Archive for Tariq Ali on Pakistan

Tariq Ali’s Interview

By David Barsamian* 
April 2003  


Tariq Ali, born in Lahore, Pakistan, is based in London where he is an editor of New Left Review. A prolific writer, Tariq Ali is author of more than 20 books, including history, politics, and fiction. His most recent books are Protocols of the Elders of Sodom (2009) and The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power (2008). His latest book is the The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity. He is a regular contributor to The Guardian, New Left Review, and the London Review of Books. In his spare time he is a filmmaker and novelist.  I talked with him at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil in late January 2003.

Q. Imperialism is not a word that is often used in polite discourse in the United States.

I’ve always found it very strange, traveling and speaking throughout the United States, that it’s a word they don’t like. They assumed that an empire consisted of colonies abroad that were ruled and staffed by people sent from the imperial country, whether it was Britain in India or France in Algeria or Germany in Namibia or Belgium in the Congo. And they said, “Well, we don’t do it like that.”

For a long period the U.S. kept to its own sphere. What caused them to move out was not so much the need for colonies, which they didn’t need in that sense, given the size and scale of the United States itself and the natural resources it possessed, plus the fact that they dominated South America. What forced them to move out was the Russian Revolution. There is a very interesting parallel that at the same time as the Russian Revolution was taking place, Woodrow Wilson decided it was time for a major U.S. intervention because they were nervous now that the threatening of capitalist interests in Europe could actually threaten them in the long term. That’s when they decided they had to go international.

The victory of the Russian Revolution meant that it had an enemy. Here was a country that challenged capitalism quite openly. So for 70 years they fought that system. Finally they defeated it by forcing it to go on a binge of military spending, which was completely unnecessary. So the USSR imploded. That was a big, big victory for this empire.

To what extent is imperialism connected to or is an outcome of capitalism?

All the early empires were founded by the need for capital to expand, the need for capital to find new markets. It was this struggle for markets that finally created the British empire, the Dutch empire, the Belgian empire, the French empire. World War I was a war fought over colonial expansion. Who would control the trade routes? Who would control the markets? Germany, which had unified late and came to capitalism later than the other powers, decided it wanted its own empire. It felt that the way to get it was to defeat Britain, and then it could actually move forward.

For a while this got disguised because while the Soviet Union and that whole bloc of states existed, there was talk of imperialism, but by and large people in the West saw this as essentially fighting a war against an evil enemy, an evil empire. Now the slate is clean once again. We have the world before us naked. We see exactly what is going on. The September 20, 2002 strategy doctrine put out by the Bush administration makes it crystal clear what this is all about. They say a holy moral principle is the defense of free trade, i.e., free trade as we see it and according to rules that we make and how we regulate it. In order to defend this, we are prepared to go to war. That has been the principle of all empires. The difference between the American empire and previous empires is that the United States usually prefers to work through local compradors, local rulers who are on their side. They don’t like ruling directly because they know it’s an enormous expense. Why send your own people out to run a country when you can find locals to do it? That is how they’ve always operated. For example, they occupied Japan after World War II, they created a constitution and MacArthur was like a viceroy. But they pulled out after a few years and let their local relays in Japan carry on, as they still do. The Japanese Liberal Democratic Party was created by the United States to do the job for them.

At a distance, they see the Far Eastern region, the united Korean peninsula, Japan, and China, as a combination that could be deadly if it ever got together economically, politically, and militarily. They fear that if this happened, within ten years this area would become economically hegemonic. Thus, American strategic policy is designed to keep these countries separate from each other. That’s why the Bush regime is now trying to stop Korean reunification because they are fearful that a unified Korean peninsula with nuclear weapons would make the Japanese go for nuclear weapons. Then you would have three nuclear powers in the region: Japan, Korea, and China. If that happened, I think they would try and make them fight each other because they are really fearful of a link-up in this region. That would severely threaten their interests.

If you read Thomas Friedman’s article on the war in Iraq, this guy spells it out. He says, It’s laughable to pretend it’s not about oil. He says, It’s not just about oil and of course we know it’s not just about oil, but he says oil does play a big part in it. So they are no longer trying to conceal their real aims. They are saying, This is the situation. We’re the world’s mightiest power. These are our economic interests, these are our strategic interests, and these are our geopolitical interests. You’d better watch out, guys, because we’re going to defend them. This is imperialism, different from the past, in a new situation. In the war in Iraq they will assert new, raw imperial power in a way they have not done before.

