North Waziristan & the Haqqani Network

Located between the Khost province of eastern Afghanistan and KP of northwest Pakistan, North Waziristanis the second largest tribal region of FATA.

According to security experts, the area is considered today to be the epicentre not only of violence inAfghanistanandPakistanbut also a major source of International terrorism. Along with its geographic isolation, difficult terrain and relatively stable coalition of militant groups, they believe that the region has become the most important centre of militancy of FATA because of the impunity with which militants in the area have operated.

Local tribesmen do not approve of the presence of foreign militants, especially the Uzbeks and Punjabis, because they encroach the tribes’ lands and are insensitive to local customs

The most important militant group operating in the region is the Haqqani Network, an Afghan insurgent group led by Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani. Haqqani left his native Khost province and settled in North Waziristanas an exile during the republican Afghan government of Sardar Mohammad Dauod Khan in early 1970s. His son Sirajuddin, popularly known as Khaleefa, who became a key insurgent leader in theAfghanistanin mid 1980s, manages the network’s organisation from the Danday Darpakhel village near Miramshah in North Waziristan and carries out attacks on US and NATO forces inAfghanistan, according to security experts and local elders.

The second most important group in North Waziristanis led-by Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a key militant leader known for hosting foreign militants. Bahadur was announced as Naib Amir (deputy head) under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud upon the formation of the 2007 Tehreek-e-TalibanPakistan (TTP), an umbrella organisation of various militant groups operating in FATA. However Bahadur later formed an anti-TTP bloc by joining hands with Maulvi Nazir’sSouth Waziristan based group because of disagreements over TTP attacks against the Pakistani security forces and tribal rivalries of Mehsuds. The Haqqani Network and Bahadur are considered ‘good Taliban’ by thePakistan military authorities as they don’t carry out attacks insidePakistan and focus only on Afghanistan.

North Waziristan also provides shelter to several other local, foreign and international militant groups, such as the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Army of Great Britain , Ittehad-e-Jihad Islami (IJI), the TTP, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the Harkat-ul-Jihad al Islami, the Fidayeen-e-Islami, Harkat-ul-Mujaheen, the Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, according to a latest report published in The News. Elders and political activists of North Waziristan say that many of the foreign militants, especially Central Asians, Arabs and Afghans, arrived inPakistan’s tribal areas when their bases inAfghanistanwere closed down in late 2001. They say that the local population does not approve of the presence of foreign militants, especially the Uzbeks and Punjabis, because they encroach the tribes’ lands and are insensitive to local customs. “We need neither good Taliban nor bad Taliban. The Pakistani government should abandon their policy of using militant groups against each other and should take stern measures to flush out all of these monsters from the area. They are not only carrying out subversive attacks inAfghanistanbut also destroying peace inPakistan,” said an elder from Dawar tribe of North Waziristan.

“We hate Taliban and there are no two opinions about it, but we are compelled to bear the atrocities of these militant outfits because the state has no writ,” said another elder from the Utmanzai tribe. “Our voices are not heard and we are not given appropriate space and airtime in the mainstream media.”

Because of the reluctance of Pakistani authorities to carry out a military operation in the region,USdrone have targeted the Mir Ali, Dattakhel and Miramshah areas of North Waziristan extensively, with five out of six drone strikes inPakistannow being reordered in North Waziristan. Residents of the tribal region say that they live in a constant state of fear of being hit, because of local and foreign militants. The attacks occur without any warning and are often not related to the Pakistani military’s operations.

“The drone frightens women and children who sometimes become the victims, especially if the intended targets are close to their homes,” the Utmanzai elder said.

Tribal elders believe many foreign and local militant leaders have been killed in drone strikes inNorth Waziristan. New America Foundation, a Washington-based think tank, estimates on basis of media reports that 80% of the people killed in drones were Al Qaeda and Taliban militants. The accuracy rose to an astonishing 95% in 2010. This assertion was corroborated by Pakistani security official Maj Gen Ghayur Mehmood, who commands troops inNorth Waziritan, in a March 9 media briefing. Between 2007 and 2011, he said, 164 drone strikes had carried out and over 964 terrorists had been killed. Of those killed, 793 were foreigners – Arabs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens, Filipinos and Moroccans.

