstacles to equality? For all the publicity about the new female members of the Shura Council, for instance, they still don’t have the voting rights of their male colleagues. “This is tokenism, it’s insulting,” says Hatoon Ajwad al-Fassi, a columnist and assistant professor of women’s history at King Saud University. “We are asking for full participation. All the doors that are closed for women should be open.”

Given government restrictions on the right to assemble and discuss political issues even in private homes, al-Fassi says it’s impossible to know just how many Saudi women want change. “It’s an exaggeration to call it a women’s movement. But we are proud to say that something is going on in Saudi Arabia. We are not really free, but it is possible for women to express themselves as never before.”

Change, and Its Limits

Saudi Arabia’s western allies have been pushing it to reform its social and political arrangements since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Fifteen of the 19 hijackers on 9/11 came from Saudi Arabia, where a conservative version of Islam, high unemployment, limited democratic rights and archaic attitudes to women fed a mood of unchecked radicalism among some young men.

In February 2009, Abdullah announced a sweeping reshuffle of posts in government to remove some of the more old-style figures, including a top judge who once ruled it would be legal to kill the owners of a television station that broadcast “immorality.”

Abdullah installed an Education Minister charged with ensuring that schools emphasize Islam’s tradition of tolerance, and a woman, Norah al-Faiz, to be Deputy Minister in charge of girls’ education, the first time a woman has held a Cabinet-level post.

Though al-Faiz is well known and admired, her appointment also reveals the limits to the changes under way in Saudi Arabia. Al-Faiz meets with her male colleagues only by videophone, asks her minister for permission to appear on television, declines to be photographed and vented her frustration to the press when what appeared to be an old passport-style photograph of her (without a niqab) appeared on the Internet.

Al-Faiz says that she brings no special mandate beyond improving education for girls. “I don’t like quick action,” she says. “I’ll have to decide where the needs are and to rank them. I believe in teamwork.” Al-Faiz’s caution is understandable.

She’s being watched by the whole country. “The pressure is huge, not to make a mistake,” says Dr. Hanan al-Ahmady, a friend of al-Faiz, and her successor as head of the women’s department at the Institute of Public Administration, a government school for civil servants. “You have to prove you are not giving away your religious principles. You have to prove that participating in public affairs and taking leadership positions doesn’t jeopardize Islamic values and Saudi identity.”

barage3

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Abstaining From Alcohol Makes You Unhappy

Alcohol has a peculiar relationship to happiness.

We drink to celebrate, but because alcohol works as a depressant, it ends up deadening feelings.

image0502_2Not surprisingly, there’s an observable correlation between alcoholism and depression, and even though it’s not always clear which leads to which, everyone knows you can’t drink like a Sterling Cooper employee for too long before becoming a perpetual sad sack.

But if alcohol can lead to depression, does that mean abstaining from alcohol will make you happier?

In fact, those who never drink are at significantly higher risk for not only depression but also anxiety disorders, compared with those who consume alcohol regularly.

The study, which was published recently in the journal Addiction, looked at more than 38,000 people in Norway. Researchers, led by Jens Christoffer Skogen of the University of Bergen in Norway, asked the participants how much they had drunk in the previous two weeks; the research team also asked them various questions to measure their levels of anxiety and depression.

People in the top fifth percentile of drinkers had the highest odds for anxiety. But it was abstainers who were at the highest risk for depression — higher even than the heaviest of drinkers. Why?

One reason is that the abstainers in the study sample were more likely to have illnesses such as osteoarthritis and fibromyalgia, and people with chronic illnesses are more prone to melancholy.

Also, “some people assume it’s healthier not to drink,” says Skogen — which may be particularly true of those who have chronic illnesses.

Finally, some abstainers were formerly heavy drinkers — alcoholics who had to give up the bottle. It makes sense that they would have more psychological distress than others, but only 14% of the abstainers in the Norway study fit this category.

