Archive for South Asia

Green Bhutan Suffers Due to Others Climatic Violations

By Alistair Scrutton

Punakha Dzong, Bhutan: For centuries this monastic fortress in Bhutan’s Himalayas has sheltered ancient Buddhist relics and scriptures from earthquakes, fires and Tibetan invasions. Now the lamas here may have met their match – global warming.

At least 53 million cubic metres of glacier melt is threatening to break the banks of a lake upstream in the Himalayan peaks and spark a “mountain tsunami” in Punakha valley.

The government is pressing the lamas, so far unsuccessfully, to transport relics to a nearby hilltop for safekeeping. Massive flooding could inundate these valleys, which hold about a tenth of Bhutan’s population, by 2015.

“Pollution has disturbed our deities,” Leki Dorji, a red-robed lama, said in a courtyard as monks chanted mantras. “It’s for that the rains have not come on time, that we have not had snow for five years.”

Bhutan, one of the earth’s greenest and most isolated countries and one of the few states that absorbs more carbon than it emits, faces the impact of a rise in global temperatures despite environmental polices lauded the world over.

It is not just about holy relics, but the livelihood of a nation dependent on Himalayan glacier-fed rivers which are also the life-blood for hundreds of millions of people downstream in the plains of South Asia.

“It has not been easy to conserve our ecological balance,” PM Jigmi Y. Thinley said in an interview. “It has come at a cost. We could have been much richer.” “Now we are as vulnerable and exposed as other countries.”

For the monks it may be angry deities. But science says the threat to Punakha is due to rising global temperatures melting the world’s “third pole” of Himalayan glaciers.

The government has identified 26 glacier lakes in Bhutan at risk of what is called Glacier Lake Outburst Floods, when accumulated melt breaks its moraine banks. Scientists say that glaciers in Bhutan are retreating by around 30 metres a year.

Many lamas in Punakha Dzong – both a monastery and a fortress, and once Bhutan’s capital – believe deities will ultimately protect relics from whatever extreme weather can throw at them. The monastery was damaged by a similar glacier outburst in 1994. Then monks gathered to pray for their treasures’ safety, especially Bhutan’s most precious relic – the Rangjung Kharsapani, the self-created image of the deity of compassion.

At least 20 people in the valley were killed them. The next torrent of water would be three times greater. “We hope to convince the monks to move the relics. If the next lake bursts, you can imagine what it would trigger,” Thinley said. “Our valley, settlements, or farms would be swept away.”

Bhutan, with under 700,000 people in an country roughly the size of Switzerland, has a constitution that guarantees 60 per cent of its land must be forested. Air pollution hardly exists. There are only 33,000 vehicles.

Environmental threats

But there are other cracks in this environmental Shangri-la. The government says global warming will soon not just impact its glaciers, but threaten its efforts to develop hydroelectric power and also damage crops with erratic weather.

After an initial increase, melting will eventually lead to reduced river flows, threatening plans to increase hydroelectric power from 1,500 megawatts to 10,000 megawatts within a decade. “Hydroelectric power is the backbone of our economy,” said director general of the National Environment Commission.

Global warming is already blamed for increasing erratic monsoons and snows, making it hard for crops. Warming has led some farmers to grow oranges in Himalayan valleys.

Pests like rodents are appearing higher up in the Himalayas. Cases of lowland diseases like malaria and dengue are increasing. “For agriculture, erratic weather is the biggest challenge,” said Agricultural Minister. “Rainfall doesn’t come to May, then there is a torrent for three days and causes a lot of damage. Then we have a spell of drought.” Bhutan plans to mitigate these risks.

But that can be expensive for a nation with a $1 billion economy. The country already depends on official aid for nearly half its budget. Just take the Thorthormi glacier threatening the monastery. Some 300 workers hiked with yaks for 10 days to drain the lake.

Two lakes are separated by a thinning 30-metre moraine. If they join, the combined force will spill down the valley. Working at more than 4,000 metres above sea level, workers drained around 0.86 centimetres, half what they aimed. The project cost $7 million, and that is just one glacier among hundreds.

Many Bhutanese feel hard done by. Their government has made more efforts to lead the ways with environment policies, but its very success has often made its own problems ignored. “We hope to get due compensation for increasing forest cover,” said Gyamtsho, referring to the spread in forests from more than 60 per cent to 72 per cent of the country within a decade. Bhutan says it will commit at Copenhagen to being carbon neutral. But unless money is spend on mitigation, the economic sacrifices that Bhutan has made to stay green may be in vain.

“Seven million dollars is quite a lot of money for Bhutan,” said representative of the UNDP, partly funding efforts to drain the lake. “But certain funding windows are not available to Bhutan because it is doing well with emissions and forest cover. In a way, it is a victim of its own success.” In Punakha, the monks still refuse to move their relics, hopeful their faith means they will survive any “tsunami”. “They say the dzong survived because of the relic,” said Thinley. “We’ll see if they will stay put.”—Reuters

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Imperial Forces ve Changed Taliban into Nationalistic Movement

On Newsnight (Aug 20, 2009 ), the US general incharge of the Afghan war, David Petraeus, said that the war was “not a war of choice”. Afghanistan has not been an important planning area for any attacks on western countries and the Taliban have shown no inclination to conduct war against NATO countries outside Afghanistan (so far, but we seem to be doing our best to change their practices). They are freedom-fighters who want us out of their country. Would we be killing them if there were no oil and gas around the Caspian sea?

General Petraeus said that the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001 were planned in Afghanistan. This remark is disingenuous. Osama bin Laden may have been in Afghanistan at the time of the attacks, but had he been in Washington, New York, London, Paris or Hamburg, his whereabouts would have made no difference to the outcome. The perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks resided in Germany, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and were trained (in part) in flying schools set up (some allege, for this very purpose) by the CIA in Florida, US.

Gordon Brown statement that 75 per cent of the terrorist attacks planned against Britain so far have been planned in Afghanistan or Pakistan is a dishonest one.

Mr Brown has no idea what terrorist attacks on Britain have been planned so he cannot know what percentage were planned in Afghanistan or Pakistan. The most he can ever claim to know is what percent of the terrorist attacks planned, and known to our intelligence services, originated from one of those two countries. How many such plans does he know about? Is it 75 per cent of one, two, three, or four plans? We are not told and we don’t ask. 

And what about the convenient disjunction in the claims of our officials — that the terrorist plots were planned in Afghanistan or in Pakistan? Well, which country was it?

For the existence of any such plans to afford us grounds for killing thousands of Afghans in their own country, it would have to be shown (minimally) that such plots could never be hatched elsewhere. Clearly that cannot be shown. So, even if such plans might have exited, or might occur in future, their existence, or possible existence, offer no grounds for our belligerent presence in Afghanistan; any more than their known past occurrence in Britain, France, Germany, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and America would justify the mass killing of the nationals of those countries by anyone’s armed forces.

Would the Taliban be justified in bombing London just because our politicians are aggressive, dishonest, opportunists?

Two British journalists have at last mentioned that during the eight years of our presence in Afghanistan, there has been no improvement whatever in the appalling conditions under which most Afghans live. Perhaps that was news to them, but it is not news to any Afghan, nor to anyone who knows the region well.

Despite the billions of dollars that have poured into Afghanistan since 2001 (which has promptly poured straight out again), no help has been given to the poor there. Actually the condition of the poor has got much worse since 2001, which is why, contrary to yet more dishonest statements by our officials, a great many Afghans support the Taliban. The only reliable experience Afghans have had of most NATO powers is that they break their promises (under Mullah Omar, the Taliban did not break their promises). So why should the NATO powers ever be trusted?

And the plight of poor Afghan women (outside of the privileged families located mainly in Kabul) has also got worse since the Taliban were overthrown (hard as this may be for us liberals to believe). But did we not invade to liberate them?

Had the money spent on the Afghan war been spent on the poor, there would be no war there.

At last we see a glimmer of truth in the self-serving, meticulously disseminated, ‘fog’ of war. The fog exists in Europe and America, not in Afghanistan. The Afghans have a perfectly clear, close-up, view of what we are up to: and what they see is not pretty. They must think foreigners are all fools or liars.

When challenged on the failure of the NATO powers to do anything to help ordinary Afghans, the usual response from officials in the NATO countries is that the Taliban always prevent developmental projects from being implemented. They call it ‘the security situation’. But the claim is another lie.

There are huge areas of Afghanistan suffering the agonies, deformities, diseases and deaths caused by poverty, but those areas are untroubled by the Taliban. Nevertheless, they have not seen a dime since 2001. These areas are free from the troublesome Taliban, so anyone could visit them safely and confirm the truth of what I have just said, and so prove that what British and American officials are saying is false; but few do.

Western officials talk little of the fact that when the Taliban were in power from 1996 to 2001 opium production in Helmand was eliminated completely. Newspapers allege, repeatedly, that the Taliban are financing themselves with sales of heroin. The western media’s favourite estimate of the profit made by the Taliban from heroin sales is $100 million a year.

First question: how do they know?