Walter Rodney, a political thinker and writer from Guyana, talked about what he called “the local lackeys” of imperialism. Tell me more about this class of collaborators.

In the middle of the last century, you have the Korean War—a three-year war fought by the United States under the banner of the United Nations, in the course of which the industrially strong part of Korea, which was the north, is completely devastated. Not a single building was left standing. Its entire infrastructure was destroyed.

Then you had the Vietnam War. First, the French were defeated in Vietnam. The United States was not prepared to see that defeat and stepped in. The aim of the American empire was, by hook or by crook, to get rid of these governments somehow; to maintain a nationalist pretense and to get in a different group of people who could pretend to be anticolonial nationalists, but who would actually be serving the needs of the great metropolitan empire.

How did they do this? They failed in Vietnam. They succeeded in dividing Korea. But they couldn’t rule South Korea democratically because no lackeys could be found who could be elected. So when you don’t find lackeys who can be elected democratically, you put the army in power. They did the same thing in Pakistan. When a general election was planned for April 1959 that would have returned a government that would have withdrawn from the security pacts into which they tied Pakistan, they organized a coup d’etat and put the military in power in October 1958 to preempt a general election. The country that worried them the most in the middle of the last century was Indonesia because this country had the world’s largest Communist Party outside China and Russia, with a million members, with an additional two million people in front organizations. It had a big influence on the government and the armed forces. So what do they do? They organized one of the most dastardly actions we have seen since World War II, a military coup, where they put Suharto in power. Suharto proceeds to kill a million people and wipes out the most powerful social movement in the country. In 1975 he invaded East Timor, killed several hundred thousand people there and wiped out all the secular, radical opposition in the country. Then people are surprised the Islamists are so powerful because the Islamists are the people who were used in 1965 to kill “Reds.”

Then you have a new phase, which is the post-Cold War phase, where basically the triumph of the United States and world capitalism totally disarmed even seminationalist politicians, who said, Now there is nothing else to do. Just work with them, serve them. This led to a phenomenal growth in corruption all over the Third World, and not just the Third World, in the First and Second Worlds as well. Massive corruption in politics. Politics became part of corporate life, which they had been in the States for some time, but that process then began to seep through. It’s been very difficult for the last 20 years to get elected leaders who are prepared to fight for their own people.

Interestingly enough, we’re having this interview in Latin America, and this is a continent that has been in revolt for some time. You have seen the election of Chavez. You have seen the failure to topple Fidel Castro after 40 years of the blockade. You’ve seen a victory of Lula in Brazil. You have seen the victory of Gutierrez in Ecuador. Evo Morales in Bolivia, came very close to defeating the corporations’ candidate. So we are seeing beginnings of a new wave of, let’s call it, subnationalism or protonationalism, which wants to resist. But by and large, in Asia and Africa they have, so far, been pliable regimes.

I don’t think this can last indefinitely. I think, curiously enough, the war in Iraq and the occupation of Iraq and the substitution of Saddam with a U.S. puppet government, so the oil can be shared out as war trophy is bound to create resistance sooner or later. It may take four years. It may take ten years. We don’t know. But it will happen. In that sense, the American empire is no different from other empires. It is slowly sowing the seeds of the forces that will one day confront it.

Clearly, 19th century European imperialism was predicated on racism, the white person’s burden, bringing Christianity and enlightenment to the benighted natives. That was then. What about now?

You can’t deny the underlying feeling of white superiority in all this. I’ll give you a concrete example. The tragedy of 9/11, when lots of civilians were killed in New York and some in Washington, the whole world was forced to weep for them in public. Why? Because they were citizens of the United States of America. When Afghan citizens are killed by indiscriminate bombings, by so-called accidental bombings and the deaths from starvation, these deaths don’t count for much. No one will ever build a monument for the Afghan civilians who died in the bombing raids. Just a crude war of revenge, as I called it at the time.

Why not? Why are Afghan lives not as important as any other lives? Because underlying all this is still the belief that we are a superior nation, a superior race, and a superior people.