The most powerful explanation seems to be that abstainers have fewer close friends than drinkers, even though they tend to participate more often in organized social activities. Abstainers seem to have a harder time making strong friendship bonds, perhaps because they don’t have alcohol to lubricate their social interactions. After all, it’s easier to reveal your worst fears and greatest hopes to a potential friend after a Negroni or two.

So does this mean we should all have a cocktail? Maybe, but Skogen says he doesn’t believe his study should encourage abstainers to become drinkers. Rather, he says doctors might want to investigate why abstaining patients don’t drink and explain that in societies where alcohol use is common, not drinking may lead them to feel left out. Sometimes, you should just say yes.

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Muslims Now Number 1.57 Billion and Growing

New Study Estimates Global Muslim Population at 1.57 Billion

Nearly a Quarter of World Population is Muslim

Clip_2A new, comprehensive demographic study of more than 200 countries finds that there are 1.57 billion Muslims of all ages living in the world today, representing 23% of an estimated 2009 world population of 6.8 billion.

Released by the Pew Research Center ’s Forum on Religion & Public Life, Mapping the Global Muslim Population offers the most up-to-date and fully sourced estimates of the size and distribution of the worldwide Muslim population, including sectarian identity.

Key findings include:

• While Muslims are found on all five inhabited continents, more than 60% of the global Muslim population is in Asia and about 20% is in the Middle East and North Africa .

• The Middle East-North Africa region has the highest percentage of Muslim-majority countries. More than half of the 20 countries and territories in that region have populations that are approximately 95% Muslim or greater.

• More than 300 million Muslims, or one-fifth of the world’s Muslim population, live in countries where Islam is not the majority religion. These minority Muslim populations are often quite large. India , for example, has the third-largest population of Muslims worldwide. China has more Muslims than Syria , while Russia is home to more Muslims than Jordan and Libya combined.

• Of the total Muslim population, 10-13% are Shia Muslims and 87-90% are Sunni Muslims. Most Shias (between 68% and 80%) live in just four countries: Iran , Pakistan , India and Iraq . Previously published estimates of the size of the global Muslim population have ranged widely, from 1 billion to 1.8 billion.

The new study is based on the best available data for 232 countries and territories. Pew Forum researchers, in consultation with nearly 50 demographers and social scientists at universities and research centers around the world, analyzed about 1,500 sources, including census reports, demographic studies and general population surveys, to arrive at these figures – the largest project of its kind to date. (http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=450).

The Pew Research Center ’s Forum on Religion & Public Life delivers timely, impartial information on issues at the intersection of religion and public affairs. The Pew Forum is a nonpartisan, nonadvocacy organization and does not take positions on policy debates. Based in Washington , D.C. , the Pew Forum is a project of the Pew Research Center , which is funded by The Pew Charitable Trusts.

If you have general questions, please contact Sahar Chaudhry, Research Analyst, Religion & World Affairs, at schaudhry@pewforum.org

or Loralei Coyle, Communications Manager, at lcoyle@pewforum.org.

 

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Rationalism in the Quran

By SYED GHULAM SARWAR

TO VENTURE upon an interpretation of The Quran is an extremely difficult task. Shortly after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, the complexion of Islam started to change. This was partly because of the emergence of new political and non-political interests, and the disappearance of its original torchbearers. There appeared also a new class of Muslims who were more concerned with isolated sayings of the Prophet than with the spirit of Islam as a movement. A new cultural mix which came in the wake of military conquests and non-Arab nations joining the ranks of Islam further blurred the picture of Islam in its pristine form.

This change of complexion accords with the normal conduct of history. Other radical movements too have undergone similar transformations. Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Christianity, as started by their founders, were revolutionary, spiritual, social, even political movements with dominantly simple, practical programs of action and concepts, but with the passage of time they became metaphysical, formulized and ritualistic. This change in shape makes it difficult to peep into the original form, especially when the change has lasted for centuries.