Second question: which Taliban make this money? The so-called Taliban no longer have a unified command (we saw to that). There are at least fourteen different groups being called ‘Taliban’. Is the dope trade run like a welfare state, with fair shares for all? NATO officials are probably the source of most claims about the drug trade in Afghanistan. Can they be trusted? I don’t think so.

Simultaneously with claims that the drug trade is run by the ‘Taliban’, we are told that it is run by Karzai’s ‘war lords’. But Karzai is America’s man. So could it be that the drug trade is financing America’s men (as it did during the Vietnam war and during the illegal, American-run, Contra war against the elected Sandanista government of Nicaragua)? In any case, can these commentators have it both ways? Is the drug trade financing both sides? Maybe, maybe not.

The writer has degrees from the Royal College of Art, Oxford University, and the Institute of Psychiatry, University of London. He divides his time between the UK and Pakistan. Email: charlesferndale@ yahoo.co.uk

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Durand Line Should be Redrawn on Ethnic Lines

by Tarique Khan Javed

President, Overseas Pakistani Investors Forum

Pakistan at a cross road

Some think that Pakistan will not survive, as it is and will be cut to size which will mean only the plains of Sindh and Punjab will form Pakistan; while rest will break away. There are others like me, who think a historical opportunity for Pakistan to expand west wards has arrived, to become a significant power of the world. 

An opportunity for Pakistan

The departure of Western forces from Afghanistan will compel Pakistan to move westward and take over all Pakhtun belt in Afghanistan comprising Kabul, Jalalabad, Khandahar, Helmond and Farah provinces upto the Turkmenistan border. This will reduce Afghanistan, to the areas now occupied by Northern Alliance forces comprising areas inhibited by Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen etc. It will also cut its land connection with Iran. 

Historically, Iran and India have always divided Afghanistan between them equally. While Kabul, Khandahar, Farah was always with the Mughal or earlier Muslim Rulers, many of them Pakhtuns, rest of Afghanistan was under the influence of Iran. In areas dominated by Iran Persian language and culture held sway while the rest retained its Pashto language and traditions. Most Pakhtun, who are dire hard Sunnis, always treated Iranians as decadent people, following a loose version of Islam. Thus they found co-habitation with them impossible. On the other hand the Sunni Muslim rulers of India were much more acceptable to them as they were co followers of their faith and always gave a lion share of the government to Pakhtuns, even if the top leadership was with Mughal. 

First and last Afghan Kingdom

For the first time in 2000 year recorded history an independent Afghanistan under Durranis arose in 1747 and lasted  till 1957 or 210 years  as Kingship and later as a Republic for  22 years till it was taken over by the Soviets in 1979. The Sikh rule started around 1790 lasted for only 156 years till it was ended by British rule in 1846. 

Since 1988 when the Soviets left, Afghanistan is trying to find a basis of continuing as a nation. The tragic fact is that the nation is overwhelmingly dominated by Pakhtun who not only comprise 50% of the population but are also the only martial race of the nation. They always dominated and ruled without giving any significant share to lesser tribes like Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks, whom they considered inferior not only because they were mostly Shias but also because they considered them less manly and thus not deserving respect. 

Between 1989 and 1995 a civil war of high intensity continued in Afghanistan during with Pakhtun leaders like Hikmatyar tried their best, in the name of Islam, to capture Kabul and rule all over Afghanistan but Tajik leaders like Ahmed Shah Masood and Uzbek leaders like Rashid Dustam resisted fiercely and Kabul was completely destroyed. Hikmatyar was backed by Pakistan yet he failed. Muslim brotherhood was unable to over come the tribal, religious and linguistic differences. 

Rise of Taliban

Fed up of the unending civil war, Pakistan tried to open the route from Chaman to Turkmenistan by taking a large convey through in 1994. When resisted by Orakzai tribe near Herat, local Talibs (Madarsa students) were hired and armed to help open the route rather pay the heavy sum demanded by the tribesmen. With Pak army backing these untrained volunteers succeeded. The success in the operation led to creation of Taliban. Taliban with their firm discipline, simple message of restoration of law and order, implementation of Shariah laws and support of Pakistan Army succeeded in ending the resistance of Northern Alliance. They captured and ruled over the whole of Afghanistan from 1995 till Nov 2001 when USA forced them out of power following 9/11 and established a government mainly headed by Northern Alliance, although, Hamid Karzai was kept as a figure head to appease the Pakhtun population. Pakhtun reject this kind of power sharing and have kept on their resistance in the name of Taliban, to the extent that Western forces are now exhausted and want to leave in three years. 

Division of Afghanistan on ethnic lines

In order to avoid what happened after Soviet withdrawal it is pertinent that Afghanistan be divided between Pakhtun and rest of the tribes. So that Pakhtun take the East and South of the country while rest goes to others. 

If this is not done an unending civil war in post war Afghanistan is inevitable. Now the Northern Alliance is much stronger than they were in 1994 and will resist strongly Pakhtun attempts to once again dominate them. Pakhtun based on history will fight to take control of all of Afghanistan and impose their moral system and power sharing on previous basis. This time around the Northern Alliance will be actively and openly supported by India, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and above all Iran. While Pakhtun may bank on only covert support of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States like UAE. West will probably remain neutral or support both parties equally. Thus this is a recipe for an extended conflict in which none of the parties can hope to win and dominate. 

UN must act to avoid disaster

To avoid these dire consequences it is pertinent that the World should sit together under the UN and decide to extend the current Durand Line west ward to incorporate all Pakhtun area into Pakistan. The line drawn on ethnic line is likely to yield lasting peace. The current line drawn on scientific lines as per the British, take into consideration only physical features and mostly pass over mountain ranges without regard to composition of population on both sides of the line. This has divided the Pakhtun in two and this is the single most important cause of unrest in the region. This historical anomaly needs to be fixed on urgent basis as part of preparation of departure of western forces from the region.

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India Jittery About the Americans Leaving Afghanistan

The road to success for President Obama’s Afghanistan strategy runs through India. That’s because reversing the Taliban’s momentum requires getting rid of the movement’s sanctuary in Pakistan, where the insurgent leadership is known to be based in and around the city of Quetta. 

But while Pakistan is aggressively tackling its domestic Taliban, it has consistently declined to act against Afghan Taliban groups based on its soil — because it sees the Afghan Taliban as a useful counterweight to what it believes is the dominant influence in today’s Afghanistan of Pakistan’s arch-enemy, India. Unless India can be persuaded to take steps to ease tensions with Pakistan, some suggest, Pakistan will not be willing to shut down the Afghan Taliban. 

Indian influence has expanded after the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and toppled the Taliban — it had been a longtime supporter of the Northern Alliance, the anti-Taliban coalition that dominated the Karzai government, and it poured hundreds of millions of dollars of aid into supporting the new regime. 

That’s left many in Pakistan raising the specter of Indian encirclement — a concern noted by U.S. General Stanley McChrystal in September, when he said that “increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions.” 

Some U.S. pundits have even called for India to scale back its operations in order to appease the Pakistanis. 

Indian officials have little time for such reasoning. Events northwest of the Khyber Pass have had a central place in the strategic calculations of generations of rulers in Delhi, dating back to the imperial Mughals and the colonial British. India’s ties with Kabul had lapsed during the bloody civil war that saw the Pakistani-backed Taliban rise to power in 1996, turning Afghanistan into a hotbed of extremism, some of it directed against India. 

In 1999, an Indian passenger airliner was hijacked by Pakistani nationals and flown to Afghanistan — negotiating for the release of the hostages, India was forced to free three Islamist militants, one of whom was later implicated in the killing of American journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan. 

The Taliban also forged links with fundamentalist groups waging war on India in the disputed territory of Kashmir. “The consequences of that vacuum where Pakistan stepped in and meddled were horrendous for India,” says Harsh Pant, professor of defence studies at King’s College London. “It’s a lesson no one in India is in the mood to learn again.” 

That’s why India has pumped over $1.2 billion in development aid to the Karzai government, funding infrastructure projects ranging from highways to hydroelectric dams to a 5,000-ton cold storage facility for fruit merchants in Kandahar. India is building schools and hospitals, as well as flying hundreds of Afghan medical students to train in Indian colleges, because its own experience of the last period of Taliban rule has given it a vested interest in preventing a recurrence. 

The popularity of Bollywood music and Indian soap operas also hints at India’s significant cultural influence in Afghanistan, which is buttressed by lasting bonds with Afghanistan’s political elite. 

Afghan President Karzai went to university in India, while his electoral opponent, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, belongs to the old Indian-backed Northern Alliance. Kabul and New Delhi also share a common distrust of Islamabad, seeing the 1996 Taliban takeover as having been enabled by Pakistan’s military intelligence wing. 

But in the India-Pakistan relationship, each side often thinks itself the victim of the other’s machinations, and Pakistan’s generals view India’s growing influence in Afghanistan as motivated by an intent to destabilize Pakistan. 