Look at the cavalier way in which casualties are discussed in the case of Iraq. There was a conference organized by the State Department and its favorite Iraqis and an Iraqi friend of mine attended who wasn’t on their list. He told me, “What shocked me was the way they were discussing casualties, how many civilian deaths would be acceptable.” He said the figure the Iraqis and the Americans were talking about was 250,000. It shouldn’t go above that. A quarter of a million civilian deaths acceptable? When 3,000 deaths are not acceptable in the United States of America, but a quarter of a million Iraqi lives are acceptable, what is that if not the most grotesque demonstration that the lives of these poor Arabs don’t matter a damn. The form racism takes is different from the old empires, but it’s still there.

Talk about the role of the media in shaping and forming public opinion. For example, the media constantly repeat that Saddam Hussein represents a grave threat to the United States.

This notion of Saddam Hussein being a threat to the United States makes everyone in Europe laugh, including European politicians. Recently, I was at a debate in Berlin at a big theater, 1,000-2,000 people there. I was debating Professor Ruth Wedgewood. She is an adviser to Donald Rumsfeld. To my amazement she suddenly turned to the Germans and she said, I know the reason you are opposed to this war. It’s because you’re scared of Saddam. Afterwards, people came and told me, “We were really taken aback by that. What does she mean?” I said, “This is what they say in the United States all the time. They frighten the people that Saddam represents a real threat. I’m staggered that they’ve begun to believe their own rhetoric.”

Why is Tony Blair such an enthusiastic partner of George Bush in his war on terrorism?

In terms of foreign policy, I think Blair decided very early on after he came to office that he was going to continue the deals Thatcher had done with Reagan. What these deals have done, basically, is they have locked the British Ministry of Defense into the Pentagon. It’s to the point now that when the Pentagon upgrades, the British Ministry of Defense, which doesn’t need to do it, has to do it because it’s part of the same system.

Now the British are totally committed to this alliance. It reminds you of what Charles DeGaulle used to say when he kept on vetoing British entry into the Common Market. He used to say that Britain will always be an American Trojan horse in the European Union. How right he was. Blair likes to go and tell the Europeans, I’m close to Bush. I can influence him. He tells Bush, It’s important I’m in the European Union, because I can make sure that your views there are properly defended.

Underlying Blair’s servility to the United States is how he sees the country. Britain is a medium-sized, northern European country. It no longer has an empire. The country has quite an exploitative deregulated system, which attracts foreign capital because wages and taxes are low. This is what Thatcher achieved. Blair believes this has to be maintained because he doesn’t have any other vision. One of the ways it can be maintained is by hanging alongside the United States in whatever they do, sharing part of the proceeds and being seen by Washington as a loyal ally. It’s classic.

I have to also tell you, because it would be one-sided not to do so, that he is hated by large numbers of people in Britain for doing this, including the British establishment, who find that sort of servility to the United States to be incredibly debased and vulgar and low. Both within the mandarin civil service and the military establishment there is a lot of nervousness and hostility to the war on Iraq. For the first time also in Britain you have a majority of public opinion against the war. So Blair is really putting his future on the line.

The United States, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been fervently looking for an oppositional force to replace it. They tried Noriega in Panama, Qaddafi in Libya, and the Cali and Medellin drug cartels. Now they’ve zoomed in on Islam, fundamentalist and militant, as the new archenemy.

It’s crazy to make Islam into a monolith. It’s just as divided as any other part of the world. The maximum number of people al-Qaeda has, 3,000? Maybe 4,000? Though no one has agreed on it, it’s definitely somewhere between 2-3,000, ensconced in different parts of the world, including Europe and the United States. So how come this can’t be destroyed? It could be. But the problem is not al-Qaeda. The problem is the conditions that create this mood, which drives young people to despair. That will not stop unless the central problems in the Middle East are solved.

Bernard Lewis has achieved almost iconic status in the West as an expert on Islam and how Muslims think. He wrote an essay for Atlantic magazine in 1990 called “Roots of Muslim Rage,” in which he used the term “clash of civilizations.” That term was picked up later by Harvard University professor, Samuel Huntington. He wrote a book called The Clash of Civilizations. Now you have written a book called The Clash of Fundamentalisms. What do you think about this so-called theory?

The Lewis theory is largely based on a view of a world that I don’t recognize. I grew up in that world and have traveled throughout it. There is rage in the Muslim world, obviously, and the reasons for that rage are the imposition of a settler state in the heart of the Arab world and the attempt to destroy the Palestinians and their identity. I know in the United States this is a sensitive subject, but before the formation and foundation of Israel, there was very little anti-Semitism in the Arab world. Large Jewish communities lived in the Maghrib, North Africa, or in the heart of the Middle East, in Egypt and Iraq.