While other divine books either have disappeared altogether or have been drastically distorted, The Quran remains intact in its original language, Arabic. However, in several cases, its original purpose, spirit, significance and approach to human problems have been lost to the sight of most of its adherents. Miracles have replaced rationally explainable events and a number of metaphorical expressions used in The Quran have been given a literal or mythical sense over the centuries. The present-day writers have repeated the same versions, further thickening the cobwebs of myth woven round the face of Islam. Even the ablest and the most intellectual of modern commentators overlook the political (in particular) and secular aspects of this divine book. ‘Divine’ and ‘secular?’ Contradiction in terms? No. Spiritual in origin and divinely inspired, The Quran presents a secular program of action based on lofty morality rooted in faith in God.

The myths evolved some centuries after the death of the Prophet mainly for two reasons.  One, a literal interpretation without regard to the idiomatic or metaphorical sense of a term or statement or to the idea that The Quran has evolved its own terminology to describe a certain event or situation.  Two, with the emergence of a plethora of ‘ahadith’ (sayings of Muhammad) after the Prophet, which referred to the relevant verses, the trend to emphasize the miraculous grew.  Some of the commentaries have been based on biblical accounts without proper scrutiny, while the Quranic references to them have not been understood in their purported import. 

That trend continues, making the mythical and the miraculous part of the faith of Islam.  One of the expressions that has fallen victim to this trend is the term, ‘tayr,’ (literally, ‘birds’).

The term, ‘tayr,’ has been used in a specific sense in The Quran on four occasions: in connection with the invasion of Makkah referred to in chapter 105, entitled ‘Al-Fiel;’ in connection with Jesus; and in connection with David and his son, Solomon.

Abraha, the Christian ruler of Yemen, led the invasion of Makkah in the year of the birth of the Prophet (A. D. 570).  It was revived in the memory of our people towards the end of the Musharraf era in Pakistan when some of our leaders described the agitating lawyers as ‘ababeel’ (mistaking ‘ababeel’ for a kind of birds, while it literally means groups, swarms, etc.) which destroyed Abraha’s army.  The myth has become so firmly rooted in the minds of our people that some of our top recent commentators persist in emphasizing the miraculous in the event.

To arrive at a feasible explanation, we must look at the essential teachings of The Quran.  Besides the belief in the oneness and uniqueness of God and the day of final reward and punishment for our actions, there is overwhelming emphasis on obedience to the rightly-guided leader, perseverance in following the right course of action (‘sabr’), faith and unrelenting determination (‘eemaan’), high aims and skill, knowledge or wisdom (‘ilm,’ ‘hikmah’).  The Quran does not refer to any miracles, except the miracle of God’s Creation and the plan working in it, the raising of a messenger from among the people themselves, the inclining of people’s hearts towards him and leading him to success and victory despite overwhelming odds.  Otherwise, they are only metaphorical, allegorical or symbolic expressions.  Even if, at all, The Quran seemingly makes an occasional reference to the miraculous, that is not its main purpose, nor is it important in itself.  The main purpose is to convey the true message and guidance, and its significance lies in the drawing of attention to the ultimate success of the righteous mission against all odds and in the warning about disastrous consequences in the event of rejection of the guidance.  The common interpretation of the chapter ‘Al-Fiel,’ conveys the sense of a miracle, minus human effort, that destroyed the invading army.

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Christian Hotel Owners Face Criminal Charges for Offending Muslim Guest

Christian owners of a hotel in Liverpool face criminal charges and could lose their business after “defending their faith” to a Muslim guest.
Ben and Sharon Vogelenzang got into a “heated” argument with an unnamed woman wearing a hijab — a traditional Muslim head covering — during breakfast at the Bounty House Hotel, according to the story by the Daily Mail. She challenged the owners on Christianity, and allegedly, the couple said Mohammad, the founder of Islam, was a warlord and that wearing her hijab was a form of bondage.
The woman complained to police, and the couple is being charged with using “threatening, abusive, or insulting words” that were “religiously aggravated.” As a result of the court case, the Vogelenzang’s have lost 80 percent of their bookings and have had to put their hotel up for sale, the story said.