Islamabad claims that India’s consulates in the Afghan cities of Kandahar and Jalalabad have been orchestrating terrorist activity in Pakistan, particularly in the vast, restive province of Baluchistan. India vehemently rejects such claims, for which no evidence has been offered in public. During her trip to Pakistan last month, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also dismissed the notion that India was trying to foment trouble in Pakistan. “The Pakistani fears are completely imaginary,” says Bahukutumbi Raman, a former top-ranking Indian intelligence official and prominent strategic analyst. 

The problem for Washington, at least according to Raman and other Indian analysts, is that regardless of their validity, Pakistan’s fears translate into inaction when it comes to tackling the Afghan Taliban on its soil. “The Afghan Taliban are important to the Pakistanis. They give them a strategic depth,” says Raman. The Pakistani military is still struggling to accept a strategic universe in which India is no longer its most dangerous enemy. You get the sense that if India does not loom large as a threat, then the Pakistani military loses much of its raison d’etre as an institution. 

Indian analysts fear tensions could be exacerbated by President Obama’s declaration that the U.S. will begin to draw down 18 months after surging some 30,000 more American troops into Afghanistan. 

The prospect that the U.S. will soon depart Afghanistan makes it even less likely that Pakistan will want to crack down on a group that could still be a strategic asset in an uncertain situation. 

India, for its part, is unlikely to change its own strategy in Afghanistan. It is developing a port at Chabahar in Iran, which could become a key point of entry for Indian goods and materiel into Afghanistan because Pakistan refuses India land transit rights to the Afghan border. 

India also runs an air base at Farkhor in Tajikistan on Afghanistan’s northeastern border — a facility it secured with Russian support. Neither Moscow nor Tehran want to see the Taliban return to power, and a growing consensus between Russia, Iran and India — all traditional backers of the Northern Alliance — could work to prevent that in the months and years to come. 

“India may have to hedge its bets with these regional partners,” says Harsh Pant. “When America leaves Afghanistan, they may be the ones left to deal with the mess.”

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Bangladesh Doing Better Than Pakistan

Through a Pakistani Lens

by Ahmed Bilal Mehboob

Nearly four decades after the secession of East Pakistan – now Bangladesh – most Pakistanis continue to see Bangladesh and its experiments with democracy through a three-faceted prism.

The initial feeling of acrimony over the dismemberment of their nation, or the hope that one day Pakistan and Bangladesh will either re-unite or form a confederation, are today merely part of a faded discourse that no longer enjoys currency in public or official sentiments.

The psyche of both the Pakistani people and the state over the wound caused by the secession of Bangladesh seems to have healed itself far quicker than has ostensibly happened in India over the separation of Pakistan where, apparently, a perspective clouded by resentment still resonates, even if it’s not dominant. In fact, our own obsession with India and an India-centric approach remains the predominant lens through which we look at Bangladesh.

One major approach is based on our understanding of Bangladesh’s relations with India. Clearly the fact that India is the largest exporter to Bangladesh creates substantial unease in Pakistan.

Many Pakistanis continue to characterize political parties in Bangladesh as being either ‘soft’ or ‘tough’ on India. The overwhelming victory of the Awami League and its allies, who won an impressive 263 seats in the 300 member Parliament in December 2008, continues to be a cause of anxiety in Pakistan given the pro-India image of the Awami League. The Awami League trounced its rival Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)-Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) coalition, which managed only 32 seats.

Tensions between Bangladesh and India appear to please many in Pakistan and closer relations between the two countries are viewed with suspicion. Irrational or jingoistic but such is the sad reality which both media and intellectuals reflect in their occasional public, but generally private, discussions. Against this backdrop, the Awami League victory has not been perceived as a source of great satisfaction in Pakistan.

The sentiment among certain segments of the Bangladeshi political elite that the Bangladesh ‘establishment’ sided with the Awami League to present a ‘liberal face’ of Bangladesh to the world is echoed in Pakistan’s discussion rooms.

Unfortunately, after a rather promising start, the current state of relations between Pakistan and India have once again become strained following the terrorist attack in Mumbai. One hopes that as relations between the two countries normalize, this habit of viewing Bangladesh’s politics through an Indian angle will subside. A second prism through which we in Pakistan view Bangladesh revolves around the role of its military in politics. Expectedly, given our own troubled history with military intervention in politics, the role of the Bangladesh military in the country’s politics generates substantial interest in Pakistan. Quite unlike the decade of the 1990s when, despite weaknesses in the political process, it appeared that Pakistan was gradually moving towards a democratic consolidation, the period between 1975 and 1991 in Bangladesh was dominated by its army, a development similar to what has usually happened in Pakistan. Yet, instead of welcoming the change, the democratic transfer of power to a civilian government in Bangladesh in 1991 created some consternation in Pakistan.

The dominant view, shared with leading Bangladeshi scholars, was that since the Bangladesh military was happily engaged in peacekeeping missions overseas, it would not risk the ire of the international community by intervening in the internal politics of the country. This understanding, however, had to be revised as the powerful Bangladesh military intervened in politics once again in 2007. Fortunately, however, it stopped short of turning the intervention into a full-scale coup and instead facilitated the appointment of a dozen businessmen, technocrats and former diplomats to manage the administration. A key reason why the Bangladesh Army preferred to stay behind the scenes was that it did not want to lose out on the opportunity to participate in UN peacekeeping missions, as it accounted for a considerable sum of money coming into Bangladesh, directly benefiting army personnel.

Many in Pakistan wonder whether such a reward system could similarly work in their own case. Yet while many in Pakistan give credit to the inventive model of the military coup in Bangladesh, they are less sanguine about its applicability in their own country, especially when the 18 month itch with a democratically elected government has already kicked in and stories of alleged corruption and incapacity for good governance are rather widespread. Nevertheless, having tried the Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Musharraf models – all hands-on, very intrusive and boasting of ‘unity of command’ – the ‘behind-the-scene’, ‘reform-oriented’ role of the Bangladesh military in 2007-08, backed by the silent or not-so-silent cheers of international diplomats, looks just too tempting to the democracy-fickle millions in Pakistan.

Bangladesh’s impressive electoral reforms, that I discuss ahead, are believed to have been achieved under the military’s watchful eye, an accomplishment that eight years of the Musharraf regime could not boast of in Pakistan. Bangladesh witnessed a peaceful transition of power from a military-backed caretaker government to a democratically elected government in 2008. The successful handling of the ninth parliamentary election in December 2008 by the military, and the wide scale of political and electoral reforms preceding the election, has been viewed with admiration in Pakistan.

When it comes to electoral reforms, many feel that Pakistan’s political leadership has a few lessons to learn from the country’s former eastern wing that chose to go its separate way and became the People’s Republic of Bangladesh in 1971. Although Bangladesh was a late starter on electoral reforms, it has made quick and impressive strides contributing to a smooth election and subsequent quick transfer of power. The Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC) became a truly independent body only during the past couple of years as a result of the intensive electoral reforms undertaken by the caretaker government.

These reforms became possible only after the government appointed a Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) who was not only considered reform-minded and dynamic, but had impeccable administrative experience. The extensive electoral reforms were the result of a comprehensive dialogue between the BEC and the political parties. As many as sixteen political parties were involved in three rounds of dialogue.

In addition, media and civil society were also consulted by the BEC on the reforms before they were introduced in the form of various laws. In contrast, dialogue between the Election Commission and political parties is rare in Pakistan. The last time the Elections Commission of Pakistan consulted political parties ahead of the general elections was in 2008 for merely a couple of hours and that too at the direction of the Supreme Court. Pakistani observers viewed the preparation of an accurate voters list in Bangladesh with considerable envy.

The Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC), with the active participation of the army, was able to prepare a voter list of about 81 million people which is digitised, carries each voter’s photograph, includes close to 95% of all eligible voters and, above all, has won the confidence of all political parties, citizens’ organizations and the international community. The list took just eleven months to prepare. A significant bye-product of the voter list is a National Identification Card for the adult (18 years and above) population of Bangladesh. Photographs of all adults, including women, were mandatory, for both the voter list and identification card. By integrating each voter’s (including those of purdah-observing women) picture into the voters list, the commission has satisfactorily solved the problem of voter identification. Voter identification remains a major challenge, creating perpetual controversy as a potential source of bogus vote casting, especially at women’s polling stations in Pakistan, Bangladesh and, to some extent, India.

Moreover, incorporating the voters’ picture in the electoral rolls has precluded the need of carrying any additional identification document by voters. The Election Commission of Pakistan too had commissioned similar computerised electoral rolls way back in April 2006, and completed the exercise in about 20 months, just a few weeks before the 2008 general election. Unfortunately, the so-called computerised electoral rolls of Pakistan neither contain the individual’s picture, nor are they complete or error free. Despite a door-to-door survey and an expense of over a billion rupees, the resulting voter list does not generate requisite confidence in either the political parties or citizens’ groups. Our list is replete with errors, viz. multiple entries of voters, and thus a major source of dissatisfaction for various candidates in the 2008 election.