The Baghdadi Jews in particular had a special flavor culturally in terms of cuisine, in what they did, in how they operated, and many of them were founders of the Egyptian and Iraqi Communist Parties. That’s how integrated they were in those societies. This was all destroyed by the Zionist project and the creation of Israel. Obviously, the result has been a lot of crude anti-Semitism. But please don’t think it comes out of something, which is fundamental to Islam. It doesn’t. It did not exist in that shape or form until the 20th century.

So the rage of which Bernard Lewis talks is a different rage from the rage I see because he sees it as inherent in civilizational differences. I see the differences as being fundamentally political and economic.

If you read Huntington’s book, you see that he has these formulas, which he’s now modified subsequent to 9/11. He said, we, the West, are a Judeo-Christian civilization. We are now confronted by all the other civilizations: Islamic civilization, Chinese civilization. African civilization he didn’t mention because he said he was not sure such a thing existed. The big danger, he said, came from a possible unification of Chinese and Islamic civilizations. When you read between the lines, these are coded messages for the phenomenal growth of the Chinese economy and Chinese exports to the U.S. and the centrality of Arab oil. That is what all this civilization nonsense boils down to.

In The Clash of Fundamentalisms, I said it was a clash between a tiny religious fundamentalism, which was very retrogressive and retrograde, but that the parent of all fundamentalisms was American imperial fundamentalism. This empire, the most powerful in history, now uses its economic and military muscle to reshape the world according to its needs and its interests. Resistance against this is bound to rise. At the moment, it’s taken the form of an ultrareligious fundamentalism, which will not work because it has nothing to offer. But this will change. Other resistances will come.

The average American might say to you, “Well, even though you’ve said many interesting things, I’m not quite sure. How do I get a better understanding of what the United States is doing and how the world system operates?

One of the suggestions I would make is don’t ignore history. One of the things that has happened in our culture as a whole is that history as a subject has become devalued. If you read the history of the United States, you will find not just the history of an empire in the making, but you will also find the history of dissent in the United States and you will also find many surprising things. Walt Whitman, for instance, is supposed to be the poet of liberation and anti-slavery and pro-Lincoln, but in his earlier years Walt Whitman was a firm believer in American whites as a superior civilization, which had the right to crush Mexicans because they were a second-rate civilization. There was a lot of ambiguity in the early American poets and writers about American expansionism. This changed by the end of the 19th century, with Mark Twain and with Whitman in his last years, by the way. After the end of the Civil War, he was a deeply shaken person, when he saw how much blood had been spilled.

I always say to my American friends that America is a very rich country in every way. It is rich economically. It is rich in the dissenting movements that have grown up within it. It’s rich also as a country that has committed atrocities all over the world. You have to choose which of these riches you want. Martin Luther King, the year before he was assassinated, said, “the greatest purveyor of violence in the world is my own country.” People should learn that the most gifted and capable Americans, many of whom were killed by the state, historically are people who have stood up and resisted.

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Allah, America & Army: Tariq Ali’s New Book

Allah, Army and America” – or, to put it succinctly, the “3 As” – is a formula coined by social scientists often used to explain the political and social malaise that afflicts Pakistan. Numerous studies have been written on the Pakistani ruling elite’s amour with 2 As, namely Allah and the Army, most recently by Hasan Abbas and Irshad Haqqani on the former, and by Ayesha Siddiqa and Shuja Nawaz on the latter. However, what is usually missing from the discussion is how incurably enamoured the Pakistani ruling elite has become of the greatest imperialist power since the end of the Second World War, and how small the dividends, if any, this dangerous liaison has yielded to the people of Pakistan. 

Tariq Ali’s latest work, The Duel, attempts to bridge this gap in our understanding of the relations between the United States and the Pakistani ruling elite. 

Ali is one of the few prominent Pakistanis on the Left who grew up during the formative years of Pakistan’s birth as a postcolonial state, and the fact that he left it in the 1960s to pursue a more fulfilling political career in Britain has not stopped him from penning three works on his native country. 

His two earlier works on Pakistan created some controversy (not with readers but with Pakistan’s ruling elite), the hallmarks of which can be seen in this latest work. That no doubt played a part in the book’s subsequent unofficial ban in Pakistan, followed lock, stock and barrel by the Pakistani media. 