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Dilemma of Balancing Exercise with Islamic Modesty Codes

The first time I went jogging in Tehran, I nearly hyperventilated after four blocks, despite wearing the gauziest of head scarves and a decidedly immodest Nike capris. The fabric covering my ears and neck stoked my body temperature unbearably, and the pleasurable strain of running gave way to acute discomfort. “How am I going to stay fit here?” I wailed to my Iranian girlfriends, experts in the dilemma of balancing exercise with Islamic modesty codes. They offered me a rich store of advice, from head scarves with ear slits to calibrating outdoor exercise with the seasons to where to find women’s only gyms.

Clip_7For the pious Muslim woman, one of the greatest challenges of modern life is how to get a health-conscious work-out. In Iran, of course, the state mandates Islamic dress, so secular and faithful women alike must contend with religious codes that interfere with exercise. But the problem persists for individual Muslim women throughout the Islamic world and the West. It grabbed headlines recently week when a Paris swimming pool refused entry to a young Muslim woman wearing a “burqini,” a swim garment resembling a diving suit. In France the incident falls into a wider political debate over how to reconcile the country’s Muslim immigrants to French secular values. And while the number of Muslim women in France — indeed throughout the world — who insist on such a severe covering as the burqa is small, the challenge of staying slim and Islamically proper is not.

So what is the faithful but health-conscious Muslim woman to do? There are many schools of thought addressing this practical problem, and often the answer boils down to comfort versus one’s attachment to a particular sport.

I am a runner by nature, keenly attached to the mind-slowing demands of setting pace and the sensation of my feet first thudding and then gliding over pavement. But my discomfort threshold is ridiculously low, and while living in Iran I gave up running in favor of hiking (in mountainous seclusion, no one frets if you tie a bandana over your hair instead of a proper veil). During snowy Tehran winters, I pushed myself to go skiing, since modesty ceases to be an issue when you’re bundled in a ski-suit and hat. I did more yoga than I was accustomed to, since the Iranian middle-class is obsessed with yoga and classes are more ubiquitous than mosques in many neighborhoods.

Many Muslim women are more devoted to their favorite form of exercise. If they are runners they must run, if they are swimmers they must swim. For these women, there are only two answers: a clever outfit that breathes, or sequestration in a same-sex exercise facility. The athletic veil, know as the “hijood,” is made from high-tech fabric that’s meant to wick sweat off the skin, and debuted when the Bahraini sprinter Rogaya Al Ghasara wore it while competing at the 2008 Olympics.

While it takes a certain steely piety to wear the hijood — its slick ninja-esque style might be too assertively Muslim for some — the relative ease of sweating or swimming in something other than heavy cotton is pretty unbeatable.

In certain situations, even the burqini might prove indispensable. A decade ago, when I regularly frequented Wild Wadi, Dubai’s vast waterpark, mothers in sopping wet clothes gamely accompanied their children down spiralling slides and endless rivers. They must have been miserable to no end, but put up with it rather than refuse their kids the thrill of water rides.

For pious moms on beach holidays with families — when women-only beaches or hours at waterparks are useless, since older boy children and dads must be left behind — the burqini is useful, not the joke it seems sometimes in the West.

For some Muslim women, though, gender- segregated exercise is the preferred and discrete option. When you’ve grown up in a culture where men and women relate prudishly, not even a Coolmax barrier of high-tech lycra is going to put you at ease panting alongside men in a co-ed exercise class. Women’s-only gyms, or gyms with women’s-only hours or rooms, dot the whole of the Islamic world. Even in the United States, the idea that women are more relaxed exercising without men’s eyes on them has led to a preponderance of secular, women-only chains like Curves and Linda Evans Fitness. This non-religious attitude toward gender-segregated exercise neatly sets immigration politics aside, and has created a way for Americans from Muslims countries to retain their piety without seeming to embrace separation. I have fond memories of following my mother around her local Linda Evans center in California, watching Pakistani matrons and white soccer moms chat and stride energetically on long rows of treadmills.