Further, despite the fact that Pakistan instituted a system of National Identification Cards as far back as 1974, and adopted computerised identification cards through the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) in 1998, even today nearly a quarter of the adult population (around 25%) remains without identification cards. The Bangladesh government, by contrast has performed the feat of providing identification cards to over 95% of its adult population in less than a year.

The process of voter registration and preparation of a National Identification Card is an integrated process in Bangladesh, eliminating time-consuming duplication of effort by citizens and state institutions. In addition to the success story of the compilation of electoral rolls, the recent elections in Bangladesh set an admirable example of fair and orderly election. As any politician with experience of electoral politics will testify, a major expense of candidates is incurred on mobilising transport for voters on polling day.

In order to minimize the influence of money in elections, the Bangladesh Election Commission prohibited the use of all motorised vehicles on election day, except for inter-city traffic and emergency use. No banners or hoardings were allowed by the BEC either. Candidates were allowed to print only black and white posters of a certain size, and attach them to strings that were hung across the streets.

Posters could not be pasted on any wall or structure. Painting on walls was not permitted. All these instructions were strictly followed and none of the international observers found any violations. The result was clean walls, resulting in huge savings on cleaning and re-painting. Another interesting electoral reform was the 30-page exhaustive disclosure and declaration form that each candidate was required to file along with nomination papers.

The disclosures and declarations were made public by the Bangladesh Election Commission and placed on its website for public scrutiny. Each candidate was required to state his/her educational qualification; details of any pending criminal cases; any outstanding amount payable to any state institution; details of any outstanding or written-off loans payable to any bank or financial institution, and so on.

Whether or not such public disclosures can be made mandatory in Pakistan, it is nevertheless clear that such disclosures help voters decide about the ‘suitability’ of candidates. Another innovative feature of the 2008 parliamentary election in Bangladesh was the inclusion of a ‘no vote’ provision for voters unhappy with all candidates.

In the 2008 election, some 380,000 voters cast a ‘no vote’, accounting for about 0.5% of the total votes cast. The election rules provide that if over 50% of the voters chose to cast a no vote in a particular constituency, it would automatically lead to re-election. Fortunately, no constituency faced this scenario in the 2008 election. News about the living conditions of stranded ‘Bihari Pakistanis’ in Bangladesh is prominently carried in Pakistan.

This time, however, a sizeable number of the Urdu speaking population, who had been living in camps for the last 38 years and consistently refusing to accept Bangladeshi citizenship by claiming to be Pakistanis, opted to register as voters in the 2008 election after becoming Bangladeshi nationals. Although their exact number is not available, it is widely accepted that most of the Urdu-speaking voters did vote in this election. Candidates in constituencies with a sizeable number of Urdu-speaking voters even published election posters in Urdu, a fact highlighted by Bangladeshi media.

Interestingly, as many as 87% of registered Bangladeshi voters turned out to vote in the 2008 election. Pakistan, by contrast, suffers from a chronic and embarrassingly low voter turnout, the lowest average turnout among countries of South Asia, and one of the lowest in the world. (Pakistan ranks 164 among 169 countries studied by International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance – IIDEA – since 1945.) After the seemingly successful intrusion of the military into politics and delivering a rather admirable election to the people of Bangladesh in December 2008, many in Pakistan forecast that the army chief, General Moeen U. Ahmed would assume the presidency of the country. They were proved wrong. The General retired and a political figure was elected as the new President of Bangladesh.

Many Pakistanis also expected that following a smooth and orderly election, politics in Bangladesh would become more stable and less fractious. However, this assumption appears to be somewhat premature. Bangladesh seems to be following in the footsteps of Pakistan’s fast-fading environment of ‘reconciliation’ between Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N and the Zardari led PPP.

Even though Sheikh Hasina has promised to set a new example in politics in line with her promised ‘charter of change’ by seeking opposition support in decision-making and even giving Khaleda Zia, the former prime minister, a position in the government, reconciliation and cooperation between the two parties remains somewhat distant. Nawaz Sharif’s party and the ruling PPP had locked horns throughout the decade of the 1990s, much like the acrimonious relationship that exists between the two leading political parties in Bangladesh.

The signing of a Charter of Democracy in May 2006 between the late Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif did raise hopes that the two parties were willing to learn from the past. Yet, while the charter of democracy does seem to have guided the PPP and PML-N in forming a coalition government after the February 2008 elections in Pakistan, the ‘conciliatory’ atmosphere did not last long. Fortunately though, the PML-N, which occupies the opposition benches in the National Assembly today, has not let its opposition to the government reach acrimonious levels.

The government-opposition relationship in Bangladesh, in contrast, seems to be much more tense. Although the Sheikh Hasina government has yet to make major headway in rooting out corruption or containing militancy, she remains remarkably popular in the country with 78% people very satisfied or satisfied with her job performance.1

In contrast, the popularity rating of President Zardari of Pakistan stands at a low 32%, down from 64% a year ago.2 Another poll released by Gallup International in July 2009 records public confidence in the Bangladesh government at 87% while 88% approve the job performance of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.3 The performance rating of the Bangladesh leader of the opposition, Khaleda Zia, at 41% is quite a contrast from 79% popularity ratings of Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan, head of the leading opposition party, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). Pakistan’s PM Gilani, a stalwart of the PPP, hand-picked by President Zardari, incidentally enjoys 67% approval ratings. Economic progress is another point of reference for viewing Bangladesh from Pakistan. Prior to East Pakistan seceding and becoming Bangladesh, a small but influential section of the Pakistani establishment unjustifiably believed that East Pakistan was a drag on the national economy and that Pakistan would develop much faster after the break-up.

On the other hand, many people in the then eastern wing of the country believed that the western wing was exploiting their resources and that they had been deprived of their rightful share in national development allocations. Nearly four decades later, the people of Pakistan are naturally curious about how the estranged former eastern wing has fared on the economic front. Development professionals and economists in Pakistan are envious of Bangladesh’s success at controlling its high rate of population growth.

At the time of independence, Bangladesh was more populous than its erstwhile western wing. This ‘superiority’ in numbers was not recognised by the western wing for most part of their journey together from 1947 to 1971, as the first Constitution of the country developed the principle of ‘parity’ between the two wings by allocating an equal number of parliamentary seats to both despite the numerical superiority of the eastern wing. The Bangladesh population, at around 140 million in 2006, is growing at an annual rate of about 1.4% compared to around 3% in the period up to 1990.

In contrast, the Pakistan population grew at around 2.6% per annum, a figure that has only now come down to 1.8% per annum. Its population, as of 2006, now stands at 157 million. Despite a higher population, Pakistan exports fewer workers to international markets as compared to Bangladesh. As of 2007, Bangladeshi workers around the world numbered 981,000 compared to around 300,000 Pakistani overseas workers.

As a result Bangladesh was able to earn close to US $8,000 million in remittances through its overseas workers in 2007-08 compared to about US $6,451 million by Pakistani migrant workers. Pakistan is envious of the growing competitiveness of Bangladeshi workers in the international market. Pakistanis also note that Bangladesh’s GDP growth rate during the past decade or so has been impressive, at times higher than that of Pakistan. For example, the GDP growth rate in Bangladesh was 6.21% in 2007-08 compared to Pakistan’s 4.1% in the same period. Although total Pakistani exports are still higher, Bangladeshi exports of cotton garments and finished cotton goods are a source of envy for Pakistan, especially as it is one of the largest growers of cotton whereas Bangladesh virtually has to import all its raw cotton for its finished cotton goods.

Bangladeshi exports of finished cotton goods worth over US $10,000 million compared to Pakistan’s US $7,500 million during the year 2007-08, illustrates the point. Overall then, close to four decades since the coming into being of Bangladesh, Pakistanis continue to view the country’s political and economic developments through the prism of their own mixed track record.

* The author is with PILDAT (www.pildat.org) an independent think tank working to strengthen democracy and democratic institutions. He was in Bangladesh during the December 2008 parliamentary election as a part of the Commonwealth Election Observer Group.

Footnotes:

1. Survey of Bangladesh Public Opinion, 11-19 June 2009; International Republican Institute http://www.iri.org/Polls.asp

2. The Pew Global Attitudes Project: Pakistan Public Opinion http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/265.pdf

3. A Gallup Poll of Bangladesh http://www.gallup.com/poll/121937/religion-secularism-working-tandem-bangladesh.aspx

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Nepalese Girls Trafficked to the Gulf

Barely a year ago, Lalita Rai, 22, travelled to Kuwait escorted by a local job broker, who had promised her a good position at a beauty parlour. Instead she was tricked into working as an unpaid servant for a local household. As soon as she got into a taxi from the airport in Kuwait, the broker took her passport and showed her to the house. He promised to return to fetch her, but she never saw him again. Lalita protested against working as a servant, but she was beaten and locked in the house. “It was a trap. I had trusted this man,” Lalita says now while sitting in her house in Nepalgunj, nearly 500km southwest of the capital. Finally, in October this year, she escaped, although she refused to say how she returned to Nepal.