When drones kill a key militant leader or fighter, the Ittehad-e-Mujahedeen-e-Khurasan (IMK), a relatively less-known alliance of all local and foreign militant outfits, kill innocent people belonging to local Utmanzai and Dawar tribes, accusing them of spying. The murders have created more hatred for the foreigners. Most of the killings are carried out by Uzbek and Arab members of the IMK, tribal elders say.

Some Pakistani militant groups have abandoned the IMK because of the brutal ways in which they murder people. “We tried our best to reform the IMK but repeated attempts to correct them failed,” Bahadur said in a recent statement issued after pressure from local Wazir tribesmen.

It is pertinent to mention here that with the help of militants led by Nazir, the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe of South Waziristan successfully flushed out Uzbek militants of IMU from Wana and other Wazir-dominated areas of the region in a spring 2007 uprising sparked by the brutality of the Uzbeks.

Similarly, the tense relationship between local and foreign militant outfits operating in North Waziristan has been displayed several times in the past, particularly in November 2006, when the IMU and the IJU accused Bahadur of betraying them and jumping into the government camp by demanding their eviction from theNorth Waziristan. Differences between Gul Bahadur and Central Asian militant outfits were solved after the Haqqani Network intervened.

Security experts say that the Haqqani Network has been playing the role of bridge between the local and foreign militants, especially Pakistani and Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda. It was the Haqqani Network that brokered a truce between the Nazir-led militant group and the TTP in South Waziristan when they were fighting over expulsion of Uzbek militants from the region, said a Bannu-based journalist, adding that that the Haqqani Network has strong presence not only in North Waziristan but also in South Waziristan, Kurram and Orakzai tribal agencies.

The Shia Turi tribes of neighbouring Kurram Agency say the growing drone attacks that killed dozens of Al Qaeda, Haqqani Network and TTP leaders, and the US pressure on Pakistani government to begin an operation inNorth Waziristan, has increased the importance of Kurram for the Haqqani Network. The network will also find in Kurram Agency new passages intoAfghanistan, especially with help from former TTP leader Fazal Saeed Haqqani. And it will bring new problems for the Shias of Kurram Agency.

In Defense of Pakistan’s Pro Haqqani Policy

What does Pakistan really want in Afghanistan?

That question has become all the more urgent since Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, accused Pakistan of being indirectly responsible for last week’s attack on our embassy in Kabul. Reports of a second possible attack, on Sunday, on the CIA building will, no doubt, fuel further speculation. Assessing Pakistan’s interests inAfghanistanthrough the prism of honesty and realpolitik rather than wishful thinking may be the only way we’re going to get out of this messy war.

For a start, we need to understand that Pakistan in tends to bring down the government of Afghan President Karzai, even if that means taking on its sometimeU.S. ally. Pakistan hates Karzai out of a conviction that he has made common cause withPakistan’s strategic nemesis,India, and a suspicion that the Afghan leader intends to harmPakistan’s strategic interests in other ways. And, of course, the hatred is mutual. Rightly or wrongly, Karzai believes that ISI assassinated his father, and would do the same to him given half a chance.

A second misunderstanding we need to dispense with is that the ISI is somehow a rogue organization outside of Pakistan’s chain of command and is pursuing a pro-Taliban agenda all its own. The Pakistani army can remove the ISI director, General Ahmad Shuja Pasha — or any other officer of the organization — at a moment’s notice. So, if the ISI did indeed sponsor an attack on theU.S.embassy inKabul, such a step should be assumed to have been taken with the consent of the power that be inPakistan, i.e. the military establishment. The idea that to make our Pakistan problem go away, the ISI needs to be “cleaned up” is naive.

The Pakistani actions that make life difficult for the U.S. in Afghanistan are driven by a clear-sighted strategic agenda.

As for the Pakistani proxy accused of carrying out the embassy attack, the Haqqani network, we need to understand why Pakistan won’t give it up or act against it as theU.S.demands. With up to 15,000 fighters and effective control of large parts of eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan’s North Waziristan, the Haqqanis are an indispensible party to a peace settlement in Afghanistan — and a vehicle for securing Pakistan’s interests in that country after the U.S. withdraws. To sever relations with the Haqqanis now would mean Pakistan giving up a large degree of influence in Afghanistan after the war is over.