When I asked Ali during an interview, while he was visiting Pakistan in 2002, whether he had any plans to update his conclusions about the country in Can Pakistan Survive?, he emphatically dismissed the suggestion, saying that the conclusions he drew in 1981 were still relevant. That he had cause to change his mind is disconcerting. In many ways, the book is a mea culpa for his native country’s economic and political woes and a testament to the changes that he has witnessed – and chronicled – in other parts of the world, in Latin America for instance, but never in Pakistan. 

The book begins with a foundational history of Pakistan as a confessional state, brought into being by a political party dominated by feudal potentates. In many ways, the fact that the All India Muslim League looked to the British Empire, rather than the Indian people, for protection and advancement of its interests, and its demand for a separate state had a shaping influence on the actions of independent Pakistan’s ruling elite. The latter also relied selfishly on its relationship with the U.S. for self-preservation rather than on the people who had actually sacrificed their lives and properties in the bloodbath of Partition. 

Most readers will not be amused to find out that even the founding father, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, was not immune to the charms of Washington, most noticeably evidenced by the fact that he once tried, unsuccessfully, to sell the Flagstaff House to the then American Ambassador in Karachi. 

This lucrative relationship was facilitated by the fact that for the first decade of Pakistan’s independence, the new country did not have a Constitution or elections: this situation allowed an unelected coterie led by Ghulam Mohammad and Iskander Mirza to strengthen their power and cement a lasting alliance with the landed elite and the military. This coterie also set the tone for Pakistan’s foreign policy slavishly in tune with U.S. strategic interests. A curious thing that happened was the inclusion of this “most Allied of America’s allies” in the Non-Aligned Movement and its building of an all-weather friendship with Maoist China, which survives to this day. 

We all know the sorry state that Pakistan was in after the bureaucratic-military raj gave way to a more direct military takeover by Ayub Khan in 1958. Ali’s description of Ayub’s years in power as well as the resentment that festered in East Pakistan is tinged with uniquely personal insights, especially into the class nature of the new Bangladeshi leadership under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as well as the Mukti Bahini guerilas inspired by Che Guevara, among others. 

The truncated and moth-eaten state that remained after the independence of Bangladesh in 1971 had a remarkable opportunity to be refounded by an unchallenged Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, with the military’s humiliating retreat to the barracks. However, he squandered the few chances that were made available to him, and the promise of limited land reform, free public education and health, nationalisation of public utilities and an independent foreign policy gave way to a deterioration of democracy not only within the PPP but in the country as a whole. This, combined with Bhutto’s intransigence vis-a-vis the U.S. over Pakistan’s nuclear bomb precipitated the overthrow of the first democratically elected leader in the country’s history. It also led to the brutalisation of Pakistan’s political culture at the hands of a dictator who was greenlighted to power by Washington, having firmly established his credentials for the job earlier in 1970 by brutally crushing Black September, a popular Palestinian uprising against the Jordanian monarch. 

Tariq Ali, who was close to Bhutto, and was later in touch with Bhutto’s daughter Benazir, devotes a whole chapter to the rise and fall of the Bhutto dynasty. As with all charismatic postcolonial leaders of the Third World, the tragedy of this dynasty is inevitably the tragedy of modern Pakistan. The PPP was formed by a dedicated cadre of people who wanted a thoroughgoing structural transformation of the state. But petty dynastic politics and attempts to be on the “right side of history” have gradually isolated the PPP from its mass base, with the result that the post-Zulfikar Ali Bhutto leadership reposes more trust in the halls of power in Washington and London than in the Pakistani people. As a result, Pakistan’s largest political party is now little more than a patronage-doling machine dominated by feudal elements, opportunists and bandwagon careerists of every hue who have now anxiously hopped onto the Washington Consensus to preserve their privileges. This can only lead to tragedy, as in the case of Benazir Bhutto’s assassination. 

The failure of the Bhuttos, however, does not absolve the other dynasties that have ruled Pakistan in the past and, unlike the Bhuttos, owe their origins to benign dictators – the Sharifs and the Chaudharys of Gujrat, whose servility to power is well known and do not offer any hope for the future. 