For the fitness-minded faithful, the terrain varies dramatically from one country and region to another. But with some determination, it remains entirely possible for Muslim women — from the gently shy to the severely pious — to stay in shape while respecting their faith’s modesty etiquette.

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Misyar Legitimizes Sexual Relations Outside Marriage

Misyar is a form of marriage that allows couples to live separately but come together for sexual relations. For the women who accept it – spinsters, divorcees and widows – it’s a something-is- better-than- nothing option, though they waive almost all the rights that a normal Muslim marriage entitles them to. For men it offers an opportunity for a bit of fun on the side, in secret, and at a huge discount.

Clip_87Reasons for popularity of misyar include the high cost of marriage – the dowry, several dinners, parties, decoration of a flat or a villa and the honeymoon. All this may set back the groom by several hundred thousand riyals. Misyar for cash-strapped men is a boon.

Hamdan, a Saudi colleague  – distraught and depressed after the break-up of his first marriage – entered into a succession of misyar marriages. None lasted for more than six months. He confided that he had hoped to find a compatible partner for a permanent relationship but it didn’t work out. He also said that misyar wives are crafty and inclined to extract money and gifts. In his words: misyar marriages are not cost-effective. The colleague is now married again – in a normal marriage – and hopes to live happily ever after.

Thanks to Bluetooth technology, friendly websites and an abundance of furnished apartments in major cities like Riyadh and Jeddah, there are tales of misyar wives who have clandestinely entered into more than one misyar contract. These enlightened ladies say misyar husbands never tell their full-time wives about their relationships so why can’t misyar wives have similar arrangements? Clerics view this as a dangerous trend.

Website ads for misyar marriages often reveal the immaturity and desperation of those looking for partners:

• Young man, 21, excellent monthly income, seeks marriage as soon as possible to single girls up to 70 kgs, living in Jeddah.
• Saudi clerk, 38, from a well-known family, seeks pretty, white, delicate, businesswoman or clerk for misyar marriage. With Allah’s help, if things work out, the marriage will be official.
• Accountant, 30, seeks misyar marriage with Saudi woman. Age, experience, number of children, widow or single or divorced unimportant. What is important is her ability to satisfy the needs of a man who desires things permitted by religion (halal).

Misyar is popular in the kingdom because in a society where extramarital and premarital sex is a cardinal sin it legitimizes sexual relations outside the framework of conventional marriage. It was legalised through a fatwa (religious edict) issued by late Sheikh Abdulaziz bin Baz, then the chief mufti of Saudi Arabia. ‘Urfi (unofficial marriage) in Egypt and muta’h (temporary marriage) in Iran are variations on the same idea.

The Egyptian Centre for Women’s Rights says misyar is an insult to both men and women and a sanction for the trafficking of women. Clerical opinions vary.

Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Qatar-based Egyptian scholar, says:

Misyar should be viewed as a form of legal relationship between man and woman regardless of any description attached to it … But I do have to make it clear that the aforementioned statement does not make me a protagonist of misyar marriage … There is no doubt that such marriage may be somehow socially unacceptable, but there is a big difference between what is Islamically valid and what is socially acceptable.

Emirates-based scholar Sheikh Ahmad al-Kubaisi says that while misyar marriage is correct Islamically, it also compromises some values. Al-Kubaisi believes that misyar can solve the high rate of spinsterhood in the Arab countries:

The only difference (with a normal marriage) is that the woman abandons voluntarily her right to housing and support money. There is nothing wrong in relinquishing one’s own rights.

In 2006, after years of deliberation and a fair degree of dissent, the Mecca-based Muslim World League’s constituent body, the Islamic Jurisprudence Council ruled that misyar marriage was legal. Samirah, a Saudi media personality (not her real name) described the decision as unfortunate. She thought the jurists had a difficult problem to resolve but this wasn’t the best way out. Rula Dashti, head of the Kuwaiti Economic Society describes misyar as an arrangement that destroys the fundamentals of family. Ghada Jamshir, a Bahraini activist who lobbies for reduction of clerical influence in family affairs, thinks liberals should object to misyar marriages.