Jamuna Chaudhary, 18, underwent a similar ordeal. Tricked into working as a domestic servant for a household in Abu Dhabi, where she had gone with the help of a local broker, she was sexually abused by her employer and his friends. “I am lucky to be alive and back home,” said Jamuna, who finally escaped with the help of the Nepal embassy in Abu Dhabi, which arranged and paid her flight home.

Foreign incomes

Foreign employment has become an important source of income in Nepal, with remittances contributing 18 to 22 percent to gross domestic product, according to a 2006-2007 report on trafficking in Nepal by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/india/Nat_Rep2006-07.pdf]

Gulf countries are one of the main trafficking destinations for labour

Nepal usually pay attention to the trafficking of Nepalese girls to India’s brothels but it often forgets that large numbers of women are also trafficked to the Gulf. The trend of trafficking to the Gulf for labour is a growing problem, as it is often a challenge to control this. This is a serious problem that needs to be addressed strongly, or a lot of Nepali women will face enormous risk of being trafficked and victimised.

It is difficult to prevent such movement to the Gulf, since the women travel through neighbouring India, and from there they fly to the Middle East. The traffickers, posing as employment agents, easily take the women through the open 1,690km border between India and Nepal’s south, choosing areas where there are no police checks.

In 2008 alone, nearly 17,000 girls and women were rescued from traffickers as they were crossing the border.

Better enforcement needed

A large percentage of the Nepalese female workers are illiterate and impoverished and they have no choice but to work abroad for the sake of feeding their families, and they do that even at the risk of being killed.

The Nepalese government introduced the Foreign Employment Act in 2007, which helps to protect and guarantee women’s security and rights when seeking jobs abroad. However, implementation of this law – which forbids women from working overseas in informal sectors such as domestic service because of the abuse they are subject to – has not been enforced strictly.

Meanwhile traffickers are difficult to prosecute. Unfortunately, the traffickers go scot-free due to a lack of enough evidence, and it is difficult to prove their crime.

According to the government’s Foreign Employment Department, more than 20,000 Nepalese women work abroad, mostly in the Gulf, and many are at risk. These women cannot even report to the police, either in Nepal or abroad, as they have no legal contract. The only way to protect them is to increase police vigilance and prevent them from being trafficked across the border.

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Strange War: Americans Fund Taliban to Get Clearance for their Convoys

How the U.S. Funds the Taliban

By Aram Roston, The Nation
Posted on November 13, 2009

On October 29, 2001, while the Taliban’s rule over Afghanistan was under assault, the regime’s ambassador in Islamabad gave a chaotic press conference in front of several dozen reporters sitting on the grass. On the Taliban diplomat’s right sat his interpreter, Ahmad Rateb Popal, a man with an imposing presence. Like the ambassador, Popal wore a black turban, and he had a huge bushy beard. He had a black patch over his right eye socket, a prosthetic left arm and a deformed right hand, the result of injuries from an explosives mishap during an old operation against the Soviets in Kabul.

But Popal was more than just a former mujahedeen. In 1988, a year before the Soviets fled Afghanistan, Popal had been charged in the United States with conspiring to import more than a kilo of heroin. Court records show he was released from prison in 1997.

Flash forward to 2009, and Afghanistan is ruled by Popal’s cousin President Karzai. Popal has cut his huge beard down to a neatly trimmed one and has become an immensely wealthy businessman, along with his brother Rashid Popal, who in a separate case pleaded guilty to a heroin charge in 1996 in Brooklyn. 

The Popal brothers control the huge Watan Group in Afghanistan, a consortium engaged in telecommunications, logistics and, most important, security. 

Watan Risk Management, the Popals’ private military arm, is one of the few dozen private security companies in Afghanistan. One of Watan’s enterprises, key to the war effort, is protecting convoys of Afghan trucks heading from Kabul to Kandahar, carrying American supplies.

Welcome to the wartime contracting bazaar in Afghanistan. It is a virtual carnival of improbable characters and shady connections, with former CIA officials and ex-military officers joining hands with former Taliban and mujahedeen to collect US government funds in the name of the war effort.

In this grotesque carnival, the US military’s contractors are forced to pay suspected insurgents to protect American supply routes. It is an accepted fact of the military logistics operation in Afghanistan that the US government funds the very forces American troops are fighting. And it is a deadly irony, because these funds add up to a huge amount of money for the Taliban. It’s a big part of their income. 

In fact, US military officials in Kabul estimate that a minimum of 10 percent of the Pentagon’s logistics contracts–hundreds of millions of dollars–consists of payments to insurgents.

Understanding how this situation came to pass requires untangling two threads. 

The first is the insider dealing that determines who wins and who loses in Afghan business, and the second is the troubling mechanism by which “private security” ensures that the US supply convoys traveling these ancient trade routes aren’t ambushed by insurgents.

A good place to pick up the first thread is with a small firm awarded a US military logistics contract worth hundreds of millions of dollars: NCL Holdings. Like the Popals’ Watan Risk, NCL is a licensed security company in Afghanistan.

What NCL Holdings is most notorious for in Kabul contracting circles, though, is the identity of its chief principal, Hamed Wardak. He is the young American son of Afghanistan’s current defense minister, Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak, who was a leader of the mujahedeen against the Soviets. Hamed Wardak has plunged into business as well as policy. He was raised and schooled in the United States, graduating as valedictorian from Georgetown University in 1997. He earned a Rhodes scholarship and interned at the neoconservative think tank the American Enterprise Institute. That internship was to play an important role in his life, for it was at AEI that he forged alliances with some of the premier figures in American conservative foreign policy circles, such as the late Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick.

Wardak incorporated NCL in the United States early in 2007, although the firm may have operated in Afghanistan before then. It made sense to set up shop in Washington, because of Wardak’s connections there. On NCL’s advisory board, for example, is Milton Bearden, a well-known former CIA officer. Bearden is an important voice on Afghanistan issues; in October he was a witness before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where Senator John Kerry, the chair, introduced him as “a legendary former CIA case officer and a clearheaded thinker and writer.” It is not every defense contracting company that has such an influential adviser.

But the biggest deal that NCL got–the contract that brought it into Afghanistan’s major leagues–was Host Nation Trucking. Earlier this year the firm, with no apparent trucking experience, was named one of the six companies that would handle the bulk of US trucking in Afghanistan, bringing supplies to the web of bases and remote outposts scattered across the country.

At first the contract was large but not gargantuan. And then that suddenly changed, like an immense garden coming into bloom. Over the summer, citing the coming “surge” and a new doctrine, “Money as a Weapons System,” the US military expanded the contract 600 percent for NCL and the five other companies. The contract documentation warns of dire consequences if more is not spent: “service members will not get food, water, equipment, and ammunition they require.” 

Each of the military’s six trucking contracts was bumped up to $360 million, or a total of nearly $2.2 billion. Put it in this perspective: this single two-year effort to hire Afghan trucks and truckers was worth 10 percent of the annual Afghan gross domestic product. NCL, the firm run by the defense minister’s well-connected son, had struck pure contracting gold.

Host Nation Trucking does indeed keep the US military efforts alive in Afghanistan. “We supply everything the army needs to survive here,” one American trucking executive told me. “We bring them their toilet paper, their water, their fuel, their guns, their vehicles.” 

The epicenter is Bagram Air Base, just an hour north of Kabul, from which virtually everything in Afghanistan is trucked to the outer reaches of what the Army calls “the Battlespace”–that is, the entire country. 

Parked near Entry Control Point 3, the trucks line up, shifting gears and sending up clouds of dust as they prepare for their various missions across the country.

The real secret to trucking in Afghanistan is ensuring security on the perilous roads, controlled by warlords, tribal militias, insurgents and Taliban commanders. 

The American executive I talked to was fairly specific about it: “The Army is basically paying the Taliban not to shoot at them. It is Department of Defense money.” That is something everyone seems to agree on.

Mike Hanna is the project manager for a trucking company called Afghan American Army Services. The company, which still operates in Afghanistan, had been trucking for the United States for years but lost out in the Host Nation Trucking contract that NCL won. 

Hanna explained the security realities quite simply: “You are paying the people in the local areas–some are warlords, some are politicians in the police force–to move your trucks through.”

Hanna explained that the prices charged are different, depending on the route: “We’re basically being extorted. Where you don’t pay, you’re going to get attacked. We just have our field guys go down there, and they pay off who they need to.” Sometimes, he says, the extortion fee is high, and sometimes it is low. 

“Moving ten trucks, it is probably $800 per truck to move through an area. It’s based on the number of trucks and what you’re carrying. If you have fuel trucks, they are going to charge you more. If you have dry trucks, they’re not going to charge you as much. If you are carrying MRAPs or Humvees, they are going to charge you more.”

Hanna says it is just a necessary evil. “If you tell me not to pay these insurgents in this area, the chances of my trucks getting attacked increase exponentially.”

Whereas in Iraq the private security industry has been dominated by US and global firms like Blackwater, operating as de facto arms of the US government, in Afghanistan there are lots of local players as well. As a result, the industry in Kabul is far more dog-eat-dog. “Every warlord has his security company,” is the way one executive explained it to me.