The price Pakistan has paid for being steered into the flight path of American power has been great and is growing. One of its most disastrous results is the events in Afghanistan, where state-led efforts at modernisation and establishment of secular nationalism were repeatedly stalled by foreign powers, Pakistan included. All that eventually boomeranged on America, in the form of 9/11, and on Pakistan, which has a murderous imperial war going on on its western borders involving the Taliban, the Pakistan Army and the U.S. forces. 

In the absence of a secular-nationalist Left, and with a puppet imported from California in power in daytime Kabul, the task of resistance to foreign occupation in Afghanistan is inevitably left to the remnants of the Taliban. The latter might very soon be reclaiming their past status as rulers of Afghanistan, thanks to the spectacular corruption of a tiny U.S.-backed elite and the success of the resistance. Only a total withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan and an alliance with China, Pakistan, India and Iran that guarantees non-interference in that country’s affairs can salvage a lasting peace for this tortured land. 

Ali shatters a few myths about Pakistan, which in the West fill tonnes of paper, devoted to proving that Pakistan is a failed state. Firstly, the duel that he alludes to in the title of his book is not one on its western borders between the Taliban and the government, but the duel between the people of Pakistan and the American-backed elite, who have historically ruled and plundered the country. In fact, this duel is a familiar story in many parts of the world – Colombia, Afghanistan, Israel, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and the scores of tiny American protectorates in the Gulf, the Balkans and the Caucasus are part of this distinguished club. Secondly, that Pakistan is on the verge of a takeover by the Taliban and that the only party able to do business with them are the khaki ironclads. Indeed, the way Washington is currently dealing with the new regime in Islamabad proves that the latter claim is false. 

The way forward for Pakistan, according to Ali, lies in the end of the American search for a perpetual khaki-clad to manage Pakistan. In addition, Pakistan has to evolve from a national security state to one where desperately needed land reforms are carried out, with free health care, education and housing for the poor. Peace with India should be the foremost priority, as also the formation of a South Asian Union with increasing political and economic ties to China and Iran in order to counter American efforts to put a permanent military presence there. Ali places little faith in the traditional political parties but hails the enthusiasm of the judicial activism that erupted in March 2007. 

One wishes he had also mentioned the scores of social movements that have been battling to change the status quo in various parts of the country – the Anjuman Mazareen Punjab in Okara, the Baloch resistance, the peasant resistance in Hashtnagar in the NWFP and the Fisherfolk Forum in Sindh, all refreshingly secular and having no truck with religion. But he makes up for it with warm references and homages throughout the book to regional poets and writers to show that art and culture have never been coopted by the Washington consensus. 

Earlier, in September 2008, the Pakistan government paid its own tribute to Ali’s book when it unofficially banned the work in Pakistan. However, the learned mandarins within the Ministry of Information did not have to wait for long to discover that books and ideas are never hindered by frontiers. Ali’s book, like his previous two on Pakistan, succeeded in finding a large black-market readership before the ban was ultimately revoked. 

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Tariq Ali: A Tragedy Born of Military Despotism & Anarchy

Friday December 28, 2007
The Guardian

Even those of us sharply critical of Benazir Bhutto’s behaviour and policies – both while she was in office and more recently – are stunned and angered by her death. Indignation and fear stalk the country once again.An odd coexistence of military despotism and anarchy created the conditions leading to her assassination in Rawalpindi yesterday. In the past, military rule was designed to preserve order – and did so for a few years. No longer. Today it creates disorder and promotes lawlessness. How else can one explain the sacking of the chief justice and eight other judges of the country’s supreme court for attempting to hold the government’s intelligence agencies and the police accountable to courts of law? Their replacements lack the backbone to do anything, let alone conduct a proper inquest into the misdeeds of the agencies to uncover the truth behind the carefully organised killing of a major political leader.

How can Pakistan today be anything but a conflagration of despair? It is assumed that the killers were jihadi fanatics. This may well be true, but were they acting on their own?

Benazir, according to those close to her, had been tempted to boycott the fake elections, but she lacked the political courage to defy Washington. She had plenty of physical courage, and refused to be cowed by threats from local opponents. She had been addressing an election rally in Liaquat Bagh. This is a popular space named after the country’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, who was killed by an assassin in 1953. The killer, Said Akbar, was immediately shot dead on the orders of a police officer involved in the plot. Not far from here, there once stood a colonial structure where nationalists were imprisoned. This was Rawalpindi jail. It was here that Benazir’s father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was hanged in April 1979. The military tyrant responsible for his judicial murder made sure the site of the tragedy was destroyed as well.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s death poisoned relations between his Pakistan People’s party and the army. Party activists, particularly in the province of Sind, were brutally tortured, humiliated and, sometimes, disappeared or killed.