To misyar or not to misyar? Saudi society is certainly confused on this issue, as is apparent from the following conversation reported in a Saudi newspaper:

 ’Why buy a cow when milk is free?’ Many talk about loose girls and there not being any need for marriage with them around,” said a university professor. With misyar marriage, haven’t we just legalized the ‘why-buy-the- milk-when- the-cow-is- free’ syndrome? And we are supposed to be civilized?

In Islam all acts – including misyar – are judged and will be judged on the merit of motives and intentions.

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Is Roza Doing Muslims Any Good?

Clip_29During Ramadan in Pakistan, mosque loudspeakers’ volumes are raised an extra notch, a crude but effective way to ensure all in their immediate vicinity bridge the class divide by being equally susceptible to inner ear damage.

And salespeople ringing up midday food purchases do so with such a contemptuous superiority it is a wonder they are able to stay seated and not inadvertently levitate straight to heaven, bottoms up.

And should the topic of inappropriate sanctimonious be brought up in conversation with, say, a person who has broken a red light in their rush to get home for Iftar and nearly totaled your car in the process, do you know what you are likely to get in response? I cannot possibly eat humble pie: I am fasting.

I read about the directive issued by the Ministry of Religious Affairs to all provincial governments directing them to ensure full implementation of the Ehteram-e-Ramadan Ordinance. The ordinance, promulgated in 1981 under Zia-ul-Haq, makes it illegal for anyone – young, old, infirm, pregnant, lapsed – to eat, drink or smoke in public and applies across the board to Muslims and non-Muslims. 

Quite apart from the fact that whether a Muslim fasts is not the business of the state, the ordinance effectively marginalizes Pakistan’s minorities, among which should be included its atheists, its agnostics, its dissolutes, telling them that if they cannot conform, they will be made to conform. So, an affirmation of the lingering suspicion that minority’s rights will remain forever subservient to the majority’s misplaced perceptions of its own? One more nod to the mullah fostered ignorance, arrogance and insularity that has brought us nothing but fragmentation and death?

What a way to mark the passage of the month meant to foster empathy and community for all humanity, not just one subset of it. And what a hypocritical lot some of us are, baying for the blood of one dictator while kowtowing to the pseudo-religious fascism that should have been buried with another. In an unmarked grave. 

Thus, in what is no doubt being peddled as a sign of our new found open mindedness, shows featuring the worst and latest crass commercialization of the performing arts have not in fact been taken off the air but rather repackaged. The subsequent juxtaposition of base imagery and avowed spirituality is, for lack of a better word, bizarre.

For example on one particular radio station the show ‘Lunch with etc.’ has been named ‘Running on empty’ for the duration of the month. In one set I was unfortunate enough to have to listen to, being stuck in a traffic jam with a teenager, the anchor interspersed songs featuring the sort of asinine derogatory lyrics that make feminist poets kill themselves with monologues about how he was really ‘feeling’ his fast that day. Then there were tips sponsored by multinational corporations (a long-established if unacknowledged bastion of Islamic values, apparently) about how eating fruit during sehri helped quench ones thirst during the day.

Quite apart from the fact that the songs apparent hold on the imagination of a populace ceaselessly objecting to drone attacks is fascinating, this superficial toeing of the official line while surreptitiously continuing to do exactly what one wants to do is emblematic of my other big problem with Ramazan as it tends to unfold here.

For most people, it has no meaning beyond publicly abstaining from the publicly-proscribed for a certain duration each day. The inward journey, lessons learnt during the deprivation (a deprivation that is meant to be self imposed, not involuntary, mind you), promises made in isolation…these things are forgotten once that siren sounds to be remembered anew the next morning and discarded again the next night.

Shandana Minhas is a writer. Email: shandanaminhas@yahoo.com

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