In theory, private security companies in Kabul are heavily regulated, although the reality is different. Thirty-nine companies had licenses until September, when another dozen were granted licenses. 

Many licensed companies are politically connected: just as NCL is owned by the son of the defense minister and Watan Risk Management is run by President Karzai’s cousins, the Asia Security Group is controlled by Hashmat Karzai, another relative of the president. The company has blocked off an entire street in the expensive Sherpur District. Another security firm is controlled by the parliamentary speaker’s son, sources say. And so on.

In the same way, the Afghan trucking industry, key to logistics operations, is often tied to important figures and tribal leaders. 

One major hauler in Afghanistan, Afghan International Trucking (AIT), paid $20,000 a month in kickbacks to a US Army contracting official, according to the official’s plea agreement in US court in August. 

AIT is a well-connected firm: it is run by the 25-year-old nephew of Gen. Baba Jan, a former Northern Alliance commander and later a Kabul police chief.

But the heart of the matter is that insurgents are getting paid for safe passage because there are few other ways to bring goods to the combat outposts and forward operating bases where soldiers need them. By definition, many outposts are situated in hostile terrain, in the southern parts of Afghanistan. The security firms don’t really protect convoys of American military goods here, because they simply can’t; they need the Taliban’s cooperation.

One of the big problems for the companies that ship American military supplies across the country is that they are banned from arming themselves with any weapon heavier than a rifle. That makes them ineffective for battling Taliban attacks on a convoy. “They are shooting the drivers from 3,000 feet away with PKMs,” a trucking company executive in Kabul told me. “They are using RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades] that will blow up an up-armed vehicle. So the security companies are tied up. Because of the rules, security companies can only carry AK-47s, and that’s just a joke. I carry an AK–and that’s just to shoot myself if I have to!”

The rules are there for a good reason: to guard against devastating collateral damage by private security forces. Still, as Hanna of Afghan American Army Services points out, “An AK-47 versus a rocket-propelled grenade–you are going to lose!” That said, at least one of the Host Nation Trucking companies has tried to do battle instead of paying off insurgents and warlords. 

It is a US-owned firm called Four Horsemen International. Instead of providing payments, it has tried to fight off attackers. And it has paid the price in lives, with horrendous casualties. 

FHI, like many other firms, refused to talk publicly; but I’ve been told by insiders in the security industry that FHI’s convoys are attacked on virtually every mission.

For the most part, the security firms do as they must to survive. A veteran American manager in Afghanistan who has worked there as both a soldier and a private security contractor in the field told me, “What we are doing is paying warlords associated with the Taliban, because none of our security elements is able to deal with the threat.” He’s an Army veteran with years of Special Forces experience, and he’s not happy about what’s being done. He says that at a minimum American military forces should try to learn more about who is getting paid off.

“Most escorting is done by the Taliban,” an Afghan private security official told me. He’s a Pashto and former mujahedeen commander who has his finger on the pulse of the military situation and the security industry. And he works with one of the trucking companies carrying US supplies. “Now the government is so weak,” he added, “everyone is paying the Taliban.”

To Afghan trucking officials, this is barely even something to worry about. One woman I met was an extraordinary entrepreneur who had built up a trucking business in this male-dominated field. She told me the security company she had hired dealt directly with Taliban leaders in the south. Paying the Taliban leaders meant they would send along an escort to ensure that no other insurgents would attack. In fact, she said, they just needed two armed Taliban vehicles. “Two Taliban is enough,” she told me. “One in the front and one in the back.” She shrugged. “You cannot work otherwise.”

Which leads us back to the case of Watan Risk, the firm run by Ahmad Rateb Popal and Rashid Popal, the Karzai family relatives and former drug dealers. Watan is known to control one key stretch of road that all the truckers use: the strategic route to Kandahar called Highway 1. Think of it as the road to the war–to the south and to the west. If the Army wants to get supplies down to Helmand, for example, the trucks must make their way through Kandahar.

Watan Risk, according to seven different security and trucking company officials, is the sole provider of security along this route. The reason is simple: Watan is allied with the local warlord who controls the road. Watan’s company website is quite impressive, and claims its personnel “are diligently screened to weed out all ex-militia members, supporters of the Taliban, or individuals with loyalty to warlords, drug barons, or any other group opposed to international support of the democratic process.” Whatever screening methods it uses, Watan’s secret weapon to protect American supplies heading through Kandahar is a man named Commander Ruhullah. Said to be a handsome man in his 40s, Ruhullah has an oddly high-pitched voice. He wears traditional salwar kameez and a Rolex watch. He rarely, if ever, associates with Westerners. He commands a large group of irregular fighters with no known government affiliation, and his name, security officials tell me, inspires obedience or fear in villages along the road.

It is a dangerous business, of course: until last spring Ruhullah had competition–a one-legged warlord named Commander Abdul Khaliq. He was killed in an ambush.

So Ruhullah is the surviving road warrior for that stretch of highway. According to witnesses, he works like this: he waits until there are hundreds of trucks ready to convoy south down the highway. Then he gets his men together, setting them up in 4×4s and pickups. Witnesses say he does not limit his arsenal to AK-47s but uses any weapons he can get. His chief weapon is his reputation. And for that, Watan is paid royally, collecting a fee for each truck that passes through his corridor. The American trucking official told me that Ruhullah “charges $1,500 per truck to go to Kandahar. Just 300 kilometers.”

It’s hard to pinpoint what this is, exactly–security, extortion or a form of “insurance.” Then there is the question, Does Ruhullah have ties to the Taliban? That’s impossible to know. As an American private security veteran familiar with the route said, “He works both sides… whatever is most profitable. He’s the main commander. He’s got to be involved with the Taliban. How much, no one knows.”

Even NCL, the company owned by Hamed Wardak, pays. Two sources with direct knowledge tell me that NCL sends its portion of US logistics goods in Watan’s and Ruhullah’s convoys. Sources say NCL is billed $500,000 per month for Watan’s services. To underline the point: NCL, operating on a $360 million contract from the US military, and owned by the Afghan defense minister’s son, is paying millions per year from those funds to a company owned by President Karzai’s cousins, for protection.

Hamed Wardak wouldn’t return my phone calls. Milt Bearden, the former CIA officer affiliated with the company, wouldn’t speak with me either. There’s nothing wrong with Bearden engaging in business in Afghanistan, but disclosure of his business interests might have been expected when testifying on US policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. After all, NCL stands to make or lose hundreds of millions based on the whims of US policy-makers.

It is certainly worth asking why NCL, a company with no known trucking experience, and little security experience to speak of, would win a contract worth $360 million. Plenty of Afghan insiders are asking questions. “Why would the US government give him a contract if he is the son of the minister of defense?” That’s what Mahmoud Karzai asked me. He is the brother of President Karzai, and he himself has been treated in the press as a poster boy for access to government officials. The New York Times even profiled him in a highly critical piece. In his defense, Karzai emphasized that he, at least, has refrained from US government or Afghan government contracting. He pointed out, as others have, that Hamed Wardak had little security or trucking background before his company received security and trucking contracts from the Defense Department. “That’s a questionable business practice,” he said. “They shouldn’t give it to him. How come that’s not questioned?”

I did get the opportunity to ask General Wardak, Hamed’s father, about it. He is quite dapper, although he is no longer the debonair “Gucci commander” Bearden once described. I asked Wardak about his son and NCL. “I’ve tried to be straightforward and correct and fight corruption all my life,” the defense minister said. “This has been something people have tried to use against me, so it has been painful.”

Wardak would speak only briefly about NCL. The issue seems to have produced a rift with his son. “I was against it from the beginning, and that’s why we have not talked for a long time. I have never tried to support him or to use my power or influence that he should benefit.”

When I told Wardak that his son’s company had a US contract worth as much as $360 million, he did a double take. “This is impossible,” he said. “I do not believe this.”

I believed the general when he said he really didn’t know what his son was up to. But cleaning up what look like insider deals may be easier than the next step: shutting down the money pipeline going from DoD contracts to potential insurgents.

Two years ago, a top Afghan security official told me, Afghanistan’s intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security, had alerted the American military to the problem. The NDS delivered what I’m told are “very detailed” reports to the Americans explaining how the Taliban are profiting from protecting convoys of US supplies.

The Afghan intelligence service even offered a solution: what if the United States were to take the tens of millions paid to security contractors and instead set up a dedicated and professional convoy support unit to guard its logistics lines? The suggestion went nowhere.

The bizarre fact is that the practice of buying the Taliban’s protection is not a secret. I asked Col. David Haight, who commands the Third Brigade of the Tenth Mountain Division, about it. After all, part of Highway 1 runs through his area of operations. What did he think about security companies paying off insurgents? “The American soldier in me is repulsed by it,” he said in an interview in his office at FOB Shank in Logar Province. “But I know that it is what it is: essentially paying the enemy, saying, ‘Hey, don’t hassle me.’ I don’t like it, but it is what it is.”