Pakistan’s turbulent history, a result of continuous military rule and unpopular global alliances, confronts the ruling elite now with serious choices. They appear to have no positive aims. The overwhelming majority of the country disapproves of the government’s foreign policy. They are angered by its lack of a serious domestic policy except for further enriching a callous and greedy elite that includes a swollen, parasitic military. Now they watch helplessly as politicians are shot dead in front of them.

Benazir had survived the bomb blast yesterday but was felled by bullets fired at her car. The assassins, mindful of their failure in Karachi a month ago, had taken out a double insurance this time. They wanted her dead. It is impossible for even a rigged election to take place now. It will have to be postponed, and the military high command is no doubt contemplating another dose of army rule if the situation gets worse, which could easily happen.

What has happened is a multilayered tragedy. It’s a tragedy for a country on a road to more disasters. Torrents and foaming cataracts lie ahead. And it is a personal tragedy. The house of Bhutto has lost another member. Father, two sons and now a daughter have all died unnatural deaths.

I first met Benazir at her father’s house in Karachi when she was a fun-loving teenager, and later at Oxford. She was not a natural politician and had always wanted to be a diplomat, but history and personal tragedy pushed in the other direction. Her father’s death transformed her. She had become a new person, determined to take on the military dictator of that time. She had moved to a tiny flat in London, where we would endlessly discuss the future of the country. She would agree that land reforms, mass education programmes, a health service and an independent foreign policy were positive constructive aims and crucial if the country was to be saved from the vultures in and out of uniform. Her constituency was the poor, and she was proud of the fact.

She changed again after becoming prime minister. In the early days, we would argue and in response to my numerous complaints – all she would say was that the world had changed. She couldn’t be on the “wrong side” of history. And so, like many others, she made her peace with Washington. It was this that finally led to the deal with Musharraf and her return home after more than a decade in exile. On a number of occasions she told me that she did not fear death. It was one of the dangers of playing politics in Pakistan.

It is difficult to imagine any good coming out of this tragedy, but there is one possibility. Pakistan desperately needs a political party that can speak for the social needs of a bulk of the people. The People’s party founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was built by the activists of the only popular mass movement the country has known: students, peasants and workers who fought for three months in 1968-69 to topple the country’s first military dictator. They saw it as their party, and that feeling persists in some parts of the country to this day, despite everything.

Benazir’s horrific death should give her colleagues pause for reflection. To be dependent on a person or a family may be necessary at certain times, but it is a structural weakness, not a strength for a political organisation. The People’s party needs to be refounded as a modern and democratic organisation, open to honest debate and discussion, defending social and human rights, uniting the many disparate groups and individuals in Pakistan desperate for any halfway decent alternative, and coming forward with concrete proposals to stabilise occupied and war-torn Afghanistan. This can and should be done. The Bhutto family should not be asked for any more sacrifices.

· Tariq Ali’s book The Duel: Pakistan on the Flightpath of American Power is published in 2008 tariq.ali3@btinternet.com

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Tariq Ali’s Heart Bleeds for Pakistan