TheU.S.has for years demanded thatPakistanmount a sweeping military offensive in North Waziristan to destroy the Haqqanis, but even if they were so inclined, the fact is that the Pakistani military has only ever been able to control the main roads inNorth Waziristan. The Pakistani army is incapable of occupying and holding this territory, no matter how much money we offer or how dire the threats we make.

At the core of the problem stands a simple proposition: Pakistan doesn’t trust us with Afghanistan — and from Islamabad’s perspective, not without cause. We took a strategic decision to invade a country central to their national-security doctrine without seriously consulting them, preferring to think in terms of an Afghanistan of our dreams. Nor did we take into account their strategic interests and the proxies through which they have pursued them. The Soviet Union made the same mistake when it invaded Afghanistan in 1979.

Having failed to prevail a decade later, we now have two choices, neither of them particularly attractive to Washington. We can attempt to destroy the Haqqani base in North Waziristan by invading Pakistan. But to do that effectively would require more troops than we currently have inAfghanistan. Doing so would obviously destroy whatever relations we still have withPakistan, with profoundly dangerous consequences inAfghanistanand far beyond.

Alternatively, we could hash out a settlement with Pakistan, which would inevitably mean accepting the Haqqanis and easing out Karzai in any political settlement to the conflict. Such a deal would also potentially bring inAfghanistan’s other neighbor with real strategic interests in the country —Iran. Iran can be unpredictable, but it’s by no means certain it would accept true Pakistani-American collusion inAfghanistan. In the mid-’90s,Iran was all but at war with the Taliban, and if Iran isn’t consulted on a settlement, it could play the spoiler.

Accepting Pakistan’s post conflict agenda and backing off on the Haqqanis at Karzai’s expense is too bitter a pill for Washington to swallow in an election year, so we’ll muddle through for another year. But when theU.S.finally leaves, don’t be surprised to see the Haqqanis in Kabul.

NYT Editorial: The Latest Ugly Truth About Pakistan

Published: September 23, 2011

Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is a truth teller. He led the way among senior uniformed officers in urging repeal of the unconscionable “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy on gays in the military and pressed to shift more troops from Iraq to Afghanistan.

Now, as he prepares to retire next week after a 43-year career, he is telling another hard truth.

On Thursday Sept 22, he told the Senate Armed Services Committee thatPakistan’s spy agency — Inter-Services Intelligence — played a direct role in supporting insurgents who attacked the American Embassy inKabullast week, killing 16 people. He also said that with ISI support, the Haqqani network of terrorists planned and conducted an earlier truck bombing on a NATO outpost that killed 5 people and wounded 77 coalition troops, and other recent attacks.

This was a calculated revelation after Admiral Mullen and other top officials made countless pleas and remonstrances toPakistantrying to get it to sever all support and ties with the Taliban, the Haqqani network and other extremists who are killing American troops and spreading mayhem on both sides of the border.

Pakistan’s military was unapologetic. According to the Pakistani Army’s Web site, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the chief of staff, dismissed the charge as “very unfortunate and not based on facts.”Pakistan’s foreign minister warned thatWashington“could lose an ally” if it keeps humiliating Pakistan with unsubstantiated allegations.

The Pentagon hopes public exposure will shame the Pakistanis — who receive billions of dollars in aid — into changing their behavior. That didn’t happen after Osama bin Laden was discovered hiding in plain sight next door toPakistan’s top military academy. ButWashingtonneeds to keep pushing and keep reminding the Pakistanis that the extremists pose a mortal threat to their own country.

We agree with Admiral Mullen and others who say theUnited Statesshould keep trying to work with Pakistan. It has little choice. The Americans need access and on the ground intelligence to be able to go after Al Qaeda and Taliban forces on both sides of the border. They also need Pakistani routes to deliver military supplies toAfghanistan, although there are less attractive alternatives that may have to be looked at more seriously. And walking away could make the nuclear-armed government even more unstable — a chilling prospect.

But Washington needs to ratchet up the pressure as well. The Obama administration has already suspended or canceled $800 million in military aid this year, and more could be at risk. Without provoking war withPakistan, the Americans are also going to have go after the Haqqanis whenever and wherever they can.