As a military official in Kabul explained contracting in Afghanistan overall, “We understand that across the board 10 percent to 20 percent goes to the insurgents. My intelligence guy would say it is closer to 10 percent. Generally it is happening in logistics.”

In a statement about Host Nation Trucking, Col. Wayne Shanks, the chief public affairs officer for the international forces in Afghanistan, said that military officials are “aware of allegations that procurement funds may find their way into the hands of insurgent groups, but we do not directly support or condone this activity, if it is occurring.” He added that, despite oversight, “the relationships between contractors and their subcontractors, as well as between subcontractors and others in their operational communities, are not entirely transparent.”

In any case, the main issue is not that the US military is turning a blind eye to the problem. Many officials acknowledge what is going on while also expressing a deep disquiet about the situation. The trouble is that–as with so much in Afghanistan–the United States doesn’t seem to know how to fix it.

Aram Roston is an Emmy Award-winning investigative producer at NBC News and the author of The Man Who Pushed America to War: The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi (Nation Books), from which this article is adapted.

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$30Million Bribe for Awarding Contract to a Chinese Company

Afghanistan’s chief prosecutor has thrown down a gauntlet to Hamid Karzai by announcing an unprecedented attempt to prosecute for corruption two sitting cabinet members who cannot be touched until the president strips them of their ministerial immunity.

Mohammad Ishaq Aloko, the attorney general, said he was preparing a case for the prosecution of two members of Karzai’s current cabinet as well as three former ministers, in what could become a key test of the Afghan president’s willingness to tackle corruption.

The two ministers have not been named, but speculation has focused on the minister of mines and the minister of religious affairs.

The deputy attorney general, said they had collected sufficient evidence to prosecute officials at the ministry but not the minister, Sadiq Chakar, although the investigation was continuing.

The officials allegedly overcharged for rented accommodation in Makkah to house Afghans during the annual hajj pilgrimage and pocketed the difference. They were discovered on their return from Saudi Arabia with $360,000 on them.

Afghanistan has vast, untapped mineral wealth and the ministry of mines is responsible for issuing large numbers of short-term excavation rights. Irregularities have been alleged in the issuing of a $2.9bn contract to a Chinese conglomerate to exploit the Aynak copper reserve south of Kabul – one of the world’s biggest copper stores.

The Washington Post recently reported allegations by US officials that Adel had taken a $30m bribe from the Metallurgical Corporation of China to secure the deal.

The attorney general is looking at around 40 cases, with senior officials in the high single figures.

Under Afghan law, ministers and governors cannot be investigated and must be suspended from their duties. It’s a great thing that the Afghans are finally publicising cases like this, but at the moment they have no power to bring these people in.

Adding to the frustration of international anti-corruption officials, the country’s 2005 constitution calls for special courts to be set up to hear cases against various types of officials. It is hoped that the supreme court will back the establishment of a specialised anti-corruption tribunal with secure facilities to protect the judges to hear all such cases. But no site has yet been identified.

Much international effort has gone into improving Afghanistan’s law enforcement agencies, with British lawyers helping to mentor prosecutors in a special unit of the attorney general’s office focused on high- level corruption.

Also recently set up is the Serious Crimes Task Force (SCTF), known as the “Afghan FBI” because the elite police operatives are trained by the FBI and the UK’s Serious Organised Crime Agency (Soca) to use wiretaps and other sophisticated methods to collect evidence.

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An Exit Strategy for US from Afghanistan

By Dr. Ved Pratap Vaidik

 Can America get out of the quagmire of Afghanistan? (Or to use a reference from Mahabharat, the famous Indian Epic, how can the American Abhimanyu can get out of the Afghanistan Chakravyuh (maze) that he is trapped in?)

In reply to this cardinal question I have devised a five-point strategy.

Point One: President Obama should not send a single new American soldier to Afghanistan and he must announce a definite date for the withdrawal of the American army from Afghanistan. Not a single American soldier should continue to stay in Afghanistan after that date.

In my opinion this deadline should be December 31, 2010.Of course, this withdrawal would include all foreign soldiers belonging to ISAF.

This announcement will make a magic impact on the public opinion of the US.

It will, then, be Obama’s second victory in one year. All the Democrats and even Republicans will rally around him. In far away Afghanistan there will rise a high tide of joy and relief because the people of Afghanistan have an age-long hatred for the presence of the foreign soldiers on their motherland. During the last 150 years they have taught a bitter lesson to the British Army thrice and to the Soviet Army in the recent past. Initially, the people of Afghanistan had welcomed the Western Armies but now they feel that the resurgence of Taliban has taken place basically due to the presence of foreign armies (ISAF).

Point Two: If all the foreign armies leave Afghanistan within a year the question comes up that, ‘would the Hamid Karzai Government survive’? Will anarchy not spread in Afghanistan? There is no doubt about it. So what are the options? 

At least a National Army of half a million Afghan soldiers and a Police Force should be raised immediately.

When Zahir Shah was over thrown 36 years ago, the Army and Police consisted of about  200,000 soldiers. Now the population has grown two-fold and since the last 30 years Afghanistan is passing through a war-like situation. If an Army of half a million soldiers becomes a reality then you won’t find any unemployed youth on the streets of Kandahar or Kabul. It is mostly the unemployed youth that is being trapped by the Taliban, smugglers and the mafia. If they find a place in the Army, the human source of the Taliban and smugglers will totally dry up. No youth will be left to be drafted by the Al-Qaeda and Taliban.

The expenses incurred on inducting five million youth to the Army will be less than the expenses of maintaining just five thousand soldiers of any Western Army in Afghanistan. If the US and other NATO countries take up the maintenance of the Afghan National Army for the next five years, they will still save billions of dollars and hundreds of precious lives. If the ISAF armies leave Afghanistan, the Taliban will automatically lose their rationale to operate.

India can take up the responsibility of training the soldiers and officers in Afghanistan. If we need to immediately step up the fighting strength of the present army set up, instead of sending new soldiers from the western countries, the friendly Asian and African countries can be approached to do the needful.

Point Three: What makes the Taliban and Al-Qaeda thrive is the ill-gotten wealth of opium. Afghanistan is the world’s largest producer of opium. You will be shocked to know if I recount the name of the people who are involved in the growing and smuggling of opium. The funds generated from opium far exceed the national budget. The opium money is the mother of corruption in Afghanistan. A total ban may be imposed on the cultivation of opium or it can be put under stringent laws as it is in India. If they clamp down on illegal wealth obtained through opium, the Karzai Government can not only break the back of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda but can also get rid of many rogue politicians.

Point Four:  There is no central control or accountability of the billions of dollars that pour into Afghanistan. President Karzai himself had shared with me this fact a few months ago that in Kabul his government has control on only four percent of the total foreign aid that comes into his country. The balance, 96% is allotted to provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). There teams operate on their own. They have very little say of the Central Afghans Government in their functioning. This gives rise not only to corruption and malpractices but also deals a blow to the image of the Central Government. The people of Afghanistan respect the government which is strong and assertive. Not only the foreign aid but also the overall control over foreign troops and their operations should be in the hands of the Central Government of Afghanistan.

Point Five: The Karzai Government has to put up a determined fight against the violent terrorists but at the same time it should not hesitate to enter into a dialogue with the Taliban.

After all they are also the sons of Mother Afghanistan ( Maadare-Watan). If their ideas are totally absurd why so many young men are out to sacrifice their lives ? I had been talking to Taliban and Al-Queda leaders.

About ten to twelve years ago in Kabul, Kandahar, Peshawar, Islamabad, London, Washington, DC and New York. They are abusive and acrimonious at times but they do also believe in the value of argumentation. They are open to the contrary view. I found them flexible, and helpful too. If it is not so, how the high jacked Indian airplane was released from Kandahar in 1999. The dialogue with the Taliban should be conducted by the Afghans and not the Americans. Assistance of some other knowledgeable persons may be sought.

If this Five-Point strategy is put together and implemented, the US can rescue itself from the quagmire of Afghanistan.

While putting this strategy into action, the policy makers may face several new questions.

While implementing this exit strategy, if the image of the Afghan Government is not built as all-powerful and sovereign body, chances of success would appear to be bleak. To bolster the image of Karzai Government it is absolutely imperative that President Karzai take a drastic and exemplary action against corruption. If need be, he might have to sideline some of his close friends and relatives even if it is meant to placate the public opinion.

                                                         Similarly, the deadlock between the President and the Parliament must be broken at its earliest. The Constitution of Afghanistan cannot be replaced now at this juncture, there is a plausible remedy in my view. Why can’t the political leaders be encouraged to set up viable political parties, which can become a bridge between the President and Parliament and also the Government and the ordinary people. How can you imagine a healthy democracy without the political parties?

Dr. V.P. Vaidik, A-19 Press Enclave New Delhi 110 017, (Phone) (0091-11) 2686 7700, 2651 7295 Mob. : (0091)98-9171-1947, e-mail : dr.vaidik@gmail.com

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Why Pak Army is Not Fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan?

The success of Obama’s strategy in Afghanistan will depend heavily on Pakistan acting to stop its territory being used to attack Western forces next door.