Tariq Ali – My heart bleeds for Paksitan My heart bleeds for Pakistan. It deserves better than this grotesque feudal charade By Tariq Ali, Pakistan-born writer, broadcaster and commentator The Independent Six hours before she was executed, Mary, Queen of Scots wrote to her brother-in-law, Henry III of France: “…As for my son, I commend him to you in so far as he deserves, for I cannot answer for him.” The year was 1587. On 30 December 2007, a conclave of feudal potentates gathered in the home of the slain Benazir Bhutto to hear her last will and testament being read out and its contents subsequently announced to the world media. Where Mary was tentative, her modern-day equivalent left no room for doubt. She could certainly answer for her son. A triumvirate consisting of her husband, Asif Zardari (one of the most venal and discredited politicians in the country and still facing corruption charges in three European courts) and two ciphers will run the party till Benazir’s 19-year-old son, Bilawal, comes of age. He will then become chairperson-for-life and, no doubt, pass it on to his children. The fact that this is now official does not make it any less grotesque. The Pakistan People’s Party is being treated as a family heirloom, a property to be disposed of at the will of its leader. Nothing more, nothing less. Poor Pakistan. Poor People’s Party supporters. Both deserve better than this disgusting, medieval charade. Benazir’s last decision was in the same autocratic mode as its predecessors, an approach that would cost her – tragically – her own life. Had she heeded the advice of some party leaders and not agreed to the Washington-brokered deal with Pervez Musharraf or, even later, decided to boycott his parliamentary election she might still have been alive. Her last gift to the country does not augur well for its future. How can Western-backed politicians be taken seriously if they treat their party as a fiefdom and their supporters as serfs, while their courtiers abroad mouth sycophantic niceties concerning the young prince and his future. That most of the PPP inner circle consists of spineless timeservers leading frustrated and melancholy lives is no excuse. All this could be transformed if inner-party democracy was implemented. There is a tiny layer of incorruptible and principled politicians inside the party, but they have been sidelined. Dynastic politics is a sign of weakness, not strength. Benazir was fond of comparing her family to the Kennedys, but chose to ignore that the Democratic Party, despite an addiction to big money, was not the instrument of any one family. The issue of democracy is enormously important in a country that has been governed by the military for over half of its life. Pakistan is not a “failed state” in the sense of the Congo or Rwanda. It is a dysfunctional state and has been in this situation for almost four decades. At the heart of this dysfunctionality is the domination by the army and each period of military rule has made things worse. It is this that has prevented political stability and the emergence of stable institutions. Here the US bears direct responsibility, since it has always regarded the military as the only institution it can do business with and, unfortunately, still does so. This is the rock that has focused choppy waters into a headlong torrent. The military’s weaknesses are well known and have been amply documented. But the politicians are not in a position to cast stones. After all, Mr Musharraf did not pioneer the assault on the judiciary so conveniently overlooked by the US Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte, and the Foreign Secretary, David Miliband. The first attack on the Supreme Court was mounted by Nawaz Sharif’s goons who physically assaulted judges because they were angered by a decision that ran counter to their master’s interests when he was prime minister. Some of us had hoped that, with her death, the People’s Party might start a new chapter. After all, one of its main leaders, Aitzaz Ahsan, president of the Bar Association, played a heroic role in the popular movement against the dismissal of the chief justice. Mr Ahsan was arrested during the emergency and kept in solitary confinement. He is still under house arrest in Lahore. Had Benazir been capable of thinking beyond family and faction she should have appointed him chairperson pending elections within the party. No such luck. The result almost certainly will be a split in the party sooner rather than later. Mr Zardari was loathed by many activists and held responsible for his wife’s downfall. Once emotions have subsided, the horror of the succession will hit the many traditional PPP followers except for its most reactionary segment: bandwagon careerists desperate to make a fortune. All this could have been avoided, but the deadly angel who guided her when she was alive was, alas, not too concerned with democracy. And now he is in effect leader of the party. Meanwhile there is a country in crisis. Having succeeded in saving his own political skin by imposing a state of emergency, Mr Musharraf still lacks legitimacy. Even a rigged election is no longer possible on 8 January despite the stern admonitions of President George Bush and his unconvincing Downing Street adjutant. What is clear is that the official consensus on who killed Benazir is breaking down, except on BBC television. It has now been made public that, when Benazir asked the US for a Karzai-style phalanx of privately contracted former US Marine bodyguards, the suggestion was contemptuously rejected by the Pakistan government, which saw it as a breach of sovereignty. Now both Hillary Clinton and Senator Joseph Biden, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, are pinning the convict’s badge on Mr Musharraf and not al-Qa’ida for the murder, a sure sign that sections of the US establishment are thinking of dumping the President. Their problem is that, with Benazir dead, the only other alternative for them is General Ashraf Kiyani, head of the army. Nawaz Sharif is seen as a Saudi poodle and hence unreliable, though, given the US-Saudi alliance, poor Mr Sharif is puzzled as to why this should be the case. For his part, he is ready to do Washiongton’s bidding but would prefer the Saudi King rather than Mr Musharraf to be the imperial message-boy. A solution to the crisis is available. This would require Mr Musharraf’s replacement by a less contentious figure, an all-party government of unity to prepare the basis for genuine elections within six months, and the reinstatement of the sacked Supreme Court judges to investigate Benazir’s murder without fear or favour. It would be a start.

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