And that’s bad news, because the demands of its own domestic counterinsurgency campaign, doubts about the duration of U.S. commitment in Afghanistan and looming political instability in Islamabad have left Pakistan in no hurry to help out.

Obama’s National Security Adviser General James Jones in November 2009 visited Islamabad carrying a message from his boss to Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari. 

Obama in the letter urged Zardari to rally his nation behind a joint campaign against militants who fight the Pakistani government and those who fight U.S. and allied troops in Afghanistan. Obama was also reported to have demanded more decisive action against al-Qaeda leaders hiding in Pakistan’s tribal areas. In return, he reportedly offered a range of fresh incentives, “including enhanced intelligence sharing and military cooperation.”

The problem, of course, is that Obama’s letter may have gone to the wrong address. As a weak and unpopular President scarcely seen in public and now the object of growing vilification at home, Zardari is in no position to lead a popular movement against militancy, much less to redirect his army’s focus.

As ever, it is the all-powerful military establishment that will make the key decisions in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s military has certainly moved decisively against those militants that pose a direct challenge to its authority on home soil.

Buoyed by its successes in last May’s campaign to drive the Taliban out of the Swat Valley, it has for the past month deployed some 30,000 troops to confront the militants in their main stronghold of South Waziristan, along the Afghan border. The army has steadily cleared territory eastward, seizing some of the Pakistani Taliban’s most prized bases, but also sparking a vicious wave of terrorist attacks that continues to claim innocent lives on a near daily basis.

The South Waziristan offensive, however, may be the limit of what the Pakistani military is willing to take on right now. It’s priority after clearing the area of Taliban elements will be to hold it — and there are signs that the militants have merely scattered to areas beyond the scope of the current offensive, waiting to stage a return. “We have not been defeated,” Taliban spokesman Azam Tariq told reporters at a secret location on Nov 18, dismissing the army’s claims. “We have voluntarily withdrawn into the mountains under a strategy that will trap the Pakistan army in the area.”

With a long fight ahead of it, the Pakistan army won’t welcome demands that it expand its range of operations. They will view this letter with some displeasure. Pakistan army is not going to go to North Waziristan before it completes its operation in South Waziristan.

Two of the militant groups that Washington would like to see Islamabad target are based in North Waziristan: the Haqqani network and the one led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur, both of whom mount cross-border attacks on NATO forces in Afghanistan.

I don’t think that the Pakistan army will target Haqqani. The reason being that they don’t want to open a front with every militant group. The army has long insisted that it does not have the resources to counter the full range of militants based in the tribal areas. Already, military officials argue, heavy numbers are committed all along the tribal areas and in the Swat Valley. It is also forced to commit forces to guard against upsurges of militancy in other parts of Pakistan.

And, of course, the army’s priority remains guarding the eastern border with India. Indeed, the fact that India continues to be viewed as the principal security challenge by the Pakistani military establishment also dictates a policy toward Afghanistan that does little to help the U.S. there.

Pakistan’s generals are concerned by what they perceive as growing Indian influence in Afghanistan, through the Karzai government and massive development projects. They also accuse India of using Afghanistan as a base from which to wage a proxy war on Pakistan. Its priorities make the Pakistan army unlikely to turn its fire on the Haqqani and Hafiz Gul Bahadur networks, as Obama is demanding.

Instead, the army has revived a nonaggression pact with Bahadur and with Maulvi Nazir — both of which use Pakistani soil as a base from which to wage war on NATO forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s priority is simply to get them to agree to stay neutral or join in the fight between the army and the Pakistan Taliban. Nazir, who was freed from Pakistani custody to fight al-Qaeda-linked Uzbek militants, controls the areas of South Waziristan where the Pakistan army has positioned troops to seal off a line of retreat for the Pakistan Taliban. The danger for the U.S. is that such deals involve a nod and a wink for continued cross-border attacks, making the militants an even more potent threat.

The Haqqani network is believed to have long-standing links with the ISI, while senior Western diplomats allege that Mullah Omar and the leadership of the Afghan Taliban continues to operate out of Quetta.

Many suspect that the reason that the Afghan Taliban manages to operate unmolested on Pakistani soil is Pakistan’s need to maintain leverage in Afghanistan, where the U.S. presence is viewed as temporary. Indeed, some Pakistani observers suggest that even if a U.S. surge is successful, it will at best lead to a negotiated settlement with the Taliban, in which Pakistan would play broker.

You need an increased U.S. troop strength to countervail the Taliban in the south and the east, so that you can bring them to the negotiating table. The Pakistani military also thinks that if they succeed in Afghanistan, the Taliban will be less powerful in Pakistan. The Americans should see Pakistan as an interlocutor for trying to handle these groups politically.

The U.S. troop surge in Afghanistan is unlikely to work unless the Taliban and their allies are denied the sanctuary they enjoy across the border in Pakistan. That’s why two top U.S. military commanders, General David Petraeus, head of U.S. Central Command, and Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Islamabad in Dec 2009 to press their Pakistani counterparts for action on Afghan Taliban networks based in Pakistani North Waziristan and around the city of Quetta. But even as the Pakistani military fights a full-scale counterinsurgency war against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, also known as the Pakistani Taliban), it remains reluctant to extend its targets to include the groups that most concern the U.S.

The argument most often used by Pakistani officials to rebuff Washington’s demands for action against the Afghan Taliban–allied Haqqani network and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami, as well as the Afghan Taliban leadership core in Quetta, is about resources and priorities.

Pakistan has committed 30,000 troops to its offensive against the TTP in Swat and South Waziristan, and officials say they simply don’t have the resources to open a second front against the Haqqani network in North Waziristan (which is also where al-Qaeda’s leaders are believed to be hiding). General Ashfaq Kayani reportedly told Petraeus that Pakistan’s priority, given its limited resources, was the TTP insurgency, which directly challenges the Pakistani state.

If Pakistan is overstretched, then even the current operation against the Afghan Taliban will be directly affected. Pakistani officials advancing this argument often imply that once the domestic insurgency has been suppressed, the army can move on to tackling the groups that most concern the U.S. But many analysts believe that Pakistan’s reluctance to go after Haqqani, Hekmatyar and the Afghan Taliban leadership in Quetta is based not only on resources and priorities, but also on the Pakistani military’s assessment of its long-term interests in Afghanistan after the US leaves.

The fearsome North Waziristan–based network, led by ailing former Afghan mujahedin commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and run by his son Sirajuddin, controls three key Afghan provinces that border Pakistan — Khost, Paktia and Paktika. The network has a long-standing relationship with the ISI and is viewed by many in the Pakistani military as an important strategic asset in the regional struggle for influence in Afghanistan. (Some reports suggest that this has become a matter of debate within the Pakistani military.) Those who share this view believe that the group can be separated from al-Qaeda and could form part of a compromise political solution in Afghanistan, which Pakistan hopes to play a key role in brokering. A similar logic is probably at work with respect to Hekmatyar and even the Afghan Taliban leadership. It’s a view based on seeing the Afghan Taliban as a Pashtun nationalist movement challenging the new Tajik-dominated political order in Kabul — which is deemed by many in Pakistan to be a proxy for India. There’s also concern that mounting an offensive against Taliban groups that confine their attacks to Afghanistan will rouse Pashtun fury on both sides of the border, imperiling Pakistan’s domestic counterinsurgency effort.

To eliminate al-Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, it must be separated and isolated from the Taliban ’sea’ in which it is currently hiding. But the U.S. troop surge will be mainly directed against the Taliban insurgency. It will push al-Qaeda and the insurgents closer together, making it more difficult to isolate and target al-Qaeda. Pakistan’s going after the Afghan Taliban, which is seen as America’s enemy, would weaken Pakistan’s national consensus supporting the offensive against the TTP, many Pakistanis like Munir Akram believe.

The immediate focus of discussion between the U.S. and Pakistan is North Waziristan. While the Pakistan army has cleared swaths of territory once controlled by the TTP in South Waziristan and claims to have killed more than 600 militants, it has not managed to kill or capture any of the leadership, who have largely fled north, along with many fighters. That certainly gives Pakistan’s army a pretext for pushing into North Waziristan — as the U.S. is urging — although any such operation would probably be a limited one, focused on TTP groups and concentrated in areas where they would avoid clashing with Haqqani fighters.

If the Pakistani military declines to go after the Afghan Taliban, the U.S. faces limited options for turning up the heat. Unable, politically, to commit ground forces to Pakistani territory, it would be forced to rely on the remote-controlled drone strikes that have been effective in killing al-Qaeda leaders in the area. Conflicting reports in the U.S. media suggest that President Obama either plans to expand those operations precisely to target the Afghan insurgent groupings that remain largely unmolested in Pakistan or is reluctant to authorize strikes that go beyond the targets agreed by Pakistan, for fear of jeopardizing cooperation and triggering a political crisis. But if the goal is to reverse the Taliban’s momentum in Afghanistan, the U.S. may feel it has no choice. And that’s certainly the message it wants Pakistan — and the Taliban — to take from the current conversation.

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